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PREFACE TO ORIGINAL EDITION.
The volume which is now presented to the public contains all the
decisions made by the Hon. Elon Farnsworth while acting as chancel
lor, which have been preserved. Prior to the year 1836, there was no
court of equity distinct and separate from the courts of law. The
Ordinance of Congress of 1787, for the government of the territory
northwest of the River Ohio, did not establish a distinct and separate
tribunal for the exercise of powers usually conferred upon courts of
chancery. Neither did it vest in the courts of law any authority to exer
cise such powers. The provisions relative to the legislative power
authorized the governor and judges to adopt such laws of the original
States as might be necessary and best suited to the circumstances of the
district, which were to be in force unless disapproved of by Congress.
Among the earliest acts of the territorial government of Michigan, was
one relative to the jurisdiction of the courts, which was passed July,
1805, and declared that the Supreme Court should have original and
exclusive jurisdiction in all cases, both in law and equity, where the
title of lands was in question, but no suit in equity shall be sustained
in any case when adequate remedy could be had at law. The same stat
ute provided that “on trial of cases in equity, oral testimony and the
examination of witnesses in open court should be admitted.” In 1820
the governor and judges, who were still vested with the legislative power,
passed an act directing the mode of proceeding in suits in chancery.
By this law the county courts of the several counties were invested with
jurisdiction in all cases properly cognizable in a court of chancery, in
which plain, adequate and complete remedy could not be had at law,
where the title to laud was not in question, and when the sum or matter
in dispute did not exceed the sum of one thousand dollars; and the
Supreme Court had jurisdiction in all cases where the title of lands was
in question, and where the sum or matter in dispute exceeded the sum
of one thousand dollars. .The Supreme Court had also appellate juris
diction in all cases heard and determined in the county courts.
In 1823, some doubts having arisen as to the powers of the courts,
Congress passed an act declaring that “the powers and duties of the
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judges of the said territory should be regulated by such laws as are or
may be in force therein, and the said judges shall possess a chancery as
well as common law jurisdiction.”
In 1827, the laws of the territory were revised, and the circuit courts,
which had been organized, obtained concurrent equity jurisdiction with
the Supreme Court, subject, however, to an appeal thereto, and were
invested with the exclusive power of deciding appeals from the county
courts. It was provided by the law of 1827, that proceedings in chan
cery,‘
“ when they are not regulated by the statutes of this territory, shall
be regulated by the judges thereof, conforming to the rules and proceed
ings established by courts of chanoery in England, so far as the same
shall be consistent with the laws and constitution of the United States
and the laws of the Territory of Michigan." In 1883 the laws were
again revised, but no material alteration was made relative to the mode
of proceeding in suits in equity.
By the constitution of the State, adopted in 1835, the judicial power
was vested in one Supreme Court and in such other courts as the legis
lature might from time to time establish. At the first session of the
State legislature a separate tribunal was created, which was invested with
all the equity powers previously conferred upon the several territorial
courts, and in July, 1886, Elon Farnsworth, Esq., of Detroit, was
appointed chancellor. Mr. Farnsworth continued to perform the duties
of chancellor, with great satisfaction to the public and the members of
the bar, until March, 1842, when he was compelled to resign the oflice on
account of his health. During the time Mr. Farnsworth was chancellor,
the practice of the court was regulated by a well digested system of rules
prepared by him, which are published with the present volume.
In 1838 provision was made by law for the appointment of a reporter
of the decisions of the court of chancery, and in February, 1839, E.
Burke Harrington, Esq., received the appointment and entered upon the
duties of his offlce. About one-half of the present volume was pub
lished under his immediate supervision, in January, 1841. The destruc
tion, by fire, of the printing ofiiee, with a portion of the manuscript
prepared for the press, suspended the publication for a time, and the
repeal of the law soon after efiectually put a stop to the work until 1844,
when the legislature passed another act requiring the judges of the
Supreme Court and chancellor to appoint a reporter of the decisions of
these courts. Mr. Harrington received the appointment under the last
act, and continued to perform the duties of the oflice until his decease in
August, 1844. The last half of the present volume was then partially in
press, and almost wholly prepared by him. The undersigned was ap
pointed to fill the vacancy occasioned by the death of Mr. Harrington, and
has superintended the publication from his manuscript since that time.
PREFACE. vii
The decisions of the court are in all cases given as they were delivered
in writing at the time, or prepared by the chancellor from his notes. A
second volume of the decisions of the court of chancery, commencing
with the appointment of Chancellor Manning, is now in press, prepared
by the undersigned, and will be published during the ensuing year.
HENRY N. WALKER.
DETROIT, November 30, 1844.
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.
Harrington's Reports having for some time been out of print, the
undersigned, at the request of Mr. Walker, has taken charge of a
new edition. In introducing it to the reader, perhaps a few addi
tional words regarding the court of chancery of this State may
not be inappropriate. In the year 1846, during the fever for radi
cal changes in the law which prevailed extensively throughout the
country, and which afiected considerably the politics of this State,
a provision was incorporated in the revision of the statutes then
being made, and which was to take efiect March 1, 1847, abolishing
the distinctive equity court. Thereupon Chancellor Manning resigned,
and the Hon. Elon Farnsworth was a second time called upon to perform
the duties of chancellor for the brief period which would elapse before
the new revision would take effect. Chancellor Manning was thoroughly
familiar with equity law, and fully imbued with the spirit of its prin
ciples; and his disposition to insist upon correct practice was well under
stood, and had an important influence in educating a good chancery bar.
When that clear-headed, upright and conscientious judge withdrew from
tha bench, and when his temporary successor followed him, the excellent
and uniform chancery practice which had grown up soon fell into a dis
order from which it has never recovered.
The principal reason for this was the organization of the court of
chancery which was substituted by the Revised Statutes. That consisted
in making the several circuit courts courts of equity, and expecting and
requiring them to administer equity law under the established forms
and according to the settled principles. Aside from the improbability of
finding in every circuit a lawyer who was at the same time sufliciently
versed in the law administered in the court of chancery to fit him to be
chancellor, and also willing to accept the position of circuit judge at the
meager compensation which has always been paid in this State, there was
the further diflilculty that uniformity of practice was no longer to be
expected when we had eight or more equity judges administering justice
independently, and with no common tribunal to supervise their proceed
ings. For though the appeal to the Supreme Court in chancery cases was
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still retained, yet that remedy would do very little towards harmonizing
the practice, not merely because it was only allowed from final decrees or
orders, but also because most matters of practice are matters of discre
tion, and not subject to review at all under our statutes. It is, therefore,
no impeachment of the learning or ability of the circuit judges, many of
whom have been eminent and able lawyers, to say that chancery practice
has fallen into confusion, and that few lawyers now even pretend to be
thoroughly familiar with either the pleading or the practice of that court.
Whether the cause of justice has sufiered in consequence is a question
the discussion of which we shall not enter upon in this place.
That the independent court of chancery had become unpopular in
1846 is perhaps sufliciently proved by its abrogation; but that it became
so mainly in consequence of abuses supposed_immemorially to have
inhered in chancery practice, particularly in England, rather than
because any were complained of here, we believe to be true. No stain
ever attached to the judicial ermine as worn by Chancellors Farnsworth
and Manning; and the spontaneity with which the people called upon
the latter to occupy one of the seats on the bench of the independent
Supreme Court when that tribunal was organized, sufiiciently evinced
their confidence in his learning, industry, impartiality and integrity, and
their appreciation of his former judicial labors.
In preparing for the press a new edition of Harrington's Reports,
many difficulties were encountered. That gentleman, as is above stated
by Mr. Walker, had deceased before his work was completed, and there
are many evidences that much of it had been left to the hands of clerks
imperfectly qualified to perform it. An efiort has been made to improve
some of the statements of cases, but this has not always been practicable
without access to original papers not now attainable. Some improve
ment, it is nevertheless hoped, has been introduced, particularly in the
head notes. And the references which are made to the subsequent cases
bearing upon the same or analogous questions. it is believed will be
found a convenience to the practitioner. The original paging has been
preserved, for convenience in tracing former references.
THOMAS M. COOLEY.
ANN Anson, October, 1872.
».
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CASES IN OHANCERY.
Juba Barrows and others v. Ellis Doty.
Equity jurisdiction.’ Remedy at law. The court of chancery will not take juris
diction of a case where there is a plain and adequate remedy at law. (a)
Lachea in making defense at law. A party who has a. defense at law, of which he
is advised, and neglects to make it, comes too late into this court to ask to be
relieved against the judgment. (b)
The bill in this cause was filed in the circuit court for the
county of Wayne, February 7, 1837, before the organization
of the court of chancery, and afterwards was transferred to
this court.
The bill stated
that‘
in the month of February, 1834, Juba
Barrows, being under pressing necessity for money, made his
wants known to one Charles Tryon, who said he expected to
have money put into his hands by another person to loan,
which other person Barrows understood to be Ellis Doty; that
soon afterwards Tryon did actually loan to Barrows $44, for
which he gave his two several promissory notes for $33 each,
payable in ninety days to Tryon or bearer, which notes were
(G) See Wales v. Newbould, 9Mich., 45; Bennett v. Nichols, 12Mich., 22.
If, however, the remedy at law is diflicult or doubtful, that fact is suflicient tc
give equity jurisdiction: Ankrim v. Woodworth, post, 355. And see Wheeler 'v.
Clinton Canal Bank, post, 449;Edaell 1:.Briggs, 20Mich., 429.
The objection that there is an adequate remedy at law should either be taken
on demurrer or insisted upon by the answer: and if the defendant answer fully
without taking it, the court, when the case is brought to hearing on pleadings and
proofs, may disregard it: Stockton v. Williams, Wal. Ch., 120; except where the
ca-somade by the bill is not one of equitable cognizance, in which case the objection
will be fatal in any stage ot the case: Bennett v. Nichols, 12Mich., 22.
(b) See to the same effect Wright v. King, post, 12; Mack v. Dot]/, post, 368;
Roberts v. Miles, 12Mich., 297.
S0 if he is ignorant of his defense. but this ignorance is connected with negli
gence, and might have been avoided by the use of ordinary means to obtain the
1 1
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signed by Thomas Palmer and John Howard as sureties; that
it was at the time agreed between Barrows and Tryon that if
Barrows should pay fifty dollars when the notes became due,
it was to be received in full satisfaction thereof, and if not
paid at that time, Barrows should pay the amount of fifty dol
lars with four per cent. per month, from the time the same
became due ; that Tryon afterwards became indebted to Bar
rows in the sum of twenty dollars, which Tryon agreed to
indorse on the notes ; that when the notes became due
[*2] Barrows called *on Tryon several times with the money
to pay the notes, and he made excuses that he could not
attend to it then, saying a few days would make no difference,
and on one occasion said the notes were at Judge Doty’s;
that Doty afterwards told Barrows that he held the notes and
that payment was to be made to him ; and further told him
that he took the notes for the face of them, and should not
allow the twenty dollars which Tryon had agreed to indorse ;
that Barrows offered then to pay the notes if Doty would
deduct the twenty dollars, which he refused to do ; that Doty
afterwards recovered judgments on the notes for the full
amount of the face of the same, and was about to take out
execution.
The bill further alleged that Barrows had always been ready
and willing, and still was ready and willing to pay the actual
amount of money loaned, with legal interest thereon, and
prayed for an injunction to restrain the collection of the judg
ments. A prelirninary injunction was granted January 2, 1835.
necessary information, equity will not relieve: Wixom v. Davis, Wal. Ch., 15; com
pare Wales v. Bank of Michigan, post, 308.
But if a party is prevented by fraud or accident, or by the act of the opposite
party, from making his defense at law, he is not precluded by the judgment from
having relief in equity: Mack v. Doty, post, 366;Burpee v. Smith, Wal. Ch., 827.
Inflampau v. Van Dyke, 15 Mich., 371,a party who, with knowledge of all the
facts, delayed for over six years to file a bill to impeach for fraud a decree affecting
the title to land, was held to have lost all remedy by his laches. And in Campau v.
Godfrey, 18Mich., 27,it was decided that one having a, statutory right to redeem
who fails to exercise it in due time. can have no relief afterwards in equity.
2
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A. D. I/laser, for defendant, moved to dissolve the injunc~
tion and to dismiss the bill for want of equity.
H. Uhipman, contra.
THE CHANCELLORI
This bill cannot be sustained, for the usury was a good
defense at law, and Tryon, being the agent who negotiated the
loan, must have known all the facts, and might have been
called as a witness.
The complainants have suifered judgment to be taken on the
notes with a knowledge of all the facts, without making their
defense, and they come too late to this court to ask to be
relieved against those judgments. See Thompson v. Berry cfi
Van Buren, 3 Johns. Ch., 394; Lansing v. Eddy, 1 Johns. Ch.,
49. The injunction must be dissolved and the bill dis
missed. (c)
Ordered accordingly.
(c) See Wright v. King, post, 12. The case ot Thompson v. Berry, cited above
by the chancellor, was afiirmed by the court of enors on appeal, in 17 Johns., 436;
and was cited in the court of appeals with approval in Schroeppal 'v. Corning, 6 N.
Y., 114.
B
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Thomas Rowland v. Ellis Doty and others.
Equity jurisdiction: Remedy at law. In general where shill prays relief which
cannot be had at law, and to which the complainant is entitled, it ls sumclent to
give the court of chancery jurisdiction. (a)
Quieting title to land. Under the code of 18% the court of chancery has jurlsdie
tion to quiet the title of the legal owner of the land in possession of the name,
as against any other person setting up a claim thereto. (b)
Tax title : Tax paid. A sale of land for taxes is wholly unwarranted it the tax has
been paid, and the deed given thereon will convey no title to the purchaser. (c)
Tax title: Evidence of payment of tax. The collector‘s return that the tax has not
been paid is such evidence only of non-payment as will jnstlly the treasurer in
selling; and under the code of 1827the treasurer’s deed was evidence only that
the sale made by him was regular, according to the provisions of the statute.
The land owner might go behind both, and show that in fact the tax was paid
before the return was made. (d)
The bill in this case set forth that Thomas Rowland was, in
the year 1822, owner in fee simple of lot number 59, in section
number 8, in the city of Detroit ; that he continued the owner
and possessor of said lot up to the time of the filing of the
bill, and made permanent improvements on the same to the
value of $1,000 ; that all the township and county taxes
assessed on said lot had been paid by him from the year 1822,
up to the time of filing the bill; that a few days before the
(a) See note (a), p. 1, ante.
(b) This statute was afterwards amended so as to entitle the owner of the equit
able title to file a bill to quiet title. See Stockton v. Williams, Wal. Ch., 120; Same
Case. on appeal, 1 Doug., 546; Blackwood v. Van Vleet, 11 Mich., 252; Hunton v.
Flatt, 11Mich., 264;Fitzliugh v. Barnard, 12Mich., 104;Blanchard v. Tyler, 12Mich.,
339;Moran 1:.Palmer, 13Mich., 367; Tabor v. Cook, 15 Mlch., 322; Hall v. Kellogg, 16
Mich., 1%; Woods v. Monroe, 17Mich, 238;Raynor v. Lee, 20lVi.ich.,384.
(c) Followed in Johnstonc 1:.Scott, 11Mich., 232;Raynor v. Lee, 20Mich., 384.
(d) The law was afterwards changed so as to make the tax deed prima jacie
evidence of the regularity of all proceedings, and of title in the grantee. See
Sibley v Smith, 2Mich., 486;Amberg v. Rogers, 9Mich, 832; Groesbeck v. Seeley, 18
M.lch., 829;Wright v. Dunham, 13Mich., 414. As to proof of irregularities, see Lacy
II. Davis, 4 Mich., 140;Wright v. Dunham, 13Mich., 414;Case v. Dean, 16Mich, 12.
4
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filing of the bill he was informed for the first time that Peter
Desnoyer, the former treasurer of the county of Wayne, pre
tended to sell said lot on the third day of October, 1831, for the
taxes pretended to be due thereon for the year 1828, to one
Rufus Wilson; that in the year 1833, David French (the succes
sor to Desnoyer in the office of treasurer of said county), to
carry into effect such sale, executed a deed of said lot to said
Wilson, and acknowledged the same according to law; that Wil
son conveyed to Ellis Doty, and Doty had applied to Theodore
Williams, register in the city of Detroit, to have the deed from
French to Wilson recorded.
The bill further stated, that Rowland, as evidence that he had
paid the taxes on said lot for the year 1828, held in his
possession the receipt of Abraham C. Caniff, *collector [*4]
for the township and city of Detroit, in full thereof; that
Rowland, being in possession of said lot, was unable to divest
said Doty of his pretended title to the same by an action of
ejectment, or any other process of law whatever, and he there
fore prayed that the deed from French to Wilson might be
decreed to be given up to be cancelled, as also all pretended
conveyances from Wilson to Doty, and that said Wilson and
Doty assign all their supposed right to said lot to Rowland;
and also prayed for an injunction to restrain Wilson and Doty
from incumbering the title to said lot, and to restrain Williams
from recording said deed.
The bill was taken as confessed as against all the defendants
except Wilson, who answered and disclaimed, and Doty, who
demurred. A motion was also made to dissolve the injunction
for want of equity.
A. D. Fraser, in support of the demurrer and motion to dis
solve:
0
It is urged by the defendant that the injunction in this case
be dissolved for want of equity in the bill, inasmuch as the com
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plainant has full and adequate remedy at law, and no ground is
suggested in the bill to give this court jurisdiction.
The legality or validity of the treasurer’s deed is the ques
tion necessarily raised in this case. It is, therefore, properly
examinable at law. Whether the requirements of the act to
provide for the assessment and collection of taxes have been
complied with, and how far it is necessary for the defendant
to show compliance, are questions depending upon the statute
(see Laws of 1827, page 377), and to be adjudicated in an action
of ejectment.
Where a cause depends simply on the solution of alegal ques
tion, the proper forum for the determination of that ques
tion is a court of law; nor will this court interfere in a
[*5] *matter where relief can be had either by quo warranto
or mandamus: Attomey- General v. Utica Ina. C0., 2
Johns. Ch., 376; 20 Ves., 199.
W Wbodbridge, contra .'
The demurrer concedes all the facts stated, consequently that
the proprietor was a resident proprietor, and that the property
was assessed as the property of' a non-resident, as well as the
irregularity charged.
The mode of collecting a tax from a non-resident is variant
from that prescribed for a resident. In the latter case the col
lector must proceed by distress upon the personal property; in
the former case the tax can only be enforced by the sale of the
land.
It is legally impossible that the land of a resident proprietor
should be sold, and thus lost, if there were personal property
upon which distress might be made; and the sworn return of
the collector is the only evidence there could be that there was
no personal property. Thus bringing this case almost within
the very words of the case of Cox v. Grant, 1 Yeates, 165, and
also of Stead v. Course, 4 Cranch, 413, 414.
In order to give effect to a collector’s deed, every minute
t
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particular of the statute must have been shown to have been
complied with: 1 Yates, 800,‘ Chi}/2., 81; 4 Munf, 484.
A collector has no general authority to sell lands at his dis
cretion," but a special naked power to sell in certain specified
events; and the prerequisites must precede the deed. The
validity of the deed then finally depends upon matter in pais,
and this matter must be shown : mlliams v. Payton, 4
Wheat., 79, 80.
If the lots are not assessed in the name of the true owner, for
example, the sale is void: 8 W/zeat., 688, 6'84; 1 Munfi, 423.
The lots must be definitely and properly described: 4 Peters,
362, 868, 86.4, or the sale is void: Vide 3 Ohio Rep, 283,
234. In the case of Thompson o. Gardner, 10 Johns., 405,
the court say: “ It would be an alarming doctrine to say
that the collector might sue immediately every person upon
his assessment roll. It would be far more alarming
*if he could sell all a man’s farm without suit, at his dis- [*6]
cretion, and without a regular assessment, advertise
ment, etc.
“ The contrary is the law; even the excess of five cents in the
whole amount of a tax list vitiates the whole proceedings, and
the collector is a trespasser: 2 Greenl., 375. For if the strict
rule of the law be overleaped, there is no limit.”
The Virginia statute provides that if the tax on land remains
unpaid three years, the title thereof shall vest in the state. By
a separate provision the collector is required to distrain, if
there be personal property, and he is required to return to the
county court a report, sworn to, of his proceedings; yet a sale
by the state is utterly void unless the officer or purchaser prove
fully all the proceedings—distress, advertisement, assessment,
description, ownership and sale; otherwise, says Judge Tucker,
it would be against the principle of Magna Charta: 2 Hen.
and ]Kunf., 828.
Not only is a literal and exact compliance with the statutory
provisions requisite, but the statute itself receives a very strict
7
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construction: 9 Oranch, 6'7; Parker v. Rule, 8 Wheat., 682;
5 Ohio, 369; 4 Munf., 431.
The claim of the defendants being thus bad at law, the com
plainant has a full right to come into chancery to have the
invalid deed canceled, and the doubts thrown upon his title
removed and‘ that title quieted—things which a law court can
not do.
This case is not distinguishable from that of Yancy v. Hop
kins, 1 Munf., 419, 426, 428. The assessment was in that case
found to be irregular, and a canceling of the collector’s deed,
and also a reconveyance by release, were decreed. Nor can
this case be distinguished from the case of the Corporation of
Washington v. Pratt, 8 Wheat., 682. There had in that case
been an irregular assessment, and the city lots had been actu
ally sold for taxes. Pratt brought his bill against the corpora
tion, and averred the irregularity of the assessment and pro
ceedings, and prayed an injunction. The sale was declared
void, and the city of Washington perpetually enjoined against
issuing a deed to the purchaser.
[*7] *This case is strikingly similar in its features to the
case of Burnett v. Cincinnati, 8 Ohio, 86. In that case,
likewise, there was an irregular assessment, and the tax not
being paid, the collector was about proceeding to sell for the tax,
when the complainant obtained an injunction. The decree of
the court was a perpetual injunction against the threatened sale.
In all these three leading cases the point of jurisdiction was
either made, debated and overruled, or else made and (as in
8 Wheat., 682) given up by counsel. See also 5 Ohio, 6'79,‘ 2
Paige, 436.
THE CHANCELLOBZ
The first question that arises in this case is
,
as to the juris
diction of this court.
As a general rule, where the bill prays relief to which the
complainant is entitled, and which cannot be had at law, it is
suficient to give this court jurisdiction of the cause.
s
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The bill in this case, after stating that the complainant had
paid the tax for which the lot was sold, and being in possession,
was unable to divest Doty of his pretended title to the lot by
action of ejectment, or any other process at law whatever, prays
that the deed from French to Wilson may be delivered up to
be canceled, as also the conveyance from Wilson to Doty. It
also prays that Wilson and Doty may be compelled to assign
their claim to the complainant, and for an injunction to restrain
them from incumbering the title to the lot, and to restrain Wil
liams from recording the deed from French to Wilson.
Is it competent for this court to afford any part of the relief
prayed? Most surely it is.
The jurisdiction of this court (exclusive of any statutory
provision upon the subject) to set aside deeds and other legal
instruments which are a cloud upon the title to real estate, and
to order them to be delivered up to be canceled, is fully estab
lished : Petit v. Shepard, 5 Paige, 493; Hamilton v. Cum
mings, 1 Johns. Ch., 517; Apthoip 'v. Comstock, 2 Paige, 482;
Grover v. Hugell, 3 Russ. Ch., 432; Ward v. Ward, 2 Hayw.,
226; Leigh v. Everharfs l/7.z:’rs, 4 Monr., 380; Hamkshaw
v. Parkins, 2 Swanst., 546; 1 Munf., 419; *Burnett v. [*8]
Corporation of Cincinnati, 3 Ohio, 87 ; Mitford’s Pl.,
87; and there can be no question that there is suflicient stated
in the bill to bring the case within the jurisdiction of this
court.
But the act to prescribe the mode of proceeding in chancery,
of 1833 (Laws of Michigan, 858, sec. 29), provides that “any
person having the possession and legal title to land may insti
tute a suit against any other person or persons setting up a
claim thereto ; and if the claimant shall be able to substantiate
his title to such land, the defendant shall be decreed to release
to the complainant all claim thereto, and to pay the costs,” etc.,
and the bill in this case is framed to come within the provisions
of this section.
The facts set forth in the bill are admitted by the demurrer.
9
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The question then is
,
does the treasurer’s deed to Wilson
divest Rowland of his title, and is Rowland precluded by that
deed from showing that the tax had been paid for which the
lot wassold ?
By the 13th section of the “act to provide for the assess
ment and collection of township and county taxes (Laws of
1827', page 870) the tax is declared to be a lien on the land,
and if such tax is not paid within a certain time, the treasurer
is authorized to sell. The right to sell is, therefore, founded on
the fact of the non-payment of the tax. If the tax be paid
before the sale, that lien is discharged, and the right to sell no
longer exists.
But it is said the treasurer’s deed is conclusive upon this
point.
The 14th section of the act provides, “that the treasurer
shall, at the expiration of the said two years, execute to the
purchaser, his heirs or assigns, a conveyance of the lands so
sold, which conveyance shall vest in the person or persons to
whom it shall be given an absolute estate in fee simple, subject
to all the claims which the territory of Michigan shall have
thereon, and the said conveyance shall be conclusive evi
[*9] dence *that the sale was regular according to the provis
ions of this act.”
The conveyance from the treasurer vests “an absolute estate
in fee simple” only where the proceedings throughout have
been regular. The right to sell, being founded solely on the
non-payment of the tax, does not and cannot exist whenever
the tax has been paid. A sale, therefore, when no tax is in
fact due, is unauthorized, and the treasurer’s deed on such unau
thorized sale conveys no estate or title whatever.
The return by the collector that the tax has not been paid is
such evidence of non-payment only as to justify the treasurer
in selling ; and his conveyance on such sale is not “conclusive
evidence” that all the prerequisites have been complied with,
-1o
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but is only conclusive evidence that the sale by him was regu
lar, according to the provisions of the act.
And this was the construction given to the New York statute
(which was substantially the same as ours) in the case of Jack
son v. Morris, 18 Johns., 441.
Could the legislature have intended that a party who had per
formed all his duties to the public, should be deprived of his
property in this way? Was it not intended to operate upon
those who should not pay their taxes, and not upon those who
have, and thus have performed all their obligations ? The obli
gation is reciprocal; if the citizen performs his duties to the
government, the government should perform its duties to him.
Among the first of these is protection in his property ; it
should not be taken from him by the government or its agents
without any fault or omission of duty on his part.
It is provided by the statute of Ohio, that “ the deed made by
the county auditor, as hereinbqfore specified, shall be received
in all courts as prima facie evidence of a good and valid title
in the purchaser,” etc.
In the case of the Lessees of Carlisle v. Longworth, 5 Ohio,
374, the supreme court say : “The legislature do not say a
deed made by the county auditor ‘shall be received as prima
facie evidence of a good and valid title,’ but the deed, ‘as here
inbefore specified;
’ in other words, the deed made by the
auditor *in pursuance of this act. This is the manifest [*10]
intention. Unless it is made in pursuance of the act, it
is made without authority, and is void ; but if made in pursu
ance of the act, it is prima facie evidence of title.” And in
this case it was held that before the auditor’s deed could be
received in evidence, it must be shown that he had authority to
make it.
In the case of Stead’s Ev’re v. Course, 4 Cranch, 403, it was
decided that it was incumbent on the vendee to prove the
authority to sell.
Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the
u
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court in that case, says : “ It would be going too far to say
that a collector selling land with or without authority, could
by his conveyance transfer the title of the rightful proprietor.”
In Rule’e Lessees v. Parker, 1 Cooke, 365, it was held that the
sale of lands for the payment of taxes being a summary and
extraordinary proceeding, the party claiming title under such
proceeding must show that all the requisites that the law had
prescribed to guard against frauds and imposition have been
complied with.
And in the case of T/Villiams v. Peyt0n’a Lessees, 4 Wheat., 77,
the court say, that where there is a naked power not coupled
with an interest, every prerequisite to the ex'ercise of that power
should precede it ; and that where lands are sold for the non-pay
ment of taxes, the marshal’s deed is not even primafacie evi
dence that the prerequisites of the law have been complied with ;
but the party claiming under it must show positively that they
have been complied with.
These cases show what the general rule is upon this subject.
It is not necessary in this case to decide whether it is incum
bent on the party claiming title under the treasurer’s deed to
show aflirmatively the regularity of the proceedings, and that
all the prerequisites to the sale have been complied with.
The complainant alleges in his bill that the tax for which the
lot was sold had been paid long before the sale, and it would
be a monstrous doctrine for this court to hold that he
[*11] *is precluded by the treasurer’s deed, and cannot go
behind it to show that fact.
The demurrer must be overruled, and the motion to dissolve
the injunction denied.
13
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Equity jurisdiction: Defense at law: Lashes. It a party has a defense at law
of which he is aware, but neglects to make it, or to apply to equity for a discov
ery in aid thereof where necessary, he cannot, after judgment against him at
law, have relief in this court. (a)
'
Discovery in aid of defense at law. Equity may compel a discovery in aid of a
defense at law. and may stay the proceedings at law until an answer to the hill
for discovery has been obtained.
Implied trusts. To raise a trust by implication, there must be an actual payment
of money. (b)
Statute of frauds: Trusts. To make an express trust valid under the statute of
frauds, the terms and conditions of the trust must be in writing under the hand
0! the party to be charged.
The bill in this case was filed 11th August, 1836, and stated
that in the year 1832, the complainant and defendant, King,
became jointly guarantors of and upon a certain promissory
note made by one John Collins to John H. Kinzie, for the sum
of $212 payable in 60 days.
That Daniel Goodwin and John Hale (who were made defend
ants) were sureties or indorsers, either separately or with each
other, or with King,‘upon other notes made by Collins; that Col
lins became embarrassed and absconded from the state without
leaving any property or making any arrangement for the pay
ment of his debts; that soon after Collins had absconded, John
Hendree (who was deceased at the time of filing the bill)
informed complainant that he had previously loaned said John
Collins a sum of money, and for security for the payment of the
money so loaned, James Collins, who was brother to said John
Collins, had executed to him an absolute deed of conveyance of
two certain lots of land in the city of Detroit, and proposed to
(a) See Wizon v. Davis, Wal. 011.,15. For exceptions to the general rule above
laid down, see Wales v. Bank of Michigan, post, 808; Mack v. Doty, post, 866;Bur
pee v. Smith, Wal. Ch., 327; Roberts v. Miles, 12Mich., 297.
(b) See Bernard v. Bougard's Heirs, post, 180.
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complainant, if he would pay him the money he had loaned Col
lins, with the interest and proper charges, that he, Hendree,
would deed said lots to complainant, which complainant agreed
to do; that complainant immediately applied to Henry K. Avery
(who was deceased at the time of filing the bill), cashier of the
Farmers and Mechanics’ Bank of Michigan, for a loan to pay
Hendree the amount of his claim against Collins; that
[*13] Avery agreed" to loan complainant *the amount provided
he would pay :1.debt of about $80, due the bank by said
Collins, which complainant agreed to do on the sale of the lots.
The bill further alleged that during the pendency of the nego
tiation and before complainant had obtained the loan from the
bank, he had a conversation with Goodwin respecting the afiairs
of Collins and the liabilities of Goodwin, Hale, King and com
plainant on his own account, and in such conversation complain
ant disclosed to Goodwin the arrangement he had made for his
own indemnity, and stated that if he, Goodwin, and others inter
ested, would pay to Hendree the amount of his claim and would
satisfy the claim of the bank of $80, and would also pay Jerry
Dean $50 due him by said John Collins, and discharged com
plainant from all liabilities on said John Collins’ account, and
on the sale of the lots, after discharging the debts of said Col
lins for which Goodwin, Hale and King were responsible, pay
over the residue of the proceeds of said lots to the wife of said
Collins, that complainant would relinquish the contract made by
him with Hendree, and permit the same to enure to the benefit
of said Goodwin, Hale and King.
That shortly after this conversation, Goodwin informed com
plainant that he had seen Hale and King, and that they had
agreed to accept the proposition of complainant, and the con
veyance of the said lots was to be made to Goodwin, Hale and
King; that on request of complainant a deed of conveyance of
said lots was executed and delivered by Hendree to Goodwin,
Hale and King; that the complainant, relying on the good faith
of Goodwin, Hale and King, did not insist on the said under
14
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standing and agreement being reduced to writing, or on secur
ity on their part for its fulfillment.
That afterwards, Goodwin and Hale sold or disposed of their
interest in the said lots to King, and King sold the same or a
part thereof, for about $3,000, which sum, the bill charged, was
amply suificient not only to pay Hendree’s claim, the $80 due
the bank, the $50 to Dean, and the note guaranteed by King
and complainant to Kinzie, but also to pay and satisfy all the
demands against the said John Collins for which said
Goodwin, *Hale and King were responsible, and leave a [*14]
surplus for the wife of said Collins. The bill further
stated that complainant and King were afterwards prosecuted
in the circuit court of Wayne county, by said Kinzie, for the
balance due on the note made to him by Collins and guaranteed
by King and complainant, and that Kinzie recovered judgment
and issued execution thereon, which execution was paid by King.
That afterwards, in 1835, King sued complainant in the circuit
court of Wayne county to recover one-half of the amount he
had paid on the execution in favor of Kinzie, and obtained
judgment against complainant for $147.47 damages, and
$15.50 costs, and that execution had been issued thereon, and
was about to be levied on the property of complainant.
The bill prayed for an injunction to restrain King from pro
ceeding to collect any execution issued on said judgment, and
for a discovery, etc.
Upon this state of facts an injunction was granted according
to the prayer of the bill, by one of the justices of the supreme
court, to stand until the further order of the court.
A motion was now made by King to dissolve the injunction
and dismiss the bill for want of equity.
A. D. Easer, in support of the motion:
The facts alleged in the bill constitute a good defense to the
action at law; and complainant shows he might have established
the facts before a jury, but did not do so.
15
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After a verdict or trial at law, it is too late to come to this
court for discovery or relief. This court will not afford relief
to a party on the ground that he has lost his remedy at law.
He should have applied for a discovery before trial: Le
Guen v. Gouverneur, 1 Johns. Cas., 492, 502; Duncan v. Lyon,
3 Johns. Ch., 851; Lansing v. Eddy, 1 Johns. Ch., 51; Smith
v. Lowry, Id., 320; Barker v. Elkim, Id., 465; Penny v. Mar
tin, 4 Johns, Ch., 576; 5 Peters, 503.
The statute of frauds is a perfect bar to the present bill.
To raise a trust by implication or operation of law, an actual
payment, or actual loan of money, must be shown: Steere v.
Steere, 5 Johns. Ch., 1. To take the case out of the
[*15] statute of *frauds, its terms and conditions must be in
writing and signed by the party to be charged.
C’. W Whipple, contra.
Tun CHANCELLORI
It is a well established principle in equity, that if a party has
a defense at law, of which he is advised before the trial, and
neglects to make it
,
or to apply to this court for a discovery, if
necessary to the defense in aid of the trial at law, he is pre
cluded and cannot afterwards have relief in this court.
Lord Hardwicke says, it must appear that the defendant was
ignorant at the time of the trial, of the fact which renders the
verdict at law contrary to equity; and even then chancery will
not relieve where the defendant submits to try it at law first,
where he might, by a bill of discovery, have come at the facts
by the plaintifi’s answer before trial at law. See 1 J0/zns. Ch.,
50.
In 1 Schoales and Lefr0y’s Reports, 201, Lord Redesdale
says:
“ I do not know that equity ever does interfere to grant
a trial of a matter which has already been discussed at law;"
and at the close of the opinion, he says: “ I think it uncon
scientious and vexatious to bring into a court of equity a dis
cussion which might have been had at law.”
u
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In the court of errors in New York, in the year 1800 (1
J0/ms. Ch., 436‘), it was decided, in a case involving a large
amount, that where a. party in a suit at law has a knowledge
of fraud or other matter of defense, and neglects to make his
defense at law, a court of chancery will not interfere.
In the case of Ma Viclcar '0. Wolcott, 4 Johns, 510, in 1808,
Van Ness, Spencer, and Kent on the bench, it was decided that
a court of chancery will aid a defendant in obtaining a dis
covery before a trial, but not afterwards.
Van Ness, J ., in giving his opinion, says: “ Granting that
such answer would have furnished a complete defense, still as
they omitted to take the necessary steps to possess themselves
of that answer before the trial at law, which they might,
and, if they *deemed it important, ought to have pursued, [*16]
they are now too late.” The other judges concurred in
the same conclusion.
In 1 J0/ms. Ch., 51, Chancellor Kent says: “The general
rule is that this court will not relieve against a judgment at
law, on the ground of its being contrary to equity, unless the
defendant below was ignorant of the fact in question pending
the suit, or it could not have been received as a defense. If a
party will suffer judgment to pass against him by neglect, he
cannot have relief here for a matter which he might have
availed himself of at law.”
In fflzompson '0. Berry, 3 Johns. Ch., 395, which was a case
of exceeding hardship, relief was granted as to that part of the
demand to which no defense at law could have been made; but
the court refused to interfere as to the balance, because the
party had sufiered judgment at law to pass against him, with
out making his defense or applying for discovery before the
trial. ‘
In the case of Smith v. Lowry, 1 Johns. Ch., 320, where an
iniquitous judgment was obtained by subornation, the same
rule was rigorously adhered to.
As the same question is involved in several cases now pending
2
'
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in this court, I have purposely referred, briefly, to the leading
decisions made at different periods, both in England and this
country, and by men who are universally acknowledged to have
been the great luminaries in this branch of urisprudence.
When we find such men as Lord Hardwicke, Lord Redes
dale, Van Ness and Kent concurring in the same principle, it
would almost be presumption to question the correctness and
justice of those principles.
It remains only to apply these principles to the case under
consideration. It was urged at the hearing, that, from differ
ence of parties, an insurmountable difiiculty existed in obtain
ing the aid of this court by a discovery prior to the trial at law.
I cannot perceive any such difliculty. King, the party enjoined
here, was either a party to the agreement to release and indem
nify the complainant from all his liabilities to Collins,
l_*17] *and among others the note to Kinzie, or he was not.
If he was not a party to that agreement he is not bound
hy it; and it would be unjust and‘ contrary to equity to enjoin
and inhibit him from the collection of Wright’s proportion of
their joint liability. If King was a party to that contract, a
discovery of that fact might have been obtained by a bill for
that purpose in this court, and it would have been a perfect
defense to the action at law by King against the complainant ;
nor can there be a doubt that a court of chancery would have
stayed proceedings at law, until an answer to the bill for dis
covery could have been obtained. But, from the case made by
the bill, it would seem that the complainant had a defense at
law, without resorting to a court of chancery. According to
the statement in the bill, Goodwin knew all the facts, and what
the contract was ; and I cannot perceive on what grounds King
could have objected to the introduction of Goodwin as a wit
ness, on the trial of the suit at law, between King and the com
plainant.
It occurred to me at the hearing, that it was possible that the
bill could be sustained on the ground of the trust, as urged in
18
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the argument ; but, upon further examination, and on the
authority of the case in 5 Johns. Oh., 1, I am satisfied that it can
not.
To raise a trust by implication there must be an actual pay
ment of money ; and to take the case out of the statute of
frauds, the terms and conditions of the trust must be in writ
ing, under the hand of the party to be charged. There may be
other special circumstances where courts have declared a trust,
none of which exist here.
Upon the whole, I am of the opinion that the injunction can
not be sustained, but must be dissolved.
Injunction dissolved.
19
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Emily Peltier v. Charles Peltier.
Equity practice: Contempt: Irregularity. A defendant in contempt cannot move
to set aside proceedings; but where there is merely a failure on his part to com
ply with the provisions of an interlocutory order, he may move to discharge the
order for irregularity.
Married woman: Prochein ami. A bill by a married woman against her husband
must be flied by prochein ami. (a)
Equity practice: Process. A subpoena is the first process. It is irregular to have
injunction and ne exeat issued and served before the issue of subpoana.
Alimony: Jurisdiction. A court of chancery has no jurisdiction 0! a case where
the bill is filed for alimony merely. (b)
The bill in this case was filed May 31, 1836, in the supreme
court of the territory of Michigan, in chancery sitting, and set.
forth that the complainant came into the territory of Michigan
in the year 1834, and had resided in said territory ever since;
that in the month of January following, being then of the age
of twenty years, she was married to the defendant, who was
then twenty-six years of age, or thereabouts ; that soon after
the marriage, and within one month, the defendant evinced
angry feelings towards her, and abused and ill-treated her, and
frequently resorted to acts of violence upon her person; that in
the month of November, 1836, complainant was confined and
delivered of a child, which the defendant also ill-treated; that
this conduct was frequently repeated ; and particularly in the
month of April, 1836, he had treated the child with great cru
elty, and had beat with great violence and inhumanly treated
the complainant, and used the most violent threats toward her,
and soon after abandoned her, and went from Port Huron, in
(a) Asto mode of appointment, see Markham. v. Markham, 4 Mich., 805. The
necessity tor the appointment is now dispensed with by statute: Comp. L. 1857.
secs.3290,$29!».
(b) As to granting alimony in divorce cases where the divorce is denied, see
Ohajfee v. Chaflee, 15Mich., 184;Cooper '0.Cooper, 17 Mich., 205; Bishop 1;.Btshop.
17Micl1., 211.
20
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the county of St. Clair, where he then resided, to the city of
Detroit, and had not since returned to her.
The bill further set forth, that by reason of the shortness of
her residence in the territory, she was unable to avail
herself *of the statutory provision enabling persons res- [*20]
ident three years in the territory to procure divorces for
the cause of cruel treatment, and that complainant had no
means of support for herself and child (who was then aged six
months), nor for their clothing, or to pay counsel fees, and that
the defendant had adequate means for that purpose ; that
defendant had, been applied to on behalf of complainant to
make some provision or allowance for the purposes aforesaid,
and also for the education of the child, which he had refused
to do.
The bill also set forth that defendant had declared his inten
tion to leave this country and go to Europe to reside, as soon
as he could raise sufiicient money to enable him to do so ; and
that he was then actually arranging his affairs for that pur
pose, and had threatened to take from her the child and carry
it away with him.
The bill prayed that defendant be restrained by injunction
from molesting the retreat and invading the retirement and
privacy of complainant, or in any way intermeddling with her,
and that defendant might be restrained from taking away from
complainant the custody and care of the child, or interfering
with her management of the same, and that she might have
the sole and absolute custody, care and management of the
child ; and that defendant be decreed to maintain and support
complainant and the child, and to pay such allowance weekly
as should be found suitable and adequate for the maintenance
and clothing of complainant, and also for the clothing, mainte
nance and education of the child, and that the regular payment
thereof be secured; and for such reasonable sum to enable
complainant to prosecute her suit as to the court should seem
proper.
21
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It also prayed for a writ of ne eieeat to restrain defendant
from departing the territory, and for a subpcena, in the usual
form.
A writ of ne ecceat, directing security to be given in the sum
of $5,000, and also the writ of injunction prayed, were allowed
by the Hon. George Morell, one of the justices of the supreme
court.
[*21] *The injunction and ne exeat were served on the
defendant June 6, 1836.
At the same term, June 20, Woodbridge and Backus filed the
following motion :
Woodbridge and Backus move that the injunction in the
premises issued be dissolved, and that said writ be set aside,
and for reasons show to the court here, the following, to wit:
1. For that the same is irregular. -
2. For that the same is not sanctioned by any equity in the
bill of complaint contained. -
3. For that no bill of complaint is regularly filed or exhibited
in the premises.
4. For that the case made thereby is disapproved by affida
vits.
'
5. For that the subject matter of said writ is not an appro
priate nor legal subject for a writ of injunction.
6. For that the same issued without subpoena and improvi
dently.
They also move that the ne eazeat in said cause issued be dis
charged, and the same writ be set aside :
1. For that the same issued improvidently and irregularly.
2. For that no definite sum of money is therein, nor in said
bill, shown to be due, nor at hazard, either at law or in equity.
8. For that this honorable court has not jurisdiction of matri
monial causes, except for the purpose of granting divorce; and
said bill neither presenting a case nor containing a prayer for
such divorce, though the same purports to be a matrimonial
22
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cause, the subject matter of said writ, and the aid sought -to
be obtained thereby, are illegal and incompetent.
4. For that said writ is not accompanied by a subpoena to
answer.
5. For that no bill of complaint by acompetent party is regu
larly filed in the premises.
6. For that the case presented therein is disproved by affidavit.
They also move that the bill of complaint in the premises,
exhibited and filed, be dismissed :
*1. For thait the said bill is exhibited and filed by Emily [*22]
Peltier alone, whereas it appears by the showing thereof
that said Emily is a feme covert, and in no wise competent in
the law to file said bill, except in the name of her prochein ami.
2. For that this honorable court has no jurisdiction of the sub
ject matter of said bill, and that no subpoena ad respondendum
has been served thereupon.
At the same term, June 29, the supreme court granted an
order that the defendant forthwith pay into the hands of the
register of the court, for the use of the complainant, the sum of
$40, in order to enable her to defray the expensesiin the pros
ecution of this suit ; and also that defendant pay every week,
from that day, into the hands of the register of the court, for the
use, support and maintenance of complainant, the sum of $4,
until the further order of the court.
A certified copy of said order, together with a subpoena to
answer the bill of complaint, were served on defendant July
2'1, 1836.
On the organization of the state government, this cause,
among others pending on the chancery side of the supreme court
of the territory, was transferred to the court of chancery estab
lished under the state government, and was continued by con
sent of parties until the February term of the court of chancery,
when Woodbridge renewed the motion to dissolve the injunction
and set aside the writ; and that the ne meat be discharged and
the writ set aside; and that the bill be dismissed for irregular
PELTIIB v. Psunnla
ity and want of jurisdiction; and also moved that the order made
June 29,1836, be discharged, vacated and rescinded, on the
ground that the same was made unadvisedly, improvidently and
ea:parte.
At the same term, A. D. Fraser, solicitor for complainant,
on filing the affidavit of John Winder (who was on the 29th day
of June, 1836, register of the supreme court of the territory,
and now register of the court of chancery) that the order made
June 29, 1836, by the supreme court, had not been complied
with, and that no money had been paid into his hands by
defendant for the use of complainant, to defray the
[*23] *expenses of this suit or for alimony, moved that defend
ant be committed for a contempt of court, for not com
plying with the order.
Both motions came on to be heard at the same time.
Wm. Woodbridge, solicitor for defendant:
Woodbridge moves to dissolve injunction, discharge ne emeat,
and dismiss the bill for irregularity and want of jurisdiction,
and resists the motion of complainant for the same reasons;
and he insists that no bill and no parties are regularly here, and
therefore it is not competent to make an allowance.
1. It is not competent for a feme covert to file a bill in her
own name. If the bill be against her husband, she must sue by
her prochein ami. This is a rule so perfectly established and
so familiarly known, that no authority can be necessary to sup
port it. If an application for a divorce can be sustained in the
name of a married woman (without aprochein ami), it is because
of an express provision of the statute in that ‘regard. This is
not an application for a divorce. See Wood v. Wood, 2 Paige,
457; lllitford, 158; Cooper, 28, 163," Clancy on the Rights of
Married Women, 358,‘ 2 Kent, 187.
2. It is irregular to cause any action upon a bill, even to issue
injunction, unless simultaneously there be a subpoena to answer;
and can such an order pass without an appearance ? See Parker
M .
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v. Williams, 4 Paige, 439; Att0rney- General v. .ZVich0l, 16 Ves.,
338; Eden, 35; Ilallows v. Fellows, 4 Johns. Ch., 25; Eden, 232.
3. This court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the
hill. The essential scope of the bill is to obtain a supplicaoit and
alimony. Now, as to a supplicavit,a court of chancery can
not exercise jurisdiction of it
,
at least, unless that *mat- [*2-1]
ter arise incidentally in the course of the exercise of
another and a principal object of the suit: Oodd v. Oodd, 2
Johns. Ch., 141.
For the rest, the judicial oflicersof the law in the territory
are abundantly competent, in the ordinary administration of
the law, to furnish all the relief and protection necessary:
Oodd v. Oodd, 2 Johns. Ch., 141; Ilead v. Ifead, 3 Atk., 550.
Of alimony this court can have no jurisdiction, except so
far as incident to the power of granting a divorce: Lewis v.
Lewis, 3 Johns. Ch., 519; Mix v. Jlliaa, 1 Johns. Ch., 108;
1 17bnd., 96; Head 12.Head, 3 Atk., 547; 2 Chit. B'a., 434-5,
462-8; 1 Mad., 305-7, note.
Or unless it be applied for upon the footing of an agreement
of separation, and allowance of separate maintenance duly
entered into, and even then it would be exceedingly doubtful,
unless some third person had acquired an interest, or the agree
ment had been entered into with some third person: Bullock
'0. Menzies, 4 Ves., 799; or where it is claimed to accrue from a.
trust fund which chancery can only touch; and, as a general rule,
chancery has no jurisdiction in matrimonial cases: Legard v.
Johnson, 3 Ves., 351.
Chancery has never established a separation, except in pur
suance of a previous agreement, and with great reluctance even
then: 1 Mad., 305-7. Nor, of course, does it grant alimony
as a principal object of relief.
4, But if alimony were regularly claimed, as a measure of
relief, purely incidental to some other principal prayer, still the
party petitioning for it should apply in due form. How can
the court regulate the amount ? Suppose the defendant were
as
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insolvent! Suppose worth $50,000 per annum! Would the
rate of allowance be the same ? If the application were secu.n
dum artem, the party would file a petition, give notice of it
,
and file also an ‘-‘allegation of faculties.” This allegation of
faculties, being answered by respondent under oath, would
exhibit a true state of his funds and capacity to pay. Nor
[*25] will counsel fees be allowed by the court where *there is
jurisdiction, except ea: necessitate: 3 Johns. Ch., 519.
5. The bill is not, in contemplation of law, sworn to at all.
A wife cannot be allowed her oath against her husband, in any
case, as a general rule, except where she swears articles of the
peace against him, or where personal violence is committed
upon her; and therefore neither injunction, ne ecceat nor sup
plicavit are regular: Sedgwiclc o. Watkins, 1 Ves., 49.
But it is anticipated that the court will consider the motion
to dissolve the injunction, discharge the ne aceat, and dismiss
the bill at the same time, and for the reasons on file, as the con
sideration of the whole matter involved in this motion is almost
necessarily involved in the motion submitted by complainant.
Writs of ne cweat, aifecting the rights of personal liberty, are
never granted except reluctantly: Woodward '0. Schatzell, 3
Johns. Ch., 412. Never, except a specific sum. appear mani
festly due, and in imminent danger of loss unless it be allowed,
and which courts of law are incompetent to save: 2 lVa.r. Cha.,
161,‘ 1 Ves., 49, 94,- 2 Atk., 210. Here no sum has been de
creed or sworn to. If there rest any liability on the part of
the husband to pay for the support of the wife, it is a liability
at law; let him be sued for it.
The injunction is equally untenable. The bill is irregularly
filed. It is as if there were no bill, for (unless perhaps for
divorce, and this is not) the wife cannot file her bill without
her prochein ami, and the injunction must be dissolved, for
there is no subpoena to answer. The subject matter and scope
of the injunction is without precedent and illegal. The com
plainant meant to pray for and obtain a supplicavit, not an
2t
FIRST CIRCUIT. 25
Pnurma v. Pnurma.
injunction. But it is by statuet that in England the chancellor
exercises this power, and, I apprehend, never, even there, except
in a manner incidental to the main object of the suit. Such an
injunction interferes with the marital rights and duties of the
husband in a way not to be tolerated. But if life were in
danger, a justice of the peace would bind the party to
his good *behavior, leaving the wife where the law leaves [*26]
her, in the custody and under the protection of the hus
band.
The bill should be dismissed, because the court has no juris
diction of its subject matter.
Alexander D. Fraser, for complainant:
The complainant contends that the general rule is, that the
party must clear his contempt before he can be heard: Vowles
1:. Youn_qs., 9 Ves., 173; Hewitt 1:.Me Ourtney, 13 Id., 560; Anon.,
15 Id., 174.
On a question whether the defendant could, before his con
tempt was cleared, though he olfered to pay all the plaintiffs
demand, ordered that he should bring before the master,
principal, interest and cost, and then be at liberty to move to
discharge sequestration: Lord lVenman 1:. Osbaldiston, 2
Brown P. C., 142.
Though an injunction be irregularly obtained, it must be
obeyed or the party is in contempt: VVoodward v. King, 2
Ch. Oa., 203, 127; Partington v. Booth, 3 Meriv., 148.
Alimony has been decreed to a wife without a divorce,
where she was compelled to leave the husband from ill usage,
although she had not been beat or turned away: Rltame v.
Rhame, 1 McCord Ch., 205; Thornberry v. Thornberry, 2 J. J.
Marshall, 324; Danton v. Denton, 1 Johns. Ch., 364; Hewitt v.
Hewitt, Bland Ch., 101; Jelineau v. Jelineau, 2 Dessaus., 45;
and if there be no precedent the court will make one: Devall
v. Devall, 4 Dessaus., 79; Anon, Id., 94; Taylor v. Taylor, Id.,
167; Id., 183.
I7
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The court of chancery has jurisdiction in all cases of alimony,
and defendant will be committed until he comply with the
decree: Purcell v. Purcell, 4 Hen. and Munf., 507; Id., 515;
Id., 517; Id., 520; Anon., 1 Hayne, 347.
Courts of chancery, in the United States, have authority to
decree alimony independent of any legislative enactment; tem
porary alimony, and money to carry on the suit, is a matter of
course: Fishli v. Fishli, 2 Litt., 337; Butler v. Butler,
[*27] *4 Id., 202; PW-ight v. Wright, 1 Edw., 62; Smith v.
Smith, Id., 255; Sanford v. Sanford, Id., 317.
An injunction was appropriate to prevent intercourse or
molestation on the part of the husband: lVarter v. Yorke, 19
Vesey, 454.
It is competent for a feme covert to institute suit without a
prochein ami; and the afiidavit of the wife may be received
against the husband, and will authorize the granting of an in
junction and ne eaceat: .K'irby v. Kirby, 1 Paige, 261; Pyle v.
Cravens, 4 Litt., 18.
Woodbridge in reply:
It is admitted that when a contempt is “ fixed ” upon one, he
cannot, in general, move until the contempt “is purged.”
But even this rule applies rather to appeals to the “ discre
tion ”—that is
,
to the favor of the court, and does not and can
not preclude the enforcement of mere right: Johnson v. Pinney,
1 Paige, 646; 9 Wheat., 868. The nullity of an order, etc.,
may be always shown.
But in this case there is no contempt fixed. At the first prac
ticable moment, the motion is made to set aside the order for
irregularity, etc., and before any movement of complainant.
But to this moment nothing under that order is done by
complainant to bring us in contempt. An order or a decree
(and they both stand upon the same footing) to pay money, is
to be enforced by “execution,” and in that way only. And
especially where the order is to pay money, the course is by
8
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execution: 2 Mad., new ed., 402—4,' 8 Ves., 381; 2 Mad, old
ed., s05.
And until complainant move, by execution upon the order
against us, it cannot be enforced. In New York there is an ex
press statutory provision for the enforcement of orders, etc., by
serving copies, but we have no such statutory provision.
*.Another matter is worthy of note: that is, that [*28]
Winder’s aflidavit was not filed until this term. And if
our situation in this regard brings us within the rule alluded
to, then any suggestion of contempt, without aflidavit, will at
any time be found to be a sufiicient apology for suppressing all
claim of legal and constitutional right. But if the party were
technically in contempt, sti-ll it is competent to set aside the
order which is rendered against him for irregularity, even—
much more for nullity: Green v. Green, 2 Sim., 394; Jenkins
'0. I'Vz'ld, 2 Paige, 394.
And this doctrine is practically supported by the numerous
NewYork cases. For in all of them, perhaps——in most of them,
certainly—laborious investigations are gone into to show the
regularity of the proceedings, or the contrary, and all clearly
supporting the proposition that where the irregularity is so
glaring as to amount to nullity, this fact may be shown: 1Iig
bie v. Edgarton, 3 Paige, 253; Sanford v. Brown, 4 Paige,
360; Sullivan v. Judah, Id., 444; Osgood v. Johnson, 3 Paige,
195; People v. Spalding, 2 Paige, 329. And these, apparently,
contain the most unfavorable aspect, as against us, which the
doctrine will bear. And the mere failure to comply with an
interlocutory order, does not of itself place the party in con
tempt, nor preclude him from showing its irregularity: Hill
v. Bissell, Mose. R., 259; 1 How. Pra., 369.
Tim CHANCELLORZ
These are cross motions, and must necessarily both be
considered at the same time.
When a defendant is in contempt, he cannot move to set
29
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aside proceedings; but when there is merely a failure on his
part to comply with the requisitions of an interlocutory order,
he may move to discharge the order for irregularity: Ilill v.
Bissell, Mose. R., 259.
C
Here no contempt is fixed, and the defendant moves to set
aside the order at the earliest opportunity. Orders of this
kind are usually enforced by execution, and a mere failure to
comply with the requisitions of such an order, is not
[*29] such a *contempt as will preclude the party from moving
to discharge the order and set aside the proceedings for
irregularity.
The proceedings in this case seem to have been irregular
throughout. The bill was filed by a feme covert without pro
chein ami, and was, therefore, improperly before the court:
Wood v. 'FVo0d, 2 Paige, 454; Same Case, on appeal, 8 Wend.,
357; Mitford, 153; Cooper, 163.
The injunction and ne exeat were issued May 31, 1836,
returnable on the first Monday of June following, and were
served June 6, 1836. The subpcena was not issued until the
second day of July, 1836. This was clearly irregular: Parker
v. VVilliams, 4 Paige, 439; Attorney- General v. .ZVich0l, 16
Ves., 338.
'
The next question which arises is as to the jurisdiction of
the court.
The bill in this case is filed, not for a divorce, but for ali
mony merely.
It appears from the authorities cited by the counsel for the
complainant, that the courts of South Carolina have entertained
bills of this kind; but they have usually been to carry into
efiect some marriage contract, or where a trust property was
involved. I can find no other case where the jurisdiction has
been sustained when the question has been raised. In the case
of Hewitt v. Hewitt, 1 Bland, 101, the jurisdiction was not
questioned, the facts were admitted, and the whole matter was
submitted to the court. The cases referred to in the note to
so
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that case are too indefinite to entitle them to any weight as
authority. .
'The whole current of authorities goes to show that courts
of chancery have never entertained jurisdiction in cases of this
kind, except in aid of some other court, or to carry into efiect
a marriage contract, or in the execution of a trust: Pearne 'v.
Lisle, Ambler, 75; Perry v. Perry, 2 Paige, 501.
In England, when the court of chancery succeeded to the
jurisdiction of the spiritual courts during the usurpation, it
entertained suits of this kind, but not since the restora
tion. See *Head v. Head, 3 Atk., 551; Watkyns '0. [*30]
Watlcyris, 2 Atk., 98 ; Fonb. Eg., 98, note n.
In the case of Codd v. Codd, 2 Johns. Ch., 141, the bill
prayed for a writ of supplicavit to protect the person of the
petitioner, and her property and children, from insult and
injury, pending the suit, and Chancellor Kent refused the writ,
saying, “Why should not the party apply to a justice of the
peace to bind the other to good behavior?”
The cases cited in Dessaussure’s equity reports of South
Carolina, seem to be a departure from principle, and cannot,
therefore, be regarded as authority in this case. If it is
intended that courts of chancery should take jurisdiction of
this class of cases, that jurisdiction must be given by law. I
am satisfied that, exclusive of any statutory provision upon
the subject, this court has no jurisdiction to entertain proceed
ings of this kind.
The orders must be discharged and the bill dismissed.
81
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Jonathan Burtch v. Hannah Hogge and others.
Taking depositions: Agent of party acting in absenceof commissioner. Where the
agent or attorney of the complainant examined witnesses and wrote their
depositions, and the commissioner before whom they were taken was absent
from the room several times during the examination, and the defendant did
not appear and cross-examine the witnesses, the proceedings were held to be
irregular, and the depositions were suppressed. (a)
Irregularities or unfairness in taking depositions will, it seems, be taken notice of
by courts of equity in any stage of the proceedings in the cause before hearing.
Parol agreement to convey lands: Specific performance. Where under a parol
agreement to convey land the purchase money had been paid, possession
taken and valuable improvements made, these acts of part performance were
held to be sufficient to take the case out of the statute of frauds, and to entitle
the purchaser to a decree for specific performance. (b)
Inadequacy of price, e_fl'ectof on specific performance. inadequacy of price, where
it is so gross and palpable as of itself to appear evidence of actual fraud, may
be sufficient to induce the court to stay the exercise of its discretionary power
to enforce a. specific performance, and leave a.party to its remedy at law; but
inadequacy of price merely, without being such as to prove fraud conclusively,
is not a good objection to specific performance. (c)
The bill in this case was filed for the specific performance of
a contract for the sale of real estate.
The bill charged that Robert Hogge, the husband of defend
ant Hannah Hogge (who is now dead), in May. 1832, was seized
and possessed of an undivided interest, to the extent of seven
and a half acres, in a certain tract of ninety-one acres, situated
(ci) It is improper for a.master in chancery to perform any official act as master
in a cause in which he is solicitor or partner of the solicitor: Brown v. Byrne, Wal.
Ch., 453.
(b) See Bomier v. Caldwell, post, 65; Same Case, on appeal, 8 Mich., 463; Norris
v. Showerman, 2 Doug. Mich., 16. Delivery of possession is an act of part perform
ance: Weed v. Terry, Wal. Ch., 501; Same Case, on appeal, 2 Doug. Micli., 344. But
such possession cannot avail the complainant where it is sufficiently explained by
other relations between the parties, and cannot be unequivocally referred to the
agreement of purchase: Jones v. Tyler, 6 Mich., 364; Story Eq. Jm-is., § 768,and
cases cited.
The parol contract, in order to be enforced, must be certain in all its essential
particulars: Mclllurtrie v. Bennefte, post, 124;Millerd v. Ramadell, post, 373; Bomier
v. Caldwell, 8 Mich., 463. It must also be mutual: McMurtrie v. Bennette, post, 124;
Hawley v. Sheldon, post, 420. It must be proved in the clearest manner, and be Slllr
stantially the same set forth in the bill: Wilson 0. Wilson, 6 Mich., 9. And the bill
89
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at the mouth of Black river, in St. Clair county; that on May
25, 1832, he agreed to sell to complainant seven acres of his
said land, for the consideration of $150; that in June and July
following, in various sums, and at different times, complainant
paid to said Robert Hogge $129 of said consideration, for which
said Robert gave his receipts, and put said complainant in pos
session of said premises; that complainant had made improve
ments on the premises to the amount of $1,500 and upwards,
and had kept possession of said premises ever since; that some
time in the month_ of May aforesaid, complainant procured a
deed to be made out from Hogge to him of the land, but in
August thereafter, and before the deed was executed, Hogge
was taken suddenly ill and died intestate, leaving the defend
ant, Hannah, his Widow, and other defendants named,
his heirs at law, to *inherit his estate; that his wife [*32]
administered, and the balance of the purchase money was
paid to her, and she acknowledged satisfaction and gave receipts
therefor, and said she felt desirous and willing to convey the
legal title to the lot, if authorized so to do.
And the bill prayed that defendants be compelled specifi
cally to perform said agreement, by executing a conveyance of
the premises to complainant.
John Nolan was joined as a defendant, and he answered, stat
ing that he had been appointed administrator de bonis non of
must set out the special facts relied upon as showing part performance, to take the
case out of the statute of frauds: Bomier v. Caldwell, 8 Mich., 468. As to what is
material in such a contract, see the case last cited. And as to waiver by the vendor
of laches in performance on the part of the vendee, see Hunt v. Thorne, 2 Mich, 213;
Ingersoll v. Horton, 7 Mich., 405.
(c) SeeHunt 0. Thorne, 2 Mich., 213; Wallace 1:.Pidge, 4 Mich., 570.
The specific performance of contracts always rests in the sound discretion of
the court, to be decreed or not as shall seem just and equitable under the peculiar
circumstances of each case: Smith v. Lawrence, 15 Mich., 499; Mclllurtrie v. Ben
nette, post, 124. It will not be decreed where the contract is unequal and gives the
complainant an unfair advantage: Chambers v. Liver-more, 15Mich., 381; nor will it
bedecreed in favor of a.complainant who has laid by without performance on his part
until there has been such a change in the value of the property as to render the con
tract unequal ifmade now: Smith v. Lawrence, 15Mich, 499.
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the estate of Robert Hogge; that he had no personal knowl
edge of the matters stated and charged in the bill, and claimed
the benefit of the statute of frauds. The heirs at law, who were
minors, interposed the usual proforma answer by their guard
ian acl litem.
Hannah Hogge, the widow, answered, admitting that her
husband was seized of the land, as alleged in the bill; neither
admitting nor denyingthe contract of sale set forth in the bill,
but denying all knowledge of its terms; admitting the payment
of money to her husband and herself, as set forth in the bill,
and the giving of receipts therefor, but claiming the benefit of
the statute of frauds. She also denied that, on her part, she
had ever agreed to release her right of dower.
General replication was filed to these answers, and an order
entered for the taking of testimony before a special commis
sioner. Testimony having been taken under this order on the
16th, 17th and 18th days of September, 1835, and the same hav
ing been returned and filed.
Woodbridge and Backus, on behalf of the minor heirs, now
moved to suppress the depositions taken on the first two days
for irregularity.
[*33] *It appeared from the certificate of Horatio James, the
special commissioner appointed to take the testimony,
that several witnesses appeared before him, at his otfice in St.
Clair, on the part of the complainant, and that Ira Porter, Esq.,
appeared as counsel for the complainant, and put questions gen
erally to the witnesses, and took down, in his own handwriting,
all the answers given to such questions by the witnesses, and
reduced to writing all the depositions taken; that neither the
defendants, their agent or attorney, were present at the exam
ination until all the witnesses had testified; that he had frequent
occasions to leave the room, and was not present all the time
during the examination; that he only administered the oaths to
the witnesses after their depositions were fully written by Mr.
Porter.
S4
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The aflidavit of John Thorn stated that he was present at
the taking of the depositions in question, and that Ira Porter
put all the questions to the witnesses, and wrote all the depo
sitions ; that Porter appeared to act as the attorney for Burtch,
the complainant, in taking the testimony.
Ira Porter states in his afiidavit that some time in the sum
mer of 1835, Burtch, the complainant, informed him that depo
sitions were to be taken at Palmer before Horatio James, a
special commissioner appointed for that purpose, to be used
upon the trial of a cause pending in chancery, wherein he was
complainant, and Hannah Hogge and others were defendants ;
that Burtch wished him to testify in the matter, and that he,
Porter, agreed to attend as a witness ; that Burtch requested
him to see something to the inclosing and transmitting of the
testimony to Detroit, but did not employ him as counsel or
attorney; that he was not at that time an attorney in this
state or elsewhere ; that at the solicitation of James, the com
missioner, he wrote his own deposition and those of several
other witnesses then in attendance ; that John Doran, who
appeared to be interested in the matter, either as one of the
parties or as their agent, was present, and did not object to his
writing the deposition; that the depositions were written by
him truly and faithfully, and were read to, and approved
of by the *witnesses, and that he had no interest in the [*34]
event of the cause.
H. 71 Backus", in support of the motion.
A. D. Fraser, contra. 1
Tun CHANCELLORZ
There can be no doubt that the conduct of the commissioner
in taking these depositions was highly improper.
Thorn, in his aflidavit, states that Porter appeared as attor
ney, asked all the questions and wrote the depositions, and it is
apparent that he appeared there on different days, and when
he was not called there as a witness.
as
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Porter himself says in his aifidavit he was requested by Burtch
to see to the inclosing and transmitting the testimony to
Detroit ; he says he was not employed as counsel or attorney,
and adds that he was not admitted as an attorney in this state
or elsewhere at the time ; but he does not deny that he was act
ing as the agent of Burt-ch, and he states that he wrote his own
deposition and several others.
The certificate of James, the commissioner, although, per
haps, irregular, yet if looked into would not lead the court to
place much confidence in the faithful execution of his duty as
a commissioner. He says in his certificate that he was absent
from the room a part of the time during the examination of the
witnesses and the writing of the depositions. The proceedings
in taking these depositions were clearly irregular: See 2 Chan.
Rep, 899; Hind’s*Uh., 844, 348; 15 Ves., 380. _
But it is urged that the irregularities in taking the deposi
tions are waived by the defendants having taken further steps
in the cause ; and the case of Skinner v. Dayton, 5 Johns. Ch.,
191, is relied on as authority to support this position. That
was a case where the notice to take testimony was
[*35] *claimed to be insufiicient; no want of fairness in the
execution of the commission was complained of, and
three terms had been suffered to elapse after notice to take tes
timony had been given. An ofl‘er to cure the defect of notice
had been made and declined, and the cross-examination of the
witness had been expressly waived. This was a very different
case from the one now under consideration.
The case cited in 3 Brown, 620, was a case on appeal, and
the depositions had been used at the hearing in the court below.
In the case of 1 Peters, 807, the deposition had been read with
out objection at the hearing ; but the judge in that case says :
“If the objection had been made to the admission of the depo
sition at the hearing, it ought not to have prevailed, because
the opposite party appeared and cross-examined the witness.”
In this case it was a question of regularity merely, and there
as
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was no pretense of impropriety or unfairness in taking the
deposition.
Courts have always looked with jealousy upon proceedings
of this kind, and guarded with great care the rights of the par
ties against imposition and fraud ; and under our practice,
where depositions are generally taken without interrogatories
being filed, it seems almost indispensable to the ends of justice
that this court should scrutinize well the proceedings in taking
depositions before it permits them to be read as evidence. I
should feel great reluctance in deciding this case upon testi
mony taken as loosely as this seems to have been.
In 3 Atk., 812, although the aflidavits had been read, the
court, for the reason that the depositions had been unfairly
taken, and for other reasons there appearing, dismissed the
proceeding with costs, to come out of the pocket of the solicitor
who had unfairly taken the depositions.
It seems that courts of equity do take notice of errors of the
kind here complained of, at any stage of the proceedings in the
cause before hearing.
The depositions taken in this case must be suppressed.
But as in the case of Shaw v. Lindsay, 15 Ves., 384, if it
should happen that the witnesses could not be examined
again, *this order does not go to the length of prevent- [*36]
ing the court’s directing hereafter that the depositions
may be opened if necessity should require the rule to be dis
pensed with.
Depositions suppressed.
A new order was obtained to take testimony, and the testi
mony having been taken and returned, the cause came on for
final hearing.
A. D. Fraser, for complainant:
Inadequacy of price, unless it amounts to conclusive evi
dence of fraud, is not of itself sufiicient ground for refusing a
specific performance. Although this was the case of an auction
a1
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sale, the opinion was pronounced on the general doctrine:
Hatch v. Ifutch, 9 Ves., 292.
In another case it was expressly “held on a bill for specific
performance, that if the parties bargained with their eyes open,
and without imposition or surprise, mere inadequacy of price
was not of itself sufficient to prevent the court from adminis~
tering its usual equity: ” Colyer v. Brown, 1 Cox, 428.
This, say the court of errors in the state of New York in a
similar case, “is the doctrine of common sense and common
honesty, for it may be asked with propriety, what right have
we to sport with the contracts of parties fairly and deliberately
entered into, to prevent them from being carried into effect ?”
The court further say: “Much property is held by contract,
purchases are constantly made on speculation, the value of real
estate is constantly fluctuating, and in such matters there most
generally exists an honest diiference of opinion in regard to
any bargain, as to its being a beneficial one or not. To say,
when all is fair, and the parties deal on equal terms, that a
court of equity will not interfere, does not appear to me to be
supported by authority:” Seymour v. Delancy, 3 Cowen, 532;
King v. Hamilton, 4 Peters, 328; Day '0. Newman, 2 Cox, 77;
Willan v. T/Villan, 16 Ves., 83.
[*37]
* Wbodbriclge and Backus, for defendants.
II. T Backus:
The specific execution of agreements in a court of chancery,
is not ea: olebito justitz'0e: Att0rney- General v. Day, 1 Ves., 219.
But a bill for the specific performance of an agreement (even
where the agreement is in writing), is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction:
Seymour 11.Delaney, 6 Johns. Ch., 222. If its specific perfor~
inance is refused, the party loses no right, for the only remedy
to which the party has a right, is his remedy at law for dam
ages for the breach of contract.
An agreement (even in writing) must be certain, specific,
as
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mutual, and for an adequate consideration to be specifically
performed: 1 Mad. Ch., 423," Parkhurst v. Van Cortland, 1
Johns. Ch., 273; Benedict v. Lynch, Id., 370. Where the
agreement is uncertain, the court will refuse a specific perfor
mance: 1 Jllad. Ch., 426,‘ 2 Sch, and Le/T, 7, 553; ZVewland on
Con., 151; Brownly v. Zefrees, 2 Vern., 415. Where there is
any doubt as to the identity of the lands to which a contract
relates, a court of equity ought not to decree a specific perfor
mance: Graham v. Henessen, 5 Munf., 185; Calverly v. VVil
liams, 1 Ves., 210. A contract must be so precise that neither
party can misunderstand it, or it will not be specifically per
formed by chancery, but the parties will be left to their reme
dies at law: Colson v. Thompson, 2 Wheat., 336.
Inadequacy of consideration (even in the absence of all
fraud) is a suflicient reason for refusing a specific performance,
for an agreement must be just and fair in all its parts, other
wise a specific performance will not be decreed: Seymour v.
Delaney, 6 Johns. Ch., 222 ; Cletheral o. Ogilvie, 1 Dessaus.,
275. A court of chancery will refuse a specific performance
where the price of sale is very low: 1 Mad. Ch., 425; 8
Brown O’. 0., 228 ,' 2 Cow, 77,‘ Newland on Contracts, 66 ,'
10 Ves., 592: 1 Ves., 279; Fonb. Eq.,284; 3 Ves. and Bea.,
192-3. Even a contract will be rescinded and conveyance set
aside for inadequacy of consideration: Sugd. on Vend.,
170, 171; *2 Brown (7. (1., 150; 1 Vern., 465,’ 1 Brown [*38]
C. 0., 176; 6 Johns. Ch., 222. Inadequacy of price is
'
often (even in the absence of all fraud) the ground of refusing
a decree for specific performance, though not suflicient of itself
to induce the court to set aside an executed agreement, but the
court will leave the parties to their remedy at law: Osgood v.
Franklin, 2 Johns. Ch., 23; 14 Johns., 527; 1 Vern., 472;
Awbry v. Ifeen, Chan. Cas., 19; 1 Dessaus., 250. Nor will a
court of chancery decree a specific performance against a
widow entitled to dower: Sugd. on Vend., 142.
But where an agreement is certain and for an adequate con
so
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sideration, to be specifically performed by the decree of a
court of chancery, it must be in accordance to the forms pre
scribed by law: 1 Mad. Ch., 872,- 8 Ves., 420; 3’ Atk., 385;
1 Ves., 279,- 1 Eden, 323. The statute requires all agreements
touching lands to be in writing. In this, equity follows the
law. A letter or receipt may be suflicient writing within the
statute; but it must specify all the terms of the contract. The
most trifling omission is fatal: Sugd. on Vend., 45, 48,‘ for an
agreement cannot rest partly in writing and partly in parol:
1 Johns. Ch., 131, 272. It is insisted that the case in hand is
taken out of the operation of the statute by part performance;
this exception (of part performance) to the operation of the
statute is viewed with extreme jealousy, and properly so, by
courts, as tending to relax a salutary rule of law, and open a
door for all the frauds the statute was intended to guard
against: Foster v. Hale, 3 Ves., 712, 382. Part or full pay
ment of the purchase money (even on full and distinct proof
of parol agreement) is not such a compliance with the spirit
of the statute as a court of chancery will recognize and carry
into execution: 1 Mad. Ch., 881,- 2 .Des., 190 ,' Lord Pangall v.
Ross, 2 Eq. Ab., 46; Leah v. Morris, 2 C. C., 135; Lord Redes
dale’s remarks in Clenan v. Cook, 1 Sch and Lef., 40, where
he says, payment of purchase money will in no case amount
to a part performance, nor will giving directions for
[*39] *conveyances, deeding estate, etc., take a case out of the
statute: Clark v. Wright, 1 Atk., 12; VV/zaley v. Bag
nall, 6 Brown, C. C., 45; Gwins v. Calder, 2 Dessaus., 190.
To take a case out of the operation of the statute on the
ground of part performance, the existence of the contract as
laid in the bill must be made out by clear and unequivocal
proof, and the acts of part performance must be of the iden
tical agreement set up: Phelps v. Thompson, 1 Johns. Ch., 131,
149. It is not suflicient that the act is evidence of some agree
ment, but it must show unequivocally, the existence of the
particular agreement set forth in the bill, and that that very
40
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agreement was in part executed: Lindsay v. I/ynch, 2 Sch.
and Lef., 8.
W IVOodbridge.'
Certainty in a contract is essential; if uncertain, a specific
execution will be refused: 1 Johns. Ch., 273, 181; 14 Johns., 15,
7 Johns. O'h., 18,‘ 1 Mad., 886-7," 1 Vern., 406," 5 Munf, 185.
Equity will not compel a specific execution, unless when es
sential to justice: Mitf. PL, 119. A hard bargain merely,
therefore, will not be opened, especially as to infant heirs.
“ Already have so many cases been taken out of the statute
of frauds, which seem to be within its letter, that it may well
be doubted whether the exceptions do not let in many of the
mischiefs against which the statute was intended to guard.
“ The best judges in England have been of opinion that this
relaxing construction of the statute ought not to be extended
further than it has already been carried, and this court entirely
concurs in that opinion:” 4 Uranch, 224; 2 Peters’ Cond. Rep.,
96; 1 Mad., 302-3; 3 Ves., 712,- 6 Ves., 32, 87; 5 Munfi, 185,
818. In such cases the complainant should be left to seek his
remedy at law: 1 Wheat., 197.
Part performance implies a fraud on the opposite party. See
Story’s Eq., 66‘, 74," 1 Johns. Ch., 149. Payment is no part
performance: 2 Story’s Eq., 64-5; 5 Munjl, 817.
Tun CHANCELLORZ
The bill in this case is filed to compel *the specific [*40]
performance of aspecial contract to convey land. Two
questions arise for the consideration of the court.
Ifirst. Has there been such a contract proved as will enable
this court to decree a specific performance ? and,
Second. Has there been such a part performance as will take
the case out of the statute of frauds ?
That there was an agreement or contract for the sale of some
portion of or interest in the McNiel tract (so-called) at the
mouth of Black river, in St. Clair county, by Robert Hogge to
41
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Jonathan Burtch, cannot admit of a doubt. Several receipts
have been produced by Burtch, in which Hogge acknowledges
the receipt of money to apply as payments on the land sold by
him to Burtch. Although these written. receipts do not show
what the contract was, they are evidence of some contract
between the parties respecting the sale and purchase of land;
and it is pretty clearly shown by Hogge’s acknowledgments
that he had sold to Burtch his undivided interest of between
seven and eight acres of land in the McNiel tract (reserving
to himself one-half acre), for the sum of $150.
Testimony on the part of the complainant:
'
William H. Carleton states that he “heard I-Ioggesay, in
1832, that he had sold all his lands at the mouth of Black river,
except half an acre, to Burtch, who had pretty much paid all
up for the same.” Previous to this heard Hogge saying “ that
he had bought, at the mouth of Black river, seven acres, or
seven acres and some hundredths of an acre.
Harman Chamberlain states that he received $45 from Burtch
in July, 1832, to pay to Hogge for land purchased by Burtch
formerly from Hogge, which he paid accordingly. Proves the
execution of Hogge’s receipt for $85; also a receipt for $36,
and two receipts for $23, by Hannah Hogge. Heard Hogge
say
“ that he had sold a part of his interest in his lands at Black
river, about seven acres, to Burtch; understood it to be of the
lands purchased by him from E. P. Hastings. This was in the
fall or winter of 1831.” That Burtch was in possession before
the death of Hogge; that Burtch has erected upon said land,
since the death of Hogge, a store, tavern-house and one
[*41] *barn, the value of which he believes to be about $2,500,
and were erected from four to five years since; that
Hannah Hogge asked him whether she had a right or ought to
give a deed to Burtch of the land, she being the administratrix;
that Hogge’s deed was given to Burtch to take to Detroit to
have the necessary papers made out to obtain a deed; that
Burtch has continued in possession where he built ever since;
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that Hogge, when he purchased of Hastings, supposed that he
had purchased 30 acres, and was then ignorant of the Masten
claim; understood that the sale from Hogge to Burtch consisted
of seven acres, and that it was an undivided interest; estimates
the seven acres in 1831 at $500; considered Hogge an intelli
gent man, and as capable of estimating the Worth of property
as most men.
Israel Carleton testifies that Hogge told him that he-had
purchased a part of the McNiel tract, in company with a Mr.
Sales; has heard him say that he sold his interest, except half
an acre, to Burtch, and had made about $90 in the trade; heard
him say this in various conversations in 1832; the lands referred
to are near the mouth of Black river; testifies to the payment
of $40 on the purchase, and proves the receipts of Robert and
Hannah Hogge; that the land sold to Burtch by Hogge was
an undivided interest, reserving half an acre.
Edmund Carleton says, that in the summer of 1832, in con
versation with Hogge respecting a payment to be made by him
and Hogge jointly, Hogge stated that he expected to receive
$80 or $90 from Burtch, in part payment for some lands sold
him at the mouth of Black river; said that the lands were
undivided, that he (Hogge) had reservedhalf an acre.
Ira Porter testifies that he heard Hogge speak of his pur
chase in December, 1831; that the interest was an undivided
interest, and purchased jointly with Edward Sales, and was a
portion of the McNiel tract, situated at the mouth of Black
river. Some time in January or February, or thereabout, of
1832, Hogge, in conversation with Harrington and others, said
that he had sold out his interest in the McNiel tract to
Burtch, *reserving half an acre, for $140 or $150; in the [*42]
spring of 1832, Hogge requested him (Porter) to make
out a conveyance, and he did so accordingly, and gave it to
Hogge; it was prepared in exact accordance with Hogge’s
instructions, and was read to him, and no fault found with it;
he paid witness for drawing it; estimates the value of improve
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ments made by Burtch and his assigns, between the date of
the purchase and the commencement of this suit, at between
$1,800 and $2,500; Burtch and his assigns have been in pos
session ever since the purchase; thinks the white store was
erected after the date of the deed; Burtch rented to Samp
son.
John S. Heath says that in June or July, 1832, he had a con
versation with Robert Hogge, who then told him that he had
formerly an interest in six or seven acres of land at the mouth
of Black river, but had sold the same to Burtch, reserving half
an acre.
Jeremiah Harrington testifies that in the year 1832 Robert
Hogge told him that he had sold to Burtch all but half an acre
of the land which he had bought in the McNiel tract, and had
received his pay in full for it; it was from seven to eight acres;
had two conversations with Hogge, in which he said the same
thing.
Jacob Miller states that in 1832 he had a conversation with
Hogge about the purchase of half an acre of land. Hogge told
him he had sold to Burtch his land in the McNiel tract, reserv
ing half an acre; thinks it was seven acres which Hogge said
he had sold; Hogge said he had received some part of his pay;
had more than one conversation with him on the subject, one
of which was in May, 1832; knows that Burtch was in pos
session of some part of the McNiel tract a year before this
conversation.
John Thorn states that Robert Hogge called upon him to
make out a deed to Burtch for some portion‘ of the McNiel
tract, and had his papers with him. It was some certain inter
est with the reservation of half an acre; Hogge refused to leave
the papers on account of the price the witness would
‘
[*43] *charge for making the deed; Hogge’s deed was from
Eurotas P. Hastings, who derived title from Sibley and
Kearsley.
44
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Dqfendanfls witness:
John Thorn testifies that he had a conversation with Hogge
in 1831 or 1832, about making out a deed from him to Burtch,
for some certain interest which he had sold to Burtch in the
McNiel tract, at the mouth of Black river; it was an undivided
interest which Hogge wished to convey; that Hogge produced
the patent to Solomon Sibley, and a transfer by Sibley, and also
by Jonathan Kearsley as the administrator of the estate of
Edward Prucell, to E. P. Hastings, and a transfer from Hast
ings and wife to Hogge; that he (Thorn) could not understand
from Hogge how much interest he wished to convey to Burtch;
that Hogge intended to reserve something more than half an
acre; that Hogge gave him to understand that the reservation
which he wished to make was subject to litigation, for the rea
son that he (Hogge) had been induced to believe, by those of
whom he purchased, that he had purchased a sixth instead of a
third part; that he (Thorn) advised Hogge that it appeared
from his papers that he had purchased a third instead of a
sixth part; that he (Thorn) did not make out the deed, in conse
quence of the uncertainty of the amount of interest to be con
veyed, and the price which he charged for making the proper
investigation and the deed; that Burtch was living on the
McNiel tract previous to Hogge’s purchasing any interest
therein; that he estimates the value of the land in the McNiel
tract, in 1832, with a clear title, at $10 per acre; at this time
$500 per acre.
On his cross-examination says: The original patent of the
McNiel tract, containing about 90 acres, was to Solomon Sib
ley; it appeared by the papers shown by Hogge that Sibley
purchased for himself and two others; that one of them was
Edward Prucell; that Prucell’s interest appeared to have been
sold to E. P. Hastings by Kearsley, who was Prucell’s admin
istrator; that Sibley’s interest also had been sold to Hast
ings; that Hogge derived his title through Hastings; that
after Hogge had purchased Prucell’s third, as he supposed,
as
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[*44] *and paid his money therefor, those from whom he
had purchased endeavored to persuade him that he
had purchased only a sixth instead of a third; Hogge said the
reason given by the persons from whom he derived title, why
he had not purchased a third, was that Prucell had sold a part
of his interest to Masten; that he (Thorn) saw the original
articles of agreement between Prucell and Masten, at Gen. Lar
ned’s oifice, in Detroit, subsequently to Hogge’s purchase; that
he believes the articles were signed by both Prucell and Masten;
it was an agreement to convey half of Prucell’s interest in the
McNiel tract, and the one-half of other lands.
It is proven by several witnesses that Hogge, in his lifetime,
stated that he had sold about seven acres; and nearly all the
witnesses speak of this as the quantity, reserving to himself
half an acre.
Thorn says that he did not understand what the interest was
which was reserved; that it was half an acre and something
more, and that it was subject to litigation. I think Thorn’s
deposition, together with the testimony of the other witnesses,
explains the difliculty.
It appears that nearly all the witnesses understood the interest
sold to have been seven acres. From the deposition of Israel
Carleton it appears that the purchase was made by Hogge and a
Mr. Sales; from the deposition of Mr. Thorn, that it was a
matter of doubt and dispute whether they had purchased the
one-third or one-sixth. They at first supposed it to have been
one-third, but it afterwards appeared that there was an out
standing contract made by Prucell, to convey one-half of his
interest to a man by the name of Masten. This, I think,
explains the seeming discrepancy, and shows clearly the under
standing of the witnessss that the interest which was to be con
veyed was seven acres, and that the reservation was to be some
thing more than the half acre, and that it was subject to liti
gation. And Hogge’s objection to signing the deed is also
explained.
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It is hardly possible that so many witnesses can be mistaken
as to the amount of interest to be conveyed. It is
apparent to *my mind that Hogge intended to convey to [*45]
Burtch the seven acres; to reserve to himself all the
right which he had to the other sixth, claimed by Masten. The
land containing ninety-one acres and forty-one hundredths,
it seems by the testimony, was originally divided into three
shares, making thirty-one acres and forty-six hundredths each.
One-half of this share, which was asserted to belong to Hogge,
as appears by Thorn’s deposition, had been contracted to Mas
ten by Prucell, which would leave, if the contract should prove
a valid one, fifteen acres and twenty-three hundredths as the
part belonging to the estate of Prucell. This, it appears, was
purchased by Hogge and Sales together. This, then, would
leave, without reference to the disputed one-sixth, alleged to
have been contracted to Masten, the seven acres testified to by
the witnesses, and the reservation of the half acre and a small
fraction over to Hogge. And this substantially and satisfac
torily explains the whole of the evidence.
From all the evidence in the case, I think it clear that Hogge
had sold his undivided interest of seven acres in the McNiel
tract to Burtch, reserving to himself all over the seven acres,
supposing it to be about a half an acre.
Second, As to the part performance.
It appears clearly by the proofs in this case, that a principal
partof the purchase money was paid to Hogge in his lifetime,
and that the balance was paid to Hannah Hogge, his widow,
who was administrator of his estate, soon after his death.
The question whether the payment of the purchase money is
such a part performance of a parol contract to convey land as
will take it out of the statute of frauds, seems to be as yet
unsettled. But the case does not turn on this point alone. It
has been proved that Burtch was in possession of a portion of
the McNiel tract at the time he purchased of Hogge, and that
he has ever since remained in possession; that he had made
41
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valuable improvements on the same after his purchase from
Hogge, and before the commencement of this suit; _that these
improvements were worth from $1,800 to $2,500.
There is some doubt, perhaps, as to the time some por
[*46] tion *of the improvements were made; but that the
most valuable and expensive were made after the pur
chase by Burtch from Hogge there can be no doubt.
The payment of the purchase money, the possession, and the
improvements made by Burtch since the purchase, I think, are
clearly sufiicient to take this case out of the statute of frauds.
It has been urged that there was such an inadequacy of price
that this court will not decree a specific performance.
Inadequacy of price, where it is so gross and palpable as of
itself to afiord evidence of actual fraud, may be sufiicient to
induce this court to stay the exercise of its discretionary power
to enforce a specific performance, and leave the party to his
remedy at law; but inadequacy of price merely, without being
such as to prove fraud conclusively, is not a good objection
against decreeing a specific performance. See Seymour v.
Delaney, on appeal, 3 Cowen, 445, where all the authorities
upon this subject are collected.
The value must be taken at the time the contract was made.
There is some discrepancy in the testimony as to the value
of the land at that time. Chamberlain, in his testimony, esti
mates its value in 1831 at $500. Thorn, in his deposition taken
by the defendants, estimates the lands in this tract in 1832,
with a clear title, at $10 per acre, making $70 for the seven
acres. The price agreed upon was $150. Where witnesses
vary so much, with equal opportunities of judging, it would
certainly be going very far for this court to come to the con
clusion that there is any such inadequacy in the price, which
the parties themselves have agreed upon, as to amount to
fraud, when it appears too that Hogge sold at an advance,
although he only retained the lands from December to
["'47] May following. *The prayer of the bill must be granted
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or refused. Here is payment for the lands, all the posses
sion of which the subject matter was capable, and an expen
diture, according to the testimony of Chamberlain, of $2,500,
and according to Porter’s deposition, of from $1,800 to $2,500.
The fact that the lands on which the improvements were
made were undivided, would perhaps be entitled to some con
sideration. But it is not to be believed that Burtch made these
expensive improvements without reference to his interest in the
lands, relying upon obtaining an allowance therefor on a divi
sion with the other owners. There may be some doubt as to
whether the eleven-hundredths over the half acre were to be
retained by Hogge, or conveyed to Burtch. But the witnesses
most of them designate the quantity at seven acres, and as the
remainder would be so near the half acre, it would naturally be
mentioned as a half acre.
The decree must be for a conveyance of Hogge’s undivided
interest in the McNiel tract, of seven acres, to the complainant,
reserving to the heirs and legal representatives of Hogge all
other right, title and interest which they may have in said tract,
and without prejudice to the right of dower therein of Hannah
Doran, late Hannah Hogge. (I2)
(Z2)Mrs. Hogge in this case appears to have been made defendant on the ground
of having, as administratrix, received payment of part of the purchase price. In
Richmond v. Robinson. 12 Mich., 193,it was held (following Weed v. Terry, 2 Doug..
Mich., 844),that the wife cannot be compelled to release her dower in lands which
her husband has contracted to sell, and that she is not a proper party to a bill by the
purchaser for specific performance.
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Henry V. Disbrow v. DeGarmo Jones and others.
Possession of lands constructive notice of equities. The possession of a tenant ll
notice to a purchaser of the actual interest the tenant may have in the prem
ises. (a)
Cotemporaneous contracts. Where several papers are executed between the same
parties cotemporaneously, and relate to the same subject matter, they are
regarded as together constituting one and the same transaction. (L)
Insurance is a personal contract, and does not pass to a purchaser by a conveyance
of the property insured. (c)
Fbrecloaure for one installment. Equity will not interfere to prevent the mortgagee
selling, under the power of sale, the whole of the mortgaged premises for a sin
gle installment, when it appears that they cannot be sold in parcels without
injury to the whole.
Purchaser subject to mortgage cannot contest it. One who buys land and receivesa
conveyance subject to a mortgage thereon, cannot afterwards contest the valid
ity of the mortgage on the ground of defect in the formalities of execution.
Motion to dissolve an injunction. The facts, as they appeared
by the bill and answers, may be shortly stated as follows:
February 1, 1832, the defendant (Jones), being the owner of
a lot in the city of Detroit with a warehouse thereon, leased
the same to John L. Whiting and John J. Deming for a term
of five years, at the yearly rent of $600. The lessees agreed to
keep the warehouse insured for not less than $2,500 for the ben
efit of Jones, and Jones covenanted that in the event the ware
house should be destroyed from hazards contemplated by the
(a) When a party purchases lands which are in the possession of a third person
he takes them subject to all equities existing in favor of the occupant as against his
vendor: Rood v. Chapin, Wal. Ch., 79; Godfrey 1:.Disbrow, Wal. Ch., 260;McKee v.
Wilcox. 11Mich, 858; Norris v. Showerman, 2 Doug. Mich., 16. But the continuous
possession of a grantor after giving a deed is no notice to a purchaser that he claims
equities in opposition to his conveyance: Bloomer v. Henderson, 8Mich., 895.
(b) Compare Bronson v. Green, Wal. Ch., 56; Norris v. Hill, 1 Mich., 202; Dud
geon u. Haggart, 17Mich., 275.
(c) Nor can a trespasser in whose hands the property is accidentally destroyed,
avail himself of a recovery of the insurance moneys by the owner, to reduce the
recovery of damages against him for his trespass: Perrott v. Shearer, 17Mich, 48.
~
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policy, he would rebuild within six months thereafter. Sep
tember 10, 1834, Jones indorsed upon the lease an agreement
to extend it for two years longer, for an additional sum of not
exceeding $200 a year.
April 27, 1836, Jones sold the premises to Augustus Garrett,
Daniel B. Brown, Nathaniel J . Brown, William R. Thompson,
and George W. Hoffman, for $20,000, and conveyed the same
by deed, with covenants of seisin and against incumbrances,
taking back a mortgage on the premises for $16,000 of the pur
chase price. At the same time Jones entered into an agree
ment with his vendees, reciting the extension of the term to
\Vhiting (who had bought out Deming, and was then in pos
session of the premises, and so continued to be until the
bill was filed) and stipulating that *until possession [*-19]
should be given up by Whiting, Jones should pay his
vendees interest on the $20,000 in lieu of the rents for that
time; and the rent was to be received by the vendees up to
February 1, 1837. Whiting, it appeared, was at this time
applied to by the parties to see if he would give up possession
at the end of the five years, and declined to do so, expressing
his intention to hold for the full term, as extended.
Soon after the purchase Garrett and the Browns sold and
conveyed their interest to Thompson, and afterwards, on Oc
tober 21, l836, Thompson sold and conveyed all his interest to
Disbrow.
December 7, 1837, Whiting caused the warehouse to be in
sured in his own name, but for the benefit of Jones, against
loss by fire, in the sum of $2,500, in fulfillment of his covenant
in the lease. The next April the warehouse was destroyed by
fire. No payment had then been made on the mortgage to
Jones. The insurer was ready to pay the amount of his policy
to Whiting, but Disbrow claimed three-fourths thereof, and
alleged in the bill an offer to pay three-fourths of the amount of
the mortgage to Jones if Jones would stipulate to give him
possession, and to rebuild the warehouse within a reasonable
51
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time, and give him three-fourths of the insurance money. This.
ofier was denied by the answer of Jones.
[*50] *April 29, 1837, one installment of the mortgage to
Jones being due and unpaid, he proceeded to foreclose
under the power of sale. ' Disbrow then filed his bill, alleging
that the whole of the premises had been advertised for sale by
Jones for the first installment, and insisting that it was not
competent to advertise and sell more than was necessary to pay
the amount then due. He also alleged the mortgage to be
defectively executed, there being but one subscribing witness
to the execution by the Browns; and he prayed for an injunc
tion to restrain the insurance company from paying over the
money, and to inhibit and enjoin Jones from proceeding
to foreclose under his notice, and that Thompson be decreed
to vest in complainant a more perfect title to the pre
[*51] mises, or *that the sale from Thompson to complainant.
might be set aside, and he be decreed to repay the pur
chase money, etc.
The answers showed that the mortgaged property was so
situated that it could not be sold in parcels without injury to
the whole.
i
A preliminary injunction having been granted, motion was
now made to dissolve the same.
D. Goodwin and Tl Romeyn for the motion.
Woodbridge if: Backus, contra.
[*55] *Trua: Cnancnrmosz
In the argument of this motion it has been urged on
the part of the complainant that Jones, having put it in the
power of his vendees to commit a fraud upon the complainants,
is responsible for the consequences.
I am unable to see anything in this case to authorize this
position in the argument. There is no showing that goes to
charge Jones with fraud.
At the time of the execution and delivery of the conveyance
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by Jones to Thompson and others, Whiting was in possession
-and occupied the premises under the lease from Jones, and the
vendees all knew that fact. Whiting was applied to at the
same time to learn whether he wished or intended to occupy
the premises the full term to which the lease had been extended
(to February 1, 1839), and he replied that he did, and this fact
was also communicated to the vendees of Jones.
There is
,
therefore, not only the absence of fraud on the part
of Jones in this respect, but Whiting’s right to occupy formed
"the subject of a positive agreement between Jones and his
vendees.
The deed by Jones, the bond and mortgage on the premises
by his vendees, and an instrument or agreement reciting and
"recognizing Whiting’s unexpired term, and his right to occupy
under the lease, signed by all the vendees, were all executed
and delivered at the same time; each of these instruments,
therefore,
mu_st
be regarded as a part of, and as constituting
one and the same transaction. The vendees of Jones
have *nothing to complain of, for Whiting was in pos- [*56]
session when they purchased, and their right to posses
-sion was subject, by agreement, to his unexpired term. Dis
brow, the complainant, was not an original purchaser from
Jones, but derived his title through the vendees of Jones, and
clearly they could convey no greater interest than that which
they themselves had in the premises.
Whiting was also in possession, and occupied the premises at
the time of Disbrow’s purchase from Thompson, and Disbrow
knew that fact, as he admits in his bill; and there is no prin
ciple better settled than that the possession of a tenant is notice
to a purchaser of the actual interest the tenant may have in the
premises: Ohesterman v. Gardner,5 Johns. Ch., 29; Daniels
v. Davison, 16 Ves., 249; Taylor v. Slibbert, 2 Ves., 437.
In the case in 4 Hen. cf; Zllunjl, 120, which has been cited by
the complainant, it does not appear that the purchaser had
notice that Bibb was in possession before he received the first
(SI
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deed (of February 11, 1790), and this fact, on a careful exami
nation of the case, will be found to form the basis of that
decision. In the case of Grimstone v. Carter, 3 Paige, 439, I
have been able to find nothing conflicting with the rule above
stated, but on the contrary Chancellor Walworth says in that
case, that it is the settled law of the land that the possession
of premises by a third person is suflicient to put purchasers on
inquiry, and to deprive them of the defense of bona fide pur
chasers without notice of his rights.
From the answers of Jones and Whiting in this case, it is
clearly to be inferred that Disbrow had, at the time of his pur
chase, not only notice of the existence and substance, but also
of the details of Whiting’s lease.
It is, therefore, clear to my mind that when Disbrow pur
chased the premises of Thompson, he took them not only sub
ject to the mortgage, but also to Whiting’s term under the
lease.
It is also insisted by the complainant, that the mortgage is
defective, there being but one witness to the execution
[*57] of it *by Garrett and N. J. Brown. To this allegation
the defendants answer, that the officer who~took the
acknowledgment must be considered a subscribing witness.
It is not necessary now to decide how far the execution of the
mortgage may be considered in compliance with the statute,
for if the mortgage were defectively executed in this respect,
it could form no ground in the present case for the interfer
ence of this court.
The complainant has recognized this mortgage in his pur
chase, and there is no pretense that the money is not due.
The tender alleged in the bill is not supported by any other
evidence, and is positively denied in the answer.
That the whole of the premises are advertised to be sold for
the first installment due on the mortgage, furnishes no ground
for the interference of this court, as it is shown by the answer
that the premises are valuable principally for a wharf and store
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house, and the whole premises have heretofore been used and
occupied for that purpose, and cannot be sold separately with
out injury to the whole.
After a careful examination of the whole matter, I have
been irresistibly led to the conclusion that the case does not
justify an interference with the policy of insurance.
The insurance is a personal contract, and does not pass
with the title of the property insured. This doctrine is clearly
laid down in Ellis on Insurance, 10. 72. The language of Lord
Chancellor King is there quoted, and he says, in reference to
policies of insurance: “ these policies are not insurances of the
specific things mentioned to be insured, nor do such insurances
attach on the realty, or in any manner go with the same as
incident thereto, by any conveyance or assignment; but they
are only special agreements with the persons insuring against
such loss or damage as they may sustain.” This doctrine is fully
recognized, and stated to be the true one in the Sadrllers’ Com
pany '0. Badcock, 2 Atk., 554, and in 1 Phillips on Insurance, 27.
All the decisions I have been able to find conflicting with
this principle arise under the builders’ act, statute of 14 George
III, which empowers the governors or directors of the
insurance *ofiices within certain districts, upon the [*58]
request of any persons interested in or entitled to any
houses or buildings which may be burned down, etc., or upon
any grounds of suspicion that the person insured has been
guilty of fraud or wilfully setting the houses or buildings on fire,
to cause the insurance money to be laid out, as far as the same
will go, towards rebuilding or repairing the property damaged,
etc. Although, therefore, a policy as a personal contract does
not pass with the property insured, yet a covenant to insure to
a certain amount, entered into by a lessee or other person hav
ing an estate in land, is so far beneficial to the property, that
in cases to which this statute applies, it will run with the land,
and an assignee entitled to the benefits of covenants real may
as
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maintain an action on the covenant to insure, if it be not
observed: Hughes on Insurance, 892.
The case of Vernon '0. Smith, 5 Barn. & Ald., 1, was a case
arising under the statute of 14 George III, and the views
expressed by Best, J ., in that case have not the authority of a
decision, and the reasons upon which those views were based
do not exist here.
If Jones had no remaining interest or liabilities, the case
would present a different aspect. But if the views heretofore
taken are correct, the execution and delivery of a deed, bond
and mortgage, and agreement, were all at the same time, and
formed parts of one and the same transaction, and that Dis
brow had legal notice of the existence of the lease, it follows
that both Whiting and Jones had an insurable interest. Jones
is bound to pay $1,400 per year for the two years, and is bound
by his contract with Whiting to rebuild in six months,_and
Whiting is to pay rent for the two years.
Whether the doctrine of Best, J ., in 5 Barn. & A1d., be cor
rect or not, it would be going further than any case I have
been able to find to interfere by injunction in cases like the
present. The legal rights of the parties should be carefully
guarded, and seldom interfered with by injunction.
As to whether Jones may not be compelled to apply the
insurance money, at or before the expiration of Whit
[*59] ing’s term, *need not now be decided. The dissolution
of this injunction does not prevent Disbrow’s recovery
of Jones, if he is liable to him for any portion of the insurance
money; and there is no allegation in the bill that Jones is
insolvent or unable to pay any amount which may be recov
ered against him. _
Upon the whole, then, Jones seems to have acted fairly, so far,
at least, as regards the sale to the vendees. All of the facts
in relation to the premises were at that time disclosed by Jones,
and Whiting’s right to occupy under the lease was made the
mi
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subject matter of a positive agreement between Jones and his
vendees.
Whiting continued to occupy and was in possession when
Disbrow purchased from Thompson, and Disbrow knew that
fact, and this the law regards as notice to him of Whiting’s
rights in the premises.
If a fraud has been practiced upon the complainant at all, it
is by his immediate vendees, and as against them he has an
adequate remedy.
Jones is
,
therefore, clearly entitled to his remedy to collect
his money which is due; he has not been in fault, and it would
be unjust to restrain him from doing so. Jones and Whiting
had an insurable interest to more than the amount insured, and
they have earned the benefits to be derived from the policy, for
they have paid the premium on the insurance.
Some other points have been made in the argument, and they
have all been carefully considered, and I have been irresistibly
led to the conclusion above stated.
This case may be, like the case of Grimstone v. Garter, 3
Paige’s Reports, 439, a hard one; but this court is bound by
the rules of law, and whenever courts shall undertake to judge
according to the convenience of parties in each case, there is
an end to all fixed and settled rules, and the rights of parties
will be left to the caprice of whomsoever may occupy the seats
of justice at the time. The injunction in this case must be
dissolved.
Injunction dissolved. I
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Aaron Gofi‘ and others v. John Thompson and others.
O'0nsideration: Agreement to support. An agreement by a daughter and her hus
band to support her father during his natural life, is a sufficient consideration
for a.conveyance of the father’s lands to the daughter.
And after the death of the father, the agreement having been fully performed, the
conveyance will not be set aside to give effect to a previous will made by the
father, notwithstanding the daughter had attempted, by deed executed by her
alone, to reconvey the lands to the father as security for his support.
Deed of married women void. Such a deed, executed by a married woman without
her husband joining with her, is void. (a)
Bill by the devisees of Richard McCurdy (who was deceased),
to set aside a conveyance of land which he had made to Diana
Thompson, his daughter, the wife of John Thompson,
[*61] and dated September 27, 1834. *The bill charged
Thompson and his wife with fraud in procuring said
deed, and alleged that afterwards (in December, 1834), on said
Richard threatening legal proceedings to set the same aside,
said Diana executed, acknowledged and delivered to him adeed
to reconvey the same lands, in which deed her husband did not
join, but said Richard, who was an ignorant man, received the
same, not knowing that the husband’s joining therein was nec
essary; that in the following September said Richard died,
leaving a last will, under which complainants claimed, and
which had been duly proved.
[*62] *The bill prayed that the deed to said Diana might be
decreed to be void and ordered to be delivered up to be
canceled, and that an account might be taken, etc.
[*63] *The answer fully denied all fraud ; averred that the
deed to said Diana was given by said Richard at his
(a) This rule of the common law was changed by statute in 1855,and since that
time a married woman may convey her lands alone, by deed executed and acknowl
edged in the same manner asif she were unmarried: See Compiled Laws, §829£;
Farr v. Sherman, 11Mich.. 33; Watson v. Thurber, Ibid.. 457. And husband and wife
may convey directly to each other: Burdeno v. Amperse, 14Mich, 91.
l._____ss
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urgent request and solicitation, that in consideration thereof
they would receive him into their family and support him dur
ing his natural life, which agreement they made and fully per
formed ; and that the deed afterwards executed by said Diana
and delivered to said Richard, was executed at the request and
for the satisfaction of said Richard, in order to secure to him
the support agreed upon, he, the said Richard, having expressed
fears that a claim set up by one of the complainants against
said John Thompson might otherwise deprive him of the pro
vision he had made for his old age.
*The case was submitted on bill and answer. [*66]
A. D. Fraser, for complainant.
B. R H. VVitherell, for defendants.
Tan Cnsnonrmon :
The consideration for the deed from Richard McCurdy to
Diana Thompson was a good and suflicient consideration, and
the condition having. been performed, there can be no doubt
that the title of the defendants, John Thompson and wife, to
the land in question is good.
The conduct of the defendants, John and Diana Thompson,
seems to have been not only just, but meritorious.
The deed from Diana Thompson to Richard McCurdy is
stated in the answer to have been executed as security merely,
and having been destroyed or canceled by the grantee, in pur
suance of the agreement of the parties, cannot form the found
ation of any claim of the present complainants. That deed was
also void in itself, it having been executed by a feme covert with
out her husband’s joining with her : See Sexton v. Pickering,
3 Rand. R., 468. -
No relief is prayed against Carson McCurdy, the other
defendant.
The bill must be dismissed, with costs.
Bill dismissed.
U
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Specific performance of parol contract: What will take case out of statute of
frauds. Specific performance will be decreed of a parol contract for the con
veyance of lands where the vendor has received a considerable portion of the
purchase money, caused the land to be surveyed, put the vendee in possession,
and allowed him to retain such possession and make valuable improvements, in
reliance on the contract, for a series of years; these acts of part performance
being sumcient to take the case out of the statute of frauds. (a)
The bill in this case was filed for a specific performance of a
parol contract to convey land.
The bill states that some time in the year 1830 the complain
ant and defendant entered into an agreement, in and by which
the defendant sold to the complainant a certain tract of land
situated on Otter creek, in the county of Monroe, being three
arpents in front and twenty-five in depth, in consideration of
(a) This case is more fully stated and considered on appeal to the supremo
court, where the opinion was delivered by Fmrrcnnn, CB. J. It is reported in 8
Mich., 463,and the following is the syllabus:
Vfltat is material in a contract to convey lands. In a contract for the conveyance
of land, the time, place and mode of payment are not considered matters of sub
stance unless by the express stipulation of the parties they are declared to be so,
or unless from the special nature of the case, and the necessary intention and
understanding between the parties, they must be deemed material. Therefore,
where on abill for the specific performance of a. parol agreement for the pur
chase and conveyance of lands the contract as proved varied in these particulars
from that set out in the bill, but corresponded in other respects, the variance
was held not materiel
Party in default will berelieved where it is not unconscientious. Where the parties
to an agreement have not expressly stipulated that performance at a particular
time shall be an essential part of the agreement, and where, from the circum
stances and nature of the contract, and the situation of the parties, there would
be no particular hardship upon the party against whom the execution of the
contract is sought to be entorced—the conduct of the party in default not being
unfair or his claim unconscientlous—a court of equity, so far as performance
at the time is concerned, will aid the party in default, and decree a specific exe
cution of the agreement as the only adequate measure of equitable justice
between the parties.
W7:-atpart performance will take case out of statute of frauds. Where, under a
parol contract for the purchase and conveyance of lands, the vendor had caused
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which the complainant was to pay $150; $80 of this sum was to
be paid immediately in cattle, and the balance in the three
years thereafter ; that it was understood by the parties that if
the complainant found it inconvenient to pay the balance in
three years, that then and in such case the defendant was to
give further time, and would receive, instead of money, cattle
or grain, as might suit the convenience of the complainant.
The bill further states that the agreement was not reduced
to writing, the complainant having full confidence in the integ
rity of the defendant; that the defendant caused a survey of
the land in question to be made, and put the complainant in
the full possession thereof, which possession the complainant
has ever since held, and paid the taxes thereon; that the com
plainant, pursuant to said agreement, did deliver to the defen
dant cattle valued at $80; that on the 10th day of July, 1835,
the complainant tendered to the defendant the sum of $94.50,
the land to be surveyed, received upwards of one-half the purchase price, put
the vendee in possession, and had permitted him to retain that possession for
several years, in reliance upon the contract, and without taking any steps to put
an end to it : Held, that these acts of the vendor constituted such a part perfor
mance as to take the case out of the operation of the statute of frauds, and
entitle the vendee to a specific performance of the agreement.
Bill for specific performance, what it must set forth: Evidence not warranted by
allegations must be disregarded. In a bill for the specific performance of a
paroi contract for the conveyance of land, the general facts relied upon showing
a part performance as a ground for taking the case out of the statute of frauds,
and for enforcing the agreement, must be specifically set forth. And if evidence»
is taken in the case of valuable improvements made by complainant on the land
in controversy, when there is no allegation in the bill with respect to such
improvements, the court cannot consider such evidence in the decision of the
cause.
That time is not generally of the essence of such contracts. See Wallace 1:.Pidge,
4 Mich., 570; Morris 1;.Hoyt, 11Mich., 9; Richmond v. Robinson, 12Mich., 193; Con
verse 1:.Blurm-ich_ 14 Mich., 109. That it may become so where the vendee delays»
until the value of the property is essentially changed. See Smith v. Lawrence, 15
Mich., 499.
That the court cannot give relief on a case proved but not put in issue by the
pleadings. See Wurcherer v. Hewitt, 10Mich., 453; Peckham v. Bufum, 11 Mich.,
529; Dunn v. Dunn, 11Mich., 284; Moran v. Palmer, 18Mich., 367.
And on the general subject of specific performance, see Burtch v. Hogge, ante, 81,
and notes.
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being the balance of the consideration money and interest,
which he refused to accept.
The answer denies making the agreement set out in the bill,
but admits that an agreement was made in substance as
[*68] follows: *The defendant agreed to sell the land in
question to the complainant, but defendant does not
recollect whether the complainant was to pay two or three dol
lars per acre ; that the defendant was to receive $80 in cattle
from the complainant in part payment, upon the delivery of
possession of said land; that the complainant further agreed
to deliver to the defendant during the fall next succeeding, a
certain yoke of oxen as a further payment, and the balance in
three years, with interest, and also to pay the taxes on said
land, and on two other tracts which the defendant owned.
The defendant denies that he agreed to give further time
after the expiration of said three years, to pay the balance of
the consideration money, should the complainant find it incon
venient to pay such balance, or receive grain instead of money,
or any other cattle than the yoke of oxen which the defendant
avers the complainant was to deliver in the fall; the defendant
further states that it was understood between the parties that
a bond for a deed was to be given to the complainant upon
receiving the said yoke of oxen, and a deed upon the payment
of the whole amount agreed to be paid.
The defendant admits that in the fall of 1835 the complainant
called upon him, and said that he was ready to pay the amount
due for the purchase of the said tract of land, etc., and further
admits that the complainant asked him (the defendant) to
receive the balance due, which the complainant said he then
had in money, etc.
Whipple and Vandg/he, for complainant.
R Johnson, for defendant.
Tnr: Onanonnnonz
From the testimony there can be no doubt that the agreement
between the parties was substantially as stated in the bill.
02
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‘ By the testimony in the case, it appears that the price to be
paid by the complainant for the land was $150; that
$80 was *paid down, leaving only a balance of $70 due; [*69]
that the land was surveyed by defendant, and that he
put the complainant in possession. It further appears that
complainant has resided on the land ever since, and that he has
built an addition to the house, has cleared, fenced and improved
some twenty-five acres of land, and set out an orchard. The
improvements are estimated by the witnesses at from $200 to
$500.
The payment of so considerable a portion of the purchase
money, the being placed in possession by the defendant, and
the long occupation by the complainant, and valuable improve
ments made by him on the premises, are such acts of part per
fcrmance as to take the case out of the statute of frauds.
It is next to be considered whether there has been such a
neglect to perform the conditions of the contract, on the part
of the complainant, as to preclude him from relief in this court.
There is some discrepancy between the answer and the testi
mony as to what the precise terms of the agreement were.
The witnesses Lavigne and Antaillaird both state that the
agreement was, that after the payment of $80, the defendant
was to give the complainant three years to pay the balance. and
that if the defendant was not then able to pay, he would give
him a longer time and would not trouble him. The defendant,
in his answer, says the complainant was to have delivered to
him another yoke of oxen in the fall, and that then he was
to have three years to pay the balance. He further says his
object in selling the land was to obtain the oxen in the fall, and
also because he should want money at the end of three years.
It is conclusively established that the price to be paid for the
land was $150, and that $80 was paid down, and that the bal
ance due was but $70. Now if the oxen had been delivered in
the fall, at $50, there would have been but $20 remaining.
It seems somewhat strange that the defendant (who is a man
ca
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of wealth, as appears) should let either the one or the other of
these objects form the inducement to the sale.
From a view of the whole sase, I am led to the con
[*70] clusion *that this matter of the delivery of the oxen in
the fall did not form any part of the original contract,
and that this matter is improperly blended with the agreement
set up in the answer. It seems incredible that three years’ time
should have been given to pay the $20, with the assurance that,
if it should become necessary, the time should be further ex
tended.
, The defendant states in his answer that he does not remem
ber whether the price of the land was $150 or $225. Now, if
he cannot remember what the price of the land was, it may be
presumed, without any imputation of intentional mis-statement,
that he may have so far, at least, forgotten its details as to have
mingled that which was a matter of subsequent conversation
with the original agreement. Three witnesses concur in their
statements with regard to the price to be paid for the land, and
as to the terms of agreement between the parties; and this
statement of the agreement which is given by the witnesses
was made by the parties about the time the sale was made, and
when it was fresh in the recollection of both the complainant
and the defendant. The terms of the agreement were simple
and easily understood, and the witnesses all concur that 8150 was
to be paid for the land, $80 of which was paid down, the bal
ance to be paid within three years; that the complainant stated
at the same time that, from the relation which exists between
him and the defendant, if defendant could not pay him the bal
ance at the end of the three years, that he would not trouble
the defendant, but would give him further time. Can this be
reconciled at all with the fact that the balance was only $20?
There can be but little doubt that the witnesses state the con
tract correctly, and that this agreement to deliver the cattle
in the fall, and to pay taxes, was in pursuance of the agreement
that the defendant would receive cattle or grain for the balance.
04
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This is perfectly consistent with the conversation between the
complainant and the defendant, mentioned by Le Duo in his
testimony, and in no other way can the whole of the testimony
be reconciled.
When the defendant said to the complainant, “ You did not
bring the oxen !” the complainant replied, by way of
apology, *that one of them had died; and this conversa~ [*71]
tion is perfectly consistent with the testimony of the
three witnesses first named. In their statement of the agree
ment there appears to have been no condition that the com
plainant was to deliver to the defendant a pair of oxen, as stated
in the answer. This must have been a matter of subsequent
conversation, and in no other way can it be reconciled, either
with the testimony or the other facts in the case.
But even supposing this condition had made a part of the
original agreement under the facts in the case, this court would
hesitate much before it would refuse relief to the complainant.
Here the excuse for the non-delivery of the oxen was, that
one of the oxen died before the time they were to have been
delivered. The defendant permitted the complainant to remain
in possession, without taking any steps to rescind the agree
ment, until 1835, and permitted him to go on uninterrupted to
make valuable and permanent improvements on the premises.
This case, in itself, is not of great importance, but it is import
ant to the complainant, as it involves the labor of many years.
I cannot well conceive of a case which would call more
strongly upon the court to decree a specific performance of a
contract, on the ground of part performance, than this. The
tender on the part of the complainant was suflicient under the
circumstances; it was an offer to pay the balance, which was
refused by the defendant.
The complainant must have a decree for a specific perform
ance upon payment of the balance due, with interest.
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David Cooper and Charles Jackson v. Hiram Alden and others,
Commissioners of Internal Improvement, and the
Mayor. etc., of Detroit.
Order for injunction by ofllcer out of court: Motion to dissolve. An injunction
granted by a justice of the supreme court, in cases where the statute authorizes
it, stands upon the same footing as it granted by the chancellor; and in either
case it is competent for the defendants, in vacation, and before they put in their
answer, to move to dismiss the injunction tor want of equity in the bill.
Lot owners in Detroit, rights of in streets. Purchasers of lots in the city of Detroit
acquire no other or greater rights from the fact that said city was laid out by the
governor and judges of the late territory of Michigan, under an act ot Congress
authorizing them so to do, than they would acquire it the same had been laid out
by an individual who had legally dedicated certain portions for streets and alleys.
Rights of lot owners in streets: Power of city to lease street. Purchasers of lots
bounded on a street or square acquire a right to have such street or square pre
served and appropriated to the uses for which it was dedicated, and the city, in
the absence of any express authority, has no power to lease any portion of such
street or square, to be used for a purpose destructive of the ends tor which it was
originally dedicated. (a)
Injunction to prevent improper appropriation of street. Where land is dedicated to
a particular purpose, and the municipal authorities undertake to appropriate it
to an entirely diflerent one, they may be restrained by injunction, on the appli
cation ol an adjoining lot owner, from so doing.
Corporate powers of Detroit. The corporation of the city of Detroit has no power
except that which is conferred by the act of incorporation or other acts specially
relating thereto. (b)
Commissioners of internal improvement, power of to appropriate streets. The com
missioners 0! internal improvement have no right, under the general powers
conferred on them, to appropriate a portion of a street in the city of Detroit for
the purpose of erecting ofiices and other buildings thereon. (c)
Injunction against public oflicers. Equity has undoubted jurisdiction to interfere by
injunction where public ofilcers are proceeding illegally and improperly, under a
claim of right, to do any act to the injury of individual rights. (cl)
The bill in this case was filed September 20, 1832, and stated
that complainant Jackson was the owner in fee of the west
(a) See People v. Carpenter, 1Mich., 173. See, also, a very lull discussion of this
general subject in Milhau v. Sharp, 17Barb., 435; Same v. Same, 28Barb., 228; Same
Case, on appeal, 27N. Y.,6l1.
(b) The general inclination of courts seems to have been to construe all charters
of incorporation strictly, and to require the corporation in all cases to show legisla
tive suthority for the powers it assumes to exercise: See Dunham v. Rochester, 5
C0w., 465; Mayor of Savannah v. Hartridge, 8 Ga., 23; Rochester 11.Collins, 12Barb.,
559; Reed v. Toledo, 18 Ohio, 161; Mt. Pleasant 1:.Breeze, ll Iowa, 339; Bennett 1.1.
Birmingham, 31Penn. St., 16.
(c) In People v. Carpenter, 1 Mich.. 173,it was said that neither the common
council ot Detroit nor the governor and judges (the legislative authority) of Michi
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half of lot number 43, and that complainant Cooper was the
owner in fee of the east half of said lot, and also the entire lot
42, both of said lots being in section six of the city of Detroit,
according to the plan of the city made and adopted by the gov
ernor and judges of the late territory of Michigan, pursuant to
the provisions of an act of congress for that purpose.
'
*That said lots were situated adjoining and fronting [*73]
on a public street called Michigan Grand avenue, 200
feet wide; that said street was laid out and established as a
public street and open space, not only for the free and uninter
rupted use of all the citizens as a street, but for the ornament
of said city, and more especially for the convenience, benefit,
use and healthfulness of the lots adjacent to and situated on
said avenue; that complainants, and those through and under
whom they claim, had been in full, peaceable, quiet and unin
terrupted possession of said lots and of said avenue, as an ease
ment, for more than twenty-five years last past; that they gave
a much greater price for the lots than they would have done,
had they supposed they did not acquire a vested right in said
avenue as permanent and indefeasible as in the lots themselves;
that they had expended large sums of money in improving said
lots, had erected expensive buildings and actually resided
thereon with their families for several years.
That the mayor, recorder, aldermen, etc., of the city of
Detroit, September 4, 1838, executed a lease to the people of
the state of Michigan, reciting that,
“ Wnnnans, Pursuant to a call of the mayor of the city of
Detroit, a meeting of the freemen was held at the city hall, in
said city, on Thursday, the second day of August, A. D. 1838:
gan Territory could authorize the exclusive use of any of the streets of the city by
individuals. This is unquestionably true so far as the appropriation would interfere
with the vested rights of adjoining individual lot owners, and to that extent the case
of Carpenter supports the present.
(d) See Brown v. Gardner, post, 290. The right to restrain public officers by
injunction, when proceeding illegally, was also recognized in Williams v. Detroit, 2
Mich., 560;Woodbridge v. Detroit, 8 Mich., 274;Palmer v. Rich, 12Mich., 414;Miller
r. Grandy, 13Mich., 540;Conway v. Waverly, 15Mich., 257; School District v. Dean,
17Mich., 223;Ryan v. Brown, 18Mich., 196;Kinyon v. Duchene, 21Mich., 498.
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And whereas, after said meeting was duly organized, and the
object of the call explained, the following resolution was
adopted by said meeting, viz.:
“ Resolved, That the common council of said city be author
ized to lease to the state of Michigan a space in Michigan
Grand avenue, between the city hall and Bates street, adjoin
ing Bates street, sixty feet in width and extending one hun
dred and forty feet towards the city hall, for the purpose of
erecting a brick building for a depot for passenger cars, and
for other purposes connected with the operations of the Cen
tral railroad; and also the privilege of laying a track or tracks
from the‘ present termination of the railroad, in the most eligi
ble manner, to the aforesaid ground between Bates street and
the city hall.
[*7-1]
* “ Now, therefore, be it known, that the common
council of said city, in obedience to the resolution of the
freemen of said city, above recited, so far as they have power
and authority under the city charter and amendments thereto,
and without the intervention of a jury to assess private dam
ages, and in this manner so to do, do hereby lease to the peo
ple of the state of Michigan all that space of ground in the
center of Michigan Grand avenue, in said city, between the
city hall and Bates street, sixty feet in width on the west side
of Bates street, adjoining said Bates street, and extending one
hundred and forty feet towards the city hall, for the purpose
of erecting thereupon a brick building, to be used as a passen
ger car house and for railroad oflices, connected with the oper
ations of the Central railroad only. And the said common
council, so far as they have power, as aforesaid, do hereby also
grant to the people of the state of Michigan the other privi
leges in said resolution of the freemen above recited, for the
purposes therein specified.
“It being always understood, however, and these presents
are upon these express conditions, and not otherwise, viz.:
“That these presents and the privileges and ground hereby
as
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granted and leased to the people of said state, shall continue
and be in force so long as said ground and the buildings
thereon to be erected, and said privileges, shall be used and
occupied for the purposes hereinbefore specified and mentioned,
and that as soon as they shall cease to be thus used and occu
pied, they shall all and singular forthwith revert to the mayor,
recorder, aldermen and freemen of the city of Detroit, and
these presents from thenceforth be null and void.
“ And upon the further condition, that no more than one
track or railway shall be placed or made across Woodward
avenue, from the present termination of the railroad, for the
purpose of arriving at said passenger car house.
“ And upon this further condition, that in case the people of
said state, or their agents, or the commissioners of the Central
railroad, or the acting commissioner thereof, do not, within one
month from this date, notify the common council of said
*city of the acceptance of this lease and privileges [*75]
hereby granted, subject to the provisions, conditions and
understanding hereinbefore and hereinafter contained, or in
case the said people or their agents, or said commissioners or
commissioner, or his or their successors in ofiice, do not, within
the period of one year from and after the date of such notification .
to said common council, have erected and completed the afore
said brick building, and in use for the purposes aforesaid; then,
and in each of these cases, these presents shall cease, be inopera
tive, null and void. And these presents are upon this further
express condition and understanding, and not otherwise, viz.:
that the said state of Michigan shall and will, from time to
time, and at all times, save harmless and keep indemnified said
common council and every member thereof, and the mayor,
recorder, aldermen and freemen of the city of Detroit, of and
from all damages, sums of money, costs, charges, troubles, suits
and expenses which they or any of them shall or may, at any
time hereafter, be put unto, by being compelled to pay dam
ages or sums of money to individuals, by reason of said com
00
75 CASES IN CHAN CERY.
Coorsa v. Arman.
mon council having executed these presents, or on account of
said space of ground and privileges hereby granted being used
or occupied as aforesaid. In testimony,” etc.
That ifsaid road should be constructed and laid down as
contemplated, it would pass along the entire front of complain
ants’ dwelling houses and premises on Michigan Grand avenue,
and near to the same; and that if the building contemplated
by the lease should be erected, it would greatly incumber said
avenue, and block up and obstruct the free use of the same,
and extend across the entire front of said lots, to the great
annoyance and damage of complainants. The bill charged
that the lease was made without authority; it further stated
that the commissioners of internal improvement did, on or
about the same day the lease was made, accept the same in
behalf of the people of the state of Michigan, and by a reso
lution of the board directed the acting commissioner on the
Central railroad to go on and erect the buildings, and lay down
the track of the railroad, as contemplated in the lease,
[*76] without *providing any compensation whatever for
complainants’ damages; that Hiram Alden, the acting
commissioner, had employed engineers and other persons, and
actually commenced the construction of said road and build
ings, and threatened to continue the same; that the necessary
grade for said road would elevate the same from one to three
feet above the general level of said avenue.
The bill prayed an injunction to restrain the commissioners
from constructing the road and erecting the buildings, in said
Michigan Grand avenue, etc.
Upon proof of the sickness of the chancellor, an injunction was
granted, according to the prayer of the bill, by the Hon. George
Morell, one of the justices of the supreme court, Sept. 20, 1838.
A motion was now made to dissolve the injunction for want
of equity in the bill.
P. Morey, attorney-general, for defendant Alden.
1. The complainants do not show such rights as will authorize
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the court to interfere in their behalf by injunction, nor such a
case as will sustain a decree. _
2. If the court should be against us on the first point, then
we say, that by their own showing in the bill, they have an
ample and complete remedy at law for the injury complained
of; for if they have rights to sustain this proceeding, they
must have sufficient to sustain a suit at law for the trespass;
or, if their property is injured, they can appeal to the appraisers
under the provisions of the 15th section of the act for the
regulation of internal improvement, etc., page 197, Session.
Laws of 1837.
3. By the provisions of the 20th section of the act relative
to the city of Detroit, approved April 4, 1827, and the 1st
section of an act to amend the same, approved June 29, 1832,
the common council are vested with full power and authority
“to make or alter” streets and “ generally to do and perform
under the by-laws and ordinances or other directions of the
common‘ council,” whatever may be for the regularity, public
health, and convenience of the city.
*And by the lease set out in the bill, all this power is [*7 7]
delegated to the board of internal improvement. This, ‘
it is contended, must operate as an estoppel of any claim of
the complainants, and as a relinquishment of damages by the
city of Detroit; and on this ground, it is contended there is no
equity shown in complainants’ bill, or rather that their own
showing divests them of a right to interfere.
4. But conceding all other grounds, it is still contended that
the “right of eminent domain,” under our constitution and
laws, must remain with the sovereign power, the people; and
that the defendant, Hiram Alden, acting commissioner of the
Central railroad, who appears for the purpose of making this
motion, was but acting as the agent of the people in the exercise
of this right, in doing the acts complained of in the bill, and
consequently that no court can interfere with or restrain him
and his associates, in the exercise of the power thus delegated
to them by the sovereignty of the state.
71
77 GASES IN CHANCERY.
Coornn v. Annex.
It is urged that this right of “ eminent domain ” was intended
to be exercised by the legislature, and that it is fully delegated
to the commissioners of internal improvement by- the 15th sec
tion of the act for the regulation of internal improvement,
and for the appointment of a board of commissioners, approved
March 21, 1837. See Session Laws of 1837, pages I97 and 198.
The following authorities are referred to as fully sustaining
the construction contended for: Rodgers 0. Bradshaw, 20
Johns, 735, and cases cited; Wheeloclc v. Young and Pratt,
4 Wend., 647; Beekrnan v. Saratoga (f: Schenectady R. R.
C’0., 3 Paige, 72, 73, and cases cited; Varick v. Smith and
Attorney General, 5 Paige, 137; The Mohawk Bridge Co. v.
The Uifica zf: Schenectady R. R. 00., 6 Paige, 560 to 565; and
the Charles River Bridge Co. v. The Warren Bridge 00., ll
Peters, 536 to 583, and the cases cited.
5. It is contended also, that the allegations in the bill show
that the people of the state of Michigan, the grantees in the
lease,which the complainants seek to have delivered up to be
canceled, should have been made parties to the bill, and
[*78] that the *injunction should be dissolved because their
rights cannot be infringed in a case to which they are
not parties.
Woodbridge cf: Backus, contra. (Argument omitted.)
[*84] *THE OHANCELLOEZ
A preliminary objection is made by the counsel for
the complainants, that the injunction in this case, having been
allowed upon the bill, as sworn to, and no answer having been
put in, nor the state of the case varied, it is not competent, or
according to the course of practice, to move to dissolve on the
same state of facts in vacation.
Our statute (R. S., 376', sec. 108) authorizes the justices of
the supreme court severally, to “exercise the powers of the
chancellor, with respect to the granting of injunctions,” in
certain cases. An injunction granted by a justice of the
supreme court, in cases where the statute authorizes it
,
stands
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upon the same footing as if granted by the chancellor, and in
either case, it is competent for the defendants in vacation, and
before they put in their answer, to move to dissolve the injunc
tion for the want of equity in the bill. See Zllinturn 2:. Sey
mour, 4 Johns. Ch., 173.
It is urged by the counsel for the complainants, that the
mayor, recorder and aldermen had no authority to make the
lease to the commissioners of internal improvement; that the
city of Detroit, having been laid out by the government of the
United States, and lots purchased with reference to the plan of
the city, adopted by the government at the time of laying out
the same, the purchasers have acquired vested rights of such a
character, that the plan of the city, thus adopted and estab
lished, cannot be changed or in any manner interfered
*with, even by the full and express authority of 1egisla- [*85]
tive power, and that the exercise of such a power is re
garded in the light of a revocation of a grant, or the violation
of the obligation of a contract, and the cases of Fletcher 0.
Peck, and Dartmouth College v. Woodward, are cited in support
of this doctrine. I cannot view the question in this light. I
am unable to perceive that the United States, by authorizing
their trustees, the governor and judges, to lay out a town,
intended to convey or did convey, any other or greater rights
to purchasers of lots in the premises, than would be acquired
by purchasers of lots where an individual had laid out a town
or city, and had legally dedicated certain portions for streets
and alleys, on which lots were bounded. But it is undoubtedly
true that purchasers of lots bounded upon a street or square,
acquire a right and are interested in its preservation, and the
application of such street or square to the uses for which it was
dedicated; and should any city corporation, without full and
express authority so to do, undertake to grant any portion of
such public street to other individuals, to be used for any pur
pose which should be destructive of the ends for which such
street was originally dedicated, such grant would be void. It
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is not necessary to discuss at present, the extent or the limits
of the legislative power to authorize an improvement in a city
or town, by the change of a plan, or a mere easement as a right
of way for a railroad, or even the absolute appropriation, for
the purpose of erecting permanent public buildings.
If the ground had been dedicated to a particular purpose, and
the city authorities had appropriated it to an entirely difierent
one, it might afford ground for the interference of a court of
chancery to compel an execution of the trust, by restraining the
corporation, or causing the removal of the obstruction. See
Barkley v. HowelZ’s Trustees, 6 Peters, 507.
It is contended that the common council of the city of Detroit,
in granting the lease set out in the bill, have exceeded their
powers; that no such authority has been given to the city author
ities by the statutes creating and governing the corpora
[*86] tion, *and that the act making such grant is void, and
can in no manner afiect the rights of the complainants.
The authority of the common council to lay out, change or
alter any street or highway, is contained in the second section
of the act entitled “An act to amend an act entitled ‘An act
relative to the city of Detroit,’ approved June 29, 1832,” which
provides “that when any street, lane, alley, sidewalk, high
way, water course or bridge, is proposed to be laid out, estab
lished, opened, made or altered by the said common council in
said city, due notice shall be given to all persons whose property
will be affected thereby, and a jury shall be drawn,” etc., “ who,
after being sworn, shall go on to the premises on which it is
proposed to lay out, establish, open, make or alter any street,
lane, alley, sidewalk, highway, water course or bridge, as afore
said, and from an actual view of the premises, shall, upon their
oaths, determine whether the public improvement or conveni
ence require the thing proposed should be done, and if they
agree in the aflirmative, then they shall proceed to assess the
damages, if any, upon any property affected thereby, respec
tively, to each owner or occupier thereof, and the said damages
'14
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shall be paid before such improvement or alteration shall be
made, and within one month after the verdict, which shall be
returned to, and recorded in the mayor’s court, shall have been
rendered,” etc.
The other sections of the acts relative to the city of Detroit,
referred to, have no application to the present case. The cor
poration of the city of Detroit have no power, except that
which is derived from the act incorporating the same, or the
acts specially relating thereto. See The People v. The Corpora
tion of Albany, 11 Wend., 544; Oakley o. The Trustees of
Vfllliamsburg and lllonroe, 6 Paige, 262.
Does the statute above referred to authorize the corporation
of the city of Detroit, by a vote or lease, to make a permanent
appropriation of a part of one of the streets of the city for the
purpose of erecting a large and permanent building, and to the
great injury of individuals ? Is it such an alteration or change
of the public street as is contemplated by the act ? The
*corporation have not pretended to follow the forms of [*87]
law. It is so alleged, and their acts show it to be so.
The lease is carefully guarded. It says: “The common coun
cil so far as they have power and authority, under the city
charter and amendments thereto, and without the intervention
of a jury, to assess private damages, and in this manner so to
do, do hereby lease to the people of the state of Michigan,” etc.
This lease purports to have been executed by virtue of a reso
lution of apublic meeting of the freemen of the city of Detroit.
But this cannot vary the case; a portion, or even a majority of
the citizens cannot legislate upon the rights of others in this
way. It is competent for individuals to stipulate as to their
own rights or their own property, but they cannot in this way
interfere with the rights or property of others.
The hasty conclusions of a public meeting, regulated by no
forms or rules of proceeding, would be substituted for the safe
guards of our constitution and laws. It would be deserting at
once the learning and the labors of the statesmen and law-givers
rs
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who have endeavored to define and protect the rights of property
among other rights, and submitting all to the passions or inter
est which would prevail at the moment. If it is competent to
lease a street in this manner to be occupied for this purpose, it
would be for any other purpose; and whoever should happen
to be the individual whose dwelling was approached in this
manner, would be fully sensible of the danger and inconvenience
of such an exercise of power. It is not in the power of the city
authorities, at all events, under the existing laws, to make such
a grant to the injury of any individual; and the complainants
may properly treat this proceeding, as far as it interferes with
their rights, as void, and as conferring no authority upon the
commissioners of internal improvement to erect the building
complained of, to their injury. But it is insisted that if it
should be found that the common council exceeded their powers
in granting the lease in question, still the commissioners of
internal improvement have full authority to do the acts com
plained of by the bill.
This presents a difiicult and important question.
[*88] *By the thirteenth section of the act for the regula
tion of internal improvement, etc. (Session Laws of
1887, page 196), the board of internal improvement are author
ized and required to establish the rates of toll, etc., and “ to
erect all such toll houses, weighing scales, oflices, and other
edifices; and also to purchase such grounds for the convenience
thereof as they may think necessary for the convenience and
profitable use of their canals or railroads,” etc.
The fifteenth section of the same act provides that
“ the said
board are hereby empowered to receive any cessions or grants
for the use of the people of this state, from any person or per
sons, of any lands through which any line of canal or railroad
or other public work, shall have been located. Said board of
commissioners, and every acting commissioner under their
direction, shall be, and they are hereby, vested with all the
privileges and powers necessary for the location, construction
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and keeping in repair all canals, railroads and other improve
ments of which they may have charge; and the said board,
their agents or those with whom they may contract for work
ing or repairing any of said works of internal improvement, or
any parts thereof, may enter upon, use and excavate any land
which may be wanted for the site of the same, or any other
purpose which is necessary in the construction or repair of any
of said works,” etc.
It is said, by the counsel for the defendants, that these two
sections give the commissioners full power and lawful author
ity to do all that it is alleged in the bill they have done, or con
template doing. <
Have the legislature, by these general powers, authorizing
and requiring the commissioners to erect toll houses and other
edifices, and to purchase the lands necessary for the convenience
thereof, etc., authorized them in the manner complained of by
the bill, to appropriate and occupy a public street for a perma
nent building, 140 feet long by 60 feet wide, to the great dam
age, as alleged in the bill, of the complainants?
After the most careful examination, I have been led to the
conclusion that the legislature did not contemplate con
ferring *this power on the commissioners, and that no [*89]
such power is
,
by the act, conferred.
In order more fully to understand this question, it may be
well to refer to the laws of the state of New York upon this
subject, and the construction which has been given to the pow
ers of the commissioners conferred by those laws.
By thesixteenth section of the revised laws of New York,
full power is given “to erect on, and take possession of, and
use all lands, streams and waters, the appropriation of which
for the use of such canals and works, shall, in their judgment,
be necessary.” By the nineteenth section of the same law, it
is provided “that whenever for the purpose of constructing a
canal or making any extraordinary repairs or improvements, it
shall be deemed necessary by the canal commissioners having
7':
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charge of the work, to discontinue or alter any part of a public
road on account of its interference with the proper location or
construction of such work, he shall make or direct to be made,
such discontinuance or alteration.”
By the twenty-fourth section of the same law, the board of
commissioners are authorized “ to erect such toll houses, ofiices
and other edifices, and (urchase such grounds for the conveni
ence thereof, as may be deemed necessary for the profitable use
of the canals,” etc.
It would seem, then, that the legislature of the state of New
York, only contemplated the discontinuance or alteration of
any public road in case of its interference with the proper loca
tion or construction of the canal, repairs or improvements, and
deemed it necessary to authorize it
,
by special authority, so to
do. The general powers given to the commissioners in this
act, are substantially the same as the powers conferred upon
the commissioners of our state by the act above referred to.
For the purpose of ofiices o
r
edifices, I am inclined to believe
that the laws of New York contemplate the acquisition of lands
by purchase or grant, only. It certainly does not contemplate
occupying a highway, in a case like the one now before this
court; but only in cases where the highway shall interfere with
the public works.
l
[*90] *By the thirteenth section of the act of this state,
before referred to, the commissioners are authorized to
construct all houses and necessary edifices, etc., and to pur
chase lands for the convenience thereof, etc.; and it is urged
that by the general powers contained in the fifteenth section
of the same act, it is competent for the commissioners to
appropriate a part of one of the public streets for the purpose
of erecting thereon the proposed edifice, and to extend the rail
road some twenty rods, as appears from the plat exhibited,
from its present termination, and directly away from the route,
and not as a connecting link between its points of termination.
Can it be fairly inferred from the act, that it was contemplated
vs
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to authorize the occupation and obstruction of highways for
public buildings, in this way ?
I cannot view the powers conferred by the fifteenth section
in any other light than as applying to cases where it became
necessary to appropriate property, and interfere with private
rights, in carrying out the great objects of the law to connect
the two points of termination by a continuous railway, and
that the legislature did not contemplate or intend to confer the
power to construct lateral ways to the distance here contem
plated, and there appropriate a public highway for the purpose
of a large permanent building for car houses and oflices.
The strongest case to be found in support of the exercise of
such broad powers, is the case of Rogers v. Bradshaw, 20
J ohns., 735. In this case, where the route of the canal inter
fered with a turnpike road, the supreme court held that the
commissioners were not justified in placing the road on adjoin
ing lands, although it was proved in the cause that the one or
the other must yield. On appeal to the court of errors, it was
held that the general authority to discontinue a public highway
included a turnpike; and, also, that under their general powers,
it was competent for them to make‘ this diversion of the turn
pike from the necessity of the case, and that the legislature
must have intended to confer this power, which was necessary
to carry their general powers into efl’eet. The court say: “ The
turnpike road was unavoidably encroached upon by the
canal. Another road was indispensable before the *canal [*91]
was commenced, and the land taken was necessary for
the road; and further, it is very certain the improvement of the
canal at this place could not be prosecuted without the road.”
Is it to be inferred from the reasoning in the above cited
case, that the general provisions of our statute above cited,
reach a case like the present ? Here the proposed erections are
manifestly not absolutely necessary to carry into effect the gen
eral powers of the board of commissioners, but the road is
extended to a distance from the line of the railroad, and the
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public street in front of the dwellings of the complainants per
mancntly appropriated.
Would the court, in the case above cited, have construed this
as coming within the meaning of the statute ? It is believed not.
But it is said the discretion is vested in the board of com
missioners, and that no other tribunal should interfere. This is
probably the correct view of the exercise of the powers clearly
given them by law, and the exercise of which is necessary to
carry out the objects contemplated by the act. But is it true,
that by virtue of their appointment, they may exercise unre
strained power over the property or rights of others, and that
no remedy exists but an appeal to the legislative power ? This
would be subverting and overturning one of the first principles
of our government.
A liberal construction of the powers the board of commis
sioners have granted to them, and necessary for the important
objects of their appointment, should be given; but if those
powers are exceeded, to the injury of the rights of individuals,
the courts, of course, when appealed to, must liear and decide.
This court has undoubted jurisdiction to interfere, by injunc
tion, where public ofiicers are proceeding illegally or improperly,
under a claim of right to do any act to the injury of the rights
of others. See Mohawk dc H. R. R. Co. v. Artcher, 6 Paige,
88; Oakley v. Trustees of Williamsburg, Id., 264; Gardner 1:.
Trustees of the village of lVewburg, 2 Johns. Ch., 162; Belknap
'0. Belknap, Id., 463.
[*92] *The commissioners would not, perhaps, be trespassers
unless they acted in bad faith; but when this court is
appealed to, to protect the rights of parties, I know of no rule
nor of any reason that will excuse it from adjudicating upon
the law and the rights of these parties, as it would be compelled
to do in every other case.
This, then, being the view entertained by the court, the ques
tion recurs, have the powers attempted to be exercised by the
board of commissioners been granted by the legislature? If
so
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this extension from the line of the road, and the car house and
ofiices, etc., proposed to be erected, are authorized by the act,
what is the limit of the powers of the commissioners? If it
may be extended twenty rods, it may, upon the same principle,
be extended one hundred rods. If the street in front of the
residences of these complainants, may, by virtue of these gen
eral powers, be occupied for the purposes here contemplated,
and there is no remedy, I can see nothing to prevent the occu
pation of the street in front of the residence of any other indi
vidual for a furnace for the manufacture of engines, and another
for a shop for the manufacture of cars or carriages, for store
houses, or for a dwelling house for the residence of the receiver
of tolls. I cannot well preceive where the limits of this implied
power are to be found. It is a conclusion from which I cannot
escape, that the legislature, by the general term of canals, rail
roads, and other improvements, and authority to occupy any
lands wanted for the site thereof, or for any other purpose
necessary in the construction and repair of any of said works,
did not intend to confer powers of the kind here claimed; but
the term “other improvements,” must have reference to the
improving the navigation of rivers and the various works of
internal improvement under their charge.
That the legislature did not contemplate, after authorizing
and requiring the board to build edifices, etc., and to purchase
such lands as were necessary for the convenience thereof, giving
power to occupy lands and highways without consent or pur
chase in the manner here complained of, and that lands,
*etc., were only to be taken against the consent of the [*93]
owners on the grounds and for the reasons for which such
powers are usually given, from the necessity of the case, where
the taking is necessary to carrying into effect the great general
objects in view. Such has been the course in New York and
elsewhere, so far as I have been able to ascertain.
The right of the legislature to grant such powers of appro
priating lands or highways for the erection of otfices, edifices
6 B1’
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and other public buildings of the kind here contemplated, it is
not intended now to discuss; but if such powers are granted, it
is but reasonable to presume it will be definitely done as in the
state of New York, and as was done by our legislature in ex
tending the Central railroad down Woodward avenue, in the city
of Detroit, and not by implication, and with proper safeguards.
It has been urged that the statute of March 20, 1837, section
2, required that the surveys of the several routes should be first
made; that notice should then be given, and after hearing those
interested, the commissioners should then proceed to establish
such routes, and file in the ofiice of the secretary of state,
accurate plans of such surveys and locations. That, as it is
alleged in the bill, and there being no answer, of course no
denial, that the extension complained of was ordered by a reso
lution, merely to make this extension according to the terms of
the lease, and alleged to have been done without law or right,
and without observing the mere forms of law; that the pro
ceeding is irregular, and the parties cannot show it to have
been legally done by reference to the statute merely, but must
show aflirmatively and positively, by way of answer, that they
have pursued its forms and kept within the powers granted.
After the views expressed on other points in this case, it may
not be very material for the purposes of this motion to decide
this question. But, as it may be convenient as a question of
practice, it may be proper to express my views upon this point.
This is a motion to dissolve an injunction without answer, and
for want of equity in the bill.
So far as the statute, which is a public law, goes to
[*94] show *that the acts of the commissioners, as set out in
the bill, are within their powers, and to be exercised in
the manner therein stated, so far is it competent to show by it
,
they are lawfully authorized to perform the acts they are alleged
to have performed, and that the complainants have no just
cause of complaint, and that hence results a want of equity in
the bill.
—~ _|
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It has been further said in the argument, that the legislature,
by their act of April 6, 1838, have themselves put a construc
tion upon the powers of the commissioners, and that further
legislation was necessary to authorize a further extension of
the railroad from its present termination.
This act provides that the commissioners are hereby author
ized, with the consent of the common council of the city of
Detroit, to extend the tracks of the Central railroad from its
present termination down Woodward avenue to its intersection
with Atwater street, and thence each way along said Atwater
street as far as said commissioners may deem best for the pub
lic good, etc.
This may not be of decisive consequence in the decision of
this question, but it certainly may be regarded as confirmatory
of the views heretofore expressed of the proper construction of
the general powers of the commissioners. The commissioners
themselves, by asking and obtaining a lease of the city, and by
the uncontradicted allegations of the bill, acting in pursuance
of it
,
and making it the basis of their proceeding in this matter,
seem to have taken the same view of their powers.
But it is said that whatever views may be taken of the
powers under which the commissioners acted, still the com
plainants have not made a case of such an interference with
their rights, as calls for the interposition of this court by
injunction.
It must be remembered that the allegations contained in the
bill are not denied, and that, for the purposes of this argu
ment, they must be taken as true, as admitted.
In regard to the injury, the bill alleges, in substance, that
the complainants, and those under whom they claim, have been
in possession for more than twenty-five years; that the com
plainants have laid out large sums of money in erecting
buildings, *and preparing residences for themselves and [*95]
their families; that the obstructing said street by build
ings and permanent fixtures would render the complainants’
as
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premises uncomfortable, inconvenient and unsafe, in propor
tion as the said street should be contracted or obstructed; and
that, should said avenue be permanently contracted, their plans
of making said premises a place of residence would be wholly
defeated, and they would be compelled, to their great loss
and damage, and in violation of their vested rights, either to
suffer hazard, inconvenience, annoyance and wrong, or to aban
don their improvements, made on said premises, and seek else
where a place of residence.
That if said building shall be erected, as contemplated by
said lease, it will greatly incumber, block up and obstruct the
free use of the same; and will extend across the entire front
of lot 42, and nearly all of the eastern half of lot 43, the
property of the complainants, to the great annoyance and
damage of the vested rights of complainants and other pro
prietors of lots on said avenue. That the board of commis
sioners have directed said building to be erected, etc., to the
great wrong and injury of complainants, without pretending
to provide any compensation for the great damages the com
plainants would sustain thereby, and without pretending to
pursue any of the mere forms of law. That defendants, or
some of them, have commenced breaking up the streets, etc.,
and that they fear, unless restrained, they will go on and erect
said building, dig up and incumber said avenue, to the great
and irreparable loss and damage of the vested rights of com
plainants. That the street, as they believe, must be elevated
from one to three feet, etc.; that they will be deprived of all
passage, except at the peril of the lives and safety of them
selves, families and property, by reason of the cars, engines
and other vehicles passing and re-passing upon said railroad,
and collected about said contemplated depot; and that said
railroad and building will be a great and intolerable nuisance
to the said complainants’ said premises, and render the same
wholly unfit and unsafe as a place of residence for the
[*96] complainants and their families, *and that their prem
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ises would be in danger of fire from engines passing and
being stationed so near them, etc.; with other allegations
of similar import, and to which it is not necessary further to
refer. The foregoing are referred to, merely to show the
character of the averments in the bill, and to test the question
whether such a case is made, which standing uncontradicted,
that the court is bound to interfere.
It is said that as there is a plat accompanying the bill show
ing the extent of the obstruction contemplated, this court can,
without denial of the strong allegations of the bill which are
sworn to by the complainants in this cause, infer that they are
mistaken in their views, and that they do not sustain such an
injury as they have alleged. This would be going quite too
far. The substantial allegations of the bill must be held to be
true until denied. Is there, then, such a case made as renders
it the imperative duty of this court to permit the injunction
allowed by the judge of the supreme court to stand until an
answer ?
Of this, if the most respectable authorities furnish a guide,
and if the views previously expressed in this cause are correct,
there can be very little doubt. In 6 Paige, 264, Oakley v. The
Trustees of Williamsburg, where the trustees were proceeding
to dig down astreet, the chancellor says: “ if the trustees have
no such powers as they have assumed to exercise, then this
appears to be a very proper case for the allowance of an injunc
tion, to restrain an illegal proceeding by them, to dig down
and alter the grading of the street as established, which, as
alleged in the bill, will be a material injury to the value of the
property of these complainants.” The cases cited, 2 Johns.,
.463,‘ Bellmap v. Belknap, 1 Vesey, 188; Slush v. Trustees of
Morden College; Agar v. The Regents Canal Com, Cooper,
77, and 6 Paige, 88, are also in point, and show that jurisdic
tion in this class of cases has been in constant exercise.
The case of Corning and others v. Lowrie, 6 Johns. Ch.,
440, is strictly analogous. This was a bill for an injunction to
as
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restrain the defendant from obstructing Vestry street,
[*97] in the *city of New York, and averring that he was
building a house upon that street, to the great injury of
the plaintiffs, as owners of lots on, and adjoining that street;
and that Vestry street has been laid out, regulated and paved,
for about twenty years. The chancellor distinguished this
case from that of the Att0rney- General v. The mm Insur
ance Company, inasmuch as here was a special grievance to
the plaintiffs, affecting the enjoyment of their property, and
the value of it. The obstruction was not only a common or
public nuisance, but worked a special injury to the plaintiffs,
and upon these grounds the injunction was granted. I am
unable to distinguish this case from the one under consideration.
It results, then, that, having jurisdiction of the subject
matter, and being appealed to by those who, as they allege, are
sufiering wrong and injury, and who have made a case coming
clearly within the authority of adjudged cases, the duty of this
court is imperative; it is one from which it dare not shrink,
however much it may regret that this question has arisen.
' It is but due, and of this the court is fully conscious, that
the public ofiicers should be sustained in the exercise of the
powers which are granted them; but when appealed to, upon a
question of individual rights, it can have no other duty but to
apply the law to the case. It cannot be improper further to
say, that in the prosecution of the work here complained of,
it is beyond doubt that the board of commissioners have acted
in the most perfect good faith.
A great variety of other questions have been raised and dis
cussed, in the course of this laborious investigation. They
have been intently and carefully considered, but not being
material in the decision of this motion from the conclusion to
which I have arrived, it is not deemed necessary to discuss
them further in this preliminary stage of the cause.
The motion to dissolve the injunction must be denied.
Motion denied.
ss
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Mary Devaux v. the Mayor, etc., of the City of Detroit.
Plat of Detroit: Power of common council to open streets. Complainant went
into possession of a lot in Detroit, in 1809,and in 1821received s. conveyance of
the same from the governor and judges of Michigan Territory. Nearly thirty
years after she took possession, the common council of Detroit, on a claim that
a street was laid out through the lot originally, proceeded to open the same. On
bill filed for the purpose, held, that the common council should be enjoined from
opening the street until they had established their title at law. (a)
Titles to land should be tried at law. A court of chancery is not the appropriate
tribunal for the trial of titles to land. (b)
Motion to dissolve an injunction. The case is sufiiciently
set forth in the opinion of the chancellor.
A. D. Fraser and I A. Van Dyke for the motion.
D. Goodwin, contra.
*Trua: CHANC1-ZLLOR2 |_*l00]
The bill states that the complainant and those under whom
she claims, have been in possession of‘ the lot since 1809; that
it has been inclosed by a fence since that time, and that valua
ble improvements haye been made upon it, etc.; that defend
ants are about proceeding summarily and without pursuing
the forms of law, to pull down the fences and remove the
buildings, etc.; that in addition to the possession, she holds
(a) The eflfect of the plan of the governor and judges in establishing streets in
the city of Detroit, was much considered in People v. Jones, 6 Mich., 176,and Till
man v. People, 12Mich., 401. In the former case it was held, that the plan did not,
of itself, make public highway of that portion of the projected streets which was
covered by private claims and occupied as private property, and in both cases it
was decided that the plan alone did not establish a street without some act on the
part of the public accepting the offered dedication. From both it is also inferable
that the right to accept might be lost by lapse of time 'in connection with other cir
cumstances, making it operate unjustly upon private lot owners.
(b) See also Blackwood 1:.Van Vleet, 11Mich., 252. It has, however, s. jurisdic
tion conferred upon it to quiet the title of the party in possession; as to which, see
Rowland v. Doty, ante. p. 8, and cases cited.
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the lands by deed emanating from the governor and judges of
the late territory of Michigan, dated April, 1821.
The answer admits the possession, but sets up that Longdon,
the grantor of the complainant, held a part of the land under
a permission from the governor and judges, and that he took
possession of the residue without authority, and that the deed
of 1821 is uncertain in its description, and does not include the
land in controversy, and that by the plan of the city said street
was laid out sixty instead of fifty feet wide.
It is an admitted fact that the complainant and those under
whom she claims, have been in possession and have had this
property inclosed for nearly thirty years; and the question is
,
shall the defendants, after such a length of possession, be per
mitted ‘to take forcible possession, and remove the fences and
building, without first establishing their right by legal process.
It appears to me but just, that the complainant, after
|_*101] such a *length of possession, should be protected in
the enjoyment of this property until an adverse right
be established.
It is urged that the governor and judges, being trustees, with
defined powers, after having laid out and established the plan,
had no authority, either to grant to any one the right to occupy
a part of the street, or to grant the deed-of 1821.
After ground had been dedicated and appropriated for a
public street, and rights acqnired'with reference to the plan,
they had- no authority to appropriate it to a different purpose.
But it appears in this case, that the land in question was
never used or appropriated as a street, and the dedication of it
is attempted to be shown by reference to the plat, and on this
ground the court is asked to dissolve the injunction, without
any establishment of the right in opposition to a possession
and improvement of thirty years. ,
The complainant seems to have acquired a confirmation of
her claim by the deed of 1821, from the same board which is
is alleged to have established the plan of the city. It is said
as
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that this deed is imperfect, but it is manifest that it contem
plated the same premises. There are cases where the abandon
ment of the street may be presumed by non-user. There hav
ing been a possession and improvement for so long a period;
the land in question having never been used as a street, it
would be obviously unjust to permit this forcible entry with
out the defendants’ first establishing a right at law. See Var
ick '0. Corporation of New York, 4 Johns. Ch., 53. And this
court is not the appropriate tribunal for the trial of titles to
land: Abbott '0. Allen, 2 Johns. Ch., 521.
’
The injunction must be continued until the defendants estab
lish their right at law.
Motion denied.
so
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DeG-armo Jones v. Henry V. Disbrow and others. (Cross Bill.)
Fraud in convey/um-e: Lathes in applying for relief. A party seeking to set aside
a conveyance on the ground of fraud, must be prompt in communicating it
when discovered, and consistent in his notice to the opposite party of the use he
intends to make of it. (a.)
Same: The principle applied. Where the complainant had rested for several
months after he had knowledge of the fraud complained of, and until the condition
of the property had changed, before he took any steps to rescind the contract,
this court refused to interfere, and left the complainant to his remedy at law.
Foreclosure: Set-of by mortgagor of claim owing by mortgagee. Where land
Which was under lease for a.term was sold, and a. mortgage taken back for the
purchase price, and it was agreed between the parties that during the leasehold
term, the mortgagee should pay to the mortgagors the interest on the purchase
price; held, that on a foreclosure of the mortgage the amount of this interest
should be deducted from the amount due on the mortgage, and a sale be decreed
for the balance only. (b)
For a general statement of the facts in the first of these cases,
see ante, p. 48.
In that case Jones was proceeding to foreclose a mortgage
by advertisement, under the statute, and Disbrow, claiming an
undivided interest in the mortgaged premises as purchaser
from one of the mortgagors, filed his bill and obtained an
injunction, restraining the foreclosure. On the coming in of
answers to this bill, the injunction was dissolved. Jones then
discontinued the proceedings to foreclose by advertisement,
and filed his bill, December 6, 1837, for foreclosure in equity.
(0.) See for the same principle, Street v. Dow, post, 427; McLean v. Barton, post,
279;DeA'rm.a'ndv. Phillips, Wal. Ch., 186;Campau v. Van Dyke, 15Mich., 371;Story
Eq. Juria, §§ 1520-1522.
(b) In Detroit <2‘Milwaukee R. R. C0. v. Griggs, 12Mich., 45, it was decided that
one who had given a mortgage for the purchase price of lands which were conveyed
to him with a covenant against incumbrances, is not confined to his remedy upon
the covenant, but may set off the amount of a prior mortgage, which he has paid,
against his own mortgage when suit is brought to foreclose it. See this case as to set
off generally in equity; also Lockwood v. Beckwith, 6Mich., 168; Hale v. Holmes, 8
Mich., 37; McGraw v. Petfibone, 10Mich., 5'30.
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The bill is in the usual form, against the mortgagors, and
states that Disbrow, some time after the sale of the mortgaged
premises by Jones to the mortgagors, acquired by purchase of
the mortgagors, or some one of them, an estate and interest in
an undivided part of said premises, the same being conveyed
to him in fee simple; that said Disbrow, by such pur
chase and *c0nveyance, claimed to be the owner of [*103]
the undivided three-fourth parts of said premises.
The bill alleged that at the time of such purchase and con
veyance, Disbrow was fully informed of the bond and mort
gage, and of Whiting’s lease; that he was notified of the lease
by Thompson, and also had notice thereof from other sources,
and purchased and acquired the interest which he held in the
premises, subject to Whiting’s lease; that Whiting was, at the
time of the purchase and conveyance to Disbrow, in the actual
possession and occupation of said premises, under and by vir
tue of the lease, and that Disbrow knew of the indorsement on
the lease extending Whiting’s term to February 1, 1839.
July 23, 1838, the bill was taken pro confesso as to all the
defendants except Disbrow, who answered. The answer
admits the sale of the premises by Jones, the bond, mortgage,
lease and agreement; also, the possession, by Whiting, of the
premises, but denies that he, Disbrow, knew the terms of the
lease, or had any knowledge of the special agreement reciting
the extension of the term to Whiting, until his purchase, but
states that after his (Disbrow’s) purchase of Thompson, Thomp
son drew from his pocket and gave him that agreement.
D. Goodwin, for complainant.
Woodbridge (f: Backus, for defendant Disbrow.
Tan CHANCELLOR :
The most important points in the first of the above cases
were decided upon the motion to dissolve the injunction (see
Disbrow v. Jones, ante, 48); and it is not necessary again to
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examine and decide the same points which were then discussed
and decided.
Jones and Whiting, each, had an insurable interest in the
premises; they paid the premium on the insurance; they have
sustained loss to the full amount of the insurance, and they are
clearly entitled to the benefit of the policy. The agreement
respecting the insurance was between Jones and Whiting; Dis
brow was not a party to it; Jones is liable to his vendees for
the $2,800, and this amount must be deducted from
[*104] *the amount secured by the mortgage; but I cannot
perceive how Jones can be made responsible to Dis
brow for the $2,500 when the policy does not pass with the
title to the premises.
There is another point in this case upon which I have enter
tained some doubt. It is the alternative prayer in the bill by
Disbrow v. Jones and others, that the contract between Dis
brow and Thompson may be rescinded, and the deeds and con
veyances set aside on the ground of fraud. If this is done, it
must be on the ground that the complainant has not a full and
adequate remedy at law.
The only particular in which the remedy in this court would
be more full than at law, is, if the contract between Disbrow
and Thompson should be set aside, this court would have the
power to order a re-conveyance. It is alleged in the bill that
a part of the consideration paid by Disbrow to Thompson was
paid in lands, and upon a proper showing it would unquestion
ably be competent for this court to order a re-conveyance; but
it does not appear that the title to the lands conveyed by Dis
brow to Thompson is still in Thompson, and a re-conveyance
is not specifically prayed for in the bill; a specific sum was
agreed upon by the parties, which Disbrow was to pay Thomp
son for his interest, a part of which was paid in lands at a spec
ified price. The incumbrance of \Vhiting’s lease does not
affect the title to the property conveyed by Thompson to Dis
brow,\but the present possession only; and it does not sufiici
ently appear that Disbrow has not an adequate remedy at law.
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A party seeking to set aside a conveyance on the ground of
fraud, must be prompt in communicating it when discovered,
and consistent in his notice to the opposite party of the use he
intends to make of it: B03/ce’s Eafrs 1;.Grundy, 3 Peters, 315.
Such was not the case here; the complainant had notice of the
incumbrance of Whiting’s lease at the time, or immediately
after his purchase from Thompson, and he admits that Thomp
son handed him the agreement recognizing VVhiting’s right to
occupy the premises, under his lease from Jones, until Febru
ary 1, 1839, at the time or immediately after the con
summation *of the contract between Disbrow and [*105]
Thompson. If Disbrow conceived this to be a fraud
upon his rights, he should at once have given notice of his
intention to recede from the contract. But this was not done.
Disbrow rested for several months, and until the condition of
the property was changed, before he took any steps to rescind
the contract.
Under the facts here presented it would be going farther
than any case I have been able to find, to rescind the contract
between Disbrow and Thompson, and order the deeds to be
canceled.
The complainant must be left to his remedy at law, where,
so far as I can perceive, that remedy is full and adequate.
The mortgagee having retained possession of the mortgaged
premises of his tenant, would, perhaps,. exclusive of any agree
ment on the subject, be liable to the mortgagors for the rents;
but here was a specific agreement as to the rents, between the
mortgagors and the mortgagee. Jones was to pay the mort
gagors $1,400 per annum in lieu of rent. The amount secured
by the mortgage is admitted to be unpaid, and a portion of it
now due; this mortgage is expressly recognized in the deed
from Thompson to Disbrow. The mortgagors have permitted
the bill to be taken as confessed against them, and Jones is
entitled to a decree for the amount now due upon the mort
gage, deducting the amount due from Jones to hi mortgagors
by virtue of the agreement; and it must be referred to a master
to ascertain the amount so due.
The bill in the case of Disbrow against Jones and others
must be dismissed.
as
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Insolvency of bank, what facts are evidence of. Where it appeared from the state
ments in the bill, that a bank commissioner examined into the aflairs of the
bank of Brest on the second day of August, 1838.and the specie then on hand
was $9,754.92,and that another examination of the aflairs of the bank was made
on the eleventh day of the same month, and it then had but $138.89,and there
was no correspondent decrease of liabilities; and about $44,000of the issues of
the hank were in the hands of agents without sulficient sureties; and that of the
assets there were $5,000in uncurrent notes; and that $25,000of post notes were
issued on the fourth day of the same month oi‘ August, without being indorsed
by a bank commissioner; and the bill charged the bank to be insolvent; and the
answer admitted the facts set forth in the bill, but denied the insolvency; it was
held that the bank was insolvent within the meaning of the law, and that a
proper case was made for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of its
effects.
Assignment bybank. A transfer, by way of security, of a portion of the eflfectsof a
moneyed corporation, for the purpose of carrying on the concern, is within the
powers of the directors; and a. corporation which has no particular mode
pointed out for closing its concerns, may make an assignment on obtaining the
assent of the stockholders.
Surrender of corporate rights. what is. It a corporation suflers acts to be done
which destroy the end and object for which it was instituted, it is equivalent to a
surrender of its rights.
General assignment by bank. The directors of a moneyed corporation, like that of
the bank of Brest, have no power to make an assignment, without being author
ized so to do by the stockholders.
Directors of bank, for what purpose are trustees. The directors are trustees of the
stockholders tor the purpose of carrying on the business of the corporation, and
not for the purpose of winding it up and destroying its existence.
Banks, statutory provisions for winding up are forpublic security. The statute pre
scribes the mode in which the afisirs of banking associations, established under
the general banking law of this state, shall be wound up, in case of insolvency;
and this forms a part of the security to the public, and is one of the conditions
upon which they take their chartered powers.
Banks, assignment to evade statute void. An assignment made by the directors of
the bank of Brest, to a trustee, for the benefit of creditors, with a view to evade
the provision of the statute, was held to be against the policy of the law, and
void. (a)
This was a motion for the appointment of a receiver.
The bill alleged that the bank of Brest had become a body
(a) The statute under which the bank of Brest was organized was declared uncon
stitutional in Green v. Graves, 1 Doug. Mlch., 351,as opposed to that clause of the
then existing constitution of the state, which provided that "The legislature shall
pass no act of incorporation unless with the assent of at least two-thirds of each
house;” which was construed as requiring a special act for each incorporation. For
other cases where insolvency of banks was discussed, see Barnum v. Bank of Pon
tiac, post, 116;Attorney Generralv. Bank ofMichigan, poet, 315; Fay v. Erie 1t Kal
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corporate and politic, under and by virtue of the provisions of
an act entitled “ An act to organize and regulate banking asso
ciations,” approved March 15, 1837; that it commenced the
usual business of banking, on or about the 30th day of Septem
ber, 1838, and had continued to do banking business up to the
time of the filing of the bill; that, January 10, 1838, it
became subject to the provisions of an act entitled “An act to
organize and regulate banking associations,” approved Decem
ber 30, 1837; that Alpheus Felch, one of the bank
commissioners, *in the performance of his ofiicial [*107]
duties, examined into the affairs and condition of the
bank, on the second, and again on the eleventh days of Aug
ust, 1838; that from such examinations, i_
t appeared that
between the second and eleventh days of August, the specie of
the bank had been reduced from the sum of $9,754.92, which
was actually on hand on the second day of August, to the sum
of $138.89, which was all that remained in the bank on the
eleventh day of the same month, and that no correspondent
decrease of the liabilities of the bank had been made; that
about $44,000 of the issues of the bank were in the hands of
Lyman A. Spalding, of Lockport, state of New York, and
other persons, agents of the bank, without suflicient security
being given therefor; that of the assets of the bank there were
$5,000 of uncurrent notes of the “ River Raisin and Lake Erie
railroad company;" that post notes to the amount of $25,000
were issued, August 4
,
1838, payable at the Phoenix hank, of
the city of New York, one year from date, bearing an interest
of seven per cent.; that all of the said post notes were issued
without having been indorsed -by a bank commissioner, in vio
lation of the forty-first section of the “Act to amend an act
amazoo R. R. Bank, post, 194; Attorney-General v. Oakland County Bank, Wal. Ch.,
90; People v. Bank of Pontiac, 12Mich., 527. In the case last mentioned it was held,
that where a bank became insolvent in 1840,and suspended operations, the' state
showed sufficient diligence in insisting upon a forfeiture of the corporate rights by
such insolvency and suspension, 1
!
it instituted proceedings tor that purpose within
a reasonable time after an attempt by the bank to resume business. The attempt at
resumption in that case was made in 186$
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entitled ‘An act to organize and regulate banking associa
tions, and for other purposes,’ approved December 30, 1837;”
and that said bank had failed to comply with section thirty-six
of the last mentioned act, in furnishing the securities to the
amount required.
The bill charged the bank to be insolvent, and prayed for an
injunction, and for the appointment of a receiver to take charge
of its property and efiects; also, for a decree to deprive said
bank of its corporate privileges, and a dissolution of the cor
poration.
The bill was filed and injunction issued August 15, 1838;
injunction and subpoena served on the 16th of the same month.
The answer admitted the facts as stated in the bill, but
denied that the bank was insolvent, and insisted that its assets,
if no unexpected loss occurred in collecting them, would fully
discharge all its liabilities.
[*108] *The answer further stated, that from various difli
culties and disappointments, and more particularly from
the impossibility, under the circumstances of the case, of perfect
ing its securities, its president, directors and company concluded
to close its afl’airs, and on the fourteenth day of August, 1838,
passed the following preamble and resolution: “ Whereas,
from various disappointments in the receipt of money, and from
other unforeseen and embarrassing circumstances, it is impos
sible for the bank of Brest to redeem, upon demand, all its
notes and bills in circulation, and to pay its other debts; and
whereas, unexpected difficulties have arisen in perfecting its
securities required by law for the above bank, and the further
transaction of its business is exceeding inconvenient; there
fore, resolved, that all the choses in action, and personal and
real estate, and all the effects and assets whatever of said bank,
be assigned and transferred to Alexander D. Fraser, Esq., and
Theodore Romeyn, Esq., or either of them (i
f one shall decline),
in trust, ‘for the purpose of paying all the debts of said oank,
as soon as may be, according to the statutes of the state; that
96
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a deed of assignment be forthwith prepared in pursuance of
the above resolution, and that the cashier affix thereto the seal
of the bank, and that the same, when so sealed by the said
cashier, shall be considered as the deed of the bank.”
That Theodore Romeyn having declined the trust, the bank
did, on the fifteenth day of August, execute to Alexander D.
Fraser, Esq., an assignment of all its credits and efiects, which
assignment was in pursuance of the foregoing resolution, and
was executed and delivered prior to the issuing of the injunc
tion, and with no knowledge or notice thereof. That said trust
was accepted by said Fraser, and that he, by virtue of said
assignment, took possession of all the property and effects of
said bank, and removed the same previous to the service of said
injunction. That the assignment was executed in good faith, etc.
P. Morey, attorney-general, in support of the motion:
*1. The directors of such a corporation as the bank [*109]
of Brest may assign property to pay a debt, or for any
other lawful purpose which will promote the objects contem
plated by the charter; but they cannot make an assignment
merely for the purpose of closing its existence, as that would
be the exercise of a power not delegated by law, and would,
in efiect, accomplish a surrender of their chartered rights to
another power than that by whom their privileges and fran
chises were bestowed. See Session Laws oj‘1838, page 81, sec
tion 17', of the “ Act to amend the act to organize and regulate
banking associations, and for other purposes;” where the pow
ers of directors are limited to such acts as “ appertain to the
business of a banking association.”
2. The “ act to create a fund for the benefit of the creditors
of certain moneyed corporations,” provides the mode in which
all corporations subject thereto shall be proceeded against on
their becoming insolvent, or for any violation of law. It is
made the imperative duty of a bank commissioner, immedi
ately upon the ascertainment of any violation of law or insol
vency, to apply to the court of chancery; upon bill or petition,
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for an injunction; and it is declared that the same proceeding
shall, in all respects, be had, as in cases of application by the
attorney-general. See Session Laws of 1835-6, page 162, section
18. Section 9, page 159, of the same law, further provides,
when a corporation shall become insolvent, and shall have been
proceeded against as above, “ it shall be the duty of the court
of chancery, immediately after a final dividend shall have been
made, to cause an order prescribing certain rules to be entered
in its minutes,” shows clearly, anticipating and intending that
what was imperatively enjoined as an ofiicial duty upon the
bank commissioner, would be performed in good faith, and
that full force and effect would be given by the court of chan
cery to what is thus required.
All of this, an assignment such as is now presented, and
relied upon to defeat the motion, would prevent. It would
render the law nugatory, and place the bank commissioner in
the strange predicament of being imperatively required
[*110] by statute *to perform an act in the furtherance and pro
motion of the public interests, through the medium of
the court of chancery, and yet left powerless to enforce what
was there enjoined; and subject too to be defeated by an act
itself a fraud upon individual rights, and a clear violation of
the spirit and intention of the law.
fl Romeyn, contra .'
I. The act of 21st June, 1837, entitled “An act to provide
for proceedings in chancery against corporations, and for other
purposes,” does not render it imperative upon the chancellor
to issue an injunction and appoint a receiver.
'
1. The words of the statute are, that in certain specified
cases the chancellor may grant an injunction and may appoint
a receiver. These words imply a discretionary power.
2. This statute, so far as it alters the common law, should
he strictly construed: 1 Kent, 433.
3. The bestowal of jurisdiction upon a court of chancery is
an infringing upon the common law, for by it the control of
as
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corporations was intrusted to courts of law, and chancery could
not interfere: 2 Johns. Ch., 379,‘ Id., 389; Hopk., 354.
4. Again. The granting of an injunction is always discre
tionary." 2 Johns. Ch., 202, 379. So is the appointment of a
receiver: 1 Johns. Ch., 57.
II. The present case does not require the appointment of a
receiver.
1. The bank has made an assignment of all its effects.
2. The act of assignment is legal.
First. It will not be pretended but that the bank might close
its affairs when it pleased, by a surrender of its franchises.
This is incident to every corporation: 1 Bl/c. C'0m., 485. An
assignment is a mutual surrender: 19 Johns. 456,- 6 C0w., 220.
Second. It had a right to make such surrender, or close its
affairs in this particular way: 4 Mass., 293,- 2 Kent, 227,‘ 1
Blk. C'0m., .475; 6 O'0w., 219; 3 Wend., 1.
*I7n'rd. This particular assignment is valid in all its [*111]
provisions. If any are legal the court will not inter
fere: 5 Paige, 818.
3. While this assignment subsists, the court may not remove
the trustee unless under special circumstances of irresponsibility,
neglect or abuse of trust, etc., which are not here pretended to
exist: 6 J0hns.C'h., 161; Hopk., 429; 1 Paige, 17,‘ 2 Paige, 438.
4. While the assignment remains in force, and the trustee
acts under it
,
there is no duty for a receiver to perform.
Rrst. The assignee of the bank has already in his possession
and control all the property which would vest in the receiver,
by the fifth section of the act under which the court exercises
jurisdiction.
Second. The securities which have been given under the
sixth section of the act amending the general banking law, are
given to the auditor-general, for the use of the state, and can
not be transferred to the receiver.
THE Onsuonnnon:
'
From the facts which appear in the bill and answer, in this
on
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case, there can be no doubt that the bank of Brest is insolvent
within the meaning of the law, and that a proper case is made
for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of its efliects.
The question as to the validity of the assignmentis not regu
larly before the court, the assignee not being a party; but both
parties and theassignee are anxious to obtain an expression of
opinion upon this point.
The assignment set up in the answer is an assignment by the
directors of all the estate, real and personal, and assets and
elfects of the bank, to a trustee. A transfer by way of security
of a portion of its efl’ects for the purpose of carrying on the
concern is within the power of the directors; and a corporation
which has no particular mode pointed out for closing its con
cerns may make an assignment on obtaining the assent of the
stockholders. If this assignment is valid, it is no doubt a sur
render of the charter; for if a corporation suffers acts to be
done which destroy the end and object for which it
[*l12] *was instituted, it is equivalent to a surrender of its
rights: Slee v. Bloom, 19 Johns., 456; People v. The
Bank of Hudson, 6 Cow., 219.
The directors, in making the assignment in question, With
out authority from the stockholders, have exceeded their powers.
They are made trustees of the stockholders, for the purpose
of carrying on the business of the corporation, and not for the
purpose of winding it up and destroying its existence: Angel
and Ames on Com, 507,- 8 Des., 557'.
The statute prescribes the manner in which the affairs of this
class of corporations shall be wound up in case of insolvency
This forms a part of the security to the public, and is one of
the conditions upon which they take their chartered powers.
An assignment made manifestly with a view to evade the pro
visions of the statute, as this seems to have been, is against the
policy of the law, and cannot be sustained.
Motion granted.
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Mortgage by deed absolute in form: Parol evidence to show intent. A deedabsolute
in form may be proved by parol to have been intended by the parties to operate
only as a mortgage for money loaned at its date; and such proof will entitle the
grantor to redeem.
Redemption against subsequent purchaser. Where the grantee in such a deed sells
and conveys to one who has full notice of all the facts, such second grantee will
take no greater interest than his grantor had in the premises, and he will hold
them subject to he redeemed on payment of the amount due on the mortgage. (a)
Attorney: Privileged communications. A statement of fact made by an attorney to
his client, and which apprises the client of equities in a third party, is not a privi
leged communication, and may be proved by the attorney.
Costs on redemption. Where one purchases lands with knowledge that his grantor
holds it in security for a loan, and refuses to receive payment of the loan when
tendered, and puts the party entitled to redeem to the expense of a suit for the
purpose, he will be compelled to pay costs.
This was a bill to redeem from the defendant a tract of land
conveyed by Antoine Laselle to Thomas Bell, as a security for
$150 loaned, and interest, September 20, 1829, by a deed abso
lute on the face, but by agreement at the time merely a security
for the $150 and interest, payable in one year. ‘
The bill sets forth the agreement as above stated, and the
deed of that date, September 20, 1829, under the agreement;
that Bell, when the money became due, had left the country,
and it was not known where he was or could be found; that
Laselle was then ready and desired to pay the money and
interest; that Laselle died about January 1, 1832, and Wolcott
Lawrence was appointed his administrator; that about Decem
(a) The doctrine of this case was reviewed and am:-med by the supreme court in
Emerson v. Atwater, 7 Mich., 12,where the cases on the subject in other states are
referred to and discussed by counsel. The court, however, did not in that case dis
cuss the question at length on principle, but contented themselves with referring to
the injustice that would be done by overruling a case which had for considerable
time been received as settlinga rule of property, and with saying that lf they thought
it erroneous in principle—which they did not—they believed it would be both better
and safer to leave it to the legislature to correct the error, than for the court to under
take it, as all intervening rights would in that case be saved, and injustice be done to
no one. As bearing upon the same point, see Batty v. Snook, 5Mich, Z11,and Enos
v. Sutherland, 11Mich., 538. See also 3 Leading Cases in Equity, Hare and Wallace's
Notes, 608,626,630.
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ber 8, 1832, he was empowered to sell the real estate of Laselle
to pay debts; the premises in question were sold to complain
ant for $2,129.90, paid by him, and January 7, 1833, a deed
was duly executed to him; that the premises were sold subject
to the mortgage, and complainant has been ever ready to pay
the amount due; that Loranger, the defendant, with full know
ledge of the nature of the conveyance to Bell, and the agree
ment with him, obtained privately and fraudulently from Bell
a deed of the premises. The bill further alleges a continued
and uninterrupted possession in Laselle, his representatives and
the complainant.
The answer‘ denies any knowledge of the transactions set
forth in the bill, showing the deed to Bell to have been a
[114] mortgage, *and also of the derivative title of complain
ant from the representatives of Laselle. It admits the
possession of the premises to have been always in Laselle and
his representatives.
D. Goodwin, for complainant.
A. D. Fraser, for defendant.
Tun CHANCELLOB2
The facts are briefly these: About the 20th of September,
1829, Antoine Laselle obtained from Thomas Bell a loan of
$150 for one year, and for security gave a deed of the premises
in question. That before the expiration of the time, Bell
absconded, and his residence has not since been known. That
Laselle has since died; that the property was sold and con
veyed to complainant by the administrator of Laselle, subject
to this incumbrance, on the seventh day of January, 1833. That
defendant knew all these facts, but yet afterwards, on the 5th
of March, 1836, procured a deed from Bell. Loranger, the
defendant, denies all knowledge of the fact that the deed from
Laselle to Bell was a security for a loan.
But from the continued possession of Laselle and his repre
sentatives, the proceedings in the attachment suit, which form
I 1
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a part of the exhibits in this cause, in which Laselle, in answer
to the attachment, states the facts under oath, and in which
suit Loranger was a party, from the evidence of Wolcott Law
rence, who states that he explained at that time the circum
stances to the defendant, and from the positive evidence of
Warner Wing, Esq., there can be no doubt that he was a pur
chaser with notice. It was objected to the testimony of Law
rence, that his evidence was aprofessional secret, and therefore
ought not to be received. But it is not a communica
tion *from the client to the attorney, but information [*115]
from the attorney to the client, informing him of the
nature of Bell’s title. It was information which, as an honest
man, he was bound to give, and which he is now not only com
petent but bound to disclose. That a deed absolute in its
terms may be proved by parol to have been intended by the
parties to operate only as a mortgage, cannot admit of a doubt.
See Strong et al. v. Stewart, 4 Johns. Ch., 167; James v. John
son, etc., 6 Johns. Ch., 417; Van Buren '0. Olmstead et al.,
5 Paige R., 9.
The facts then being ascertained, and of these there can be
but little doubt, it only remains to apply the law to the case,
and in this there is little difliculty.
I must, therefore, declare that this deed, though absolute on
its face, is only valid as a mortgage for the security of the
loan from Bell to Laselle, and that Loranger, being a purchaser
with notice, can take no greater interest than Bell had in the
premises, and that the complainant is entitled to redeem by the
payment of the amount due, which by the testimony of Law
rence and Durocher, is proved to have been one hundred and
fifty dollars at the date of the deed.
As to costs, Loranger purchased with a knowledge of the
facts; he was wrong in refusing the money when tendered, and
by denying any knowledge of the nature of Bell’s title has-put
the complainant to the expense of proving his bill. The com
plainant is therefore entitled to recover his costs.
we
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Hiram Barnum v. The Bank of Pontiac.
Injunctimt against bank, what not nqfllcicnt cause. By the act incorporating a bank
a previous act was referred to, and in effect made a part thereof, which provided
that if any bank did not pay its notes on demand, the charter should not for
that cause be dissolved, but it gave the bank sixty days within which to redeem
its notes. It contained further provisions that the act should not prevent the
issuing of an injunction, and that one might be issued when any bank should
refuse to pay its debts: Held, that these provisions relative to injunctions did
not change the previous law on that subject.
The provision that an injunction might be issued on a.failure to pay was not impera
tive, but left it to the sound discretion of the court, upon a proper case being
made.
Where a.bill alleged merely a demand and refusal by the bank to pay its notes, and
contained no allegations of any impending mischief, danger or hazard of the
rights of complainant, an injunction was refused.
Elfect of injunction against a bank. An injunction against s. bank goes to prevent
all action whatever, and is rather in the nature of a final injunction which is
sometimes granted at the termination of a cause, than the usual injunction to
prevent some particular mischief. ,
Cause for injunction against banlc: Notice. Except in cases where the bill is flied
by a bank commissioner, showing fraud, violation of the charter, or insolvency,
notice should be given of an application for an injunction against a bank, and a
case should be made out that would warrant the court to wind up the concerns
of the bank. (a)
YMotion for an injunction. 'lhe facts are sufliiciently stated
in the opinion.
Wm. Hale and P. Morey, for the motion.
Bates if: Walker, contra.
[*120] *Tnn Cnnnonnnon:
This application is founded upon the act of June 21,
1837. This bill alleges merely a demand and refusal to pay.
It contains no allegations of any impending mischief, danger
or hazard, of the rights of the complainant.
It presents no one of the ordinary features required to author
(a) See the cases of Attorney-General v. Oakland County Bank, Wal. Ch., 90, and
Attorney-General 1;.Bank of Michigan, post, 315,flor the general principles govern
lng the court in granting injunctions against banks on the application of the proper
public omcer.
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ize this summary interposition, according to the general prin
ciples of proceedings in chancery.
In the act of incorporation of the bank of Pontiac, the act of
April 23, 1833, is specially_referred to, and in eflfect is made a
part of its charter. That act provides, if any bank shall not
pay its notes on demand, the charter shall not, for that cause,
be dissolved, and give such bank sixty days within which to
redeem its notes. It further contains a provision. that that act
shall not prevent the issuing of an injunction. It may
become *necessary to examine for what cause an in- [*12l]
junction could have been issued under that act.
Very clearly, the mere provision that the “act should not
prevent the issuing of an injunction ” does not change the law
or the practice of the coup; in this respect.
It may, therefore, be premised that the legislature contem
plated that a case should be made which would authorize the
exercise, according to the course and practice of this court, of
this summary interposition.
The act of June 21, 1837, which is relied upon in this appli'
cation, provides that an injunction may be issued, when any
banking institution shall refuse to pay its debts.
It has been urged that the act last mentioned is imperative;
that whenever there is a demand and refusal to pay, the injunc
tion must issue of course. To act upon this construction would
lead to results so variant from the uniform course of- equity
proceedings, that the court must pause before adopting it.
1. It would open the door to collusion.
2. It would almost invariably lead to unjust and inequitable
results.
If the construction contended for of the act of 1833, and the
act last mentioned, shall obtain, that an injunction must be
granted on demand and refusal, and that upon payment of the
amount claimed in the bill and twenty per cent. in sixty days,
the injunction shall be dissolved, the most probable result
would be that the bank enjoined, struggling for existence, will
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within the limited period redeem the amount claimed by the
bill, although by doing so it would be unable to pay the remain
ing creditors of the bank; and this under the direction of the
court. But it is still bound by the statute to become an acces
sory in enforcing this unjust distribution.
There are other objections to which this construction would
lead. From the statutes and from the settled practice, a legal
discretion in this as in other cases, must be exercised. This
being granted, how shall this be done, or rather what rule,
applicable alike to all cases, shall be adopted. In view
[*122] of the difliculties *and consequences which have been
before alluded to, I know of no better rule than the
usual test, where an injunction is asked, in the first instance, to
require that a case shall be made shqwing immediate danger or
some impending mischief. From this it will follow that the
application in this case must be denied.
It has been contended that the act of 1837 is so far canpost
facto in its operations that it must be regarded as unconstitu
tional, and therefore of no validity so far as regards the banks
subject to the law of April 23, 1833. After arriving at the
conclusion before stated, it may not, perhaps, be necessary to
consider that question.
Without saying that it is unconstitutional, and I am as yet
unable to come to that conclusion, it is for the present suflicient
to say that it would operate with great severity upon the banks,
and with great inconvenience to the public, if the act of 1837
is regarded as imperative; if an injunction must issue at all
events when a bank shall refuse to pay any one of its notes.
It is stated by the chancellor, in the case cited in lloplcins, 591,
that these are rather in the nature of the final injunctions that
are sometimes granted at the termination of a cause, than the
usual injunctions to prevent some particular mischief. An in
junction against a bank goes to prevent all action whatever.
It is, for the time being, an utter prostration of all its powers.
Hence, except in cases where the bill is filed by a bank com
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missioner, showing fraud, violation of the charter or insolvency,
courts require notice, and proceed with caution. And it seems
to me that it is not too much, and is consistent with the discre
tion which the court is bound to exercise, to require such a case
to be made, as would authorize the court, if it prove true and
according to the exigency of the case, to wind up the concern,
and make an equal distribution of the assets among all the
creditors.
This may be made out by immediate pending insolvency, and
therefore danger to all the creditors; or such danger of a mis
application of the funds belonging to the bank as
would *require the interposition of the court for the [*123]
safety of its creditors.
The decision upon the other points made in the argument, as
well as the point last referred to, and also upon what precise
state of facts this court would feel itself bound to proceed and
wind up this or any other bank, will be more appropriate when
the case shall have been heard upon the presentation of such
facts before it.
Motion denied.
M
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Richard McMZu.rtrie and another v. John Bennette and others.
Specific performance discretionary. Courts of equity do not, as a matter of course,
decree specific performance of contracts for the conveyance of lands, but they
exercise a discretionary power in view of all the facts of the case; and their dis
cretion must not be arbitrary and capricious, but regulated on grounds that will
.
render it judicial.
Contract must bemutual. The contract sought to he enforced must be mutual, and
the tie reciprocal. or a court of equity will not enforce a performance. (a)
Contract must be certain. A parol contract will not be enforced unless it is certain
in all its essential particulars. (b)
What part performance will take case out of statute. If a party sets up part per
formance to take a case out of the statute of frauds, he must show acts unequivo
cally referring to and resulting from that agreement, such as the party would
' not have done unless on account of that very agreement, and with a direct view
’ to its performance; and the agreement set up must appear to be the same with
the one partly performed—there must be no uncertainty or equivocation in the
case.
On what g-roundsperformance of parol contracts decreed. The ground of the inter
ference of courts of equity to enforce specific performance, is not simply that
there is proof of the existence of a parol agreement, but that there is fraud in
resisting the completion of an agreement partly performed.
Part payment of purchase price not enough. Part payment of the purchase price is
not, of itself, sufflcient to warrant a decree for the specific performance of a parol
contract for the purchase of lands; but it seemsthat full payment would be. (c)
The bill in this case was filed to compel the specific perform
ance of a parol agreement to convey land.
The bill states that John Bennette, one of the defendants, in
a conversation had with complainants, in the month of May or
June, in the year 1834, verbally agreed to sell and convey to
the complainants a certain lot of land, containing eighty acres,
(a) See Hawley v. Shelden, post, 420. In the case of Chambers v. Liver-more, 15
Mich., 381,the court denied specific performance of a written contract, because by
its terms it gave the complainant an unfair advantage. See also King v. Hamilton,
4 Pet., 811; Western R. R. Corp. v. Babcock, 6 Met., 346; Eastland v. Van Arsdale, 8
Bihb., 274.
(b) See Millard v. Ramadell, post, 373,and Bomier v. Caldwell, 8Mich, 468.,cited
in note, ante, 65.
(0) This case is authority to the point that part payment of the purchase price
will not alone take the case out of the statute; hut the dictum that full payment
would. is opposed to the following among other cases: Rhodes v. Rhodes, 8 Sandi.
C11,,279; Parker v. Wells, 6 Whart., 153; Sites v. Keller, 6 Ohio, 483; Hatcher v.
Hatcher, 1McMul. Ch., 311; Johnston v. Glancy, 4 Blackf., 94.
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for the sum of one hundred and fifty dollars, a part to be paid
in money, and the remainder in a certain order drawn upon a
man in the state of New York; that complainants paid Ben
nette, at the time, four dollars; that a deed was soon to be
made for the premises; that instead of reducing the agree
ment to writing, Bennette gave the complainants the duplicate
receipt for the land, which he had received at the time he pur
chased the land of the government, saying, at the same time,
that that receipt was as good as an article, for he, Bennette,
could‘ not sell the land without it ; that Bennette put complain
ants in possession, and they had made improvements,
etc., that *afterwards Bennette gave a deed to com- [*125]
plainants of the premises, but did not deliver it; that
about a week afterwards, Bennette sold and conveyed the land
to defendant, Jameson, through his, Jameson’s, agent, Powell
Grover, one of the defendants ; that Grover knew of the pre
vious sale by Bennette to complainants, when he purchased for
Jameson; the complainants offered to perform the contract on
their part, and demanded a deed.
The bill further stated that Jameson had deeded the prem
ises to Grover, and prayed a decree for specific performance,
and also contained a prayer for other relief, etc.
The answer of Grover admits the bargain between Bennette
and complainants, but denies that the four dollars was paid
towards the land ; states that the four dollars was borrowed by
Bennette, and that he had offered to repay it; admits that
Jameson offered to purchase the land of Bennette, in June,
1834, in his presence, and that Bennette told him that he had
made a contract or bargain for the lands with complainants ;
admits his being Jameson’s agent, to purchase the land, in case
the same should not be conveyed to complainants ; states that
Bennette called on Grover, June 24th, 1834, and stated that
complainants had not complied with their contract to purchase
the land, and that Bennette then ofl’ered to sell the land, and
that he, Grover, purchased it for Jameson ; that he inquired of
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complainants respecting their agreement to purchase, and their
answer satisfied him that they had abandoned the contract;
admits the deed to Jameson, and its record, and also the
improvements by complainants ; admits that he purchased
from Jameson, March 4, 1836, for $500 ; denies any knowledge
of complainants’ having any equitable title at the time he pur
chased from Jameson, and claims the benefit of the statute of
frauds.
The cause was heard on bill, answer and testimony.
J. W Jewett, solicitor for complainants.
I H Preston, for defendants.
[*126] *TnE CHANCELLOR2
It is not a matter of course to decree specific performance of
contracts. It requires a sound discretion, upon a view of all
the circumstances; and this discretion must not be arbitrary
and capricious, but must be regulated upon grounds that will
make it judicial: Seymour v. Delaney, 6 Johns. Ch., 222;
Same Case, on appeal, 3 Cowen, 505.
The contract or agreement sought to be enforced, must be
mutual, and the tie reciprocal, or a court of equity will not
enforce a performance : 1 Mad. Ch., 423; 1 J0/ms. Ch., 282,
378. Here the contract rests entirely in parol. The letter
given in evidence is too uncertain to form the foundation of
any proceeding ; it specifies no land, nor any price, and nothing
can be drawn from it as referring to the land in question.
The contract, in order to be enforced, must be certain in all
its essential particulars. There is none of that certainty shown
in the contract or agreement here sought to be enforced, which
is necessary to enable this court to decree a specific perform
ance.
If a party sets up part performance, to take a parol agree
ment out of the statute, he must show acts unequivocally
referring to and resulting from that agreement ; such as the
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party would not have done, unless on account of that very
agreement, and with a direct view to its performance; and the
agreement set up must appear to be the same with the one
partly performed. There must be no equivocation or uncer
tainty in the case.
The ground of the interference of this court is not simply
that there is proof of the existence of a parol agreement, but
that there is fraud in resisting the completion of an agreement
partly performed : Phillips v. Thompson, 1 Johns. Ch., 131.
If this case can be sustained at all, it must be on the ground
of part performance, for there is clearly no such written con
tract or agreement as can be enforced by this court.
The question then recurs, was there such a specific, definite
verbal contract as can be enforced, and has there been
such a*part performance, and readiness to fulfill, on [*127]
the part of the complainants, as will take this case out
of the operation of the statute of frauds, and render it the
duty of this court to decree a specific performance ? It seems
to me not. The improvement I regard as out of the question,
so far as that may be sought to make a part of the perform
ance and fulfillment. It is pretty clear, that whatever was
done in this way, was not done until after the conveyance to
Jameson, and it was only done with a view to its effect upon
these proceedings. From the testimony of Green and Sewell,
confirmed by the other witnesses, it is to be inferred that there
was a parol contract for the sale of the land in question; but
this, it is equally apparent, must have been conditional ; that
is
,
that the defendant Bennette, would convey the land upon
condition that the complainants would pay to him the purchase
price. There was no such mutual undertaking on the part of
the complainants as would have enabled Bennette to compel
them to pay the money at any definite time. But it must be
inferred that the agreement was to convey the land upon the
return of Bennette from Jackson, if they would then pay him
the consideration.
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There is some discrepancy as to the intention of the payment
of the four dollars. But I am inclined to think that both par
ties intended at the time that this should apply in part pay
ment.
It has been held, that even full payment of the purchase
money is not sufficient, of itself, to take the case out of the
statute: 1 Mad. Ch., 881, and note (e).
But I am inclined to think the better opinion now is, that
the payment of the whole of the purchase money, clearly in
pursuance of a definite and mutual parol agreement, is sufli
cient to take a case out of the statute. But, I believe, it has
uniformly been held, that the payment of a. trifling amount, as
was the case here, is not, of itself, shfiicient. Indeed, if this
were permitted in a case like the present, it would defeat all
the beneficial objects of the statute. But this application of
the four dollars must, in the nature of things, have
[*128] been contingent; *that is
,
upon condition that the
complainants entitled themselves to a conveyance of
the land by performing, on their part, by the payment of the
balance of the purchase money.
The ground on which the court acts at all, in these cases, is
fi'a/ad, in refusing to perform after performance by the other
party. The allowing any other construction upon the statute
of frauds would be to make it a guard and protection to fraud:
1 Mad. 0/L., 878. This is the rule laid down in the books, and
it is the true one. Let us apply it to the case before us. Here
is not only an absence of all appearance of fraud, but of all
temptation to commit it. It appears that Bennette had
waited for the performance of complainants, away from home
for a considerable time; that he had done all his part; that he
was ready to make the complainants a title; that, on the day
on which a conveyance was made to Jameson, he applied to
one of the complainants, and then stated that he had waited
four weeks for them; but that, if they would then fulfill
the contract, he would not convey to Jameson; and he finally
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sold the land for five dollars less than, according to the bill, he
was to have received of complainants.
It is true that the complainant, Henry, replied that he was
ready to fulfill his part, but he offered no payment nor made
any definite suggestion as to any payment. This was merely
keeping the word of promise to the ear, and after so long a
delay might have justly been treated by the defendant Ben
nette as such a failure to fulfill, on the part of complainants, as
would absolve him. In the absence of all fraud and all temp
tation to commit fraud, I can see no other way of treating this
matter. What other course was left? It would have been
hard, indeed, to hold him longer in this state of uncertainty; it
would be more severe, after the lands have been conveyed to a
bona fide purchaser, and expensive improvements made by
others, still to decree a specific performance.
I do not perceive any ground to impute fraud or unfairness
to the defendant Grover, in this transaction. He swears posi
tively it was purchased for Jameson and with his
money; *that he left the agency with him because he [*129]
could not remain so long from home. It appears, too,
that Jameson owned adjoining lands. Grover manifested no
great anxiety to purchase, but it was placed on the ground that
he would take it for Jameson if the McMui-tries failed to pay.
It is true Grover subsequently purchased this and the adjoin
ing tract of land, but at an advanced price. Judges, of late,
have regretted that the cases have gone so far in permitting
part performance to take a case out of the statute, and have
said that the courts ought ‘to make a stand against further
encroachments upon the statute of frauds. In these views I
concur. Unless a stand is made, all the salutary objects of the
statute will be lost sight of. Some other points were made in
the argument, which are not necessarily involved, and perhaps
I have already gone farther than is necessary; as, after all, the
case turns principally on the entire absence of fraud on the
part of the defendants, and the non-fulfillment on the part of
8 us
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the complainants; there is such a want of certainty and mutu~
ality in this contract that it cannot be enforced. The com
plainants have failed to fulfill on their part. Decreeing a
specific performance is an exercise of the powers of this court
not an debito justitiae, but to be exercised upon a full view of
the whole case. There being an entire absence of fraud, and,
so far as can be ascertained from the case, the failure of the
contract having been caused by the
non-faflfillment
of the com
plainants themselves, they have not ma e such a case as calls
upon this court to interfere and decree a specific performance,
but that the parties should be left to their remedy at law. The
bill must be dismissed with costs.
Bill dismissed.
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Hyacinth Bernard dit Lajore v. The Heirs of Antoine Bougard
and others.
Settling equities under government grant. After a. confirmation of a claim to land
by the board of land commissioners under an act of congress, and after patent
issued, if competent at all for this court to go behind the patent to settle con
flicting claims, it should only he done on the clearest and most irretragable
proofs. (a)
Contract to mislead land board immoral and void. If two persons, claiming joint
possession of lands, enter into an agreement that a claim by them shall be pre
sented to the government land board, in the name of one alone, and that when
the claim is confirmed to him, he shall convey a part of the land to the other, is
immoral as tending to mislead the land board, and therefore, it seems,void.
Resulting trust. Where two persons claim equities in lauds. and one of them pro
sents a.claim thereto which is allowed by the government land board, there is no
resulting trust ln favor of the other which can be enforced in equity.
U
The bill in this case set forth that in January, 1793, Hya
cinth Bernard dit Lajore and one Antoine Bougard took pos
session of and settled a certain tract of land on the north side
of the river Raisin, in the county of Monroe, containing five
hundred and sixty arpents, being four hundred and sixty acres,
which they had jointly purchased of the Indians; that the pos
session was taken jointly and for their joint benefit, and the
land was possessed and used in common; that while so pos
sessed, they, at their joint expense, and for their mutual bene
fit, made permanent and expensive improvements; that they
continued their joint occupancy and improvements till March
3, 1807, and long subsequently, and the land was invariably con
sidered, held, improved and enjoyed as their common property;
that about the time last aforesaid, they came to a resolution
for partition, and agreed to set oif the easterly half to com
plainant, and the westerly half to said Antoine; that ever after
wards the easterly half was always taken as the separate prop
(a) Where, however, lands are granted by the government, by treaty or other
wise to individuals, and the president unnecessarily issues a patent, and delivers it
to a person not entitled, such patent is void, and may be so declared by the state
courts: Stockton v. Williams, Wal. Ch., 120: Same Case,on appeal, 1 Doug. Mich.,
546. And this notwithstanding it is issued under a.special act of congress: Campau
1).Dewey, 9 Mich., 381.
ii
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erty of complainant, and treated by both as such, and that he
continued to occupy and enjoy the same in his own right, and
exercised acts of ownership over it
,
and that his title was never
disputed.
The bill further stated that complainant and said Antoine
being ignorant of the proper course to be taken to obtain a
confirmation of their title, neglected to prefer their claim
until 1821, when some person advised them to put in their
claim; that they did so under the act of congress entitled “An
act to revive the powers of the commissioners for ascertaining
and deciding on claims to land in the district of Detroit, and for
settling the claims to land at Green Bay and Prairie des Chiens,
in the territory of Michigan,” approved May 11th,
[*131] 1820; that they both prepared to go to Detroit *for that
purpose, but at the suggestion of some one it was pro
posed, to save expense, that the whole lands should be confirmed
to one, the expenses to be shared equally,and that that one should
convey to the other his share; that said Antoine accordingly
went to Detroit and made his claim, which was duly confirmed
to him by the commissioners acting under the act of congress
entitled “An act to revive and continue in force certain acts
for the adjustment of land claims in the territory of Michi
gan,” approved February 21, 1823, and also by congress; that
complainant continued in possession of his part until 1829,
and he often called upon said Antoine to ascertain if the
patent had been received by him; that in 1828, and before
receiving the patent, said Antoine died, but that on the day
previous to his death he called his children, or a part of them,
together, informed them of complainant’s rights in the prem
ises, and enjoined them to convey to him; that the children
afterwards, when called upon for a conveyance, did not deny
complainant’s right, but professed a willingness to make a deed
when the patent should be received.
The bill then proceeds to allege that three of the five heirs
at-law of said Antoine, by separate conveyances made in the
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years 1829 and 1830, had each sold and conveyed an undivided
fifth part of the whole land to one H. Disbrow, with intent to
defraud complainant, and that Disbrow, at the time of con
tracting therefor, and of receiving the deed or paying the pur
chase money, had full notice of complainant’s rights, and
afterwards surreptitiously and illegally got possession
'
of the lands. *Also that the other two heirs in 1830 [*132]
each sold and conveyed an undivided one-fifth part of
the whole land to one Robert Clark, and that Clark bought
and received deeds with the like full notice of complainant’s
rights. The bill further charges that a patent was issued for
the land in 1829 or 1880, to said Antoine or to some one or
more of his heirs, the complainant being unable to state partic
ulars, as the heirs have it; and the bill asks for the production
of the patent, prays that said Disbrow and Clark be decreed
to convey to complainant, etc.
The defendants by plea relied upon the statute of frauds
as a bar to complainant’s claim.
They also answered fully, denying all knowledge, informa
tion or belief of the pretended joint purchase of the Indians;
denied the pretended joint occupancy and improvement, and
the agreement to partition; insisted that said Antoine alone
purchased of the Indians, and took possession of the whole
premises in question in his own right, and for his own exclu
sive benefit, about the time mentioned in the bill, and that he
continued to occupy the same by himself or his tenants, not
only to the year 1807, but to the time of his death in 1829,
claiming the whole of the same as his own, and at all times
denying the claims of all others. The defendants Disbrow and
Clark, in their answers, denied all knowledge or notice of
rights in complainant.
Replication was filed to the answer, and the case heard on
pleadings and proofs. The evidence is suflicently stated in the
opinion.
m
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A. D. Fraser, solicitor for complainant:
The case made by the bill is that of a trust, arising
[*133] by implication *or construction of law, and is expressly
excepted from the operation of the statute relied on, by
the 13th section (Laws of 1819, p. 118), and may be proved by
parol, even in opposition to the answer of the defendant deny
ing the trust. The statute was never held to apply to such a case:
Wray v. Steele, 2 Ves. & B., 388; 17inch v. Finch, 15 Ves., 45;
Attorney- General 1;. Fowler, 15 Ves., 90; Jeremg/’s Equity, 88.
The complainant’s case does not rest nor depend upon the
promise or arrangement between them, as to the manner of
fortifying the title, but rests upon the previous equity of the
case. The promise alleged is only an additional ground of
equity. It is the occupation and improvement of the property
by the complainant that constitutes his equitable title, and
gives him a right to confirmation under the several acts of con
gress on this subject: Hutcheon v. llfannington, 1 Ves., 366;
Boyd v. McLean, 1 Johns. Ch., 582; 2 P. Wms., 548,- 1 Johns.
Uas., 153; Decouche v. Savetier, 3 Johns. Ch., 216; Stickland
v. Aldridge, 9 Ves., 518; Livingston v. Livingston, 2 Johns.
Ch., 539; Jackson v. lllatsdorf, 11 Johns., 96.
If the deceased did not intend to take the deed as a trust,
and convey to the complainant, he obtained it in fraud, and, on
that ground, complainant is entitled to have the trust carried
into effect, notwithstanding the statute: Roberts on Frauds,
102,- 1 Com. Dig., s61, 485,- 1 Maad., 2.99, 240, 29.9.
It is a clear rule, that where A. purchases in the name of B.,
the former paying the consideration, B. is a mere trustee, not
withstanding the statute of frauds: Jieremg/’s Eq., 85. So, if
an agent locate lands for himself, which he ought to locate for
his principal, he is in equity a trustee for his principal. It is
equally well settled that all persons coming into possession of
trust property, with notice of the trust, shall be considered
trustees, and bound, with respect to that special property, to
the execution of the trust: 1 Johns. Ch., 566.
us
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H T Backus, solicitor for defendants:
A
*1. The action of the commissioners, both as to the [*l38]
right and the evidence of the right, is conclusive, and
especially so since the confirmation by congress: 7 Wheat., 28,
237,- Strother 2:. Lucas, 12 Pet., 413. And this court are in no
Wise authorized to revise those proceedings, nor by a possi
bility could such revision be productive of any benefit to the
complainant.
2. Had the complainant a valid claim, as against Antoine
Bougard or his children, yet the real defendants, Disbrow and
Clark, are bona fiole purchasers without notice, and as such will
be protected, and equity can give no assistance against them:
Host v. Beekman, 1 Johns. Ch., 300; 9 Ves., 24. But had the
defendants had full notice of the pretended claim of the com
plainant, it would in no wise have varied their rights or altered
the case, for the claim itself, by complainant’s own showing, is
a mere nullity, and in the language of Lord Mansfield, had the
defendants known of it
,
they would also have known it was
void: Wilson v. Mdson, 1 Oranch, 70, 100. As every man is
charged with a knowledge of the law: 1 Johns. Ch., 516;
Lyon '0. Richmond, 2 Johns. Ch., 51, 60.
3. If any such agreement as that contended for by the com
plainant were in fact made and entered into, yet the same was
null and void. 1. As being contrary to the policy of the law,
and in fraud of the act of congress, an agreement not only to
deceive the commissioners, but to obtain the title to the
premises by false pretenses and absolute falsehood; and all acts
or agreements in fra-udem legis, or contrary to the Policy of
the law, are prohibited and void: The William Ifing, 2 Wheat.,
148, 153; 4 Pet., 441; 4 Johns. Ch., 254; 20hi0, 510,‘ 6 J0hns.,
194,- 8 Jolms., 4.4.4. But-2. If the complainant’s own story be
true, he entered into a stipulation and agreement with Antoine
Bougard, to commit, or procure to be committed, actual perjury,
in the proof of the claim before the commissioners, and he him
self aided in the commission of that positive crime; for as he
119
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would now have this court believe, he himself procured
[*139] witness (so his bill and evidence *state) to swear that
the premises in question were the lawful claim of
Antoine Bougard, which, by his present case, he seeks to dis
prove; and the maxim both of equity and law is
,
ea: turpe con
tractu non oritur actio: 1 Bac. Ab., 111; 2 Binn., 101, and
cases there referred to; 4 Ves., 811; 8 Ves., 51,- 2 Eq. C'a.,
20; Gilberfls Eq. Rep, 153. And 3. To any such agreement
as that the complainant now seeks to enforce, the defendant’s
plea is a conclusive bar, and the same is void by the statute of
frauds: Stat. 1820, 112, 425. It is an express trust, if any
thing, by parol, and therefore void. It is not an implied trust,
or a trust in any way resulting by operation of law; if any
thing, it is a direct agreement by parol, to create a trust; an
attempt to enforce a parol declaration of a trust. The case
contains none of the elements of an implied or resulting trust.
A resulting trust can only exist where the actual payment oi
the purchase money is clearly proved: Steere v. Steere, 5 Johns.
Ch., 1. And a payment of a part, or anything less than the
whole purchase money, will not raise a resulting trust: 1 Johns.
0'/1., 582,- 2 Johns. O’/L., 405,‘ 2 Mad. O’/1., 112; 3 C0w., 588,
8 Ves., 696,- 1 Ves., $66.
But to this the complainant insists, that a trust is to be implied,
for the purpose of preventing a fraudulent use of the statute of
frauds. Trusts for that purpose are never implied, unless some
clear and specific act of fraud is distinctly proved, as prevent
ing the execution of a will or other instrument, creating an
estate or declaring a trust: Roberts on 1/‘hands, 103,- Wzynn v.
T/zynn, 1 Vern., 296. But the facts in this case show no such
thing, and if a trust might be implied in the present case it
might in every one, to the entire prostration of the statute.
But thevcomplainant further insists that the facts in the case
show the existence and creation of a trust before our statute of
frauds. The fact is not so, and it is untenable as a legal posi
tion; 1st, because prior to our statute of frauds, the legal
120
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estate to the premises was not in Antoine Bougard; his right
was a mere equity under the act of congress, and so was the
the complainant’s, if he had any; no trust, therefore,
could, by a possibility, *have existed, for the obvious [*140]
reason that there was no legal estate to sustain it. But,
l
2d, if
,
by a possibility, any could have existed before the legal
title vested in Antoine Bougard, yet, not being in writing, or
declared by writing, even before our statute of frauds, it would
have been void; for the rules of property are the same in
equity as at law: Gilbe'rt’s Law of Uses, 39. Trusts are now
what uses were before the statute of uses: Lord A-nglesea v.
Lord Altham, Holt, 736. And both uses and trusts have always
been governed by the same rules and the same reasons as legal
estates: Watts v. Ball, 1 P. Wms., 109. For were not the rules
of property the same in equity as at law, in the language of
all the books, things would be at sea, and there would be the
greatest uncertainty: Banks v. Sutton, 2 P. Wms., 713; 2 Bl.
Com. 337. Therefore, the rule has ever been, that where a
deed or writing was necessary before the statute of frauds, for
passing the legal estate, the same formality was necessary to
create or declare a use or trust: Gz'lbert’s Law of Uses, 7 ,'
7 Bac. Abr. Tit. Uses and Trusts, 92; 8 Atk., 151; 2 Atk., 37.
No legal estate whatever, by the fundamental ordinance, and
laws both of the Northwest territory and the territory of
Michigan, could, at any time, be created or transferred by
parol: Fundamental Ord., Art. 1,
‘
Lindsey v. Coats, 1 Ohio
Rep., 113. For these reasons, then, any pretended trust prior
to the statute of frauds, would be a nullity.
THE Cnsncnnnon:
Every material allegation in the bill is fully and positively
denied by the answer. The defendants, nine in number, say
the complainant never either owned or occupied the said land,
or any part or portion thereof; but the children and heirs, on
the contrary, say, from their earliest recollection, their father
121
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held the entire, exclusive and peaceable possession of the
whole tract, as well the pretended eastern as the western por
tion; that the said Antoine did not, immediately before
["‘141] his death, or at any time, direct them to convey *any
portion of the tract to the complainant, or admit that
he had any interest therein.
Indeed, it is hardly possible that an answer could be made
more full and complete to all the material allegations in the bill.
The defendants also set up and insist upon the statute of
frauds.
Voluminous testimony has been taken on both sides.
The testimony has been carefully considered, and I cannot,
from a review of it
,
come to the conclusion that the claim of
the complainant can be sustained.
The complainant relies for the establishment of his claim
upon the testimony of Joseph Beauxhomme, Louis Bernard,
Louis Morminee, Joseph .Droui1lard and Louis Louigne.
The testimony of Beauxhomme is as to admissions made by
Bougard, and is inconsistent with itself. He makes Bongard
admit that the complainant is entitled to one-half, and says
still that he said the two acres troubled him, etc.; and it is
entirely at variance with the allegations of the bill, that the
land was divided and complainant in the possessioh of the east
half. But little weight can be attached to the testimony of
Louis Bernard. It is in proof that he had previously alleged
that the present complainant had no interest in the land in
question, but that it belonged to him. Louis Morminee testi
fied before the board of land commissioners that it belonged to
Bougard. Drouillard testifies as to the original purchase from
the Indians, and says it belonged to both complainant and
Bougard. Louis Louigne substantially sustains the last wit
ness, but is manifestly mistaken as to other statements which
he makes, and so much so as at least to cast some doubt upon
his testimony. There is such discrepancy and so much uncer
tainty in the showing in this case, that the testimony of the
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witnesses as to transactions of so ancient a date should be
received with caution.
The testimony of Margaret Rivor and Narcissa Delisle, who
have resided near the land for a long time, strongly sustain the
answers; they resided near the lands at a very early period, and
never saw the complainant work on the land, or
*heard of his claim. Indeed, the proof of any actual [*1-42]
occupation by complainant, aside from the admission
testified to by Beauxhomme, is very slight. When it is con
sidered that the fact of a separate and distinct possession and
occupation of the east half of the tract of land as alleged in
the bill for so long a time, and up to a period so recent, must,
if true, have been so notorious as to have been capable of clear
and positive proof, coupled with the testimony as to the claim
of Louis Bernard that the land belonged to him; and also the
testimony of Durocher, that so late as 1821 the complainant
claimed the whole of the land, it is diflicult to come to the con
clusion, from anything here presented, that the claimant ever
had such a possession and occupation of any portion of this land,
either joint or several, as would have entitled him to a confirm
ation by the commissioners, under the act of congress of May,
1820, continuing in force the previous act of 1807. The claim
of the complainant is probably founded on family residence;
he was, no doubt, occasionally there when a boy. It is true,
there is great discrepancy in the testimony.
But after a confirmation and patent, if it is competent at all
to go behind it, it should only be done upon the clearest and
most irrefragable proof.
The point insisted upon in the argument, that the agreement,
or pretended agreement, that both complainant and Bougard
would concur in making proof before the commissioners of that
which, according to the allegations in the bill, did not exist, to
wit: the sole occupation and improvement of this property by
Bougard, so as to bring him within the requirements of the act
of congress, is immoral, is entitled to weight. The commis
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sioners had no authority to confirm to any except to those who
proved themselves to come within the provisions of the act of
congress. They have never acted upon any claim or right of
this complainant.
If the allegations in the bill are true, the commissioners have
been led by false lights to do an act which they were not
authorized to do. And if ‘this conspiracy had not existed, it is
possible such facts might have been elicited as would
[*1-18] have *satisfied them that of right it should have been
confirmed to neither the one or the other.
The ground taken by the complainant, in order to avoid the
statute of frauds, is
,
that this is a resulting trust; that the com
plainant, being actually entitled to the east half, and the title
having been vested in Bougard, the complainant may compel
the heirs to execute the trust. |
From the premises it will be perceived that, in the view of
the court, this position cannot be sustained.
First. It is not sustained by such clear and undoubted proof
as should be required in a case like the present, that the com
plainant was ever entitled to a confirmation of any portion of
this trust.
Indeed, from all the facts and circumstances developed in the
case, I am inclined to think otherwise.
Second. If it were apparent that the complainant would have
been entitled to a confirmation, it would still be questionable
whether it would come within the rule of an implied or result
ing trust.
A resulting trust only exists where the actual payment of
the purchase money is clearly and distinctly proved. Payment
of a part, or anything less than the whole, will not raise a
resulting trust: Steere v. Steere, 5 Johns. Ch., 1
; Boyd v. Mc
Lean, 1 Johns. Ch., 582.
This was not a purchase. The occupants of these lands
could not claim the grant of the government as a matter of
strict legal right, although they may have had strong equitable
124
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claims. It was rather in the nature of a bounty or gift by the
government.
If there was any trust, it was an express trust, and by parol,
not evidenced, or pretended so to be, either as to its existence
or terms, by any written contract or memorandum whatever,
and, to this, the plea of the statute of frauds, as has already
been decided in this court, is a conclusive bar.
The existence of a trust may be shown by parol, but there
must be some memorandum in writing showing its terms.
From the view I have taken of the case, all that por
tion of *the proceedings and proofs which relates to [*144]
the purchase by Clark and Disbrow with notice, as is
alleged, becomes immaterial.‘ If they had notice of the claim
of the complainant, it was a notice that he had no valid claim.
The bill must be dismissed with costs.
Bill dismissed.
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Consideration: Duress. Where the fears of a timid and ignorant man were prac
ticed upon by threats of a prosecution for slander, and he was thereby induced
to asign a mortgage to another, the assignment was held to be without con
sideration, and a re-assignment was decreed. (a)
This bill in this case was filed August 17, 1837, and states
that on or about the second day of June of the same year, the
complainant possessed a certain indenture of mortgage, ex
ecuted by William Gilcrist to complainant, bearing date April
8, 1837, of certain premises ‘therein described, conditioned to
pay five hundred dollars, and interest, six months from the date
thereof. ~
That, on or about the second day of June, 1837, complainant
had a conversation with defendant at Jonesville, in the county
of Hillsdale, in regard to the subscription, by the complainant,
for a certain newspaper called the Christian Palladium, in which
conversation complainant told the defendant that he never had
subscribed for said paper, nor authorized any other person to
subscribe for said paper for him (the complainant); and that
complainant further stated to the defendant that he, the defend
ant, had forged his (the complainant’s) name, or given some
other person liberty to sign the complainant’s name for said
paper, which the defendant denied. That, soon after such con
(a) The compromise and settlement of a claim asserted in good faith is a su1‘fici—
ent consideration for the settlement, and tor any obligations given by one party to
the other in consummation of it: Van Dyke v. Davis, 2 Mich., 144; Weed v. Terry,
Wal. Ch., 501; S’. 0., 2 Doug. Mich., 844; Hale 1:.Holmes, 8 Mich., 87. In Gates 11.
Shutts, 7Mich., 127,it appeared that defendant had charged complainant with in
tentionally burning his own mill, and made claim for payment for certain wheat of
the defendant which had been placed in the mill before it was burned; that complain
ant gave his note and mortgage for the value of the wheat, but afterwards filed a bill
to set aside these securities as obtained through threats, fear and duress: Held, that
the securities must stand if there was no fraud, and no undue advantage taken by
defendant to bring it about, and he had reason to believe the charge, and did not
manufacture it to frighten complainant into a settlement. Upon this general subject,
see 1 Story Eq. Jur1'.s.,section 1.81,et seq.; Adams‘ Eq., 183,and cases cited in fourth
Am. ed.
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versation, the defendant threatened to prosecute the complain
ant for the words he had spoken as aforesaid, and told com
plainant if he did not assign over to the defendant said mort
gage, and the bond referred to therein and accompanying the
same, as a collateral security, and settle with him, the defend
ant, for the language complainant had used in relation to the
subscription for said newspaper, he, the defendant,
*would keep the complainant in prison eight or ten [*146]
years, for what he, the complainant, had said; and com
plainant being intimidated and greatly distressed at the threats
and menaces of the defendant, and being ignorant of his own
rights, and of the law, was induced, by these threats and menaces
of the defendant, to execute an assignment of the bond and mort
gage, and did, on the second day of June aforesaid, execute and
deliver to the said defendant an assignment of said bond and
mortgage, without any consideration of whatever name or
nature, and did actually deliver over said bond and mortgage.
The bill further alleges that the complainant had applied to the
defendant to re-assign and re-deliver said bond and mortgage,
and to pay complainant the amount thereof, etc., which defend
ant had refused to do; and prays that the defendant may be
decreed to pay to the complainant whatever money, if any, he
may have received, or shall receive, on said bond and mortgage,
and be restrained by injunction from assigning or in any way
transferring or disposing of the same, and that defendant may
be decreed to re-assign and deliver up said bond and mortgage
to complainant.
The answer admits the bond and mortgage, and that at the
time of the assignment thereof there was then due thereon
about the sum of three hundred and thirty-five dollars; states
that previous to the time of the assignment stated in the bill
the defendant had been frequently informed by divers good and
worthy citizens of the county of Hillsdale that the complainant
had reported and declared, and was in the frequent habit of
reporting and declaring, that the defendant had forged the
121
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name of the complainant to a subscription for the newspaper
mentioned in the bill; that defendant was advised to ask some
redress of the complainant for his slanders; that the defendant
called on the complainant, and had a conversation with him, in
which the defendant informed the complainant of the slan
derous, false and defamatory declarations made by the oom
plainant, of and concerning the defendant, charging
[*147] *him with the crime of forgery; that the complainant
admitted to defendant that he had before then, at
divers times and places, and in the hearing and presence of
divers persons, reported and declared that the defendant had
forged his (the complainant’s) name to the said subscription,
and that the reports and declarations were false, and without
any fouhdation in truth, and that the complainant was willing
to redress the wrong he had done to the reputation and good
name and credit of the defendant by such false and slanderous
reports; to which the defendant replied that the said complain
ant must make him (the defendant) satisfaction in some way,
or that the defendant should seek redress by proceedings at law;
that complainant then informed defendant that if he (the
defendant) would take the bond and mortgage in full satisfac
tion for the wrongs done him by the false and slanderous reports
and declarations of the complainant, he (the complainant) would
duly assign over the same to the defendant; and that complain
ant strongly solicited the defendant to accept of the mortgage
in satisfaction for the said wrong; that at the special request
and urgent solicitation of the complainant, the defendant agreed
to accept and receive the bond and mortgage in full satisfaction
of said wrong and injury, and thereupon the complainant as
signed and delivered the said bond and mortgage to defendant,
and defendant at the same time acquitted and discharged com
plainant from all liability for his false and slanderous reports,
etc. The answer denies the threats of prosecution, etc., and
also denies that defendant told complainant he would keep him
in jail, as stated in the bill.
128 .
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The cause was heard upon bill, answer and proofs.
E Lawrence, for complainant.
*P. R. Adams, for defendant. [*1-49]
Tun Cusnonrmon:
From the bill, answer and testimony, it is apparent that the
defendant was practicing upon the fears of a timid and ignor
ant man, and that the assignment of the mortgage in question
was in fact procured without any consideration whatever. The
complainant is entitled to a decree that the defendant, Whitney,
re-assign and re-deliver said mortgage to the complainant
within thirty days from the service of a copy of the decree in
this cause.
Decree accordingly.*
‘An appeal was taken in this case to the supreme court, and the decree of the
chancellor atflrmed January 22, 1839.
9' mo
iii
150 CASES IN CHANCERY.
Tnonrsos v. iiiscx.
Thompson v. Mack and others.
Recording laws: Priority as between.grantees. Where a party claims priority
under or by virtue of the statute regulating the registry of deeds and mort
gages, he must show a compliance with its provisions in order to entitle him to
such priority.
Mortgage by deed absolute in form. record of. Under the code of 1833,where a
deed absolute in form was shown by contemporaneous writing to be only a
mortgage, it should have been recorded as a mortgage; and it recorded as a
deed, the record would not give it priority over a prior unrecorded mort
ease (w)
Onceamortgage always a mortgage. Where a deed absolute in form was given to
secure a debt, and the grantee at the time gave back an agreement to re-convey
when the debt should be paid, but this agreement was not recorded, and the deed
was recordedas adeed, and not—as the statute required—as a mortgage ; and
the grantor, to obtain further credit, afterwards gave up the agreement to
re-convey, and the grantee sold the land : Held, that the deed having originally
been a mortgage did not cease to be such on the surrender of the agreement,
and that the deed not having been properly recorded, the subsequent grantees
could not claim priority over a mortgage duly recorded which the first grantor
had given after conveying as above stated. (b)
This was a bill to foreclose a mortgage, and stated that the
complainant, August 11, 1830, purchased a quantity of drugs
and medicines, to the amount of $197.23 of the firm of Law
(a) See the statute under which this decision was made in the chancellor's opinion.
The provisions of the revised statutes of 1846,which are now the law on this sub
ject, are considerably different, and the question may perhaps at some time arise
whether this decision is applicable to them. The New York cases, cited in the opin
ion, were based upon peculiar provisions of statute.
(b) The chancellor appears to hold that this would be the law notwithstanding the
subsequent grantees bought in good faith, and without notice of the defeasible
character of the first deed. Indeed, he says that, “ if in tact the transactions
between Mack (the first grantor and mortgagor) and Chamberlain (the grantee in
the first deed) constituted the instrument a mortgage and no more, the record of
the mortgage of Thompson should be regarded as a sufficient notice to a subsequent
purchaser." This would be to make the protection of the registry laws to a subse
quent purchaser depend upon matters of fact not brought home to his knowledge ;
and this case would then be an exception to the general rule, that one who, in
searching the records, finds a deed apparently conveying all the grantor’s interest, is
not bound to search for conveyances by the same grantor, afterwards recorded, but
of which he has no actual notice. The statutes of 1846(Comp. Laws, 5 2751)render a
defeasance not recorded of no eflect except as against the maker thereof, his heirs
or devisees, and persons having actual notice thereof.
For illustrations of the maxim, “ once a mortgage always a mortgage," see Oom
clock u. Howard, Wal. Ch., 110; Thurston v. Prentiss, 1 Mich., 198; Batty v. Snook, 5
Mich., 251.
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rence, Keese & Co., of the city of New York. That after
wards, and before the goods were received, it was agreed
between the complainant and Mack that the latter should take
the drugs and medicines and pay for them ; and that Mack, on
the 14th April, 1831, gave a mortgage to the complainant on
lot number fifty-seven, in the village of Pontiac, to indemnify
“him against the payment of the debt due to Lawrence, Keese
& Co., which mortgage was afterwards recorded, July 24,
1833; that Mack had neglected to pay Lawrence, Keese& Co.,
who had sued the complainant for the price of the drugs and
medicines, and recovered a judgment against him of $265.47
damages, and $8 costs, which the complainant had paid ; that
April 9, 1833, Mack conveyed, by an absolute deed, the lot
mortgaged (together with another lot in Pontiac) to the defend
ant Chamberlain, whose deed was recorded July 20, 1833, four
days previous to defendant’s mortgage. The bill charged
that the deed from Mack to Chamberlain, although
absolute *on its face, was intended by the parties to ["‘151]
operate as a mortgage only, and was given to secure a
debt due from Mack to Chamberlain ; that Chamberlain had
bound himself by bond, or other writing, to re-convey the
premises on the payment of the debt, and that such bond or
writing for a re-conveyance was not recorded by Chamberlain
with his deed; it further states that, June 29, 1834, Chamber
lain conveyed the lot to the defendant Keeney, who, June 3,
1834, conveyed it to the defendants, Draper and Richardson ;
and Chamberlain, Keeney, Richardson and Draper, were sev
erally charged with notice of complainant’s mortgage at the
time of their respective purchases.
The defendants put in several answers. Mack, in his answer,
admits the purchase of the drugs, etc., but not till after they
had been received by Thompson, and put into Mack’s store for
sale; states that Thompson put a clerk in the store to sell
the goods ; that the clerk sold a considerable portion of them,
and used part of the money, the proceeds of the sales, for his
iai
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private purposes; that Mack aided in selling the goods, etc.,
that April 14, 1831, Mack purchased of‘ Thompson the drugs
unsold, and the debts due for those which had been sold,‘ and
agreed to indemnify Thompson against the debts due by him to
Lawrence, Keese & Co., and to pay the $32 for transportation,
and that Mack and wife, on the same day, executed the mort
gage mentioned in the bill, as indemnity to Thompson ; that
the mortgage was not recorded until the time stated in the bill;
that, December 10, 1832, he paid to Thompson $56.98, to be
applied on the mortgage, and took receipt to that effect;
that Thompson is also indebted to him in the sum of $91 for
services, and also owes him for rent, and on other accounts, as
he believes, to the amount of the debt ; denies any knowledge
of the judgment against Thompson ; admits the deed to
Chamberlain, of April 9, 1833, and its record, and that he took
from Chamberlain a paper, not under seal, in which Chamber
lain agreed to re-convey the lots, if he should in a short time
(could not state how long) pay to Chamberlain the amount
due him, which was about $150 ; that he, Mack,
[*152] being *in embarrassed circumstances, shortly after
wards applied to Chamberlain for further credit, and
to obtain such credit, he gave up the agreement to re-convey,
and surrendered all right, title, claim and equity of redemp
tion in the premises; that he did not tell Chamberlain of
Thompson’s mortgage, and does not believe that Chamberlain
knew of that mortgage; that the reason that two lots were
deeded to Chamberlain was that there was an incumbrance of
dower on one of them; that Keeney bought the lots 57 and
52 of Chamberlain; that he never informed Keeney, and does
not believe he knew of Thompson’s mortgage at the time he
purchased the lots; that the sale to Keeney was not for the
benefit of Mack or his family.
Chamberlain, in his answer, admits that Mack was indebted
to him, and gave him a deed of lots numbers 57 and 52, April
9, 1833; denies that he had any notice of Mack’s mortgage to
182
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Thompson. Further states that when Mack gave up the writ
ten agreement he released and surrendered all right to redeem;
that he paid Mack the full value of the premises, incumbered
as they were by a claim of dower. That Keeney paid the full
value for the lots; that at the time of making the deed to
Keeney, he, Keeney, had no notice of Thompson’s mortgage,
to his knowledge. Keeney, in his answer, denies any knowl
edge of Thompson’s mortgage at the time he purchased from
Chamberlain, and until he had sold to Draper and Richardson;
admits the deed from Mack to Chamberlain, of April 9, 1833,
and deed from Chamberlain and wife to him, June 26, 1834.
Denies all knowledge of any agreement other than the deed
from Mack to Chamberlain, until after he sold to Draper
and Richardson; that he cannot state the exact amount paid
by him for the lots; that he gave full value, and purchased
them for himself, etc. Admits the sale by him to Draper and
Richardson, June 3, 1835, and their mortgage, etc., to him.
Draper and Richardson, in their answer, admit that they had
notice of Thompson’s mortgage, either before or after their
purchase, but do rot remember which.
*R. Manning, for complainant: [*l53]
The deed from Mack to Chamberlain, although absolute on its
face, is nevertheless a mortgage. It was given to secure a
debt to Chamberlain, who was to re-convey the premises when
Mack paid him.
As a mortgage, the defeasance, or agreement to re-convey,
should have been recorded with the deed, in the record of
mortgages, as the statute requires: Revised Laws of 1833,
pages Q83 and 284, § 3. By the registry of it as a deed, instead
of a mortgage, it did not, as a mortgage, gain priority over the
complainant’s mortgage: Day v. Dun/Lam, 2 Johns. Ch., 182;
6'*rz'mst0ne v. Carter, 3 Paige, 421; James '0. Morey, 2 Cowen,
246. The registry of it
,
as a deed, availed nothing. The
registry of a legal instrument does not change the nature or
efiect of the instrument. It does not change a mortgage into
iaa
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a deed, or a deed into a mortgage. Its only effect is to give
priority to legal instruments which have been legally recorded.
Whether, therefore, the defeasance was delivered up to Cham
berlain before or after the complainant’s mortgage was
recorded, if after the deed had been recorded, cannot alter the
case, for it could not make a good record out of what was
before a bad record, or no record at all. From the testimony
of Chamberlain it appears the surrender of the defeasance was
not intended to turn the mortgage into an absolute deed. He
considered the deed afterwards, as he had done before, as secur
ity for the debt Mack owed him. The complainant’s mortgage
was recorded long before Keeney purchased of Chamberlain,
and as Chamberlain’s deed is not good, either as a deed or
mortgage, against the complainant’s mortgage, Keeney’s deed
certainly cannot be. If there was any doubt that Chamberlain’s
deed continued to be a mortgage after the defeasance was sur
rendered, and it should be insisted the defeasance was given
up to Chamberlain before the deed was recorded, the testimony
is too vague and uncertain upon that point to take away the
common law rights of the complainant. The defendants, when
seeking to gain an advantage through‘ the registry
[*154] *law, should clearly show themselves entitled to it
by a compliance with the law.
B. R H. TVitherell, for the defendant:
Chamberlain was a purchaser without notice. See 2 Ves.,
453,- 3 Vea, 221,- .4
.
Ves., 38$; 9 l7es., 24
Chamberlain took up the writing of defeasance before his
deed from Mack was recorded; when that instrument was
taken up, if not before, his deed from Mack became absolute.
By the writing or article to Mack from Chamberlain, Mack
was to have but sixty days to redeem; the deed was then abso
lute.
Keeney was a purchaser for a bona fiole consideration, with
out notice, and if Chamberlain had notice Keeney will be pro
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tected: Demarest v. Wyncoop, 3 Johns. Ch., 129; Jackson v.
Given, 8 Johns. 141; Laws 1833, p. 283, sec. 2, p. 279, sec. 2.
Draper and Richardson are protected as well as Keeney,
under the principle that a purchaser with notice to himself from
one who purchased without notice may protect himself under
the first purchaser: Burnpus v. Platner, 1 Johns. Ch., 213.
Tim CHANCELLORZ '
From the facts stated in the bill, answer and testimony,
there can be no doubt that the conveyance from Mack to
Chamberlain was a mortgage, and a mortgage only, in its
inception; and it is evident that it so continued, and was so
regarded until the transactions were closed by the payment of
the amount due to Chamberlain, and the conveyance to'Keeney.
It is admitted to have been so in the first instance.
Chamberlain, in his testimony, says that the instrument of
defeasance was given up, so that the estate conveyed should
remain as security for further advances.
The account with Mack was not closed at that time.
Chamberlain says he should, at any time, have re-conveyed
to Mack upon payment of the amount due, and an allowance
for his trouble in securing his debt.
*He did actually convey the premises to Keeney, the [*155]
father-in-law of Mack, upon payment of the advances
made by him, and the charges for his trouble. _
The statute (Laws of 1833, page 284, section 3) provides
that “every deed conveying real estate, which by any other
instrument or writing, shall appear to have been intended
as security, in the nature of a mortgage, though it be an abso
lute conveyance in terms, shall be considered as a mortgage
and be deemed and adjudged to be liable to be registered as
other mortgages are by virtue of this act; and the person or
persons for whose benefit such deed shall be made, shall not
have the advantage given by this act to mortgages, unless
every instrument and writing operating as a defeasance of the
same, or explanatory of its being designed to have the same
135
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efieot only of a mortgage or conditional deed, be also herewith
registered in substance as in case of mortgages.”
The deed of Chamberlain with the writing or agreement to
Mack ought to have been registered as a mortgage. The
recording of that deed, as a deed, though the record was prior
to that of Thompson’s mortgage, can give it no priority over
that mortgage. See Dey '0. D-unham, 2 Johns. Ch., 182;
Grimstone v. Garter, 3 Paige, 421.
Four days after the record of the deed from Mack to Cham
berlain, Thompson recorded his mortgage and thus gave notice
of its existence.
Keeney claims, however, to have been a purchaser without
notice.
But if in fact the transactions between Mack and Chamber
lain constituted the instrument a mortgage and no more, the
record of the mortgage of Thompson should be regarded as a
suflicient notice to a subsequent purchaser.
The fact of a subsequent sale, especially while the mortgage
of Thompson was standing upon the record, would not change
the character of the transaction between Mack and Chamber
lain. It would defeat the salutary provisions of the statute to
permit it to be evaded bya sale to another when the party
claiming (as in this case Thompson had done) had placed his
mortgage upon record.
[*156] *The mortgage to Thompson being of prior date,
without reference to the registry laws would have
priority; the defendants claim priority by virtue of the provis
ions of the statute. In order to entitle themselves to such pri
ority, they must conform to its terms, which has not been done.
Mack sets out in his answer that the mortgage is nearly or
quite paid. This will render it necessary that it be referred to
a master to examine and report the amount due upon the
mortgage, after allowing all proper credits and offsets, and to
report to this court with convenient speed; and further direc
tions are reserved until the coming in of the master’s report.
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The County Commissioners of Lapeer County v. Alvin N.
Hart and others.
Bills of peace. Bills of peace are only allowed where the complainant has estab
lished his right at law; or where the persons who controvert the right are so
numerous as to render an issue under the direction of this court indispensable
to embrace all the parties concerned, and save a.multiplicity of suits.
Where sixty-seven suits were brought upon county orders by diflerent plaintiffs
before justices of the peace, some of which were tried and judgments rendered
for the plaintifls, and flve of them appealed to the circuit court, and the county
commissioners claimed to have avalid defense to them all, and filed a bill in
equity to enjoin them until the appealed suits could be tried, it was held that no
case of equitable jurisdiction was made out, and a preliminary injunction was
dissolved.
The fact that there were no funds in the county treasury with which to pay the costs
and appeal the remaining suits constitutes no reason for equitable interfer
ence. (a)
The bill in this case was filed May 23, 1839, and stated that
November 16, 1838, the board of supervisors of the county of
Lapeer, assuming to act in the performance of the duties
imposed on the county commissioners by the revised statutes,
after the county commissioners had been declared duly elected,
but before they had qualified, proceeded to enter into a con
tract with one Norman Davison, by which the supervisors pre
tended to bind the county to pay Davison twelve hundred dol
lars to complete a court house (the frame of which was up) for
the county, and directed the issuing of county orders on the
treasurer of the county for six hundred dollars, which were
issued and delivered to Davison as a part payment; that the
orders were issued in small sums, from one dollar to one hun
dred dollars each, which orders were required to be paid by
the county treasurer out of any moneys in the county treasury
not otherwise appropriated; were made receivable in payment
of county taxes, and payable January 1, 1839, to Norman
Davison or bearer. That, at their first meeting after being
duly qualified, viz., the first Monday of January, 1839, the
(al As to bills of peace generally, see Mitf. Eq. PL, by Jeremy, I45; 1 Mad. Ch.
Pr., 1L0,‘2 Eden on lnJ., by Waterman, 417;Adams‘ Eq., 1.’/9,’Story Eq. J14n'c.,§§ 852
880.
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county commissioners, deeming the proceeding of the board of
supervisors illegal and unauthorized by law, passed a resolu
tion to that effect, and immediately gave notice to the collec.
tors of the several towns in said county, and to the treasurer
thereof, not to receive the said orders in payment of taxes.
That, when the orders became due and payable, payment was
demanded of the treasurer by the several holders,
[*158] which payment *was refused, as well for the reason
that the county commissioners had forbidden their
payment, as for the reason that there was no money in the
treasury not otherwise appropriated. That the holders of the
orders commenced a series of vexatious suits against the county
commissioners on the orders, before justices of the peace; that
sixty-seven suits were brought in one day, process in each
returnable on the same day, before three different justices,
keeping their oilices and doing business at distances of from
five to twelve miles from each other, for the purpose of subject
ing the county commissioners to great inconvenience, and
deprive them of making their defense. That judgments had
been rendered against the commissioners in forty-four of the
suits so commenced, and the other twenty-three were still pend
ing and undecided. The bill further stated that the Whole
amount of judgments recovered amounted to about $500, and
that the holders unnecessarily and vexatiously multiplied suits;
that appeals had been taken in five of the cases, for the purpose
of testing the legality of the proceedings of the board of sup
ervisors, and the principle involved in all the suits was the
same; that the commissioners were unable to take appeals in all
the cases, in consequence of there being no funds in the treas
ury to pay the costs; that the costs which were required to be
paid, to enable them to take appeals from the several judg
ments, would fall but little short of the whole amount of the
judgments. The bill charged that the holders of the orders
conspired to commit a fraud, and extort money from the
county, etc., and prayed for an injunction to stay proceedings
ms
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at law upon the suits already commenced, and to restrain the
holders of the orders from commencing other suits at law,
until the suits appealed should be determined. An injunction
was granted according to the prayer, and this was a motion to
dissolve the injunction for want of equity in the bill.
D. Goodwin, in support of the motion:
*1. The court has no jurisdiction. This is wholly [*159]
at law, and the courts of law can try the whole matter.
2. The complainants themselves show that in forty-four cases
tried, judgment was for the plaintiffs, and not against them.
The cases where courts of equity interfere are usually those
where, in trials at law, the complainant has sustained a title, or
right, and there are subsequent repeated actions to question
that title or right.
3. Here the right claimed is on the part of the several defend
ants in the bill who held the orders, and is resisted by the com
plainants. The complainants are not seeking to enforce a right
which is invaded, but to resist a right claimed, and by their
own showing established by forty-four judgments.
4. It does not appear from the bill that the defenses in the
several cases were one and the same. They might have been
different in each case. The. bill does not show or allege what
the pleas were in any of the cases; in some it seems the pleas
were to the jurisdiction of the court.
5. When chancery interferes to prevent a multiplicity of suits,
it is in cases where the subject of the suit is the same, and not
different. Here the suits, according to the bill, are upon sep
arate orders, and these not in the hands of the original holders,
but transferred and held by different individuals, and where the
holders may hold for a valuable consideration, and without
notice: 1 Jlleddox, 166,- 2 Johns. O'h.,281,' 8 Johns. Rep., 601.
6. In forty-four cases there were judgments rendered, and in
five of these only there were appeals. In the rest, the judgments
are absolute, and this court can never restrain their collection;
the defense, if any, now being purely at law, and the judgments~_139
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having become absolute. In the five, the judgments are sus
pended by the appeals, and it does not appear that the questions
therein are the same; and in the remainder the pleas are to the
jurisdiction, and this court is not apprised what are the ques
tions that are to be tried, and cannot, therefore, interfere.
7. The cases where the court interferes, are when it
[*160] can *ordera single issue to be tried, and one that shall
decide the whole; and where an injunction can there
upon be granted and made perpetual upon the parties, the single
right being decided. Here this is impossible.
A. S. Porter and A. D. Fraser, contra.
Tun OHANCELLORI
I am satisfied this case does not come within the principles of
any of the cases cited in support of the injunction.
Bills of peace are only allowed where the complainant has
satisfactorily established his right at law; or where the persons
who controvert the right are so numerous as to render an issue
under the direction of this court indispensable, to embrace all
the parties concerned, and save a multiplicity of suits: Fonb.
Eg., 28," E'ldri(l_qe v. Hill, 2 Johns. Ch., 281.
. It is not pretended in this case that the right in litigation has
been established in favor of the complainants; on the contrary,
all the cases which have been tried have been determined in
favor of the defendants in this cause.
It is not indispensable that this court should interfere in the
present case (on account of the great number of persons who
controvert the right) and direct an issue under t' .c-ntrol of this
court. The parties who have brought suits on t.
’
rders are all
regularly in the courts of law, and each claims in his own right;
nor is it pretended that the defense cannot properly be made at
law. The complainants do not even ask this court to interfere
and direct an issue, but concede that their defense is at law.
It is urged that more suits are brought than were necessary to
determine the right to recover. In the case of Peters v. Prevost,
140
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Paine’s U. S. C. C. R., 64, an application was made for an in
junction to stay proceedings in ninety-two suits in ejectment
(where the parties pleading title and the testimony were the
same in each suit) until one or more could be tried, and the
remainder to abide the event, and the injunction was re
fused. If the suits in the present case were wrongly
*brought, the defendants below will recover their costs [*161]
on appeal; and while the statute does not inhibit the
bringing of suits in the manner in which these suits were brought,
and gives the right of appeal, it would be stepping beyond all
precedent for this court to stay proceedings by injunction, on
the ground of multiplicity of suits.
The fact that there were not sufficient funds in the treasury
to pay the costs of appeal can hardly be seriously urged as a
reason for the interference of this court.
That the holders of these orders are unnecessarily harrassing
the complainants does not sufiiciently appear; the suits were all
brought on the same day, before three different justices, and the
complainants appeared and defended. If suits had been brought
singly, from day to day, this allegation might have been urged
with more force.
'
I had doubts of the propriety of granting the injunction in
this case, and in any view I can take of the question I am now
satisfied that it cannot be sustained.
The parties were all properly in the courts below, and are now
there, and it cannot be indispensable for this court to interfere,
to bring all the parties into one suit. Indeed, the rights of each,
for aught that appears, stand on grounds different from the
others.
If the defendants did not take appeals, for want of funds, it is
one of those misfortunes against which this court cannot relieve.
It is admitted that the defense is at law, and the parties must
there make it.
Injunction dissolved.
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Daniel B. Eldred and another v. Camp and Shumway.
Injunction, dissolution of, where equity denied. Where the equity of s billis denied
by answer, the injunction will be dissolved on motion (a); and so it will be it it
it is shown by special plea that there is no equity in the bill.
Return of execution : Creditor‘: bill. For the purposes of a creditor’s bill an exe
cution returned by the sherifl that he had " property on his hands for want of
bidders," is insufileient. (b)
Motion to dissolve an injunction.
This was a creditor’s bill in the usual form, setting forth that
the complainant, Daniel B. Eldred, recovered against the defen
dant Camp, and one Boville Shumway, two judgments in the
circuit court for the county of Calhoun, and that executions
had been duly issued on said judgments, delivered to the
sherifi’, and returned unsatisfied; that the sum of $621.28, with
interest from November 10, 1838, over and above all just
claims by way of set-ofl’, or otherwise, was, at the time of filing
the bill, due to the complainant, Daniel B. Eldred, on the judg
ments.
An injunction was granted.
The defendant Camp put in a special plea to the bill, in which
he admits the recovery of the judgments, the issuing of the exe
cutions, the delivery of the same to the_ sherifi, and the amount
due as stated in the bill, and then proceeds: “ Yet this defendant
severally pleads in bar to the said complainants’ said bill of
complaint, and says, that after the issuing of the two execu
(a) The answer, however, must be lull and satisfactory, and even then the court
may refuse to dissolve it the eflect might be to deprive the complainant of all bene
fits he might derive from succeeding in the suit: Attorney-Geneml v. Oakland
County Bank, Wal. Oh.. 90. An injunction will not be dissolved on an answer admit
ting the equity of the bill, and setting up new matter as a defense, Ibid. Affidavits
will not, as a general rule, be allowed to be substituted for an answer for the pur
poses of this motion, though there may he exceptions: Sacket u. Hill, 2Mich., 182.
(b) The return of an execution unsatisfied, for the purpose of a creditor's bill,
cannot be made before the return day: Smith v:. Thompson, Wal. Ch., 1; Beach v.
White, Wal. Ch., 495: Willianss v. Hubbard, 1Mlch., 446; Thayer 1'. Swift, post, 430.
A return unsatisfied by order of the plaintifl is insuflicient: Williams v. Hubbard,
Wal. Ch., 28.
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tions above mentioned and described, on the said two judg
ments above mentioned, with the commands, indorsements, and
directions above set forth, and the delivery of the same to the
said sheriff of the county of Calhoun, in the lifetime of the
said two executions, and before the return day thereof, to wit,
on or about the thirtieth day of August, 1839, the said sherifi
of the said county of Calhoun, to wit, Loren Maynard, by his
deputy, Solomon Platner, by virtue of said executions, and the
said indorsements so made thereon, as aforesaid, levied upon
and seized a large quantity of real estate as the property of
this defendant and the said Boville Shumway, the defen
dants in the said executions, which said property is
described *as follows (describing the land); and this [*163]
defendant further severally says, that after such levy
and seizure of the aforesaid described lands and real estate, by
the said sheriff, by virtue of said two executions, to wit, on
the said thirtieth day of August, in the year last aforesaid, he,
the said sheriff, by his deputy above named, caused a notice of
the sale of said lands and real estate to be published in a news
paper called the ‘Calhoun County Patriot,’ to take place on
Friday, the first day of November then next, at the court house
in the village of Marshall, at one o’cl0ck in the afternoon of
that day; and that afterwards and on the sixth day of Novem
ber, l839, the said sheriff of the said county of Calhoun, by
his said deputy, above named, returned the said two executions
to the clerk of the said circuit court, out of which court the
same were issued, with a return indorsed upon each thereof, and
signed by the said deputy sheriff, that he returned said execu
tions ‘ property on his hands for the Want of bidders;’ which
executions were each of them then and there filed by the said
clerk, and the aforesaid return of the ‘said sheriff, entered by
the said clerk in the book of records kept by him, the said
clerk, for that purpose, pursuant to the provisions of the statute
in such case made and provided. And this defendant further
says, that the above mentioned and described executions are
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the only executions that have been issued upon the said two
judgments, and that if any such return as is specified in said
complainants’ said bill of complaint was ever made on said two
executions, or on either of them, by the said sherifi of the said
county of Calhoun, or his said deputy, the same was falsely
and fraudulently made, by the aid, advice or procurement of
said complainants, or their solicitor or attorneys, after the said
executions had been so returned by the said deputy sheriff,
with such return thereof indorsed thereon and signed by him,
as above specified, and after said executions had been so filed
by the said clerk, and the return thereof so entered in the said
book of records, as aforesaid, without the knowledge or consent
of this defendant, or the said Boville Shumway, and without
any leave for that purpose obtained from the said
["‘l64] Calhoun county circuit *court. All of which matters
and things this defendant does aver and plead to the
said complainants’ said bill of complaint, and humbly craves
whether he shall make any other or further answer to the said
bill of complaint.”
This plea is verified by the oath of the defendant pleading
the same.
The defendants, upon filing the plea, moved to dissolve the
injunction. The motion came on for hearing at the January
term, in the third circuit.
Lee and Pratt, in support of the motion.
Sandford and Bradley, contra.
Tan Cusncmmonz
Where the equity of the bill is denied, the injunction, on
motion, will be dissolved: and where it is shown by a special
plea that there is no equity in the bill, it is the same, so far as
regards the motion to dissolve, as though the equity of the bill
were fully denied by answer.
A creditor’s bill proceeds upon the ground that the complain
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ant has exhausted his remedy at law, and the regular return of
the execution unsatisfied, by the proper oflicer, is evidence of
that fact. Here, it appears from the plea that the executions
were not returned unsatisfied, and the facts set up in the plea
are not denied. This defeats the equity of the bill, and the
injunction must be dissolved.
Injunction dissolved.
‘
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Henry B. Livingston and another v. Enoch Jones and another.
Acknowledgment no part of deed. The acknowledgment of an assignment of mort
gage is no part of the instrument of assignment. (a)
Forsclosilre bill: Allegation of assignment of mortgage. The averment in n fore
closure bili that the owner of a bond and mortgage, in consideration of one dol
lar, assigned the same to the complainants, and that on the same day the assign
ment was duly acknowledged before a commissioner ot deeds according to the
laws of the state of New York where the same was executed, is suficient on
demurrer.
Guardian of minor: Power to sell mortgage. The guardian of a minor has the
right to collect and receive money due to his ward on bond or mortgage, or to
sell and assign the bond and mortgage in the exercise of his discretion as guar
dian.
Foreclosure bill: Parties. Minors whose guardian has assigned a mortgage which
he held for them, are not necessary parties to a bill by the assignee to foreclose
the same. (b)
This was a bill for the foreclosure of a mortgage, dated Sep
tember 9, 1834, given by Enoch Jones to Seaman, Van Wyck
and Norton, to secure the payment of a bond in the penal sum
of $10,000, conditioned for the payment of $5,000 and interest,
on or before September 9, 1839. The bill averred that on Feb
ruary 10, 1835, Seaman, Van Wyck and Norton assigned the
bond and mortgage by deed, and for a consideration therein
mentioned, to Billop B. Seaman, guardian, etc., of Henry
Brockholst Livingston, Jasper Hall Livingston and Catharine
Louisa Powell, minors; that the execution of this deed of
assignment, which was made in the state of New York, was
duly acknowledged in due form of law before D. Hobart, then
being a commissioner of deeds in and for the city and county
of New York, agreeably to the law of that state; that on May
12, 1835, the deed of assignment was duly registered in the
oflice of the register of deeds, in and for the city of Detroit;
(a) A deed is valid as A conveyance as between the parties thereto without any
acknowledgment: Doughertu v. Randall, 3 Mich., 581.
(b)This point is not alluded to specifically by the chancellor, but it is necessarily
covered by the decision.
_
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that on June 18, 1836, the said Seaman, guardian as aforesaid,
in consideration of one dollar to him paid by Carroll
Livingston, as attorney for *Henry Brockholst Living- [*166]
ston, assigned to said Carroll Livingston the bond and
mortgage, and on the same day the execution of the deed of
assignment, which was executed in the state of New York, was
duly acknowledged in due form of law before John McVickar,
junior, then being a commissioner of deeds in and for the city
and county of New York, in said state of New York, agreeably
to the laws of said state; that said last mentioned assignment
was made to Carroll Livingston as attorney, for the sole and
exclusive use and benefit of Henry Brockholst Livingston.
The bill then averred that a certain amount of interest was
due and unpaid on the bond and mortgage, and prayed for
decree of foreclosure and sale.
Henry Godard, who was made defendant as subsequent pur
chaser, demurred to the bill and assigned the following causes:
1. That it does not appear that D. Hobart, before
whom *the first assignment was acknowledged, was [*167]
authorized by the laws of New York to take acknowl
edgments of conveyances of real estate.
2. That it does not appear that John McVickar, junior,
before whom the second assignment is alleged to have been
acknowldged, had authority by the laws of New York to take
such acknowledgment.
3. That it does not appear by what authority Billop B. Sea
man, who is alleged to have been guardian of the minors, and
to have held the bond and mortgage as such guardian, assigned,
sold and transferred the same.
4. That Joseph Hall Livingston and Catharine Louisa
Powell, having an interest in the subject matter, are not made
parties.
I). Goodman, in support of the demurrer, to the point that
the guardian’; authority was special, and that he could not
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assign the bond and mortgage unless authorized by statute or
by a court of competent jurisdiction, cited Reeve’: Dom. Rel.,
825-6; Morrell v. Dickey, 1 Johns. Ch., 153.
A. D. Fraser, contra, cited as to the authority of the guar
dian, Field v. Schiefelin, 7 Johns. Ch., 150. And to
[*168] the point that *it did not lie with the mortgagor to
object that the power of sale was not regularly
acknowledged and recorded, Jackson v. Golden, 4 Cow., 266.
THE Cl-IANCELLORS
The acknowledgment is no part of the instrument of assign
ment. The allegation in the bill as to the assignments having
been duly acknowledged, according to the laws of the state of
New York, where the same were executed, are suflicient on
demurrer.
The third cause of demurrer assigned, seems to be the point
most relied upon by the party demurring.
The bond and mortgage having been duly assigned to Billop
B. Seaman, guardian to Jasper Hall Livingston and Catharine
Louisa Powell, there can be no doubt that he had the legal
right to collect and receive the money due thereon, or sell and
assign the same, in the exercise of his discretion as guardian.
This principle is fully established in the case of Field v.
Schiefelirz, 7 Johns. Ch., 150; and the allegations in the bill of
the several assignments are suflicient upon demurrer.
This is not a claim set up by the infants, alleging fraud in
the assignment, but it is a demurrer by Godard, who claims
title to the premises as subsequent purchaser from the mortga
gor; and, it having been decided that the guardian had a right
to assign the bond and mortgage, and that the allegations in
the bill of such assignment are sufficient, the demurrer must be
overruled.
Demurrer overruled.
ms
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John Steward and others v. Israel C. Stevens and another.
Jurisdiction: Creditor‘s bills. The jurisdiction 0! the court of chancery to apply
the property of the defendant, which is beyond the reach of an execution at
law, to the satisfaction of the debt due to the judgment debtor, proceeds upon
the ground that the remedy at law is exhausted. -
0redito'r’s bills: Return of execution. An execution cannot be legally returned
unsatisfied until the return day.
Where a.return “ unsatisfied “ was actually made upon the execution, and a credit
or’s bill was filed before the return day, a demurrer to the hill was sustained on
the ground that the remedy at law was not exhausted. (a)
This was a credit0r’s bill, filed September 5, 1838, and set
forth that the complainant recovered a judgment in the circuit
court for the county of Wayne, against the defendant Stevens,
on May 24, 1838, for the sum of $506.23 damages; that, on
July 12, 1838, a fieri facias was issued on said judgment,
returnable on the third Tuesday of November following ; that
on August 28, 1838, the sheriff returned the said writ of fieri
facias, with a return indorsed thereon, that “after due and
diligent search, he had not been able to find any goods and
chattels, lands and tenements of the defendant, and thereford
he returned the said writ of fieri facias unsatisfied.” The bill
alleged that the full amount of the judgment remained unsat
isfied, and contained the other allegations usual in creditors’
bills, and "prayed for a discovery, etc.
To this bill the defendants demurred, assigning for special
cause, first, an objection to the form of the fieri facias as set
forth; second, an objection to the form of the sherifi’s return;
and third, fourth and fiflh, that the return was premature, and
consequently the remedy at law was not exhausted, and the
creditor’s bill could not be sustained.
George E Hand in support of the demurrer.
Henry] N. Walker, contra.
(a) See Eldred v. Mack, supra, 162,and cases cited in note.
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The first and second causes of demurrer assigned, it is not
necessary now to consider.
The third cause of demurrer is well taken, and is conclusive.
The fieri faciaa was returned, and the bill filed a long time
before the return day. The jurisdiction of this court to apply
the property of the defendant, which is beyond the reach of
execution at law, to the satisfaction of the debt due to the
judgment creditor, proceeds upon the ground that
["‘171] he has exhausted *his remedy at law: Cassidy v.
Jlleackam, 3 Paige, 312. Until the return day of the
execution, it is the duty of the oflicer to seize and sell any
property of the defendant found within his county. The exe
cution, therefore, cannot be considered as legally returned
unsatisfied until the return day. .
In the case under consideration, it does not appear but that
the oflicer, before the return day of the fierifacias, could have
found property sufiicient to satisfy the judgment. The statute
(R. Stat, 365, sec. 25) provides, that
“ whenever an execution
against the property of the defendant shall have been issued
on a judgment at law, and shall have been returned unsatisfied,
in whole or in part, the party suing out such execution may
file a bill in chancery against such defendant,” etc.
This section is similar to a provision of the revised statutes
of New York, and in that state it has been uniformly held that
a creditor’s bill cannot be properly filed until after the return
day of the execution issued on the complainant’s judgment,
although the execution had been actually returned before the
return day. See Beck 0. Burdett, 1 Paige, 305 ; Edmeston 'v.
Lyde, Ib., 637 ; Clarkston v. De Peyster, 3 Paige, 312, 320;
McElwain v. "Willis, 9 Wend., 560. And this is unquestion
ably the true rule. A defendant ought not to be harassed bya
suit in chancery, when he has property which can be reached at
law, during the life of the execution.
The demurrer is well taken, and must be sustained.
Demurrer sustained.
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Zebulon Kirby v. Justus Ingersoll and Nehemiah Ingersoll.
Partners, implied power of. One partner may bind his co-partner in all matters
within the scope of the co-partnership; the implied authority of one partner to
bind his co-partner is generally limited to such acts as are in their nature essen
tial to the general objects of the co-partnership.
Partners, general assignment by one. One partner cannot make a general assign
ment of the partnership effects toa trustee for the benefit of the creditors of
the flrxn, without the knowledge or consent of his co-partner, when he is on the
spot, and might have been consulted.
There is no implied authority resulting from the nature of the contract of co-part
nership, that will authorize one partner to make a. general assignment of the
partnership effects, without the knowledge or consent of his co-partner.
Partners, implied power of. The authority impliedly vested by each partner in the
other is for the purpose of carrying on the concern, and not for the purpose of
breaking it up and destroying it.
One partner does not, by any implication, confer a power upon his oo-partner of
divesting him of all interest in, or authority over, the concern.
One partner may transfer a portion of the assets for the purpose of paying or secur
ing debts, or to raise means to carry on the concern; but the power of divesting
entirely one partner of his interest, appointing a trustee for both, and breaking
up the concern, is not one of the powers either contemplated or implied by the
contract of co-partnership.
Covenants, several. Where the covenants and conditions of bonds and other deeds
are several, they may be good in part, and void as to the residue.
Deed fraudulent in part is void. The better opinion seems to be, that even at com
mon law a deed fraudulent in part is altogether void.
Fraud, meaning of. By the term fraud, the LEGAL intent and effect of the acts
complained of is meant.
The law has a standard for measuring the intent of parties, and declares an illegal
act, prejudicial to the rights of others, a fraud upon such rights, although the
party denies all intention of committing a fraud.
Partners, general assignment by one. The principle upon _which general assign
ments by one partner have been declared void is, that one partner has no
authority to make a general assignment of the partnership eflects in fraud of
the rights of his co-partner to participate in the distribution of the partnership
effects among the creditors.
Illegal conveyance void. The construction to be put upon a deed conveying prop
erty illegally is, that the clause which so conveys it is void equally, whether the
illegality be by statute or at common law. This is the rule, except in cases
where the statute declares the whole instrument void.
Deeds void in part. One good trust inserted in an illegal instrument of assignment
cannot make that instrument a valid one.
A grantee who voluntarily becomes a party to a deed which is fraudulent in part,
forfeits his right to claim benefit from another part which would have been
good.
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The bill in this case was filed September 5, 1839, and states
that November 9, 1833, complainant and Justus Inger
[*l73] soll, one *of the defendants, entered into a co-partner
ship in the trade and business of tanners, curriers, and
dealers in leather; that they were to be equally interested, and
devote their time and skill to the management of the business,
under the firm and style of “ Ingersoll 8: Kirby,” and were to
share the profits equally. That the co-partnership agreement
was not reduced to writing; was to continue so long as they
should be satisfied with each other.
That immediately on entering into the co-partnership the firm
of Ingersoll & Kirby purchased stock in trade to a large amount;
that they purchased out the business of a firm then trading in
the city of Detroit, under the name of “ Justus Ingersoll & Co.,”
and undertook to pay the liabilities of said firm, to the amount
of the stock received from said firm, one of which was a debt to
complainant of about $900. That at the time of forming the
co-partnership, said Justus resided at Medina, in the state of
New York, and continued to reside there until September, 1838,
when he removed to Detroit; that during his residence in the
state of New York, said Justus did not devote his time to the
business of said firm, but was exclusively engaged in conducting
and carrying on his own private business, for his own exclusive
benefit. That complainant resided at Detroit, where the busi
ness of said firm was carried on, and devoted his whole time to
the business of said firm; that the business of said firm became
prosperous and lucrative, and was carried on without any ma
terial disagreement until about the month of November, 1838,
when some diiference of opinion arose as to the mode of con
ducting the business, and the said Justus expressed a desire to
close the said co-partnership business; that complainant ex
pressed his willingness to dissolve the co-partnership as soon as
the business of the firm could be placed in a situation to secure
to the creditors of the firm the immediate payment of their debts.
That immediately complainant directed the whole of his atten
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tion to the payment of the liabilities of the firm; and to the col
lection of the outstanding debts due to the firm; that the liabili
ties of the firm had been reduced, during ten months last past,
about $11,000.
*That complainant and said Justus had from time to [*174]
time, as fast as they could without prejudicing the
rights or interests of the creditors of the firm, since that time
divided between them certain of the property of the firm, so as
to hold the same in severalty, and not as partners; that among
the property so set apart to complainant there were about 728
sides of upper leather, of about the value of $2,000. That there
was assigned to said Justus as an ofiset for the property so as
signed to complainant, about 540 hides, of about the same value
as those assigned to complainant; that said Justus took posses
sion of the property so assigned to him, and shipped the same to
Medina, in the state of New York; that complainant took pos
session of the property so assigned to him, and packed the same
away apart from the partnership property, but leaving the same
in the same building where the co-partnership business was car
ried on, and in a building contiguous thereto. That at various
other times there were other divisions of the property of said
firm between complainant and said Justus, with the view and
intent to close the said co-partnership business as fast as the
same could be done without hazarding the interests of the credit
ors or materially injuring the business of the firm. That the
property so set aside to complainant and said Justus, by amicable
division, was not charged or entered against either on the books
of the firm. That August 28, 1839, while the business of the
firm was so in progress of final settlement, the said Justus
Ingersoll, without any previous consultation with complainant,
and without complainant’s knowledge or consent, made or pre
tended to make an instrument of assignment or indemnity to
one Nehemiah Ingersoll, and in which assignment it was, among
other things, set forth that complainant and said Justus were
jointly indebted to James Abbott, of the city of Detroit, for
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rent, accruing on a certain lease, bearing date April 11, 1836,
and that said Nehemiah was liable to pay the said rent by reason
of a bond signed by him for the said firm. And that it was
further set forth in said assignment that said Nehemiah was
liable upon a certain bond bearing date November 19, 1835,
executed by him to the Farmers’ and Mechanics’
[*l75] *Bank of Michigan, for the benefit of said firm of
Ingersoll & Kirby, in the penal sum of $20,000, con
ditioned to pay the sum of $10,000, or the amount of the in
debtedness of the said firm to said bank, not to exceed that sum,
and that the present indebtedness of the firm of Ingersoll &
Kirby to the said bank, for which said Nehemiah was liable,
was about $10,000. That said Nehemiah was also liable as in
dorser of a promissory note of said firm for the sum of $2,000,
and that said firm were willing not only to secure and indemnify
the said Nehemiah, etc.,on account of his liability on the bond,
but also to pay him the $2,000 and to secure to all other credit
ors of said firm the payment of their just debts, out of the
moneys and effects of said firm after such indemnification and
payment to said Nehemiah, and for the purpose of such indem
nification, the said Justus, using the name of the said firm of
Ingersoll & Kirby, assigned to said Nehemiah the stock in trade,
or the greater portion of it
,
amounting in value to about the sum
of $9,000, and notes and accounts belonging to said firm to the
amount of about $6,000, and in and by said deed of assignment
gave said Nehemiah full authority to sell and dispose of all the
said property, and collect all the said debts, and apply the pro
ceeds of the same to the payment:
1st. Of the $2,000 due to him as indorser of said note.
2d. To pay ofi and satisfy any debts due from said firm which
the said Nehemiah was in any manner bound to pay; and
3d. To pay and satisfy any other debt or debts justly due or
owing by said firm; to retain out of the moneys collected a
reasonable sum for his services, and to pay over to said Justus
and complainant the residue, etc.
‘
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The bill states that said Nehemiah is a brother of said Jus
tus, and charges that said Justus was largely indebted, individ
ually, to said Nehemiah, for money loaned of him; and that
said assignment was made by said Justus not for the purpose of
securing any debt owing by said firm of Ingersoll dz Kirby to
said Nehemiah, or for securing or indemnifying him against any
debt or demand owing by the firm for which said Neh- ,
emiah *is security; that said firm was in good credit ["‘176]
at the time of making the assignment, and was then
i
able to pay all its liabilities and obligations; that said Nehe
miah had been the indorser of said firm during the whole time
of its continuance, and that there was not at the time of filing
the bill any paper on which said Nehemiah was liable, except
that which is held as collateral to the debts of said firm; that
said Nehemiah never became liable to pay any sum for the
firm, by reason of the protest for non-payment of the liabilities
of said firm; that said firm are not indebted to the Farmers’
and Mechanics’ bank in the sum of $10,000, but that their
whole indebtedness to said bank is $6,700, no part of which
was yet due; that since said assignment complainant has been
prevented from attending to the business of said firm, and
when complainant applied to examine the books and papers of
the firm, he was abruptly refused, and told by said Justus that
the papers. books, notes and accounts (if the firm were left in
his, the said Justus’s charge and care by said Nehemiah, and
that complainant could have no access to them.
The bill further states that there is a large amount of prop
erty, consisting of leather, hides and other stock, belonging to
said firm, which is not mentioned in the said assignment, which
is now in the possession of said Nehemiah and said Justus,
which complainant fears will be wholly lost to said firm unless
some person duly authorized should take possession of the
same; that there is also a large amount of notes and accounts
due to the firm, which are not assigned, but are in the posses
sion of said Nehemiah and said Justus, and said Nehemiah has
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demanded payment of the same; that said Justus, in said
agreement, has recognized a claim in favor of said Nehemiah
to the amount of $2,000; that instead of the same being a true
and just account, said Nehemiah justly owes the said firm of
Inger-sol1& Kirby the sum of $1,200; that immediately after
the said assignment, said Justus caused a notice of the dissolu
tion of the co-partnership to be published; that some of the
stock on hand consists of hides, now in the progress of
tanning, which requires the constant attention of a
[*177] *large number of hands to fit them for market, etc.;
and that there is danger of the property of said firm
being squandered and the creditors defrauded, etc.; charges
said Nehemiah to be irresponsible, etc., and that he is dispos
ing of the property, etc.
The bill prays for an account, for an injunction, and the
appointment of a receiver. Injunction granted.
The answer admits the co-partnership, the purchase of the
stock, etc., of the firm of J. Ingersoll & Co., to the amount of
$15,000; admits the indebtedness of the firm of J. Ingersoll &
Co. to the complainant in about the sum of $900, and that that
amount was credited to complainant as so much capital paid in
at the time of entering into the co-partnership; states that com
plainant had been employed as clerk and agent for the firm of
J. Ingersoll & Oo., and in consequence of inaccuracies in the
statement of affairs and inventory of the property of the firm
of J. Ingersoll & Co., made by complainant, said Justus (in
order to compromise the matter and enable the firm of Inger
soll & Kirby to proceed with the business) was obliged to pay
Rufus Ingersoll and John Bagley (two of the members of the
firm of J. Ingersoll & Co.) in the years 1833-4, the sum of
about $3,600 out of his individual funds. Admits that com
plainant couducted the business of the firm at Detroit; states
that complainant made all the sales, received all payments, and
that it appeared from the books of the firm up to May 14,
1835, that payments had been made to Rufus Ingersoll and
~'
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John Bagley, to the amount of about $7,790; admits that said
Justus resided at Medina, in the state of New York, up to 1838,
as stated in the bill, at which place he was engaged in attend
ing to his own business; but states that by the partnership
agreement, said Justus was relieved from devoting any part of
his time to the business of the firm; states that the firm of Inger
soll & Kirby purchased large quantities of hides at Detroit,
and sent them to said Justus to be tanned at his establishment
at Medina; that the costs and charges of said Justus, which
he had charged against the said firm, for tanning
said hides, amounted to about the sum of $10,000;
*states that during the continuance of said partner- [*178]
ship, said Justus had sent from his establishment at
Medina, to the store of the firm at Detroit, large quantities of
leather, oil, and other materials, to be sold at and used in and
about the business of the firm of Ingersoll & Kirby, at Detroit,
to the amount or value of about $8,000. The answer further
states and charges that the purchases made by complainant on
account of said firm amounts to about the sum of $122,000;
states that no cash book was kept by complainant, and that
complainant was extremely negligent in keeping the books of
the firm; that complainant had appropriated a large amount of
funds of the firm to his own use, without giving any account
therefor; that he had committed gross frauds upon the rights
of said Justus, in managing the affairs of said firm; that some
time in the month of August, 1839, said Justus declared to
complainant in positive terms that he should make an assign
ment of the partnership efiects, for the purpose of paying and
securing the debts of the firm, and that he should proceed imme
diately to dissolve the partnership, to which complainant did
not object; that August 27, 1839, said Justus, in the name of
the firm of Ingersoll & Kirby, made, executed and delivered
the assignment referred to in the bill to said Nehemiah Inger
soll, who is brother to said Justus; that complainant had fre
quently, before making said assignment, expressed his willing
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ness that said Justus should sell and transfer all his interest to
said Nehemiah, and that he would be fully satisfied with any
arrangement which said Nehemiah should recommend for the
final settlement and adjustment of all the affairs of said firm;
admits there was some conversation about making a division of
a part of the property of the firm, but denies that any such
division ever was made as is set up in the bill; that it was
agreed by complainant and said Justus that said Justus should
tan all the raw hides which should be sent to him at his estab
lishment at Medina, for which said Justus was to be allowed a
reasonable compensation by the firm of Ingersoll & Kirby;
that it was known and approved of by said complainant that
'
said Nehemiah was, from time to time, during several
[*179] *years, advancing money to said Justus for the benefit
and on the credit of the firm of Ingersoll & Kirby,
which was used by said Justus in the business of said firm, and
for the payment of which the faith of said firm was pledged;
avers that the balance due from the firm to said Nehemiah, at
the date of the assignment, was at least $1,600, which said firm
was legally and equitably bound to pay; denies that said Nehe
miah is a debtor to the said firm; states that said Nehemiah
has indorsed for said firm, since its commencement, to the
amount of $60,000; that he was at the time of the assignment
directly liable to the said Farmers’ and Mechanics’ bank for
said firm to the amount of $6,700; that he is further liable for
the payment of rent to James Abbott for said Justus and com
plainant; avers that the assignment was made for the purposes
therein expressed, and no other, and that it was made after full
notice by said Justus to said complainant of his intention to
make an assignment of the partnership property; denies that
all the property of the firm is not mentioned in the assignment;
denies that the firm was in good credit at the time of making the
assignment. The answer further states and charges that com
plainant has, since the commencement of said partnership,
received as net profits arising from the business of said firm the
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sum of $73,000; that the whole amount received by said Justus
from said firm, individually, does not exceed the sum of
$20,000; denies that said Nehemiah is insolvent; also denies all
fraud in making the assignment.
The complainant now moves for the appointment of a receiver,
and the defendants move for a dissolution of the injunction.
Walker, Porter and Goodwin, for complainant:
As to the power of one partner to assign partnership property,
see Gow on Part., 7'4, and note; Oollyer on Part., 217 and
note," 1 Dessaus., 587,- 4 Mo Oord, 619,- 5 Uranch, 800,- 4 Day,
428,‘ 4 Wash. Cir. C’. R., 282,- 3 Paige, 528," 5 Paige, 30.
*J'. M. Howard, for defendants: [*180]
It is admitted by the pleadings that complainant and J. Inger
soll were at the time of the assignment partners in trade, and
that the assignment was’ made by J. Ingersoll in the name of
the firm.
The first question, therefore, which arises, is as to the power
of Justus Ingersoll to make the assignment, irrespective of the
fraud charged in the bill, which is fully denied by the answer.
The very relation of partners implies a confidence in each
other; such a confidence as makes each partner the general agent
of the others, and renders his contracts in their name and in
reference to the partnership effects the contracts of all the
others. In all simple contracts they are regarded as one con
tracting party; and they are all bound, provided the contract
has reference to the co-partnership: Gow on Part., 58, 64, 55 ,
and such has been the law since the time of James I: Ib., 73-75.
And Lord Mansfield declared that each partner has the power,
singly, to dispose of the whole of the partnership
effects; *and this results from the principle that part- [*18l]
ners are joint tenants," one joint tenant may lawfully
dispose of the whole, which is not the case with tenants in
common: Foo: o. Hamburg, 3 Cowp., 445; Barton v. IVil
liams, 5 B. and Ald., 395; 12 Mass., 54; and see 10 Peters, 860.
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With regard to all effects contributed, manufactured or pur
chased to be sold for the benefit of the partners, each partner
in the course of trade has an absolute right to dispose of the
whole, and may assign it by way of pledge or security: lVatson
on Part, 67; Pureon v. Hooker, 3 Johns., 70, 71; Milk v.
Barber, 4 Day, 425; Harrison v. Sterry, 5 Cranch, 289. The
sale of one partner is the sale of both; and such is the unity
of right and interest, that one partner may enter the appear
ance of the other in an action against all: Gow on Part., 79,
195, and ajqoendix, p. 494; 7 T. R., 108.
The case of Dickinson, o. Legare, 1 Dessaus., 587, is the first
casein England or the United States in which the principle
has been denied; but it should be remembered that it was the
case of one partner making an assignment while a prisoner of
war in the enemy’s country and to an alien enemy; and this
has not been sanctioned by any other decision, but overruled
in Robinson 'v. Crowder, 4 McOord, 518, and in Egberts o.
Woods, 3 Paige, 523.
The only point decided in Havens v. Hussey, 5 Paige, 30, is
that one partner cannot, without the consent and against the
known wishes of his co-partner, execute an assignment of all
the partnership effects to a mere trustee for the benefit of the
favorite creditors of the assignor.” The case at bar differs
greatly from that. Here the assignment is made directly to a
creditor of the firm. The answer shows that the firm owe him
about $1,600, and denies that the assignment was made against
the known wishes of the complainant, and shows that he had
every reason to suppose—indeed, that he was directly notified
—that it would be made, and that he did not dissent. Here
the assignee is authorized to retain the amount of
[*182] *his debt; and being responsible as indorser for the
firm to the amount of the $2,000 note, and bound by
his obligation to the Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Bank to the
amount of $7,000 for their benefit, and also to James Abbott,
for the payment of the rent of the premises leased by him to
(5
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Ingersoll & Kirby, he is authorized, in order to secure and
indemnify himself, to sell the property assigned, to pay the
debts for which he is liable, and to indemnify himself out of
the proceeds; after which payment and indemnification, he is
required to account to the partners for the residue of the fund.
The authorities make no distinction between the power to
sell and the power to indemnify by pledging the property; and
they all agree that it is the right of one to appropriate the joint
property for the payment or security of the debts of the firm,
in such manner, and by giving such preferences as he may
think proper; and that preferences may be created, even if the
firm is insolvent: 3 Paige, 525, 526, Wakeman v. Grover, 4
Paige, 36; 1 Dallas, 248,‘ 7 Mass., 257.
So far as N. Ingersoll has an interest in the assignment, he
holds the property as a personal security, with full authority to
sell, and out of the proceeds to cancel his liabilities for the firm,
having first retained the amount due himself, andlthe residue of
the fund is to be applied in payment of any debts which the
firm may owe, without preference of one creditor to another.
There is no inequality, no authority to compound with the
creditors, and no terms whatever requiring them to discharge
their debts for less than the amount legally due; were there
such terms the assignment would be void: 2 Binney’-9 R., 174,’
4 Dallas’ R., 76,- 4. Paige, as-9.
'
The decision in Havens '0. Hussey conflicts with that in Harri
son v. Starry," and without any precedent to justify it
,
Chan
cellor Walworth declares an assignment by one partner to a
trustee, void in law and equity, for the reason that it is no part
of the partnership business “ to appoint a trustee of all the
partnership effects for the purpose of selling and distributing
the proceeds among the creditors in unequal proportions.” But
as if not satisfied with this decision, the same learned
judge *brings this question again into doubt in the [*183]
case of Mills '0. Argal, 6 Paige, 582, in which he says,
“there may be some doubt as to the right of the general part
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ner (i
t was a special partnership under the New York statute)
to make an assignment of all the partnership effects to a trustee,
for any purpose, without the express or implied assent of the
special partner.” The case was, however, decided on other
grounds,
But the law presumes the assent of the creditors to the trus
tee, until they express their dissent, and their rights cannot,
therefore, be disturbed: .DeF0rest v. Bacon, 2 Conn. R., 633.
The question then arises, can the security which was placed
in the hands of N. Ingersoll by the assignment be wrested from
him ? or, in other words, does the clause constituting him a trus
tee (an event which, by the way, may never happen) for the
remaining creditors vitiate and annul the whole contract of
assignment ?
That security was so given in pursuance of the authority pos
sessed and exercised by Justus Ingersoll as a partner, see 5
Paige, 31.
A. D. Fraser, on same side:
It is competent for one of several partners to make an assign
ment of the co-partnership property: Fora v. Hanbury, Cowper,
445; Barton v. Williams, 5 Barn. & Ald., 359; Pierson '21.
floolcer, 3 Johns., 70; Lg/les v. Styles, 2 VVash. C. C., 224; Lamb
v. Durant, 12 Mass., 54; Pierpont '0. Graham, 4 Wash. C. C.,
232; lmlls 11.Barbor, 4 Day, 428; Harrison v. Sterry, 5 Cranch,
289; Robinson 'v. Orowder, 4 McCord., 519; Egbert v. 'PVoods, 3
Paige, 517; Gow on Part.,51, 58, 5.4, 73, 74, '75, 7'9; Appendix,
Tag/l0r’s Case, Col]. on Part., 216, 217; Watson on Part., 67.
That a deed may be good in part, and void for the residue, is
the common law doctrine: Uniterl States v. Bradley, 10 Peters,
243, 360; Pigot’-s Case, 6 Coke, part 11, 27.
Tun CnANcr:LLon:
[*184] This case presents the broad question *of the right
of one partner to make an assignment of all the part
ncrship efiects, without the consent or concurrence of his co
_~ ~
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partner, who is on the spot, and acting in the business of the
co-partnership. Perhaps no question has been presented to this
court of greater practical importance than the present; and it
has been considered with a full and deep conviction of the res
ponsibility imposed upon the court in its decision.
The authority of one partner to make such an assignment, if
sustained in the present case, must be sustained in its broadest
form. The two partners were both, at the time of the assign
ment, in town, and attending to the business of the firm. The
complainant, on proceeding to the usual place of business, finds
the brother of the other partner in possession, and is informed
that an assignment of all the partnership effects has been made,
and is denied all access to the books, and all interference with
the property or business of the firm.
The allegation in the answer, that the subject of an assign
ment had been mentioned to the complainant, to which he made
no objection, cannot aid the assignment. It is not pretended
that at the time of actually making the assignment he was ad
vised of it
,
or was in any manner consulted as to either‘ the
assignee, the terms and conditions of the assignment, or any
thing else; but that the first notice to him was the information
that he no longer had anything to do with the partnership pro
perty or business.
Very different views seem to have been entertained upon this
subject, and it has become necessary to examine it with care and
attention.
It will be found that the dicta relied on to sustain the powers
of one partner to make such an assignment, have been thrown
out under special circumstances, and that the reports, upon a
careful examination, do not sustain the exercise of the power in
cases like the present. The elementary writers, Gow and Collyer,
state the rule to be that one partner may bind the others in all
matters within the scope of the co-partnership, and the implied
authority of one partner to bind another is generally
limited to such acts as are, in their nature, essential *to [*l85]
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the general objects of the co-partnership. Does this rule con
template the authority here contended for?
Is it intended that when both partners are on the spot, and
where no difiiculty exists in consulting each other as to the
assignee, and the terms and conditions of the assignment, that
by the law of partnership they are placed in such a position that
one partner, on repairing to the place of business, may find all
he possesses, together with the books and accounts of the firm,
transferred to a third person, placed entirely beyond his reach,
himself utterly excluded, and the business of the firm ended
Without his knowledge or assent ? This cannot be contemplated.
Do the authorities cited sustain the position ? The case which
has gone as far as any other, and much relied on in the argu
ment, is the case of Harrison v. Starry, 5 Cranch, 289. In that
case the question did not turn upon this point. But a question
was raised upon the validity of an assignment made by one
partner.
The court say in delivering the opinion: “ The whole com
mercial business of the company in the United States was neces
sarily committed to Robert Bird, the only partner residing in
the country. He had the command of their funds in America,
and could collect or transfer the debts due to them.” And it is
manifest from the case that the assignment was made of a por
tion only of the assets to obtain aid in carrying on the concern.
This case from the entire showing manifests clearly that this
is an exception rather than a rule, and that it was made under
special circumstances; and such will be found to be the case in
2 Cowper, 4.45, also much relied upon. Indeed, I have been
unable to find any case where the broad power here asserted
has been sustained. Chancellor Walworth, it is said, has count
enanced this principle in the case of Egbert v. Woocls, 3 Paige,
517; and it is unjustly, I think, said, that he virtually decreed
both ways, and that there is a discrepancy between the above
case and that of Havens 1:. 1Yussey, 5 Paige, 31.
In the first case he says: “I do not intend to express an
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*opinion in favor of the validity of such an assign- [*186]
ment of the partnership effects ‘to a trustee by one
partner against the known wishes of his co-partner, and in fraud
of his right, to participate in the distribution of the partnership
funds among the creditors, or in the decision of the question
which of those creditors should have a preference in payment
out of the effects of an insolvent concern.” Showing clearly
that after an examination of the whole subject he did not believe
in the validity of such an assignment. In the case of Havens 1:.
Hussey, he says: “Upon the most deliberate examination, he
was satisfied that the decision of the vice-chancellor was cor
rect, that such an assignment is both illegal and inequitable, and
cannot be sustained.” And further he says: “It is no part of
the ordinary business of a copartnership to appoint a trustee of
all the partnership efiects, for the purpose of selling and dis
tributing the proceeds among the creditors, in unequal propor
tions. And no such authority can be implied. On the contrary,
such an exercise of power by one of the firm without the con
sent of the other, is
,
in most cases, a virtual dissolution of the
co-partnership, as it renders it impossible for the firm to con
tinue its business.”
From a review of all the cases, it is clear that this power, if
sustained at all, must be sustained upon the implied authority
for that purpose from his co-partner, resulting from the nature
of the contract of co-partnership. There is no such implied
power. The authority impliedly vested by each partner in the
other is for the purpose of carrying on the concern, and not for
the purpose of breaking it up and destroying it. One partner
does not, by any implication, confer a power upon his co-part
ner of divesting him of all interest in or authority over the
concern. The elementary writers upon the subject do not ‘sus
tain this position. The adjudged cases, when carefully exam
ined, do not sustain it; _and assuredly it is not sustained by the
reason of the thing or the dictates of justice. Every consider
ation of public policy or commercial convenience is against it.
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1 he result to which I have arrived is, that a partner
[*l87] may *transfer a portion of the assets or obligations
for the purpose of paying or securing debts, or to raise
means to carry on the concern; but that the power here
asserted of divesting entirely one partner of his interest,
appointing a trustee for both, and breaking up the concern, is
not one of the powers either contemplated or implied by the
contract of co-partnership; and it is best that it should be so.
Else, who could with safety enter into such a connection? On
the other hand, if partners cannot agree, and one partner is vio
lating his duty or endangering the rights of the other, the rem
edy is plain and adequate.
This assignment is partly for the purpose of securing the
debts and liabilities of the firm to the assignee, as well as for
the purpose of making him a general trustee for the firm. It
was urged at the hearing that if the assignment was void in
other respects, it must be carried into effect thus far. I am
inclined to the opinion that effect may be given to the assign
ment to that extent, but it is not now necessary to decide this
question.
From the views I have taken of this case, it must result in
the appointment of a receiver, and the application of the assets
must be under the direction of the court.
There are other considerations which render the appointment
of a receiver appropriate in this case. It is contemplated by
the assignment to secure the assignee from his liability for the
payment of money due upon a lease having some twenty-five
years to run, and clearly not within the scope of the partner
ship.
The amount of the indebtedness of the firm to the assignee
is a disputed one. It will follow, then, that a receiver must be
appointed, and the assignee directed to deliver over to such
receiver the partnership property and effects, and account with
the receiver for whatever shall have come to his hands by vir
tue of such assignment.
i~iwe
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'1he counsel for the defendants requested to be further heard
upon the question of the appointment of a receiver, which
request was granted.
*A. D. Iilraser, for defendants: [*188]
The court having decided that the assignment ought to be
set aside, the complainant now insists that the property
embraced in the assignment must go into the hands of a
receiver. This position is denied by the assignee, who insists
that it necessarily follows from the decision which has already
been made that the trust shall remain with him on whom the
assignment conferred it. He submits that he cannot be
deprived of it
,
unless the case falls within some of the excep
tions to be found in adjudged cases upon this subject. The
assignee contends that the only legal operation and effect of
the decision which has been made must be to render inoperative
that part of the assignment which purports to create a trust
for the benefit of those mentioned in the assignment, other
than the assignee. If the assignment is good for any beneficial
purpose, the assignee cannot be divested of the power and rights
conferred on him by it
,
unless the fund be in danger, or some
other strong ground urged which would justify the appoint
ment of a receiver; and while he acts as assignee he is as much
under the control and direction of this court as a receiver would
be, and bound to execute the trust, modified, limited and
qualified, as the court have already decided it must be.
Under these circumstances, it is contended that a receiver
will not be appointed unless the property is shown to be in dan
ger; that the trustee is irresponsible, or where the plaintifi’s
right is not shown to be clear; must show some evil actually
existing, or danger to the property, or a strong special case of
fraud: Edw. on Receivers, 2 Ola; Willis v. Corlis, 2 Edw.,
286, 287, 288; Orphan Asylum c. M0 Carlee, 1 Hopk., 429;
Verplanclc v. Gaines, 1 Johns. Ch., 58; Huyonin v. Baseley,
13 Ves., 105; Jlliddleton v. Dodswell, Id., 266; Lloyd v. Pas
singham, 16 Ves., 59.
m
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This assignee is subject to the control and direction
[*189] of this *court as much as a receiver would be: Shafts
berry v. Arrows-mzth, 7 Ves., 486, 487; Beaufort v.
Berty, 1 P. Wms., 702.
H. N. Walker, in reply:
The complainant insists in this cause that the deed of assign
ment is void, ab initio, for the following reasons.
1. That one partner cannot assign the partnership goods
without the assent of his co-partner. This position having, as
a general rule, already been settled by this court, it is unneces
sary to say anything upon it. The case of Havens v. Hussey,
5 Paige, 30, lays down the true doctrine.
2. But this case is sought to be taken out of the rule on the
ground that the deed of assignment constituted Nehemiah
Ingersoll, the brother, a trustee as respects all the creditors of
the firm of Ingersoll dz Kirby but himself, and that he acquired
an individual right to the goods assigned, they having been
assigned to him to secure the amount due him from the firm,
and his liability for them as an indorser.
The decision that one partner cannot assign the partnership
efiects, seems to settle this question. The doctrine contended
for by the counsel opposed is that the deed may be good in
part and bad in part. This doctrine does not apply in this
case. It is only applicable where there are different clauses or
covenants in a deed which do not depend upon each other.
But where the deed is entire, and the several clauses depend
upon each other, then the distinction ceases, and it must either
be good for the whole or bad for the whole: 1 Shep. Touch
stone, 70, 71.
It is a necessary requisite that the person making the deed
be able to contract. This is not the case here: Havens '0.
Hussey, 5 Paige, 30; 1 Shep. Touchstone, 54.
It is a well established rule in courts of equity, that inter
ests of third persons gained by fraud, imposition, or even
I~
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undue influence over others, cannot be held by them. The
interest of the assignee here, if he has any, has been gained by
the fraud of Justus Ingersoll: Hugonin v. Baseley, 14 Ves.,
273, 289; Briclgeman '0. Green, Wilmot, 64; Ilildreth
v.*Sands, 2 Johns. Ch., 35, 42; Shep. Touchstone, 6'6, 67. [*190]
In cases of alleged fraud, the answer of the party
is not to be relied upon as to any advances, but positive proof
is required: 8 P. Wms., 5228; 2 Ves., 516.
'
In the case of Sands et al. v. Codwise et al., 4 J0hns., 536, the
court said that no right can be deduced from an act founded
in actual fraud. The cases in which a deed is set aside on
terms are not at all analogous to this.
Trm OHANCELLORZ
Upon a former occasion, it was held that the assignment in
question could not be sustained, so far as it purported to be a
general one, to a trustee for the payment of his own debt, in
the first instance, and also as a general trustee for all the cred
itors. It was then said that it would follow that a receiver
must be appointed.
The reasons that induced the court to come to that conclu
sion were then stated. A further reason is urged, that it
appeared by the answer that a considerable portion of the prop
erty of the concern had been sold before filing the answer, not
withstanding the injunction.
On that occasion the court remarked that it was not contem
plated to decide the question whether the assignment could be
sustained, so far as it purported to constitute a security to the
assignee, he being a creditor; but it was said that the court was
inclined to the opinion that it could be so far sustained, on the
authority of the case in 10 Peters, 368. The counsel for defend
ants requested to be further heard on the question of the
appointment of a receiver, and it has also been urged that z_
decision upon the validity of the assignment should be now
entered; so that, if the defendants desire to enter an appeal, it
may be done, and a decision had in the appellate court. This
169
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is certainly proper and desirable. In a question of this impor
tance, both in regard to principle and amount, every proper
facility for an appeal should be afl’orded. This has compelled
the court to examine this question, which, as it was not con
templated then to dispose of it
,
had not before been done. In
the case of United States v. Bradley, 10 Peters, 363,
[*191] which *was a case arising on a paymaster’s bond, i
t
was held, when the covenants and conditions are sev
erable, that bonds and other deeds may be good in part, and
void as to the residue. In Hyslop v. Clarke, 14 Johns. Rep.,
464, Van Ness, in giving the opinion of the court, sayszi “The
better opinion seems to be that, even at common law, a deed,
fraudulent in part, is altogether void.” This view seems to
have been sustained and carried out in the subsequent decisions
in New York.
By the term fraud, it should be remembered that the legal
intent and elfect of the acts complained of is meant. The law
has a standard for measuring the intent of parties, and declares
an illegal act, predjucial to the rights of others, a fraud upon
such rights, although the parties deny all intention of commit
ting a fraud: 11 lVend., 224.
The principle upon which assignments of this kind have
been declared void is
,
that one partner has no authority to
make a general assignment of the partnership efiects, in fraud
of the rights of his co-partner to participate in the distribution
of the partnership eflfects among the creditors: Havens v. Hus
sey, 5 Paige, 31.
The implied authority of one co-partner is that he may per
form any act within the scope of the co-partnership which may
be necessary to carry on the concern. Under this implied
power it has been held that one partner may assign such por
tion of the partnership efiects as may be necessary in payment
of a debt, or to secure a creditor. But this is a general assign
ment, and, if sustained at all, breaks up and puts an end to the
co-partnership. If sustained, and the assignee is authorized to
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go on and close up the affairs of the concern, does it not neces
sarily lead to all the consequences intended to be guarded
against in the decison in the case of Havens o. Hussey? One
partner, by selecting a creditor, large or small, as the assignee,
may effectually put the other partner out of the possession of
his property, and end the business without the knowledge or
assent of his co-partner. He is deprived of the right to which
the decision in 5 Paige, 31, declares he is entitled.
The preferred creditor has been selected without his
knowledge *or consent; and a party, who has been [*l92]
illegally placed in possession of the entire partnership
effects, if the views urged by the counsel of the defendants are
sustained, is entitled to the custody, and has the right to settle
and wind up the concern. One good trust could always be
inserted, and thus the partner would do indirectly what could
not directly be done. Whatever view may be taken of the
question, as to whether this assignment may be void in part
only, or in toto, it seems to me inevitable that, as the case now
stands, a receiver should be appointed. But, as it is urged
that a decision be now entered upon the validity of the assign
ment, and it seems but just and proper that it should be done, I
shall do so according to the best reflection I have been able to
give it. .
A distinction seems to have been taken, in some of the cases
between instruments void by statute and at common law.‘
In the case in Peters, cited in support of this assignment, it
is said, quoting the opinion of Chief Justice Gibbs, that if an
act be prohibited, the construction to be put upon a deed con
veying property illegally is that the clause which so conveys it
is void, equally whether it be by statute or at common law.
This is
,
undoubtedly, the true rule, and there is no reason for
any distinction, except where the statute goes further, and
declares the whole instrument void. The cases where instru
ments have been declared good in part, and bad as to the resi
due, seem to have been bonds which were variant from the
I
‘ m
192 CASES IN CHANCERY.
Kmsv v. Ixelnsou.
statute, or deeds which purport to convey lands, some portion
of which the party could not lawfully convey. In the one case
the bond may be valid in part only. The rights of no one are
interfered with. Efiect is given to the bond so far as it is in
conformity with the statute. If it contains other conditions
or requirements they are declared void.
So with deeds. The grantor may have title to nine hundred
out of a thousand acres of land, and may have no right to con
vey the residue. Still, it would be unjust to deprive the grantee
of that to which the grantor had a title, and by giving it effect
pro tanto, the rights of no one are violated.
Is it so here? The partner has been deprived of all
control *over or voice in the disposition of the effects [*193]
of the co-partnership, without his consent.
Shall efiect be given to this proceeding ? Can the court say,
where the whole efieets are mingled together, that it shall take
efiect as to certain portions of the property, and be void as to
the residue ? One good trust is inserted, but that cannot make
an illegal instrument a valid one. The legal and illegal are so
mixed and commingled that, if assignments of this character
are sustained to the extent asked, they may as Well be sustained
in toto. _
Agrantee who voluntarily becomes a party to a deed which
is fraudulent in part forfeits his right to claim a benefit from
another part that would otherwise have been good: 14 John
s0n’s Reports, 465. Here the assignee takes a general assign
ment from a party not authorized to make such an instrument
and I think it cannot be ustained.
The order is that the assignment be set aside and declared
void, and that it be referred to a master to appoint a receiver;
and that said Nehemiah Ingersoll deliver over to, and account
with said receiver, for whatever shall have come to his hands
by virtue of said assignment. (a)
Y
(a) This case was appealed to the supreme court, and the decree of the chancel
lor approved in an elaborate opinion by Mr. Justlce Felch. See 1Doug. Mich., 1,77.
I
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Insolvent banks, dismissal of suit against. Where an individual creditor had filed
his bill against a moneyed corporation, obtained an injunction and the appoint
ment of a receiver, and the receiver had taken upon himself ‘the trust, and other
creditors had flled their claims, it was held that the creditor who had filed his
bill, obtained the injunction, and the appointment of s. receiver, was not entitled,
asa matter of right (upon being paid his demand), to dissolve the injunction,
dismiss his bill, and discharge the receiver.
There is no doubt that this court has the power, in such case, to dissolve the injunc
tion, discharge the receiver, and permit the party to dismiss his bill, when it is
satisfied that the interest of all concerned will be best subserved by permitting
the corporation to manage its own concerns.
Dissolution of failing corporations. The primary object of proceeding in chancery
against failing corporations is not for the purpose of dissolving the corporation,
but to protect the assets for the benerlt of creditors. The power to decree a dis
solution ot the corporation is merely incidental.
Discharging receiver. It is the duty of the court to 10$: into the condition of the
corporation before it will discharge the receiver, and make such order, either
absolute or conditional, as the case may require.
This was an application, on the part of the complainant, to
dissolve the injunction granted in this case, to dismiss the bill,
and discharge the receiver. A sufficient statement of the facts
in the case will be found in the opinion of the chancellor.
Goodwin and Morey, in support of themotion.
George Miles, contra.
THE CHANCELLOR2
This application is founded upon an acknowledgment of pay
ment by the creditor, and is a motion on his part to dissolve his
own injunction and discharge the receiver. No provision is
made for the payment of the expenses incurred by the receiver,
or to indemnify him against liabilities.
It is insisted that this application must be granted as a mat
ter of right, and that the complainant and defendant having
adjusted the debt claimed by the complainant, no other persons
have any interest in the matter, or any right to interpose any
objections to the order asked.
If no rights, on the part of other creditors, have been
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[*195] acquired *under this proceeding, and the receiver has
incurred no liabilities to other creditors, this view is
undoubtedly correct. To ascertain this, it becomes necessary to
resort to the statutory enactments upon which these proceedings
are based.
The act of June 21st, 1837 (Session Laws of 1887, page 807),
which is the first act bearing upon the subject, provides that
proceedings may be commenced by the attorney-general, or by
any creditor, and makes no distinction in the mode of proceed
ing, whether the suit shall have been instituted by either the
One or the other.
Section five of the same act provides that the receiver, upon
his appointment, shall be vested, as trustee, with all the estate,
real and personal, liabilities and securities, of such corporation.
The act of April 15, 1839 (Session Laws, page 94), further
prescribes and defines the duties and liabilities of receiver. See
sections 11 and 17.
This renders it necessary to examine the statute prescribing
the powers, duties and obligations of assignees: Revised
Statutes, page 606.
The first section provides that all assignees are declared to be
trustees of the estate of the debtor, in relation to whose property
they shall be appointed, for the benefit of his creditors.
After this reference to the various provisions of the statute,
the question recurs, may an individual creditor, after having
commenced proceedings under the statutes before referred to,
and pursues his remedy until areceiver has been appointed, and
taken upon himself the trust, and until other creditors have filed
their claims, and still, at this late stage of the proceedings, upon
being paid his particular demand, as a matter of right, dissolve
the injunction, dismiss his bill, and discharge the receiver, with
out any right or duty, on the part of the court, to protect the
rights of the other creditors, who may have filed their claims
with him, or to protect and save harmless the receiver, who has
acted under its authority ? I think not.
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*The statutes bearing upon the question, it is true, [*196]
are not very explicit or satisfactory. But, from the -
examinations I have been enabled to give them, I cannot resist
the conclusion that, from a fair construction of their provisions,
their object and intent is not solely to aflford a remedy to the
individual creditor to collect his demand, but that they contem
plate, also, the security of such other creditors as may file their
demands with the receiver, and thu, so far, become parties to
the proceedings.
This view necessarily involves another question: Is it impera
tive upon the court, after the appointment of a receiver, to hold
jurisdiction of the case, and require the receiver to pursue his
duties, until the concern is wound up and dissolved, although
the party complainant in the suit is satisfied, and declines further
to prosecute, and when the proper prosecuting oificer on the
part of the state is satisfied that the application of this severe
remedy is unnecessary; and if
,
further, the court is satisfied that
the interests of all concerned will be best subserved by permit
ting the corporation to manage its concerns, and that it may be
safely done‘? The court entertains no doubt that it is vested
with this power. The primary object of proceedings in chancery,
against -a failing corporation, is not a dissolution of its charter,
for a violation, but to protect the assets for the benefit of the
creditors. This power is merely incidental. This court having
jurisdiction of the cause for other purposes, the legislature has
also conferred the power to decree a dissolution of the charter.
But this is the proper duty of the court of law, and for this
purpose proceedings may be instituted at any time in the com
mon law courts, for any violation of the provisions of its charter,
by a corporation.
The conclusion, then, to which I arrive in this case is that it
is the duty of the court to look into the condition and circum
stances of this corporation, and to make such order, either abso
lute or conditional, as the case may require, upon such showing
made by the parties who press this motion.
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and others.
Motion to dissolve injimction. On a motion to dissolve an injunction before answer,
an nlildnvit is admissible which goes to show that the injunction was irregularly
issued, or that the oflicer allowing the injunction was misled and induced to
grant the injunction contrary to law.
Injunction bill: Avermentc. Where the bill seeks a discovery in aid of proceedings
at law, the rule is that the complainant must charge in his bill that the facts are
known to the defendant, and ought to be disclosed by him, and that the com
plainant is unable to prove them by other testimony; and it must be affirma
tively stated in the bill that the facts sought to be discovered are material for
such purpose.
When an injunction is asked to stay proceedings at law, it is incumbent upon the
complainant to show in his bill the state ot the pleadings, and the court in which
the suit is pending, in order to enable the oflicer to whom the application is made
for the allowance of the injunction to judge of the propriety ot its allowance,
and to prescribe the terms on which the some shall be allowed.
Injunction bond. Where the statute requires that, before an injunction shall be
issued to stay proceedings which are at issue at law, a bond shall be filed by the
complainant, the court cannot dispense with the filing.
Injunction: Comiiy. Courts of chancery will not sustain an injunction bill to
restrain a suit or proceeding previously commenced in a court of a sister state
or in any of the federal courts.
The bill in this case was filed to rescind a contract on the
ground of false and fraudulent representations, and for re-pay
ment of money paid, etc., and states, among other things,
that complainant purchased of Nehemiah O. Sargeant (since
deceased), July 28, 1836, certain property in the village of
Kent, state of Michigan, for which he agreed to pay the sum of
$83,000 ; that said sum of $83,000 was paid and received as
follows : For $5,000 a draft or check at sight on the Bank of
Michigan, in the city of Detroit, was given to said Sargeant,
which was paid to him on presentation ; a draft or check for
$18,000, payable to the order of said Sargeant ninety days after
August 1, 1836, at the Phoenix Bank, in the city of New York;
and for the remaining $60,000 complainant executed to said
Sargeant a bond in the penalty of $120,000, conditioned to pay
T‘-H
we
FIRST CIRCUIT. 197
Cszmou. v. Tan Fnunms’ mn Mscnmrcs' Bum.
the said sum of $60,000 in twelve annual installments of $5,000
each.
The bill further sets forth that there had been paid upon said
purchase by complainant the sum due at the times fol
lowing, *to wit: in the month of December, 1836, [*198]
the draft on the Bank of Michigan of $5,000; in the
month of February following, the sum of $5,216 on the bond;
December 28, 1836, the sum of $4,942.44 was paid on the check
or draft for $18,000. That at the time of the payments afore
said, complainant had not discovered the falsity of many of
the material parts of the representations of said Sargeant, and
was ignorant of the damage which he had sustained by and
through the fraud and deceit of said Sargeant. States and
charges that said check or draft of $18,000 was, immediately
on receiving the same by said Sargeant from complainant,
indorsed by said Sargeant to John A. Welles, cashier and
director of the Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Bank of Michigan, and
that said Welles received the same. Charges that said Sar
geant was largely indebted to the said Farmers’ and Mechanics’
Bank. States that said bank, or the oflicers thereof, received
said check at first for collection, and that they had no interest
in or title to said check or draft before its maturity. States
that a suit was commenced on the check or draft after the same
became due in 1838, by said Sargeant against complainant, in
the supreme court in the state of New York; that before the
trial said Sargeant died, and the suit abated. States “ that
since the death of said Sargeant said Farmers’ and Mechanics’
Bank claim to be the owners and holders of said check or draft,
and have commenced and threaten to prosecute a suit thereon
for their own benefit against complainant.” Charges that said
Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Bank did not become the holders and
owners of said check or draft for $18,000 before its maturity
for a valuable consideration, and without notice of the equities
subsisting between said Sargeant and complainant. States
“ that the facts of the case, so far as the claims of the Farm
~.
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ers’ and Mechanics’ Bank are involved, lie especially in the
knowledge of the said John A. Welles, the cashier thereof ;”
“that a discovery from said John A. Welles of the various
matters charged is necessary for the enforcement and support
of the complainant’s just rights in the premises,” etc. Prays
an injunction to restrain the collection of the note.
[*199] "‘An injunction was allowed by Hon. C. W. Whip
ple, one of the associate justices of the supreme court.
A motion was made to dissolve the injunction upon the fol
lowing afiidavit :
State of Michigan, Wayne County, as :
John A. Welles, of the city of Detroit, in the county and
state aforesaid, one of the defendants in the above entitled
cause, being duly sworn according to law, deposeth and saith,
that from reading the bill of complaint filed in this cause, he
has ascertained that the president, directors and company of
the Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Bank of Michigan and this depo
nent are made parties defendants to the said complainant’s bill
of complaint, by reason or on account of a certain draft, bill
of exchange or check drawn by the said complainant on the
Phcenix Bank, in the city of New York, for the sum of $18,000,
which said check or draft was payable to the order of Nehe
miah O. Sargeant, ninety days after the first day of August,
in the year eighteen hundred and thirty-six, and this deponent
further saith, that the said check was discounted by the said
Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Bank, while this deponent was present
and acting as their cashier ; that the amount thereof, less the
discount for the time the said draft or check had to run before
maturity, was paid to Nehemiah O. Sargeant at the time when
the same was discounted.
And this deponent further saith, that the said check or draft
was not paid at maturity, but the same was returned to said
Farmers’ and Mechanics‘ Bank dishonored; that a suit has been
commenced in the supreme court of the state of New York by
the said bank, against the said Charles H. Carroll, the com
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plainaut in this suit, for the amount due or unpaid on the said
draft or check; that the said suit was put at issue previous to
the first day of November, eighteen hundred and thirty-nine;
that said suit, so pending in said supreme court of the state of
New York, was noticed for trial on or about the eleventh day
of November, eighteen hundred and thirty-nine; that pre
vious to said last mentioned day the defendant in said
*suit at law (the complainant in this cause) filed his [*200]
bill of complaint in the court of chancery in and for
the said state of New York, against the said bank, plaintilf in
the said suit at law, and Randall S. Rice, administrator of the
estate of Nehemiah O. Sergeant, deceased, and obtained from
said court of chancery in said state an injunction restraining
the proceedings of said bank in the said suit, on the draft or
check aforesaid, as well as the said Rice, administrator of said
Sargeant.
And this depouent further» saith, that he examined and read
the said complainant’s bill of complaint so filed in the court of
chancery for the state of New York, and so far as the said bill
related to the said Farmers’ and Mechanics’ bank it was for the
prevention of the said bank from the collecting the said check,
and the same allegations in substance were made against the
said bank in said bill as are made in the bill of complaint in
this cause against this depouent and the said bank; that upon
the said injunction so granted in the state of New York being
served upon the attorney of the said bank, the said suit pending
in said supreme court was continued; that immediately there
after, or as soon as the said bank could do so, a full answer to
the allegations in the bill of complaint filed in said court of
chancery was prepared and verified by the aflidavit of this
depouent; that upon filing the answer of said bank, a motion
was made before the Honorable Reuben H. VValworth, chan
cellor of the state of New York, for the dissolution of the
injunction previously granted in said state.
And this depouent further saith, the the motion to dissolve
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the said injunction came on to be heard before the chancellor
of said state on the twenty-third day of April, now last past,
whereupon an order was duly made, dissolving said injunction,
as will more fully appear by reference to a copy of said order
hereunto annexed.
And this deponent further saith, the said suit is still pending
in the supreme court of the state of New York, on said check;
that the defense set up by the defendant in said suit (the com
plainant in this cause) is
,
that the check or draft was purchased
by the said bank after it became due, or that it was
[*201] taken *in payment of some previous indebtedness of
said Nehemiah O. Sargeant to the said bank; all of
which allegations and pretences were fully and explicitly denied
in the answer of said bank to the bill of complaint, filed in the
court of chancery for said state of New York.
And this deponent further saith, that he has visited the state
of New York once as a witness in said cause, pending in said
supreme court, and the trial was prevented by said injunction;
that he has recently received notice that the said cause is
noticed for trial on the first Monday of June next, and the
attendance of this deponent is requested as a witness; and this
deponent saith he is fully and particularly acquainted with all
the facts relative to the purchasing or discounting said draft or
check by said bank.
And this deponent further saith, that he has good reason to
believe, and does believe, that unless the said bank is permitted
to proceed in said suit at law in the state of New York, at the
next term of said court, or unless the said complainant be com
pelled to give security in this court, the said bank will sufier
irreparable injury.
And this deponent further saith, that it will be impossible to
procure from New ‘York such papers or copies of them, as have
been necessarily forwarded there to defend said suits, as will be
required to make a full and complete answer to this bill of com
plaint, in time to move for the dissolution of the injunction in
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this cause, before the day on which the said cause now pending
in said supreme court is noticed for trial. And further this
deponent saith not. -Jomv A. Wnnnns.
Sworn to and subscribed before me,
'
this 14th May, A. D. 1840. l’
Hnmzv H. BROWN,
Notary Publw, W. 0., Mick.
A copy of the order of the court of chancery of the state of
New York, dissolving the injunction issued upon the
bill *filed in that state by the complainant, is attached ["'202]
to the afiidavit.
H. NI Walker, in support of the motion:
1. Where an injunction is granted to stay proceedings at
law, it is proper to make a motion, based on an aifidavit, to
dissolve or alter the terms of it: 1 Newland’s Prac., 226‘; 2
llladd. Prac., 224,- 6 Vesey, 109, I10; 2 Chan. Cas., 208; 2
J0/ms. Ch., 140.
'
2. There is no doubt but the court has the power to grant an
7injunction against a person s proceeding in a foreign court: .4
Bridg. Digest, 323; Eden on Inj., 144,- 5 Vesey, 27, 71; 5 Madd.
.Rep., 297, $09; 6 Madd. Rep., 16; 4 Bridg. Di_q., 340. But
the court will not, as a matter of policy and courtesy, restrain
the proceeding commenced in a sister state: 2 Paige, 408, 40.4;
4 Oranch R., 179,- 7 Uranch R., 278; 2 Story’s Eg., 186.
3. The bill in this case is defective. The statute provides
that a bond shall be given under certain circumstances, and
money paid into court under others. The bill should state,
then, what is the situation of the suit at law, so as to enable
the chancellor or judge to determine what order to make: R. 8.,
374, 875.
’
The general rule is
,
that if a declaration has been filed, the
plaintiif at law will be permitted to proceed to execution.
Hence the necessity of stating the precise situation of the suit:
»
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10 Vesey, 450,‘ 18 Veseg, 488," 1 lVew. Chan., 216,- 2 Madd.
Prac., 220,- 3 Paige, 33.
The bill has not the requisites of a bill of discovery, there
being no averments that the answer is wanted as evidence in
another court; which is necessaryu Story’s Pl., 422; Mit
ford’s PL, 186; 2 St0ry’a Eg., 710; 2 Johns. Ch., 547, 548;
O'00per’s PL, 191; 2 Ves., 451.
4. But, conceding the point that the bill is perfect and sufii
cient, the injunction was improperly issued until a bond was
given, in accordance with the statute: 2 R. S., LT. Y., 188,"
R. S., ]l{ich., 874. It will be observed that the two statutes are
alike: 2 Paige, 395; 8 Paige, 88; 1 Hofm. Chan. Prac., 85.
[*203] "Tl Romegn, contra:
1. The afiidavit of John A. Welles is inadmissible on this
motion. There are but two ways of dissolving an injunction:
upon answer, or on the bill: 2 Johns. Ch., 202; 1 H0fman’s
Chan. P12, 861; 1 Edw., 24; Eden on Inj., 65.
2. The afiidavit, if received, is insufiicient: 6‘ Paige, 109;
1 Paige, 427.
3. The afiidavit of the defendant’s counsel is a sufiicient
answer to the equity of the motion.
4. The complainant should have reasonable time to file the
bond. The court can exercise a discretion in this matter : I
Paige, 427; 2 Johns. Ch, 202, 208, 227.
THE CHANCELLOB!
A preliminary question is made as to the reception of the
affidavit of John A. Welles. So far as the aflidavit shows that
the injunction was irregularly issued, or that the oificer allow
ing the injunction has been misled, and induced to grant an
injunction contrary to law, the aflidavit is admissible.
2. As to want of equity in the bill. The bill alleges that an
answer from said John A. Welles is necessary for the enforce
ment and support of the complainant’s rights in the premises.
1s2
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The rule is that the complainant shall charge in his bill that
the facts are known to the defendant and ought to be disclosed
by him, and that the complainant is unable to prove them by
other testimony; and when the facts are desired to assist a
court of law in the progress of a cause, it should be affirma
tively stated in the bill that they are wanted for such purpose:
Brown v. Swan, 10 Peters’ R., 502.
If this be substantially the true rule, of which there can be
no doubt, the bill is insuflicient to sustain the injunction to the
full extent to which it was allowed.
The bill alleges various and complicated transactions, and
this allegation would be equally true whether the discovery
from Welles was necessary, either in relation to orig
inal negotiation *with Sargeant, or in relation to the [*204]
draft upon which a suit is pending. It is not stated
that the discovery is necessary to aid the defense at law, or
that they are unable to prove the subject matter of that
defense by other testimony.
The statute (R. S., sec. 91, p. 874) is positive and peremp
tory, that no injunction shall be granted to restrain proceed
ings at law, where a cause is at issue, without filing a bond in
such sum as the officer allowing the injunction_shall prescribe,
etc.
The bill alleges merely, that the Farmers’ and Mechanics’
Bank have commenced, and threaten to prosecute a suit upon
a certain draft, mentioned in the bill, given by the complainant
to N. O. Sargeant, now deceased, without alleging the court in
which such suit is pending, or whether the suit is at issue or not.
It is urged that, as the statute is imperative upon the oflicer
allowing the injunction, it is incumbent upon the complainant,
in his bill, to show the state of the pleadings, and the court in
which such suit is pending, in order to enable the ofiicer to
whom the bill may be presented for the allowance of the
injunction to judge of the propriety of its allowance, and, if
allowed, to prescribe the terms in accordance with the pro
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visions of the statute. This ground I deem to be well taken.
It has been repeatedly decided that courts of chancery will not
sustain an injunction bill to restrain a suit or proceeding pre
viously commenced in court of a sister state or in any of the fed
eral courts: 2 Paige, 404,- 4 Cranch, 179. For aught that
appears, this suit may be pending in one of the federal courts, or
in the court of a sister state. It may be at issue, or even in
judgment, in one of those courts. As the statute requires, per
emptorily, certain things to be done where a cause is at issue, it
seems necessarily to follow that the party should, when he
states that a suit is pending, show the condition of that suit,
in order to enable the oflicer allowing the writ to judge of, and
to direct the necessary conditions.
To establish a contrary rule would open the door for great
abuses of the process of the court. But whether this omission
may be technically termed an irregularity or not, when
[*205] it is *brought to the knowledge of the court that the
oflicer allowing the injunction has been misled by such
omission, that the process of the court has been improperly
abused, there can be no doubt of its duty to afford a prompt
correction. The afiidavit discloses the fact that the injunction
allowed in this cause purports to restrain the proceedings of a
cause not only at issue, but pending in the court of another
state. So far, the aflidavit may undoubtedly be received. This
being apparent, there can be no room for doubt as to the duty
of the court; so far to modify the injunction as to divest it of
this anomaly.
In the case of Mead 2). Merritt, 2 Paige, 404, the chancellor
says: “I am not aware that any court of equity in the Union
has deliberately decided that it will exercise the power, by pro
cess of injunction, of restraining proceedings which have been
previously commenced in courts of another state. Not only
comity but public policy forbids the exercise of such a power.
If this court should sustain an injunction bill to restrain pro
ceedings previously commenced in a sister state, the courts of
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that state might retaliate upon the complainant, who was
defendant in the suit there. By this course of proceeding the
courts of different states would indirectly be brought into col
lision with each other in regard to jurisdiction; and the rights
of suitors might be lost sight of in a useless struggle for what
might be considered the legitimate powers and rights of courts.”
He further says that these principles “may now be consid
ered the settled law of this country.” The prompt correc
tion of this error is called for by a decent regard for the
reputation of the court, and of the judicial proceedings of the
state; and it is also due to the rights of the parties. The
injunction must be dissolved.
Injunction dissolved.
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Emily Beaubien and others v. Simon Poupard, Administra
tor, etc.
Adnu‘nistrator‘s sale, when should be adjourned. When the day appointed for an
ndministrator’s sale is rainy and inclement, and but few persons appear and bid,
and the bids do not exceed half the value of the property, it is the duty of the
administrator to adjourn the sale.
Administrator’: sale: Administrator cannot bid. A party cannot become the pur
chaser, either directly or indirectly, at a sale made by himself asadministra
tor. (a)
Where the administrator procured his brother-in-law to become the purchaser, and
immediately afterwards took a conveyance of the premises so purchased to him
self, the court of chancery, on bill flied by the heirs, set aside the sale, ordered
the deed delivered up to be cancelled, and directed a re-sale.
The bill alleges, in substance, that Lambert Beaubien was in
his lifetime seized in fee simple of a certain tract of land sit
uated in the county of Wayne, described in the bill of complaint;
that said Lambert died in the month of September, 1819, intes
tate, leaving Jean Bt. Beaubien, the father of the complainants,
and thirteen other children his heirs at law; that said Jean Bt.
Beaubien, the father of the complainants, as aforesaid, died in
the month of December, 1828, intestate, whereby complainants
became seized and possessed of the undivided one-fourteenth
part of said tract of land; that on the fifth day of October, 1829,
Cecil Beaubien, the widow of said Jean Bt. Beaubien and mother
of the complainants, presented a petition to the judge of probate
of Wayne county, praying that administration on the estate of
said Jean Bt. might be granted to her; but before any action
was had on said petition, the defendant also presented an appli
cation to said judge for letters of administration on the estate
of said Jean Bt. Beaubien; that April 23d, 1830, the said defend
ant, with the assent of said Cecil, was duly appointed adminis
(a) See this case approved and applied to persons acting in various representative
capacities, in Dwight v. Blaclcmar, 2Mich., 830; People v. Township Board of Over
yssel, 11 Mich., 226. And see Walton v. Torrey, post, 259; Olute v. Baron, 2 Mich.,
192; Ingerson 11.Starkweather, Wal. Ch., 346; Ames 1;.Port Huron Log Driving and
Booming 00., 11Mich., 139;Flint it Pere Marquette R. R. Co. v. Dewey, 14Mich., 477.
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trator on the estate of said Jean Bt. Beaubien, and took upon
himself that trust according to law; that an inventory of the
estate was duly filed in the oifice of said judge of probate, by
which it appeared that the real estate was appraised at $800, and
the personal estate at $81.92; that on or about the 6th day of
December, 1830, the said defendant presented to said judge of
probate a paper, representing among other things, that
*he believed the estate of said Jean Bt. was indebted [*207]
in the sum of four hundred dollars, and that the said
estate was insolvent, and prayed the appointment of commis
sioners to examine the claims of the several creditors of said
estate, which prayer was granted, and the commissioners
appointed; after executing the trust reposed in them they made
their report, by which it appeared that all the claims allowed
against said estate amounted only to the sum of $110.26; that
on the 17th day of October, 1831, the defendant, as adminis
trator aforesaid, presented a further petition to said judge of
probate, stating among other things that the personal estate of
said Jean Bt. was insufficient to pay the debts due by said Jean
Bt. at the time of his death, and the charges of administration,
and praying to be licensed and empowered to sell so much of
the real estate of which the said Jean Bt. died seized as might
be suflicient to pay said debt and charges; that on the 7th day
of November, 1831, the prayer of the said defendant, adminis
trator as aforesaid, was granted, and license was granted to sell
certain lots, specified, or so much thereof as might be necessary
for the purposes aforesaid, said lots having been duly set oif to
complainants by the circuit court of said county, upon a parti
tion of the said real estate of which the said Lambert Beaubien
died seized; that on the 20th day of October, 1832, the said
defendant, as administrator, having first given the bond, taken
the oath, etc., required by law, did sell at public auction the
one lot numbered 12, at which sale the same was struck off to
one Louis Beaubien, the brother-in-law of said defendant, for
the sum of $150.
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The bill charges, that although the said lot numbered 12 was
at said sale struck off to said Louis, yet the said purchase by
him was made pursuant to an understanding or arrangement
entered into previous to said sale between said defendant and
said Louis, and that said sale was to accrue to the benefit of
said defendant.
The bill avers that on the 30th of November, 1832, the said
defendant, in his capacity as administrator, aforesaid, did
execute and deliver in due form of law to said Louis,
[*208] a deed of *said lot numbered 12, and that on the same
day the said Louis and his wife, for the consideration
of $150, did quit-claim to said defendant said lot No. 12; and
further, that December 3, 1832, the defendant did further cause
both of said deeds to be duly recorded at his own cost and
charges.
The bill further charges that the defendant further disre
garded the rights and interests of the complainants, who were
infants, by not offering for sale some one or more of the other
lots he was authorized to make sale of, instead of said lot No.
12, the said lot being a water lot and not salable, while the
others were eligibly situated and in demand, and would have
sold for a comparatively much higher price.
That said lot No. 12 would have sold for amuch greater sum,
but for the fraudulent conduct of the defendant; in proof
whereof the complainants aver that the said defendant con
cealed the time of sale from the guardian of the complainants,
who had made arrangements to prevent a sacrifice of their inter
ests, until the day of sale, although the said defendant promised
to give said guardian timely notice thereof.
That after said lot No. 12 was advertised for sale, the said
guardian applied to the defendant, and desired to be informed
in due season of the day of sale, to which the defendant replied
to said guardian, who was unlettered, and unable to read or
write, that he could not state with precision the time of sale,
although he well knew he had appointed a day for that purpose.
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That the guardian, on being advised by the defendant that the
said sale was to‘ take place forthwith, remonstrated with the
defendant for his neglect in not giving her timely notice, etc.,
and urged the propriety of postponing the said sale; to which
the defendant replied that said sale could not be postponed.
That there were but few bidders at said sale, and that the
weather was inclement, notwithstanding which the said defend
ant refused to postpone said sale, and that said lot sold for
about one-half its real value.
The bill further charges that the information with regard to
the day of sale was withheld from the guardian of the
complainants, *by the defendant, in order that he [*209]
might promote his own interest; avers that the defend
ant owned a lot adjoining said lot No. 12, which would be
greatly enhanced by obtaining said lot No. 12.
The bill further states that the defendant, before said sale,
said that he would procure some person to bid in said lot for
him, as he could not legally or lawfully purchase it himself.‘
And the bill prays that the sale may be set aside and a re-sale
ordered.
The answer admits that Lambert Beaubien was, in his life
time, seized of the premises; that license was granted to sell
the same by the judge of probate, and that lot No. 12 was sold
October 20, 1832, at public auction, by defendant, as admin
istrator, and that the same was struck ofi to Louis Beaubien,
the brother-in-law to said defendant, for the sum of $150;
states that said Louis Beaubien was the highest bidder, and
that $150 was the highest sum bidden therefor.
The answer further states that among many other citizens
whom defendant solicited and urged to attend said sale, with
a view of making a beneficial sale for said estate, of said lot,
he spoke to said Louis Beaubien to attend and bid for the
same, and that defendant told the said Louis, if he bid on said
lot, and it was knocked off to him, this defendant would take
it from him, but defendant and the said Louis both distinctly
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understood that, if it was knocked down to said Louis, he was
at full and perfect liberty to keep the same, at the price bid
therefor; and that there was no agreement, or any public or
private understanding by or between the said Louis and this
defendant, as charged in said bill, that he, the said Louis, was
purchasing the same for defendant ; but the said defendant so
spoke to the said Louis, to induce him to bid for the
[*2l0] same, *and with the sole view of making the lot sell
for a fair value. Denies that the deed from defendant,
as administrator, to Louis Beaubien, of said lot No. 12, and
the deed from said Louis Beaubien and wife to defendant,
were recorded on the same day, and the records of both deeds
paid for by defendant ; denies that defendant disregarded the
rights and interests of the complainants, by not offering some
one or more of the other lots, instead of lot No. 12. The
answer further states that the defendant “ does not now remem
ber whether, on the day of sale, the said guardian, or any
other person, desired a postponement of the sale ;” denies that
defendant ever told the said guardian that said sale could not
be postponed; admits defendant owned the adjoining lot in
the right of his wife; states that defendant does not remem
ber that he ever stated, before the sale, that he would procure
some person to bid in said lot, as charged in the bill; denies
all fraud, etc.‘
TV/nipple and Van Dyke, for complainants.
[*216] *B. E H. Witherell, for defendants.
[*217] *Tnn CHANCELLORZ
'
The several allegations in the bill, upon which relief
is sought, are sufiiciently met by the answer, except so far as
they relate to the sale of the lot in question.
The proceedings before the court of probate, and notice of
the sale, etc., seem to have been regular and fair. It is alleged
in the bill, and is not denied in the answer, that the adminis
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trator, before the sale, expressed a desire or intention to pur
chase the lot. It also appears that he requested Louis Beau
bien to attend the sale; that Louis Beaubien told him that he
had no money, to which Poupard replied, he would lend him
the money or would take the lot; that the day of sale was
rainy and inclement, and there were but one or two persons
who bid on the lot besides Beaubien, who purchased it; and
that the lot was agreed to be conveyed to Beaubien, and by
him back to Poupard, on their return from the sale. The infer
ence, I think, is strong that the sale was, in fact to Beaubien,
for the benefit of Poupard, although there does not appear to
have been an express agreement to that efiect. Else why the
strong urgency that Beaubien, who confessedly had no money
to pay for the lot, should attend the sale? Poupard, it seems,
knew that Beaubien could not pay for the lot, and the ofier to
lend him money or take the lot ofi his hands, still leaving the
option with Poupard to do either the one or the other, and the
known fact that Beaubien was unable to buy himself, in efiect
secured the lot to Poupard, and it was so consummated imme
diately after the sale. The administrator, I think, erred, act
ing in the capacity he did, in not adjourning the sale, when the
day was rainy and inclement, and there were but one or two
bidders besides Beaubien. It may have been that the desire of
Poupard to secure the lot had no influence upon this decision.
But if a sale of this character should be sustained, it would
open the door for frauds, and would certainly throw great
temptations before trustees acting in this capacity. I am sat
isfied that Louis Beaubien had no intention of aiding
*Poupard in purchasing the lot improperly; but he [*2l8]
purchased under the promise that Poupard would take
it ofi his hands. It makes no difference by what means an
administrator secures the benefit of a purchase at a sale made
by himself; the rule is imperative that he cannot become a
purchaser at all: 12 Peters, 25; Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 Johns.
Ch., 62.
rm
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I see no reason to suppose that Poupard intended, in fact, to
commit afraud upon the rights of the heirs, but enough appears
to show that he intended to secure the lot under the sale. To
sustain this sale would, in effect, break down the salutary rules
of law upon this subject, and expose the rights of minors to
the adroit management of an interested trustee.
The sale must be set aside, and the deed to Beaubien, and
from him to Poupard, canceled, and a re-sale ordered, according
to the prayer in the bill. <
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Plea. of former suit pending. A plea.of a.former suit pending in another court for
the same cause of action must set forth the general character and objects of the
former suit, and the relief prayed for. (a)
Motion to open default: Afildavit of merits. On motion to open a default, the afi
davit of merits should be made by the defendant himself, or, if made by counsel,
a snflcient reason should be shown for its not being made by the party. (b)
Hearing upon a plea. The plea was of a former suit pend
ing. It alleged in very general terms that another suit was
pending in the supreme court for the same cause of action, and
seeking the like relief prayed by the bill in this cause.
Joy and Porter, for complainant:
The plea filed in this suit is in itself defective, radically. It
does not exhibit any portion of the bill filed in the supreme
court which can make it appear to this court that both bills
were for the same identical matter; which ought to have been
done. So much of the first bill should have been set up in the
plea as would make it appear that the same matter was involved
in both. See Story/’s Pl., 570; Beames’ Pleas in Equity,
140. In pleas of this sort, says Story, there are several mat
ters essential to their validity. The pleas should set forth
with certainty the commencement, the general nature, charac
ter, objects and relief prayed for in the former suit.
In a plea of former decree, etc., so much of the bill and
answer must be set forth as will show that the same point was
then in issue: Jllitford, 258; 14 Johns. Rep., 501. The plea
must not set up the facts historically, but must set out the sub
(a) Au to the requisites of a plea in chancery in general, see Schwarz v. Wevldell,
post, 395;Thomas 1:.Stone, Wal. Ch., 117;Albany City Bank v. Dorr, Wal. Ch., 817;
Carroll 0. Potter, Wal. Ch., 355; Parker v. Parker, Wal. Ch., 457: Emerson v. Atwo
ter, 1 Mich., 12.
(b) An amdavit of merits must show what the merits are: Thayer v. Swift, Wal.
Ch., 384. See Stockton 1:.Williams, post, B41.
- — .| _
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ject matter of the suit pending, with wfiicient avcrments: 8
Atkyns, 589; 2 At/cgns, 608.
[_*220] *The above authorities are conclusive as to the
validity of this plea, and it cannot be allowed. Should
the court, however, think differently, and if it shall think this
plea well pleaded, it would only put us to an election which
suit we would prosecute, even supposing both were now pend
ing; or perhaps order the first suit to be dismissed with costs,
which was actually done before this suit was commenced. See
(7ooper’s Eq. PL, 276 ,' Storg/’s Eq. PL, 570, 672,- Beames, 161;
lllit. PL, 321.
E 11 Backus, for defendant.
Tun OHANCELLOB2
The plea in this case alleges generally, that another suit is
pending in the supreme court for the same cause and for the
like relief. This is insuflicient. The plea should set forth the
general character and objects of the former suit, and the relief
prayed: Storg’s Eg. PL, 570; 8 Atk., 590. This is not done
here, and the plea must be overruled as insuflicient.
An order, pro confesso, was entered October 27, and H. T.
Backus, solicitor for defendant, filed an aflidavit November 5,
and moved to set aside the order, pro confesso.
He states in his aflidavit, that in the order adjudging the
plea to be insufiicient, defendant was allowed to file an answer:
that he supposed he had forty days within which to file his
answer, and so advised the defendant; that “as he believes, the
said defendant has to said bill of complaint a good defense to
a part at least of the amount claimed therein, by way of ofiset,”
and that he had been unable to prepare the answer, etc.
The chancellor denied the motion on the ground that the
afiidavit was made by the solicitor, and no reason was shown
why it was not made by the party defendant himself.
I04
FIRST CIRCUIT. 221
_... x'|,.,,.
Brrns v. Gnaazsoll.
George C. Bates v. John D. Garrison.
Amending decree. The court ot chancery has the power to direct the alteration or
correction of a decree after it has been entered, either upon motion or petition,
where there is evidently a mistake or clerical error. (0)
This was a motion to correct the record, by amending the
decree entered at the term previous.
The motion was founded upon an aflidavit which stated that
the suit in which the decree was entered was for the foreclos
ure of a mortgage; that the mortgage was given for the pur
chase money, and that that fact was stated in the bill; that the
decree was by mistake entered for a sale of the mortgaged
premises, in default of'payment, etc., in two years and three
months from the time of filing the bill, instead of one year and
three months.
A. D. Fraser, in support of motion, cited Seaton’s Forms,
215,-1110172 Ch. P:-., 559.
Tun CHANCELLOR :
This court unquestionably has the power to direct the altera
tion or correction of a decree after it has been entered, either
upon motion or petition, where there is evidently a mistake or
clerical error. In this case there was evidently a mistake or
error in the decree for the sale of the mortgaged premises in
two years and three months, when the party was entitled to
take his decree for a sale in one year and three months from
the time of filing the bill.
The register is, therefore, directed to make the proper cor
rection or alteration.
And the alteration having been made by the register, the
chancellor put his initials to the same.
(a) See Jerome v. Seymour, WaL Ch., 859. And as to the power of L court to
Amend its judgments in general, see Emory v. lvhitwell, 0 Mich., 474.
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Mason and Pritchette v. The Detroit City Bank and others.
Amendments to answer, iww made. Where leave is given to amend an answer, a
new answer, with the amendments added. must be made, filed, and copy served,
or the original answer withdrawn by leave of the court, and the amendments
added; or the amendments must refer to the portions ot the answer on file,
intended to be amended, and specifying their nature and application.
Amendments in the form of aflidavlts, without referring to the answer, are irregu
lar, and a motion to dissolve an injunction will not be heard upon them.
This is a motion to dissolve an injunction on bill and answer.
The defendants at a former term had obtained leave to amend
their answer. The papers on file, claimed by the defendants to
be amendments, were drawn in the form of afiidavits, and do
not purport, either in the body or indorsement of them, to be
amendments to the answer on file.
The complainants object to hearing the motion to dissolve
the injunction, on the ground that no amendment to the answer
has been filed or served.
'
1! Romeyn, for complainants:
The defendants, Howard and the bank, had leave to amend
their answer, by having the answer of the bank sworn to, and
its seal verified.
Without adverting to the substance of the aflidavits filed
as amendments to the answer of the bank, the complainants
insist that these amendments are not legally and formally
before the court, and that they have not been duly served upon
the complainants.
The amendments do not refer to the pleadings onfile.
They should have been added to or incorporated with them
in some way or other.
A new answer should have been drawn, and the amend
ments made a part of it; and a copy of the whole should have
been served on the complainants.
The first answer was a nullity, for all purposes of a motion
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to dissolve the injunction. This is admitted; of
course, there *was no necessity for excepting to it [*228]
to prevent such a motion. When it was perfected
by being properly authenticated, then the right to except
became available. But after this no copy was served.
The afiidavits of Harris and Brown were served, but with
no notice that they were intended as amendments to the answer;
consequently the complainants have not had an opportunity of
excepting to the amended answer.
Even if the first position of the complainants be incorrect,
still it is evident that they have a right in some way or other to
their exceptions, and that this is lost if the motion to dissolve
is now heard.
If the court should not deem it necessary that the defendant
should prepare a new answer, still it is beyond question that
the amendments should refer to the answer on file. See 1
Hofm. Pr., 240, 290, 292.
The amendments should have been made in one of three
ways, viz.:
1st. A new answer should have been drawn, the amendments
added, and the whole served and filed; or
2d. The old answer should have been taken from the files by
leave of the court, the amendments added, and properly served
on the complainants; or
3d. The amendments should have been drawn, referring to
the answer on file, and a copy should have been served, speci
fying their nature and application.
The papers now produced are mere general aflidavits. Hey
do not purport to be amendments. This practice is irregular
and mischievous. They do not purport to be amendments to
an answer. They do not refer to the answer as on file, and if
false, no perjury can be assiged on them.
I M. Howard, for defendants.
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The first question presented is whether there has been
such an amendment made to the answer as would compel the
complainants to regard the answer as filed, and to except, or
_ reply to it.
[*224] *The defendants, Howard and the Detroit city bank,
had leave to amend their answer. The papers pur
porting to be an amendment are in the form of aflidavits, and
are so indorsed.
The amendments should have been added to or incorporated
with the answer in some way.
A new answer should have been made, the amendments
added, served and filed; or
The original answer should have been withdrawn by leave
of the court, and the amendments added and served on the
complainants; or .
The amendments should have been drawn, referring to the
portions of the answer on file intended to be amended, and spe
cifying their nature and application.
The papers filed are merely general aflidavits, and do not
purport to be amendments.
The motion is therefore premature, and cannot now be heard.
me
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Charles H. Carroll and others v. Robert Van Rensselaer and
others.
The vendor of real estate has an equitable lien upon the same for the purchase
money, where there is no security for its payment taken. (a)
The bill in this case was filed December 9, 1839, and stated
that November 8, 1836, complainants were seized and pos
sessed, in their own right in fee simple, of certain lands and
premises situated in the county of Lenawee, in the state of
Michigan; that they sold the same to Peter Stuyvesant, of the
city of New York, for the sum of $12,284.00, and executed and
delivered a deed therefor in due form of law; that $5,174.54
was paid on the execution and delivery of the deed, and at the
same time Stuyvesant delivered to complainant, Charles H.
Carroll, a bond, executed by John Catlin, bearing date Septem
ber 2, 1835, for the sum of $7,197.10, payable September 22,
1838, bearing interest at six per cent., payable semi-annually,
which bond was assigned and guaranteed by Stuyvesant, with
the understanding and agreement that, if the money secured
by the bond should be paid to Charles H. Carroll, the same
should be applied in liquidation of the balance of said purchase
money; that July 30, 1839, Stuyvesant conveyed the lands and
premises to Robert Van Rensselaer. The bill charges Van
Rensselaer with full notice of all the facts; and also charges
the conveyance from Stuyvesant to Van Rensselaer to be
fraudulent, and that Stuyvesant and Catlin are insolvent, and
that there yet remains due of the purchase money about the
sum of $8,222, for which a lien is claimed.
An answer was put in by Van Rensselaer, which was subse
quently withdrawn and the bill taken as confessed.
The complainants asked a decree that the amount of the pur
(a) See Payne v. Atterbury, post, 414; Palmer at al., appellants, 1 Doug. Mich.,
422;Sears v. Smith, 2 Mich., 248;Mowrey 1:.Vandling, 9Mich, 89; Converse v. Blam
rich, 14Mich., 109.
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chase money remaining due from Stuyvesant to complainants
shall be a lien on the premises, and that defendants redeem the
premises by the payment of the sum remaining due within a
certain time, or, in default thereof, that all and singular the
premises be sold, etc.
[*226] *A. D. Iibaser, for complainants:
The proposition that the vendor of real property, who has not
taken separate security for the purchase money, has a lien for
it on the land as against the vendee and his heirs, is too well
settled in this country to admit of discussion, subject indeed to
be defeated by alienation to a bona fiole purchaser without
notice: Brown e. Gilman, 4 Wheat., 255, and notes; Bayley
v. Greenleaj, 7 Wheat., 46. This doctrine is fully examined by
Lord Eldon in the case of Mackreth '0. Symmons, 15 Ves., 329.
And the result of his investigation is:
1st. That generally speaking there is a lien.
2d. That in those general cases in which there would be a
lien, as between vendor and vendee, the vendor will have the
lien against a third person who had notice that the money was
not paid. He adds, these two points seem to be clearly settled.
Chancellor Kent, also, in Garson v. Green, 1 Johns. Ch., 308,
recognizes this doctrine. Reference is also made to the follow
ing cases: Hughes v. Kearney, 1 Sch. and Lef., 132; Naim v.
Howse, 6 Ves., 752; Gilman '0. Brown, 1 Mason, 191.
True: Onsnonnnon:
The vendor of real estate has unquestionably an equitable
lien upon the same for the purchase money, where there is no
security for its payment taken. The complainants are entitled
to take their decree in the form suggested.
N0
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James B. Clark and another v. Phineas Davis.
Creditor‘: bill, what to state. A creditor’s bill must contain the averments required
by the 109thrule (rule 102of 1858),and those averments must be sworn to.
0redito'r's bill, with double aspect. A bill may be filed both to reach mere equitable
interests and in aid of execution at law; and such a bill is not multifarious.
0reditor’e bill, waiver of right to file. The right to file a creditor’s bill having once
attached by the return of an execution unsatisfied, the party does not lose his
right to file the same by the issuing of a new execution.
General demurrer. A general demurrer for want of equity cannot be sustained,
unless the court is satisfied that no discovery or proof properly called tor by or
founded on the allegation ot the bill can make the subject matter of the suit a
proper case for equitable cognizance. (a)
Demurrer ore tenus. Where a. new cause of demurrer is assigned ore tenus, the
cause must be co-extensive with the demurrer.
Motion to dissolve an injunction.
The bill filed in this case is framed with a double aspect. It
sets up the return of an execution unsatisfied, and the issuing
of another execution. It seeks to reach the equitable interests
of the defendant, and also to aid the second execution. The
jurat is special, and as follows:
“ State of Michigan, County of Wayne, ss.
“ Ezra C. Seaman, solicitor for the complainants, being duly
sworn, says that he drew the draft of the foregoing bill of com
plaint, and knows the contents thereof; that the complainants
are not citizens of the state of Michigan, but of the state of
New York, as stated in the bill, as this deponent verily believes;
that this deponent has examined the records, papers and pro
ceedings in the suit stated in the bill of the complainants,
against the defendant, Phineas Davis, in the oflice of the clerk
of the circuit court for said county of Wayne, and verily
believes that a judgment was obtained in said suit, and that an
(a) See Thayer v. Lane, post, 237; Hawkins 1:.Clermont, 15Mich., 511; Williants
v. Hubbard, Wal. Ch., 28; Edwards v. Hulburt, WaL Ch., M; Burpee v. Smith, Wal.
Ch., 327.
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execution was issued thereon and returned unsatisfied, as stated
in said bill. And this deponent further says that he, as attor
ney for the plaintiffs, procured a new execution on said judg
ment to be issued and delivered to the sheriff, as stated in the
bill, on the 28th day of July instant; and that this bill
["‘228] is *not exhibited by collusion with said Phineas Davis,
or for the purpose of protecting the property and
effects of said Davis, or any part thereof, against the claims of
other creditors, but for the sole purpose of compelling payment
and satisfaction of the money due on the aforesaid judgment,
the whole amount of which deponent believes to be unpaid, and
the judgment in full force.” Sworn, etc.
Upon this the usual injunction was allowed.
If Romeyn, in support of the motion:
The jurat is defective. _
1. No sufiicient cause is shown for its not being sworn to by
the complainants.
2. The substance of the jurat is not according to the rule of
the court: Rule 1.4. (b)
3. The averments required by the 109th rule are not sworn
to at all. These averments are material, and without them the
bill cannot be sustained: McElwain 2:. Willis, 8 Paige, 606.
E C. Seaman, for complainants: '
The aflidavit does contain and establish, by the oath of the
solicitor in the first place, an excuse why it was not made by
(b) The following are copies of rules 14and 109here referred to:
14. In bills, answers and petitions, which are to be verified by the oath of the
party, the several matters stated, charged, averred, admitted or denied,shs.ll be stated
positively, or upon information or belief only, according to the fact. The oath ad
ministered to the party shall be, in substance, that he has read the bill, answer or
petition, or has heard it read, and knows the contents thereof, and that the same is
true of his own knowledge, except as to the matters which are therein stated to be
on his information or belief, and, as to those matters, he believes it to be true; and
the substance of the oath shall be stated in the jurat.
109.Where a creditor, by judgment or decree, flies a biil in this court against his
debtor to obtain satisfaction out of the equitable interests, things in action, or other
property of the latter, after the return of an execution unsatisfied, he shall state in
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one of the plaintiffs; and, secondly, it establishes all the ma
terial allegations of the bill required by the Revised Statutes
to give the court jurisdiction (R. S.,865, secs. 25, 26), and sub
stantially complies with the rules of court.
It is averred in the bill that the plaintifis are informed and
believe that the defendant has equitable interests, choses in
action, notes, accounts, judgments, etc., amounting to over one
hundred dollars, etc., and praying a discovery.
This is
,
in effect, but a formal averment, calling for dis
covery. The afiidavit shows that the plaintiffs are citizens of
New York, and most likely they have no information whatever
as to the equitable effects and choses in action of Davis. At all
events, their solicitor here does not know, and cannot know
what information the plaintiifs have on the subject, nor what
their belief is on the subject; and, therefore, could not
[*229] swear *that the plaintifis were informed and believed
the matters stated in the bill. The solicitor might
swear that he had been informed and believed himself that
Davis has notes, etc., but he could not swear that the plaintifis
had been informed and believed. The form of aflidavit in the
rules does not, therefore, apply to cases of bills where an agent
or solicitor swears to the subject matter.
Rule 14 does not apply to cases of bills, etc., sworn to by an
agent, for he cannot swear to what the plaintiif believes, and
seldom can swear to what the plaintiff has been informed. The
statute and rule 110 (0) has been complied with, by swearing to
such bill, either positively, or according to his belief, the true sum actually and
equitably due on such judgment or decree, over and above all just claims of the
defendant, by way of oilset or otherwise. He shall also state that he knows, or has
reason to believe, the defendant has equitable interests, things in action, or other
property, of the value oi one hundred dollars or more, exclusive of all prior claims
thereon, which the complainant has been unable to discover and reach by execution
on such judgment or decree. The bill shall likewise contain an allegation that the
same is not exhibited by collusion with the defendant, or for the purpose of protecting
the property or elects of the debtor against the claims of other creditors; but for the
sole purpose of compelling payment and satisfaction of the complainant's own debt.
(c) This rule provided for the verification of bills by agent or attorney when the
complainant resided out of the state.
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all the material parts of the bill, and all the chancellor deemed
necessary when the injunction was granted.
The rules of court, requiring bills to be sworn to, apply to
only so much of the bill as seeks to reach choses in action, etc.,
on the ground of execution returned unsatisfied. The injunc
tion to restrain the party from disposing of real and personal
property, which might be levied on under execution, was pro
perly granted, according to the English rules, on a separate
aflidavit, merely setting forth the recovery of judgment and
suing out execution.
Tan CHANCELLOB2
The jurat is insuflicient. It is special, and none of the aver
ments required by the 109th rule are sworn to at all. These
averments are material; without them the injunction cannot be
sustained. See .Zl[cElwaz'n '0. Willis, 3 Paige R., 505. The
injunction must be dissolved.
Injunction dissolved.
The complainant having obtained leave to file a new aflidavit,
the following affidavit was filed as an amendment:
“ Wayne County, ss.
“ Ezra C. Seaman, being duly sworn, deposes and says, that
the complainants in this cause are not citizens or residents of
the state of Michigan; that they were both absent from the
state of Michigan when the bill of complaint was filed
[*230] in this *cause, and are still absent from this state as
deponent verily believes; that this deponent is the
attorney and agent of said complainants for the purpose of col
lecting the judgment set forth in the bill of complaint in this
case; that this deponent has imformation in relation to the
recovery of the judgment set forth in the said bill, and issuing
of the several executions thereon, and the return of such execu
tions; and from such information deponent verily believes all
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the matters set forth in said bill, in relation to the recovery of
said judgment, issuing the several executions thereon, and the
return of such executions, to be true, as therein stated, and that
the whole amount of said judgment is due and unpaid. Deponent
has also information in relation to the property, efiects, choses
in action and equitable interests and rights of said Davis, and
from such information depouent verily believes that said Davis
had at the time of filing the bill in this cause, and the com
mencement of this suit, either in possession or held in trust for
him (not including such trusts as have been created by and due
person or persons other than said Davis himself), equitable
interests, things in action, or other property of the value of
upwards of one hundred dollars, exclusive of all prior just claims
than as is set forth in said bill. Deponent further says that no
answer has been put in in this cause, and further saith not.”
Subscribed, sworn, etc.
_ The defendant then demurred generally, and insisted that
the bill was not sustainable either as a creditor’s bill, or as a bill
in aid of the execution.
The cause was heard upon the demurrer.
Tl Romeyn, in support of the demurrer:
As a creditor’s bill it is insufiiciently verified.
Such bills must be verified by oath.‘ Rule 110.
The present bill is not verified by oath according to the rules.
First. The jurat should be general, extending to the whole bill,
and according to the form prescribed by the 14th rule.
*Second. Even if the jurat may be special, and [*231]
extend to but part of the bill, the present jurat does
not cover the material statements in the bill.
The last aflidavit must be considered as superseding the
former. The rule to amend was for “leave to file a new affi
davit,” not a supplemental aflidavit. The new aflidavit does
not allege that the bill was not filed by collusion, etc., in the
manner prescribed by the 109th rule. These allegations are
205
231 CASES lN CHANCERY.
Oman v. Dsvxs.
material, and the want of them renders the bill demurrable:
McElwain v. Willis, 3 Paige, 505.
Again. If both aflidavits are to be considered in force and
subsisting, still neither of them covers the averments in the
eighth folio, that the defendant has equitable interests, etc.,
property held in trust for him, etc. This is a part of the state
ment of the bill, and must be sworn to: Rule 110.
The bill is not sustainable as a creditor’s bill, because it
shows an execution outstanding not returned, and not returna
ble at the time when it was filed, and to the levy of which
property suflicient to satisfy the debt was subject. See 8
Paige, 811.
The bill is not sustainable as a bill in aid of an execution on
account of its vagueness and uncertainty.
It does not state that the defendant was seized or possessed
of any property, but merely states the belief of the complain
ants: M-0u7l{f0‘Td '0. Taylor, 6 Vesey, 792.
There is no description of the property, nor of the incum
brances on it. The whole bill is vague, uncertain and informal.
See M'cElwain v. VVillis, 9 Wend., 561, 567-8-9.
The bill is multifarious, and, therefore, demurrable: illit
forol Oh. PL, 118, and note. The demurrer goes to the whole
bill: Boyd v. Hoyt, 5 Paige, 79.
Even were the general demurrer decided to be inapplicable,
the objections now taken are good causes of demurrer, ore
tenus: Story’s Eq. PL, 865.
[*232] *E O’. Seaman, for complainants:
The want or defect of averment required by the 189th rule
of court in New York, which is our 109th rule, has been held a
defect of form only, and may be supplied by amendment:
McElwain v. Willis, 3 Paige, 506, 507.
The defect in this case, if it was a defect at all, was in the
aflidavit only, and not in the bill, and according to the case of
ll[cElwain v. W'tllis, was a defect of form only, at most, and has
sue
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been cured by the amendment or new aflidavit filed, call it by
what name you choose.
Such ’a defect cannot be taken advantage of on general
demurrer, but must be taken advantage of either on motion or
on special demurrer. A general demurrer is good only when
it appears on the face of the bill that the complainant has no
equity: Storg/s Eg. PL, 657, sec. 455. Demurrers for all
causes, except a want of equity, must be special: ll[z'tf0r0Z’s
PL, 218, 21.4; Storg/’s Eg. PL, 357', secs. 455, 457.
The amendments to the bill, being mere matters of form, and
not of substance, are considered as forming part of the orig
inal bill, and refer to the time of filing the bill: Hard v. Everett,
1 Paige, 124; Mitford’s PL, 55, note, 330; Knight v. Matthews,
1 Mad. R., 307; Storg/’s Eq. Pl., 689; C'ooper’s Eg., 840.
The original aifidavit to the bill (which defendant’s counsel
claims is defective, and not cured even by the amendments and
new aflidavit) being required by the 110th rule of this court,
either is or is not a necessary part of the bill itself; if not, then
it is a mere preliminary matter, and the demurrer being to the
bill only, and not to this preliminary aflidavit, cannot reach it
,
even if it is defective or totally wanting. If it is a necessary
part of the bill itself, then the amended aifidavit cures the
defect, by coming directly within the terms of the general
order to amend, and is good without the special clause of which
the defendant’s counsel complains.
If the afiidavit to the bill is not a necessary part of the bill
itself, then the question arises, is it necessary at all,
unless for *the purpose of obtaining an injunction or [*233]
receiver before answer. That is the only object of it;
the proceedings would be good without any aflidavit at all.
But if this be not the true construction, then the worst con
struction that can be put upon it is that it is a mere irregular
ity of practice. If so, the only remedy the defendant could
have would be to move to dismiss the bill, and this should have
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been done before appearing in the cause, or at the first oppor
tunity after being informed of the irregularity.
By appearing and putting in a general demurrer, and allow
ing more than six months and a term of the court to elapse
without objection, it is now too late. The party has waived
his right to raise any such objection. It has been expressly
decided by Chancellor Kent, in two cases, that irregularities of
practice are waived, if the objection is not made in a proper
manner at the first opportunity: Skinner '0. Dayton, 5 Johns.
Ch., 192; 2 Johns. Ch., 226.
The demurrer is general, and if too broad must be overruled.
If a demurrer is bad in part, it must be wholly overruled, as it
covers too much: Janes o. 111-08¢, 1 Jacobs, 467; Mitford’s Pl.,
214. It is here attempted to combine together several imagin
ary causes of special demurrer, in order to make one good
cause of general demurrer—a strange mode of argument.
A bill may be filed as well in aid of an execution at law, to
discover property that may be subjected to execution, as to
reach mere equitable interests and choses in action: Cuyler v.
Jllorelantl, 6 Paige, 274; Leroy v. Rogers, 3 Paige, 236.
A bill may be filed for the sole purpose of aiding execution
at law, that is for the discovery of property, that it may be
levied on by the execution; in such case the execution must be
out, and inthe sherifl’s hands ready to be levied on the
property when the discovery is made: Leroy v. Rogers, 3 Paige,
234 to 237; Angel v. Draper, 1 Vernon, 398, 399; 6 Ves.,
jr., 788.
[_*234] *And on a general bill without any special allega
tions, defendant will be compelled to discover all his
property, including lands as well as personal estate, lying out
of the jurisdiction of the court: 3 Paige, 285.
Taking out a new execution will not prevent the plaintifi
from filing a creditor’s bill to reach equitable interests, as long
as the judgment is not paid, and property sufiicient to satisfy
it has not been levied on: Cuyler v. Moreland, 6 Paige, 274.
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Bringing suit on judgment, after return of an execution
unsatisfied, and obtaining a new judgment, will not prevent a
creditor from filing a creditor’s bill on the original judgment,
as the original judgment is not thereby extinguished: Bates v.
Lyons, 7 Paige, 86.
After judgment and an execution returned unsatisfied, if the
judgment is assigned, the assignee may file a creditor’s bill in
his own name, and without taking out a new execution: Gleason
12. Gage, 7 Paige, 121 to 124.
The demurrer must be overruled, and if so a receiver will be
appointed, of course. See 2 Paige, 348, 846,‘ 7 Paige, 58,
where Chancellor Walworth says complainant may move for an
injunction or receiver.
If defendant is allowed to answer, it should be on the pay
ment of costs: 7 Paige, 86, 124.
In all cases, on overruling a demurrer, leave to answer should
be given only on the condition of paying costs and answering
in a short period; such is the unvariable rule at law. See, also,
1 H0171 Oh. .Pr., 215.
Tun CHANCELLORZ
The aflidavit filed under the leave of the court must be con
sidered as cumulative, and does not supersede the first. They
are both annexed to the bill, and stand of record. Treating
the two affidavits as of force and subsisting, all the allegations
of the bill, which are required by the rules and practice of the
court, in order to entitle the party to file and prosecute a credi
tor’s bill in this court, are sworn to. This is suflicient upon a
general demurrer. The existence of the judgment, the issuing
and return of the execution unsatisfied, and the alle
gation that the defendant has equitable interests *to [*235]
the value of $100 and more, are sufliciently shown,
and are sworn to. The bill is not multifarious. A bill may be
filed as well to reach mere equitable interests, as in aid of an
execution at law: Guyler '0. Moreland, 6 Paige, 274. The
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right to file a creditor’s bill having once attached by the return
of the execution unsatisfied, the party is not prevented from
commencing proceedings in chancery by the issuing of a new
execution: 6 Paige, 274. It is not now necessary to decide
whether the allegations in the bill are sufliciently specific to
entitle the complainant to the relief he seeks in aid of his exe
cution. The bill, as a creditor’s bill merely, is sufiicient upon
this question. A general demurrer for want of equity cannot
be sustained, unless the court is satisfied that no discovery or
proof properly called for by or founded on the allegations in
the bill, can make the subject matter of the suit a proper case
for equitable cognizance: Bleelcer v. Bingham, 3 Paige, 246.
Where a new cause of demurrer is assigned, ore tenus, the
cause must be co-extensive with the demurrer.
Demurrer overruled, and reference for the appointment of a
receiver.
I10
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John A. Pratt and another v. Edward R. Campbell and
others.
Agency dicavowed. Where parties assumed to be agents for a bank in settling a
demand, and procured from the debtor an assignment of property in compro
mlse, and the bank denied their authority to make the compromise, whereupon
the debtor made a second assignment of the property to complainants, held,
that complainants might maintain a bill in equity to restrain the assumed agents
from collecting and disposing of the property. (a)
Motion to dissolve injunction for want of equity.
The bill states that in December, 1838, Thomas Emerson
was largely indebted to the Bank of Windsor, and a judgment
had been recovered against him by the bank, to the amount of
$59,000, upon which the latter threatened to issue ca. sa.,' that
E. R. Campbell and Rufus Emerson proposed a compromise,
in the name of the bank; that they represented themselves as
the agents and attorneys of the bank, with full power to bind
their principal; during the negotiation they conferred repeat
edly with the oflicers of the bank, and Thomas Emerson re
fused to treat with them in any other capacity; that on this
understanding a compromise was made; that previously to
this, the bank had commenced various trustee or attachment
suits against the property and credits of Thomas Emerson, in
the states of Ohio, Indiana and Michigan; that by the terms
of the compromise, Thomas Emerson was to pay $20,000, in
approved securities, in payment and satisfaction of the bank’s
claim against him; these securities were to be assigned to E.
R. Campbell and Rufus Emerson, and as collateral security
for the payment of the assigned securities, other obligations
were to be transferred to said Campbell and Emerson; that
Royal H. Waller, as agent and attorney of all the parties, was
to be sent to Michigan to change and secure the obligations
(a) A person cannot ratify in part the contract of one who has assumed to act as
his agent, and repudiate it in other particulars: Widner v. Olmatead, I4 Mich., 134;
Peninsular Bank v. Hanmer, Ib., 208; Hutchim v. Ladd, 16Mich., 493.
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which had been assigned by T. Emerson in payment
[*237] and satisfaction of the bank’s *claim against him, and
which were principally due and owing from residents
of this state; that the bank authorized him to act for them in
the premises, and by virtue of their power of attorney he dis
continued the attachment suits, changed the form of the secu
rities assigned in payment, took some notes payable to Camp
bell and Emerson, and took, also, an assignment to them of
some bonds and mortgages; after doing this, he returned to
Vermont. The bank professed to be dissatisfied, and demanded
and received additional securities as collateral to those assigned
in payment of T. Emerson’s debt, and which had been thus
changed by said R. H. Waller; that after this, the bank, for
the first time, repudiated the contract, denied the right of E.
R. Campbell and Rufus Emerson to bind them in the premises,
and without proifering a return of the securities, proceeded on
their judgment against said Thomas Emerson, and issued exe
cution thereon; that at the same time Campbell and Emerson
took similar ground, and claimed all the above securities as
their own individual property; that this claim was founded
principally on the alterations of the articles, made by them
fraudulently, after the first execution thereof; that after the
perpetration of these alleged frauds, and the entire failure of
the contract between Thomas Emerson and the bank, he
assigned all the securities and all his claim against the bank
and said Campbell and Emerson to the complainants, who had
incurred heavy responsibilities for his benefit. The complain
ants aver the utter insolvency of Edward R. Campbell and
Rufus Emerson; they aver that the notes, bonds, etc., are now
in Detroit, and some of them in process of collection, and pray
that said Campbell and Emerson may be compelled to deliver
them to the complainants; that the attorneys who hold them
may be restrained from giving them back to Campbell and
Emerson, and from paying moneys already collected to the
latter; that no more suits may be brought in behalf of Camp
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bell and Emerson, and that the several debtors may be decreed
to pay and account to the complainants; and may be enjoined
from paying Campbell and Emerson.
No injunction is asked to restrain the proceedings at law
already commenced.
l
*Injunction granted as prayed. [*238]
The defendants move to dissolve the injunction for
Want of equity in the bill.
D. Goodwin, in support of the motion:
1. The whole case is based on the assignment from Thomas
Emerson to Emerson and Campbell, which is attempted to be
varied as to its legal efiect, by parol: 1 Peters R., 1; 4 B. dz
(1,513.
This cannot be done. It was executed with a full knowledge
of the facts, and deliberately. Emerson intended to execute
just such an instrument at the time of its wcecution, and the
previous conversations and negotiations cannot be resorted to
to control it; they are merged in it.
As to the insolvency, it is alleged to have existed at the
time.
2. Upon the ground assumed by the complainants, there is
no consideration for the agreement. Emerson owed the whole
debt, and was bound legally to s~u_fi'erjudgment and pay it; and
judgment being rendered, to pay the whole amount. If a false
plea were interposed for delay, the court, if such were known
to them to be the fact, would strike it out without ceremony,
and the agreement to receive a less sum than the amount due
would be no satisfaction or discharge, even if the lesser sum
were paid; and the damages upon such a covenant would be
merely nominal: Ohitty on O'on., 277; 1'7 Johns. R., 169; 5
East, 252,- 4 B. (E 0., 513,- 1 Ib., 426.
3. Thomas Emerson makes no complaint as to the assign
ment or the present disposition of the bonds, etc. It is not
competent for his assignee to do so of his own motion; on the
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contrary, there appears an after consent on the part of Emer
son.
1! Romeyn, contra.
THE CHANGELLORZ
The facts presented in this case are sufiicient to retain the
injunction, and entitle the complainants to an answer.
[*239] *After Campbell and Rufus Emerson had obtained
an assignment and the possession of the property of
Thomas Emerson, by assuming to act as the authorized agents
and attorneys of the Bank of Windsor, the bank refused to
perform the conditions on which the assignment was made,
and denied the authority of Campbell and Emerson to act as
the agents of the bank in the premises, and the bank, and
Campbell and Emerson, who assumed to act as the agents of
the bank, now refuse to return the property, and are proceed
ing to collect the demands, and use the property assigned by
Thomas Emerson.
It also appears that subsequent to the disavowal of the
authority of Campbell and Emerson by the bank to act as its
agents in the premises, and denial of their authority to make
the compromise, Thomas Emerson has assigned the property
and demands to the complainants, who claim to be the legal
and bona fide owners of the same.
The facts presented by the bill are suflicient to authorize the
retaining of the injunction, and the motion to dissolve must be
denied.
Motion denied.
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Clark 8: Tillinghast v. The Saginaw City Bank and Norman
Little.
Plea and answer. A defendant may plead to one part of the bill, and answer to
another part; but these defenses must clearly refer to separate and distinct
parts of the bill.
When the answer and plea are to the same parts of the bill, the answer overrulel
the plea.
The bill in this case is filed for the collection of certain bills
and drafts of the Saginaw City Bank, for a discovery, and the
removal of Norman Little, the receiver heretofore appointed,
and prays for the appointmentment of a new receiver, etc.
The defendants plead to all the discovery prayed in the bill,
and to all the relief prayed, except as to the dividend to be
received from the receiver, and answer to nearly all the matters
charged in the bill.
The case was set down for argument on the plea, under the
provision of rule 32.
E 0. Seaman, for complainants:
The answer overrules the plea: Mil. Pl., 319, 820; Story/’s
Eq. PL, 505, 506.
S. G. Watson, for defendants.
Tun C1-mnonnnon :
The defendants may plead to one part of the bill, and answer
to another part; but these defenses must clearly refer to separ
ate and distinct parts of the bill. If the defendants have
answered to any part of the bill to which they have pleaded,
the answer overrules the plea: lllit. PL, 819, 820.
The plea in this case extends to all the discovery, and nearly
all the relief prayed. In fact, the plea and answer appear to
apply to the same parts of, and each to nearly the whole bill;
the answer consequently overrules the plea.
Plea overruled.
¢
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Thomas B. W. Stockton and others v. Gardner D. Williams
and others.
Setting aside default. A regular order to take the bill as confessed will not be set
aside upon a simple amdavit of merits, although an excuse is given for the
default.
In such case, the defendant must either produce the sworn answer which he pro
posesto put in, or must in his petition or aflldavit state the nature of his defense,
and his belief in the truth of the matters constituting such defense.
The bill in this case was taken, pro confesso, against all the
defendants; defendant Williams moves to set aside the order,
pro confesso, and for leave to answer, which motion is founded
on the afiidavits of defendant Williams and his solicitors.
Williams, in his aflidavit, states that he has fully and fairly
stated his defense to his solicitors, and is advised by his said
solicitors, and verily believes, that he has a good and substan
tial defense on the merits, to the complainants’ bill of com
plaint, and that great injustice would be done if he should be
precluded from putting in an answer, and thereby having an
opportunity of contesting the validity of the claim set up by
the complainants; that the property in controversy is of great
value, etc.
Hunt and Watson, the solicitors for Williams, in their aflida
vits, excuse the default, on the ground of a misapprehension of
the practice, etc., and also state their belief that the defendant,
Williams, has a defense on the merits, etc.
Hunt and Watson, in support of the motion.
Iihaser and Romegn, opposed the motion:
Before the court will open an order to take the bill, pro con
fesso, it will require that the answer proposed to be filed be
exhibited: 1 Hofii Uh. Pr., 553,- Herne v. Ogilvie, 11 Ves., 77.
The court will also require to be satisfied, both that the
answer is material, and apparently full: Hofi‘. Ch. Pr., 553.
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The defendant should have stated the nature of his defense
before making this motion: Lansing v. McPherson, 3 Johns.
Ch., 424; Hunt c. Wallis, 6 Paige, 372.
[*242] *Tn1n Onsrrcnnnoaz
A regular order to take the bill as confessed will not
be set aside upon a simple affidavit of merits, although an ex
cuse is given for the default. In such cases, the defendant
must either produce the sworn answer which he proposes to
put in, so that the court may see that he has merits, or must,
in his petition or aifidavit, state the nature of his defense, and
his belief in the truth of the matters constituting such defense,
so far at least as to enable the court to see that injustice will
probably be done if the order to take the bill as confessed is
permitted to stand: Hunt '0. Wallis, 6 Paige, 371; Lansing '0.
McPherson, 3 Johns. Ch., 424.
The defendant may have twenty days to exhibit his answer,
under the circumstances of this case.
The answer having been exhibited within the twenty days,
the chancellor opened the default, and permitted the same to
be filed on payment of costs.
I17
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Clinton E. Atwater and others v. James K. Kinman and
others.
Oath to bill. Where no preliminary order is required it is not necessary that bills
should be sworn to, although the answer under oath is not waived.
Irregular foreclosure, waiver of. Where, in a foreclosure of a mortgage, by adver
tisement under the statuw, a mistake occurs, which renders the proceedings
irregular and voldable, the mortgagee has a right to waive those proceedings,
and commence dc nooo, either by advertisement under the statute, or by avail
ing himself of the right he had in the first instance to seek his remedy in this
court.
This was a bill to foreclose a mortgage given by Carl Brock
housen and wife to Clinton E. Atwater and Henry A. Delavan,
the complainants, to secure the payment of four hundred dollars.
The bill is in the usual form for a foreclosure, and does not
waive the necessity of the defendants answering on oath. It
further states that, from the examination of the records, it
appears that James K. Kinman had purchased the said mort
gaged premises for the sum of twelve hundred dollars, and re
ceived a deed for the same, about March 28, 1839, which deed
was on record.
The bill further states that complainants had foreclosed their
mortgage by advertisement under the statute, and that the
mortgaged premises were sold under such advertisement, April
9, 1839, at the court house in the county of Hillsdale, where the
mortgaged premises were situated, by the sheriff of said county,
and bid in by Salem T. King, agent and attorney for complain
ants, for the sum of four hundred and forty-seven dollars and
sixty-three cents; that the usual certificate, afiidavits of publi
cation, etc., were duly recorded.
That complainants had subsequently ascertained that
[*244] the *sale was irregular, inasmuch as both lots were
sold together, instead of being sold separately, pursu
ant to the provisions of the statute.
The bill further states that Kinman had declared the sale to
21s
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be irregular, and that complainants would be compelled to fore
close again, and that he had given complainants to understand
that he should disregard the sale entirely, and that complain
ants are apprehensive that if the sale should be considered void
able only, and liable to be made good by the acquiescence of
the parties, yet, that the defendants would refuse to redeem the
said premises, and that they would contest any proceedings at
law to obtain possession of said premises.
'
The defendants demur.
Lee and Pratt, in support of the demurrer:
1. Complainants’ bill is not sworn to by complainants, their
agent, attorney, or solicitor, nor the answer of the defendants
on oath waived; the demurrer, therefore, is Well taken: Lans
ing '0. Pine, 4 Paige, 639.
2. If the bill filed was verified by the oath of complainants
or any other person, the defendants were not bound to look
beyond the copy of the bill served on their solicitor : Lansing
'0. Pine, 4 Paige, 639.
3. In the first place, the complainants had their election to
foreclose their mortgage at law or in equity, and, having made
their election and foreclosed at law, sold and bid in the pre
mises, they cannot now foreclose again in this court.
4. The complainants have not made such a case, upon the
face of their bill, as entitles them to any relief in this court.
The complainants do not ask to have the foreclosure at law set
aside at their own expense; nor does it appear that the com
plainants have ever asked the defendants to waive, or in any
way release, any error in the proceedings at law. Nor does it
appear but that the defendants would have been will
ing, at *any time, to have released any error if desired [*245]
or requested. Nor does it appear but that the defend
ants intended, in good faith, to pay up the mortgage and
redeem the premises before the time for the redemption expires.
5. If there was an error in the proceedings to foreclose at law
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it does not render the foreclosure void; at most the proceedings
are only voidable; and, therefore, until the defendants take some
steps to avoid the validity of the foreclosure and sale, the com
plainants cannot, in equity, ask permission of this court to avoid
their own proceedings. A foreclosure at law is in the nature
of a judicial proceeding.
A bonafiole purchaser under a judicial or other sale at law is
always protected where there is jurisdiction. And this ques
tion is fully settled in the case of the American Insurance C0.
'0. Fisk, 1 Paige, 90; and in which case the bill was dismissed
by the chancellor on that ground.
George Oi Gibbs, for complainants.
Tun: OHANCELLOR! "
Where no preliminary order is required it is not necessary
that the bill should be sworn to, although the answer under
oath is not waived. This is not required by the English prac
tice, or by the rules of this court, as they now stand.
As to the other point raised by the demurrer, it is alleged
that in the proceedings to foreclose under the statutes by adver
tisement, a mistake occurred which renders the proceedings
irregular and voidable.
It would certainly be in the power of the mortgagee to waive
those proceedings and commence de novo under the statute.
And this being undoubtedly competent, I can see no reason
why he may not avail himself of the right he had in the first
instance, and seek his remedy in this court. If he seeks his
remedy here he, of course, waives the proceeding under the
statute, and all claim for costs under that proceeding.
I can see no reason for the argument that, by first
[*246] proceeding *under the statute, which proceeding, by
mistake or accident, is inoperative or void, the party
has made his election and cannot have relief here.
The demurrer must be overruled with costs.
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Charles Thayer and others v. Marcus Lane, administrator,
etc., and others.
Equity jurisdiction : Partition. Equity has jurisdiction to make partition between
joint owners of lands, notwithstanding a remedy at law is given by statute.
Demurre-r, when too broad. Where a demurrer is to the whole discovery and relief
prayed by the bill, if the complainant is entitled to any part of the relief, the
demurrer must be overruled. (a)
Injunction to stay probate sale : Disputed rights. Where an administrator under a
» license from a judge of probate was proceeding to sell the interest of the intes
tate insixteen village lots, which interest was stated to be one undivided half,
upon a bill filed by the other parties interested, stating that the intestate owned
only an undivided interest of one-third, an injunction was granted to restrain
the sale, and the chancellor refused to dissolve the injunction until the interest
of the intestate Wu ascertained and settled.
The bill in this case was filed for a partition, and states that
Samuel Wheeler and Richard H. Root (both deceased), of the
state of Ohio, were, in their lifetime, seized in fee, as tenants
in common, of certain village lots in the village of Ann Arbor,
in the state of Michigan; that said Wheeler died intestate,
leaving five children, his heirs at law. That Root was seized
of two equal undivided third parts of said village lots, and
Wheeler was seized of the other equal undivided third part
thereof. That Charles Wheeler, brother to Samuel Wheeler,
was appointed administrator upon the estate of Samuel Wheeler,
in the state of Ohio, and was also appointed guardian for
Amanda Wheeler, one of the heirs.
That about June 18, 1834, William Munroe, of the state of
Ohio, was treating with Root for the purchase of his interest
in the lots; that it was finally agreed between Root, Munroe
and Wheeler, administrator, that he, Wheeler, should have his
first choice of four of the lots for and in behalf of the heirs of
S. Wheeler, and that Root should take the remaining twelve
for his portion, and that C. Wheeler and Munroe should pro~
(a) See Clark v. Davis, ante, 227; Williams 1:.Hubbard, Wal. Ch., 28; Edwards v.
Hulbert, Wal. Ch., 54; Burpee v. Smith. Wal. 011..327: Manning 1:.Drake, 1Mich., 84;
Hawkins v. Clermont, 15Mich., 511.
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ceed from Madison, in the state of Ohio (where this arrange
ment was made), to Ann Arbor, in the state of Michigan, and
make partition according to said understanding and
[*248] agreement. *That it was the express agreement that
the four lots to be first selected were equal to one
third part of the sixteen lots in value. That Root and wife
conveyed to Munroe by deed, twelve equal undivided sixteenth
parts of said lands, to be held in common with the heirs of S.
Wheeler. That soon afterwards, Wheeler, administrator and
Munroe proceeded to Ann Arbor and made partition, and
Wheeler, the administrator, chose and selected lots numbers 15
and 16 in block number 2, north of Huron street, range 6, and
lots numbers 4 and 5 in block 3, north of Huron street, range
3, as the four lots to be by him selected for the heirs, and that
Munroe accepted and received the other twelve lots as his por
tion, and assented to such partition and division.
That September 10, 1834, Munroe deeded to complainant
Charles Thayer the said twelve lots; that the deeds from Root
and wife to Munroe and from Munroe to complainants were
duly recorded, etc.; that the deed from Munroe to complainant
Thayer was intended to convey to complainant Thayer the
entire interest Munroe had in said 16 lots. That complainant
Thayer took immediate possession of the lots, and continued
in possession; that in the month of December, 1834, Thayer
conveyed lots numbers 6, 7 and 8, in block 3, to complainant,
George Klinedob; lots 5 and 6 in block 2 to William J. Brown;
lot number 4 to Caroline Brown; the deeds of which said sev
eral lots were duly recorded, etc. That lots numbers 4 and 5
had since, by several intermediate conveyances, been conveyed
to complainant George Ward; that lot number 6 has been con
veyed to complainant William F. Leaman, by deed bearing
date December 6, 1836, recorded April 8, 1837; that com
plainant Thayer conveyed lots 7 and 10 in block 3 to A. Burr
Harrington, and he conveyed the same to Samuel Hamlet, who
then owned and occupied the same; that the purchasers of said
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lots respectively had taken possession of the same and made
valuable improvements in good faith, and with the full belief
that the purchasers thereof respectively had good and perfect
titles to the same. The bill states that partition may be made
of the said sixteen lots so as to save to complainants
their respective *improvements, and still do justice to [*249]
all persons interested in said premises. The bill fur- .
ther states that Marcus Lane has been appointed administrator
of said Samuel Wheeler, deceased, by the judge of probate of
the county of Washtenaw, state of Michigan, and that he has
published notice that he would expose for sale at public ven
due, at the court house, in the village of Ann Arbor, on the
third day of August instant, the equal undivided half of all of
said lots, by virtue of- a power and license granted by the judge
of probate of the county of Washtenaw, aforesaid, authorizing
the sale of the real estate belonging to the estate of the said
Samuel Wheeler, deceased. And the bill prayed an injunction
to restrain the sale, which was granted.
Defendant Lane, the administrator, demurred to so much of
the bill as prays for relief and discovery, and as relates to the
agreement in the bill mentioned between Charles Wheeler and
William Munroe for a division and partition of the premises,
and assigns for causes of demurrer, that the complainants have
a full and complete remedy at law if they are entitled to any
relief.
Defendant Lane also answers and admits that Samuel Wheeler
and Richard H. Root were seized of the premises in question
as tenants in common, in equal proportion; as to the statement
in the bill, that Wheeler owned one-third and Root two-thirds
undivided, he knows not and cannot answer as to his belief or
otherwise. Admits the death of Samuel Wheeler, leaving cer
tain persons his heirs at law whose names he states are unknown
to him; admits that the complainants and the defendant Howlet
have acquired a title to an undivided interest in the premises,
but how or by what means, or what title or interest they have
an
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acquired, he knows not, and cannot answer as to his belief or
otherwise; that he has been informed and believes that Ward,
Klinedob and Leaman, complainants, have made valuable
improvements on some parts of the premises, but upon which
part he does not know, and cannot answer.
Admits his appointment as administrator, and sets forth all
the proceedings under that appointment, and states that he has
no estate or interest in the premises except as administrator; ad
mits that he gave notice of his intention to sell the equal
[*250] undivided *half part of the premises under an order
from the judge of probate for the payment of the debts
due from the estate of Samuel Wheeler, which estate is reported
insolvent, and states that he_intends to sell as soon as the in
junction is dissolved; states that he has paid all taxes which he
could find returned to the register’s oflice against the premises,
without regard to the interests of the complainants or any
other person.
The cause was heard upon the demurrer and a motion to dis
solve the injunction.
Marcus Lane, in support of the demurrer and motion to dis
solve the injunction:
1st. It does not appear that Charles Wheeler was appointed
administrator by any court or authority having power to
appoint.
2d. It does not appear that said Charles, if appointed by
authority, accepted of the appointment, and entered upon the
duties of his oflice.
3d. It does not appear that said Charles, if appointed and
qualified according to the laws of Ohio, had any power or
authority to lease, sell, divide or control the real estate of his
intestate.
4th. It does not appear that said Charles Wheeler was ever
qualified or authorized to administer upon the estate of said
intestate within the state of Michigan.
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5th. That an administrator, appointed according to the laws
of another state, has no power, or authority, or control over
the estate of an intestate within this state, unless specially
authorized by a court of competent jurisdiction in this state: 3
Mass. Rep., 514,- 11 172., 318; 10 TV/teaton, 192; 1 Uranch, 259.
6th. That an administrator, appointed according to the laws
of this state, has no power or authority to divide, sell or other
wise dispose of the lands of his intestate, except for the pur
pose of paying the debts of his intestate: .4Mass. Rep., 358;
1 1b., 45, 46; 2 1b., 478.
7th. It does not appear that the partition was
reduced to *writing, or that it was made by said [*251]
Charles in his capacity of administrator.
8th. That complainants have a full and ample remedy at law.
Miles and Wilson, contra .'
1st. As to the demurrer.
A court of chancery has concurrent jurisdiction with a court
of law, to compel partition between tenants in common: 1
Jlfaalal. Ch., 2.44; Coleman '0. Hutchenson, 3 Bibb, 209.
The title here is not disputed; the only question is as to the
extent of the interest of the respective parties. The complain
ants’ right to one equal undivided half part of the premises is
admitted by the answer.
The answer does not disprove the facts stated in the bill.
The defendant, Lane, has omitted to answer the statements
in the bill:
1st. That Charles Wheeler was appointed administrator in
Ohio, and also guardian to one of the minor heirs.
2d. That Charles Wheeler agreed with R. H. Root, the
other tenant in common, to make partition of the sixteen lots;
the demurrer only admits the agreement between Charles
Wheeler and Munroe.
8d. That Charles Wheeler and Munroe made partition; that
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Munroe immediately gave a deed of the twelve lots which fell
to his share, to Thayer, the complainant, who took possession.
The defendant admits that complainants and Howlet, one of
the defendants, have acquired a title to an undivided interest
in the premises; that Ward, Klinedob and Leaman have made
improvements, but leaves unanswered the fact that defendant
Howlet has made improvements on his lot.
The fact that the four lots remaining unsold by
[*252] Thayer are *of equal value with any of the eight sold
by him, setting aside improvements, is unanswered.
The material fact, that Root was seized of two third parts
and Samuel Wheeler of one third part of the premises, is left
unanswered; the defendant, Lane, does not even state that he
believes it untrue. See Apthorpe v. Comstock, Hopk. Ch., 148.
The defendant insists that the complainants can only claim
under the legal title, and that they must go to the law courts
and have partition under that title. See Madd. Ch., 3d Amer.
ad., 24.4; Come v. Smith, 4 Johns. Ch., 271.
But here has been a partition by parol, and a long continued
possession under it. The defendant has not answered this part
of the bill; he does not deny Thayer’s possession, and those
holding under him; and to the charge that he, as administra
tor, has taken possession of the four lots selected by Charles
Wheeler, and has paid the taxes thereon, he answers evasively
as to the payment of taxes, and as to taking possession there is
no answer. See Jackson v. Brown, 3 Johns., 459, as to parti
tion by parol.
But was Charles Wheeler, as administrator and guardian,
authorized to act in making partition ‘P The validity of his acts
is not questioned by the answer; that he did act in making the
partition is admitted by the demurrer; and that the defendant,
Lane, has acquiesced in this division, and ratified the partition,
appears from the fact, not denied by the answer, that he took
possession of the four lots selected by Charles Wheeler for the
heirs. See Jackson v. Richtmyer, 13 Johns., 367.
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But further, as to the improvements. Partition may be
made, reserving to the complainants their improvements, with
out prejudice to the other persons concerned; this is not denied.
On a partition every part of the estate need not be divided: 1
Madd. Ch., 246.
Tun Cnmcnnnoaz
That courts of equity have jurisdiction in cases for partition,
where the facts are like those here presented, is well settled.
The demurrer here being to the whole discovery and relief,
cannot be sustained; the demurrer must, therefore, be over
ruled.
*As to the injunction, I have had some doubt [*253]
whether the defendant, Lane, should not be permitted
to sell whatever interest the estate may have in the premises;
but as the amount of the interest of the several parties is dis
puted, it being alleged in the bill that the heirs of Wheeler are
in fact entitled to but one-third of the premises, and the defen
dant, Lane, proposing to sell one-half, a sale would further
embarrass the title, and I think the injunction should be re
tained until those rights are ascertained and settled.
Demurrer overruled and injunction retained.
an
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Subpoena, service 0)‘. The service of a subpoena upon a defendant out of the It-ale ll
irregular.
This was a motion to set aside the default entered in this case,
and the service of the subpcena, on the ground that the subptena
was served out of the state. It appeared that the subpoana was
served on the defendants in the state of Vermont. '
D. Goodwin, in support of the motion:
The service of the subptnna was irregular and void; the ser
vice and all subsequent proceedings must, therefore, be set aside:
R. S., $66‘, 867, 871,- Dunn v. Dunn, 4 Paige R., 425.
I! Romeyn opposed the motion, and cited 1 Hofil Pr., 110
to 112, n.
Tm: Onsncnnronz
This motion must be granted on the authority of the case of
Dunn v. Dunn, 4 Paige, 425. The case is fully considered, and
Chancellor Walworth, after a full examination of all the
authorities upon the subject, comes to the conclusion that the
service of a subpmna out of the state is irregular.
Motion granted.
22s
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Ezhalits at the hearing. Where the assignee of a mortgage files a bill to foreclose,
setting forth the mortgage and assignment, he may, upon the notice required
by the 62d rule to the opposite party, have an order to prove the assignment as
an exhibit at the hearing under the provisions of rule 56.
This was a bill of foreclosure filed by the assignee of the
mortgage. ,
The mortgage and assignment to the complainant were set
forth in the bill.
Complainant gave four days’ notice, under the provisions of
rule 62, of a motion for an order to prove the assignment of the
mortgage as an exhibit at the hearing under the provisions of
rule 56.
E C. Seaman, for complainant.
W. Hale, for defendant.
The court granted the order. (a)
(a) Rule 56was as follows:
“ Documentary evidence, which is neither made an exhibit before the commis
sioner, or set out, or distinctly referred to the pleadings, shall not be read on the
hearing, unless notice of the intention to use it at the hearing is given to the adverse
party, at least ten days before the expiration of the time allowed to produce proofs,
and no deed or other writing shall be proved at the hearing, except on an order pre
viously obtained, after due notice to the adverse party."
See Bachelor v. Nelson, Wal. Ch., 449,for a decision under this rule.
229
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Higgins and others v. Carpenter and another.
Waiver of default. A defendant who had defaulted the complainant for failure to
serve a copy ot the bill, afterwards filed his answer and moved to dissolve an
injunction: Held, a waiver of the default. (a)
Motion for decree. Applications for final decree must be made at a general term,
even though they be based on a default.
This was an application at a special term, for confirmation of
a decree to dismiss the bill.
.H. N. Walker, for defendants, at a special term, on aflidavit
of the entry of an order for service of copy of the bill in 15
days, as required by rule 20 of this court, and of the due ser
vice of notice of the order, and also stating that no copy of the
bill as required by the rule had been served, and that defend
ants have entered a decree in vacation with the register of the
court, dismissing the bill with costs, now moved for the confir
mation of the decree dismissing the bill.
.B. R Cooper, for complainants, produced an afiidavit, from
which it appeared that the defendants, after the entry of the
decree dismissing the bill, had moved the court for a dissolu
tion of the injunction on the bill and answer served upon him
since the entry of the decree dismissing the bill. .
He insisted that by the practice of this court, under rule 17, a
defendant may answer either with or without the service of a
copy of the bill. If he chooses to save the expense of a copy of
the bill, by resorting to the pleadings on file in the register’s
oflice, he can do so. If he claims a copy of the bill, he may
compel the service of a copy by virtue of rule 20. That rule is
one for the defendant's accommodation in answering; and if
subsequently to the entry of an order for service of a copy, he
(o) Bee Brooks v. Mead, Wnl. 011.,880.
280
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accepts a service for any purpose, the object of the rule is
answered, and the order is waived.
*If the order requiring service of a copy of the bill [*257]
were not so waived, the motion to dissolve the injunc
tion on the bill and answer served after the decree to dismiss
was a waiver of that decree, in accordance with the rule which
waives an irregularity, by taking proceedings in the cause sub
sequently to it
,
without taking advantage of this irregularity:
4 Paige, 288, 439,- 2 Johns. Ch., 242; 5 Ib., 191.
Tun: CHANCELLOR2
The defendants having subsequent to the default filed their
answer, and based thereon a motion to dissolve the injunction,
have waived the right to dismiss for want of service of a copy
of the bill.
Further: This being an application for a final decree in the
cause, should be made at a general term: Rose 0. Woodru_fl‘;
4 Johns. Ch., 547.
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Injunction dissolved on default. Where the complainant had due notice of a motion
to dissolve an injunction, and he neglected to appear and oppose the motion, the
defendant was permitted to take his order dissolving the injunction with costs.
Motion to dissolve an injunction:
B. E Cooper, for defendant, moved, in tendering admission
of due service of a notice of the motion, that the injunction
issued in this cause be dissolved for want of equity in the bill.
No counsel for the complainant appearing to oppose, Cooper
contended that the practice in such cases was, or should be, that
the motion be granted with costs, without the papers being read
or any further account given to the court than simply to state
the application to be made, and show by admission or aflidavit
that notice had been brought home to the opposite party: 1
Smit/1.’8 Pr.,66,- Rule 62, 69; 2 Gaines’ R., 879, 380; 8 Gaines’
.R., 8%," 1 Hofii Pr-., 551 ,' 1 Dunlap’s .Pr., 827, 850-352.
H JV. Walker, as amicus curiae, suggested that the former
practice of the court had been to look into the papers as if they
had been submitted on argument.
Tan Cnsncnnnonz
Where a party, after service of notice of motion, neglects to
appear and oppose, the court say, by not appearing he consents
to the application: Ekhart '0. Dearman, 2 Caines, 379. Such,
also, appears to be the practice in England.
The defendant may take the order that the injunction be dis
solved with costs, stating in the order, however, that no one
appeared on the motion to oppose.
W .
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Hannah Walton and others v. Joseph W. Torrey and others.
Restraint upon alienation. The provision in a. will that the estate shall remain
undivided until the youngest of the devisees becomes of the age of twenty-one
years, is not such a limitation as will inhibit any one of the devisees from con
veying his interest in the premises. ~
Provisions in restraint of alienation are not to be favored. (a)
Probate sale: Judge interested. Where a sale of real estate was ordered by a
judge of probate, and it appeared that he himself became interested in the pur
chase, the sale was set aside, and a re-sale ordered to be made under the direc
tion of the court. (b)
The bill of complaint was filed in September, A. D. 1836,
and states that in May, A. D. 1825, one Jesse Hicks, of Wayne
county, Michigan, was seized and possessed of a certain farm
on the River Rouge, in said county, called the Hicks farm; and
that said Jesse duly made and published his last will, dated May
7, 1825. The provisions of the will are set forth as follows:
1st. My will is, that all my just debts and funeral expenses
be paid out of my personal property.
2d. That as regards my real estate, my will is
,
that it remain
undivided in the use, occupation and possession of all my chil
dren now living, until the youngest attains the age of 21 years,
and that until that time, the rents and profits be equally applied
in and towards their support and education; that when and so
soon as the youngest child shall have attained the age of 21
years, my will is that an estimation of all the value of my
real estate be made by Orville Cook, of Detroit, and Henry I.
Hunt, of the same place, or if they should not be living at that
time, then by such persons as they may have nominated, and
after such estimation and valuation, that the said real estate be
divided equally, and share and share alike among my children
now alive, or the survivors of them, and the heirs of any who
may die previous to such division.
(a) See St. Amour v. Ricard, 2 Mich., 294.
(b) See Beaubien v. Poupard, ante, 206,and cases referred to in the note.~283
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3d. Such part of my stock and personal property as may
remain after payment of my debts, I will to be distributed,
one-third to my Wife, and the remainder to remain for the use
of the farm.
[*260] *4th. My will is
,
notwithstanding, that my wife be
entitled to the use of the homestead during her life,
and also the profits of one-third part of the farm on which I live.
5th. I hereby revoke and annul all former wills, testaments,
codicils or parts of the same heretofore made and executed.
In witness whereof, etc.
The bill further states, that in May, 1825, said Jesse died,
leaving the complainants, Hannah Walton, now Hannah Hicks,
his Widow, and Jesse A., Betsy, Hannah, Adaline and Theodore
E. Hicks; also Caroline Hicks (since deceased, without issue)
and Andrew Hicks (supposed deceased), his children surviving
him; that the farm has not been sold to pay said Jesse’s debts;
that said widow and children, except Andrew and Caroline, are
sole surviving devisees of said Jesse’s will; that said Theodore is
youngest, and will be 21 years old in the year 1841; that Lar
ned and Torrey were, in 1829, and previously, lawyers practic
ing in Detroit; that after said Jesse died, his said Wife and
children believing said L. and T. had been the counsel of said
Jesse, applied to them for advice as to the rights and duties of
said widow and children under said will; that said L. and T.,
by a show of kindness and regard, gained the entire confidence
of the said widow and children in their legal ability and integ
rity, and became their counsel, and had their papers relating to
said will, and knew all the rights and duties of said widow and
children under said will, and knew that said Theodore would
not be of age till A. D. 1841; that L. and T. in 1829 told said
widow and children that they might sell or encumber said
Hicks’ farm, notwithstanding said will, which they said was
invalid, and that said children were heirs at law, and that said
wife and children, up to the year 1832-3, when Torrey left the
country, believed the above statements of said L. and T.; and
254
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that said L. and T. induced said widow to convey her interest
in said farm, by telling her that such conveyance would not
expose her to be turned oflf said farm, and that she and her chil
dren should have possession thereof; and that said widow made
such conveyance, being ignorant of the eifect thereof, March
10, 1832. That at the same time said Jesse A.
*Hicks conveyed to said L. and T. his interest in said [*261]
farm as heir at law oflsaid Jesse, stating he would not
thereby lose possession thereof till 1841; and that April 6,
1832, by similar statements, L. and T. procured a deed from
complainants Blanchard and wife, while the Wife was a minor,
of one-sixth part of said farm; and that said L. and T. by the
aforesaid representations induced Downer and wife (a minor)
to convey one-seventh of said farm to one Frazer, and then
seized the first opportunity to get a deed from Frazer to them
selves.
The bill further states, that in 1832, said Torrey, as judge of
probate of Wayne county, appointed one Johnson guardian of
said Theodore and Adaline, and soon after gave him license, on
application, to sell the interests of said Theodore and Adaline
in said farm; that said Johnson then sold and conveyed the
same to one Sawyer, and said Sawyer to said Larned and Tor
rey; that said sale was unnecessary, and without consideration
either from Sawyer or Larned and Torrey; that Larned and
Torrey procured the appointment of said Johnson, and his deed
to said Sawyer, solely to get title to the interests of said
minors. The bill adds that Larned died in 1834, and that his
heirs since pretend that said Larned and Torrey leased said
farm to one Isaiah Walton, who had married said widow, and
that she held said farm under him; and charges that if so, said
lease was without the consent of any of the complainants, and
in order to undermine them; and that said widow never pre
tended to hold under said Isaiah, but only under said will; that
said Torrey and heirs of said Larned have turned said com
plainants oif from the farm, and that they have been thereto
ass
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restored; that they have since commenced and discontinued
two suits, and afterwards commenced a third suit to recover
possession of said farm.
The bill prays for a re-conveyance from Larned’s heirs and
Torrey of their interest in said farm, and that the deeds to
Larned and Torrey and Sawyer be canceled, and for an injunc
tion to stay defendants from proceeding under the forcible
entry and detainer act, and from selling or effecting possession.
The defendant Torrey puts in his answer, which is
[*262] substantially *the same with the answer of Sawyer
and that of the infants; which last defendants set forth
some facts in addition to those stated in the answers of Torrey
and Sawyer.
All said answers admit the seizing of Hicks in said farm, and
that he died and left such will and such children as is stated in
the bill, but express ignorance as to date; submit whether said
Jesse’s children were not seized in fee of said land, as heirs at
law, and were competent to convey it; and whether the estates
of said infant complainants were not subject to alienation, like
those of all infants, by order of probate court; admit partner
ship of Larned and Torrey, from October, 1825 to 1833, but
say they had nothing to do with the estate of said Jesse, and
never made any representations to complainants, as alleged in
the bill; that the said Jesse A. Hicks first offered his and his
brother Andrew’s share in said farm to Larned and Torrey for
$200, to pay for defense of said Andrew against an indictment;
that afterwards said Jesse A. and his mother urged Larned and
Torrey to buy her share, and agreed to give immediate posses
sion, or to rent the farm at $50 per year, and that they after
wards bought the shares of Blanchard and Downer. All these
purchases they made reluctantly and at the urgent solicitation
of Jesse A. and his mother, and paid $100 per share; defendants
deny that they told complainants their selling would not make
them liable to be turned oif of said farm or lose possession till
the youngest was of age; defendants admit plaintiffs’ statements
_T_—~
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as to the sale of the infants’ shares, by order of Torrey, as judge
of probate, but deny all fraud or irregularity or illegality in
the same, and say full consideration was paid for the same, and
deny any connection of Larned and Torrey with the proceed
ings relating to said sale, and deny all fraud and all intent to
commit fraud on the part of Sawyer in the sale, and deny all
fraud generally, and all intent to oppress or harrass said plain
tiffs in proceedings to obtain possession of said farm in 1836.
H. Tl Backus, for complainants.
Jl III. Howard, for defendants.
‘Tun OHANCELLOB2 [*263]
Whether the children of Jesse Hicks, deceased, the com
plainants in this case, take as heirs or devisees, they take
an estate in presenti, and whatever interest they have it isAcom
petent for them to convey. The provision in the will, that it
should remain undivided, is not such a limitation as would
inhibit anyone from conveying whatever interest he possessed.
Provisions in restraint of alienation are not to be favored.
Whether any purchaser could enforce a partition before the
youngest child became of age, so long as either of the heirs or
devisees retained his interest, is a question that does not arise
in this case. The interests being then alienable, it was within
the jurisdiction of the judge of probate to decree a sale of the
right, title and interest of the two minors, Adaline and Theo
dore E. Hicks, upon a case being made upon the happening of
which the statute authorized the sale of the lands of minors for
their support and maintenance.
The proceedings appear to have been regular.
The decree of the judge of probate stands of force, and not
appealed from.
It is too late, therefore, to interfere with the decree. ,As to
the sale and purchase in fact, by Larned and Torrey, Torrey
having been the judge of probate who granted the order, I
231
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have had some doubt. But the case of Devaux v. Fanning, 2
Johns. Ch., 268, goes the full length of declaring such a sale
void.
It is placed upon the ground of disability to purchase, aris
ing from the oflice which the purchaser held. And the case
quoted by Chancellor Kent on that occasion extends the disa
bility to guardians, judicial oflicers, and all other persons who
in any respect, as agents, had a concern in the disposition and
sale of the property of others, whether the sale was public or
private, judicial or otherwise.
l
What is the case here? The defendant Torrey, acting as
judge of probate, having previously acquired certain portions
of this property, makes the order for the sale of the shares of
these minor heirs. He becomes a joint purchaser through Saw
yer.
If there is any wisdom or justice in the rule, it seems
[*264] to me *that this presents a very proper case for its
application. Without attributing any intention to
commit a fraud, and there is nothing from which to infer it in
this case, it seems that there can be no ofiice or trust which
would present stronger temptations for abuse than that of the
one occupied by Torrey, if the real estates of minors could be
directed to be sold and purchased by the same individual. As
to this portion of the case, then, I am disposed to follow the
course pursued in the case of Devaux v. Fanning. As to the
claim of Mrs. Blanchard and Mrs. Downer, the daughters of
the deceased, they are alleged to have been minors at the time
of the execuion of the deed. As the result in this respect must
depend upon the establishment of the fact of minority, an issue
piust be directed to try that fact. The shares of the two minor
children, Adaline and Theodore E. Hicks, must be put up for
sale under the direction of the master, at the same price at
which they were sold to Larncd and Torrey, as a minimum; if
no more is offered, the former sale to stand confirmed; if more
is ofiered, the master to proceed to sell the same, and upon
ass
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being paid the consideration, to execute a deed thereof to the
purchaser, and to bring the money arising from such sale into
court to abide the further order of the court in the premises.
As to the sales made by the other complainants, there is no
ground for the interference of this court in the premises.
The injunction heretofore granted in this cause to be dissolved.
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Graham and another v. Elmore and another.
Solic1Ttar,'signature by one who is not. Where a solicitor has appeared in a cause,
and a demurrer is filed, signed by solicitors who have not appeared, the demur
rer may be treated as without signature and as a nullity.
But where the demurrer in such case was treated as a nullity by the complainants,
and a default was entered for want of an answer, and it appeared that the signa
ture of the wrong solicitors was put to the demurrer by mistake, and that injus
tice would be done if the defendant should not be permitted to answer, the
default was set aside on terms.
Decree: Cause cannot be severed. Where there are joint defendants the complain
ant cannot, upon a pro confeeso obtained against one, before the cause is at issue
or in readiness for hearing against the other, enter a final decree and issue exe
cution thereon against the party against whom the bill has been taken as con
fessed, and leave the cause to proceed against the other defendant.
Aflnal decree, or an interlocutory decree, which, in a great measure, decides the
merits of the cause, cannot be pronounced until all the parties to the bill, and
all the parties in interest, are before the court.
This court will not adjudge upon a part of the case; it will not make a final decree
until the case is properly presented in such form as will enable the court to make
a final disposition of the case, and do justice to all the parties.
Where a cause is in readiness for hearing against one defendant, and there is another
defendant as to whom the cause is not in readiness, the defendant who has
appeared and answered cannot notice the cause for hearing, but must move to
dismiss the bill for want of prosecution if the complainant fails to expedite it.
Solicitor; motion by one who is not. It is no objection to an order that it purports
to be made on the application of one who is not the solicitor in the cause. It is
not necessary that an order should show on whose mot-ion it is made.
Setting aside default. A decree by default may be set aside, on motion, without
petition, where the facts upon which the motion is based appear by the record.
The bill in this case charged that the defendant, William H.
Elmore, had obtained goods of the complainants, who are mer
chants in New York, to the amount of about $600, on the credit
of one Frederick W. H. Elmore, by representing to the com
plainants that he was the agent of F. W. H. Elmore, to pur
chase goods for him on credit; that this representation as to the
agency was entirely false, and that William H. Elmore pur
chased these goods on this fraudulent representation for his own
benefit, and that he executed to the complainants two notes for
aboiit $300 each, subscribed with the name of F. W. H. Elmore,
in his assumed capacity as agent; that after these goods were
240
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obtained, they were forwarded to Detroit, where William H.
Elmore for some time carried on mercantile business under the
name of F. W. H. Elmore ; that subsequently, an assign
ment of this store of goods was made by an instru
ment *in writing, signed F. W. H. Elmore, by W. H. [*266]
Elmore, his attorney, to Hicks, and in which was also
a covenant that it passed all right and title of W. H. Elmore to
the goods. The bill charged that when this assignment was
made, Hicks had knowledge of the fraud of Elmore in obtain
ing complainants’ goods; and the bill contained, also, a charge
in relation to the assignment of the goods in the store in the
following terms: “ among which said merchandise, your com
plainants’ charge was included, the merchandise, so as afore
said, purchased of your complainants, or the portion of them
which remained undisposed of by the said William H. Elmore,
but which particular part or portion of the same, complainants
were ignorant.”
The bill further charged that complainants parted with their
goods in the confidence in the truth of this representation; that
they did not discover the fraud until after the notes were due
and until after they had demanded payment of them at the
store where William H. Elmore had traded; that after dis
covering the fraud, they demanded a return of the goods of
Hicks and Elmore, or the unsold portion of them, which they
refused to return; that complainants had commenced no legal
proceedings against defendants, except the filing of this bill.
The first prayer of the bill was that defendants might answer,
the defendant Hicks under oath, but the defendant Elmore,
without oath, from an inspection of the inventory, invoices and
books, what goods were obtained from complainants, and what
portion of them were assigned to defendant Hicks; what por
tion of them were sold by William H. Elmore before the
assignment, and what portion by Hicks since the assignment,
and for what ? that a receiver, with the usual powers, might be
appointed, of complainants’ goods in the hands of defendants,
is 241
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or either of them, and that the unsold portion of them be
delivered to the complainants; that Elmore be liable for the
interest of the whole goods, to the time of the assignment to
Hicks, and for the amount of goods sold by him; that both
defendants, or either of them, account for the goods sold by
Hicks since the assignment, and the interest upon the unsold
portion of them since the assignment, and be personally liable
‘therefor; that defendants be enjoined from assigning
[*267] or *disposing of the goods or their proceeds, and for
such other and further relief herein as the court may
order.
_ Or secondly, that defendants might answer and be enjoined
as aforesaid; that they be decreed to return the unsold portion
of the goods to complainants, and to account and be personally
liable, as aforesaid, and for complainants’ costs. The complain
ants prayed for general relief. Their prayers were all in the
disjunctive.
The bill was takenpro confesso, and after the cause had been
set down on the orders pro confesso for a hearing, and notice
for a final decree, H. N. Walker, for defendant Hicks, applied
on afiidavit to the chancellor for leave to have the order pro
confesso against him opened, and leave to answer. The affi
davit stated that previous to the entry of the default, H. N.
Walker gave notice of retainer for Hicks, and that a demurrer
had been filed on the part of Hicks, and that by mistake the
name of the firm of Bates, Walker & Douglas was signed to
the demurrer ; that complainants’ counsel had treated the
demurrer as a nullity on that account, and had entered the
default. The aflidavit was accompanied by an affidavit of
merits, and an answer proposed to be put in. The chancellor
granted an order that the complainants show cause before him,
at his chambers, why the demurrer should not be withdrawn,
the order pro confesso opened, and defendant Hicks have
leave to answer; and that defendants’ solicitor serve on the
complainants’ solicitor the aflidavit of merits, the answer pre
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pared to be filed, and a copy of the order to show cause at
least four days before the time of hearing.
B. E Cooper, for complainants, read an afiidavit, from which
it appeared that on entering the order pro confesso, the com
plainants had served a notice upon the defendants’ solicitor of
the entry of such order, and ofl’ered to open the same without
costs, provided a full and suflicient answer were served before
the first day of the term, for which the cause had been set
down for a hearing on the orders pro confesso; that no answer
had been filed, and that two special terms had elapsed since
the entry of the orders pro confesso; and that defend
ants *had taken no previous steps in the case, and [*268]
insisted:
1. That the application of the defendant was now too late:
2 Johns. Ch., 242; 4 Paige, 288, 439.
2. That the aflidavit of merits was not sufiiciently full, and
gave no sufiicient excuse for the delay; that the answer was
exceptional for insufiiciency; he examined the whole case upon
the bill and answer served, and insisted on the authority of the
decision in 6‘ Paige, 371; 5 Ib., 164,- 1 Hofman, 7'
,
551, that
the order pro confesso should not be opened, as from the answer
presented it appeared that the defendant, although attempting
to interpose the defense of a bona fide purchaser without
notice, had nevertheless admitted and shown such a knowledge
of facts and circumstances relating to the fraud as charged as
to put him on inquiry, and to charge him with constructive
-notice of the fraud; that no injustice, therefore, would be done
to the defendant by~ refusing this motion, but injustice would
be done to the complainant if it were granted.
'
8. That the opening of the order is a matter resting in the
sound discretion of the court, who is to see that no injustice is
done. If it be now opened, the defendants should be required
to pay all costs of the suit subsequent to the proceedings to
take the order pro confesso, and the costs of the motion.
243
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They should put in a sufficient answer, and submit to such
equitable terms as the court may impose, to expedite the cause,
and to ascertain the facts of the case. In this case the defend
ants should, as equitable terms, be required to stipulate that the
complainants under the issue may, if they shall so elect, exam
ine the defendant Elmore as a witness, without a waiver of
any liability to them; and if complainants shall so elect, they
may themselves also be examined as witnesses in the cause, and
that a commission may be taken out to obtain their testimony.
The tendency of chancery practice in modern times is to let in
evidence from all quarters, to satisfy the conscience of the
court.
[*269] *H. N. Walker, for defendant, cited 8 Chit. Gen.
Pr., 525," '7 Paige, 370,‘ 6 Ib., 371; insisted that the
demurrer was regular, and a valid proceeding in the cause until
set aside. That if the demurrer were irregular he should be
allowed to answer on terms.
Tun OHANCELLORZ
The demurrer, having been signed by solicitors whose appear
ance had not been entered in this case, might, where another
solicitor had appeared for this defendant, be treated as without
signature, and as a nullity: 3 Ohitty’s Gen. Prac., 524.
But the demurrer having been filed in this form by mistake,
the court would relieve the party from the consequences, if
satisfied that injustice would be done if the party should not
be permitted to answer.
The answer discloses: First, that, as defendant Hicks believes,
W. H. Elmore was authorized to purchase the goods in the
name of F. W. H. Elmore. If this be true, no fraud was com
mitted. Second, that he purchased the goods without any
knowledge of the complainants’ claim. See Mowry v. Walsh,
8 Cow., 238.
The answer further discloses such circumstances in relation
to the knowledge of F. W. H. Elmore of the manner in which
244
FIRST CIRCUIT. 269
Gum! v. Emronn.
the business was conducted, as must, in all probability, estab
lish his liability, if any doubt existed on that subject.
The circumstance of the defendant Hicks having taken a
separate guaranty of W. H. Elmore, is urged as strong evi
dence of fraud. It may, perhaps, lead to a conjecture that
Hicks was suspicious that W. H. Elmore had some
individual *interest in the property; but, accompanied [*270]
as it is by the positive denial of Hicks of any knowl
edge of the complainants’ claims, and, also, the statement in
his answer, _that, according to his knowledge and belief, the
goods were really the property of F. W. H. Elmore, cannot be
regarded as such a badge of fraud as would render the sale to
him fraudulent and void.
The answer is objected to as not being full and perfect. The
rule laid down in Hunt v. Wallace, 6 Paige, 377, and which
has before been recognized in this court, in the case of the
Bank of Michigan v. lVilliams, ante, 219, is
,
that the defend
ant must either furnish the answer which he proposes to put
in, or state his defense so fully in his affidavit that the court
may see that injustice would probably be done if the order,
taking the bill as confessed, is permitted to stand.
The court should require a full answer, and, if satisfied that
the answer was intentionally evasive, would refuse to set aside
the order.
Such is not the case here. The answer discloses suflicient to
show that injustice would probably be done if the order is per
mitted to stand. ‘Should the court undertake to look into a
further or amended answer, it would involve a re-examination
of the papers, which may as well be done by a master. Besides,
the court is not fully satisfied that the answer will be found
insuflicient; but, as the court is inclined to think the complain
ant may be entitled to a further discovery in some particulars,
the defendant should be compelled to answer such exceptions
as may be allowed promptlyl
The order, taking the bill as confessed, must be set aside upon
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payment of costs of entering the order, and of this motion, and
the defendant’s undertaking to answer such exceptions as may
be allowed by the master, within five days after the same may
be filed, and upon stipulating that the complainants may be
examined as to the particular goods sold to Elmore, saving all
exceptions, except as to the competency of receiving such testi~
mony.
[*271] *After the order of the chancellor, directing the
opening of the order pro confesso, entered against
Hicks, and after Hicks had filed and served a copy of his answer,
denying the fraud charged against Elmore, and setting up the
defense of a bona fide purchaser without notice, etc.,
B. E Cooper, for complainants, moved, emparte, on the order
pro confesso, against Elmore, for want of appearance, for a final
decree. He cited 1 Smith’s Ch. Prac., 64, 174, 1'75.
No person appearing for defendant Elmore, the complainants
took their final decree, ea: parte, against Elmore, for the full
amount claimed in the bill, and costs, and afterwards proceeded
against him by creditor’s bill.
Henry M Walker gave notice of retainer for defendant
Elmore, and moved (on the afiidavit of Elmore, of irregularities,
etc.) for an order for complainants to show cause why the final
decree entered December 8, against Elmore, should not be set
aside for irregularity. The chancellor granted the order to
show cause.
B. E Cooper, for complainants, showed cause.
I. The decree in this cause cannot be set aside on the ground
of the insufiicienoy of the papers on which the motion is founded.
1. Because after the entry of an order pro confesso, it is a
general rule that it cannot be set aside without a production of
the answer intended to be filed. The exception in the hooks
was in the case of a non-resident, and then the motion was made
before enrollment: 5 Paige, 164,- 6 Paige, 877. The last case
was before decree entered.
\
246
FIRST CIRCUIT
Guam v. Euaou.
2. After the enrollment of the decree, the rule is now believed
to be universal, that the application to set it aside must be on the
production of the sworn answer proposed to be filed, with afull
aflidavit of merits: 1 Hofm. P1-., 551 ,' 1 Johns. Ch., 541, 681;
1 Paige, 430; 8 Ib., 407; 2 Ves. rfi Beam., 184,- 3 Johns. Ch., 424.
II. If the papers on which the motion is founded be not insuf
ficient in their character, they are too defective to allow the
relief sought for by the defendant.
*1. The paper served as an afiidavit is in form a peti- [*272]
tion. Petitions must always be sworn to, and an exact
copy with the jurat served: 1 Hopla, 101; 8 Paige, 280.
2. If the paper is an afiidavit, an exact copy, including the
jurat, should be served; it should be governed by the rules
relating to equity pleadings under oath: 1 H0pk., 101,- 3
Paige, 280.
3. It is entitled in the cause of complaint against Elmore and
Hicks. It asks for relief in two causes, viz.: complainant against
Hicks and Elmore, and complainant against Elmore. This is
entirely irregular. The relief sought for should have been con
fined to one cause, or the papers should have been entitled in
both causes, or there should have been two sets of papers and
two motions. No indictment would lie on this aflidavit for any
false swearing as to matters in the case of Elmore alone: 2
Cowen, 509," Graham’s Pr., 2d ed., 678.
4. The notice for this motion is signed H. N. Walker, who
is only solicitor in the case of Hicks and Elmore, and is entitled
in that cause alone. It differs from the order to show cause.
The notice rests upon irregularity alone.
5. Hie order to show cause is entered on motion of Douglass
and Walker, who are not solicitors in the cause in which the
papers and notice of motion is entitled. The order as entered
is irregular, and if not a nullity should be vacated. None save
the solicitors in a cause can make motions therein: Hopla, 869.
III. The decree cannot be set aside for the want of proper
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evidence that defendant Elmore has a good and suflicient
defense.
1. The aflidavit and petition have none of the usual formula
of an aflidavit of merits.
2. It does not directly state that defendant has merits, but
states in such a manner as to leave it doubtful what he does
mean.
'
[*273] *3. The aflidavit misstates the eflfect of Hicks’
answer; the answer really states that Hicks is a bona
fide purchaser without notice; it alleges that he knew nothing
of the representations made to complainants, but believes Elmore
had authority.
4. Defendants have no defense under this answer, as the
fraudulent representations are not in issue. It is a defense
inclepenrlent of them, and good, whether they were made or not,
The defense arises from a distinct matter, and subsequent to
Elmore’s fraud. ,
5. The affidavit shows that Elmore’s neglect to appear and
answer, as required by the order and practice of the court, was
the result of deliberation and 0lesign—a mode of defense selected
as well calculated to embarrass complainants as a regular defense,
according to the rules and orders of the court.
6. It appears that this was done by the advice of counsel.
Hicks, it seems by his defense, is to defend Elmore, and Elmore
to be saved the expenses of a solicitor. Elmore is to take the
chances of successful defense by Hicks, and get rid of the debt
and the trouble of litigation and its costs. If Hicks fails at the
end of a protracted litigation, then Elmore seems to suppose he
may come in, renew the fight, and take the chances of war.
In the meantime, these two complainants are to stand and see
these two defendants use up their goods without paying for
them, and encounter the delays and losses and vexations of liti
gation. Will a court of equity listen to an aflidavit of such a
character as this? It would be a stain on the administration
of justice.
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IV. The cases of opening decrees are all limited to the open
ing the enrollment. After oreditor’s bill is filed, no such appli
cation has been or should be granted: 6’ Paige, 254. The
afiidavit of complainants shows that the order to answer is
nearly out in the oreditor’s bill. The order to stay proceed
ings and show cause is served after defendant is on his exam
ination to discover his property. After taking the chances of
the first suit, he has taken all the chances ‘of the second, to the
time when he is about to be compelled to discover his prop
erty. If this motion be granted, its effects in other
suits will be most *disastrous. Defendants will lie [*274]
by until called to answer or discover when they will
thus seek to come in, after a great lapse of time. In the mean
time, their property will be either fairly or fraudulently dis
posed of, and the complainants will be throw-n back to the fil
ing of the bill, to fight a defendant who has thus managed to
delay his proceedings and discover his strength.
V. If the decree, pro confesso, can be set aside after filing a
oreditor’s bill, there is no suflicient ground for it shown on this
application, either in the complainants’ mode of proceeding, or
in the merits disclosed by the defendants’ aflidavit.
It is objected, first : That the affidavit shows execution put
in the sheriflf’s hands on the return day. Aflidavit of com
plainants denies it; it was some days before the return. If it
were not, no collusion is charged by defendants; without this
charge, the return of the sheriff cannot be impeached: 2
Paige, 408.
It is objected, second: That the decree against Elmore was
entered up while the cause was not even at issue against Hicks:
Answer, there is a decree pro confesso, against Hicks, not
yet opened.
Answer 2. That bill for fraud is like an action on the case at
law, for a tort. There one defendant may suffer judgment by
default, another may give a cognovit; one may be found not
guilty by verdict, and the other guilty; in such case the tort
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is joint and several. So in this bill for fraud; there may be an
order pro confesso, against one defendant, and a decree, while
the cause may proceed against the other, who may have a
decree in his favor: Smith’s Pr., 174, 175; 2 Paige, 102,- 7'
Johns. Ch., 19.4. This bill is
,
in substance, an action on the
case. Why wait, after an admission by Elmore himself of the
fraud? 7 Paige, 448; 1 Peters, 80.
VI. If either of the two last mentioned grounds are sufficient
to set aside a decree after enrollment, it can only be on a bill
of review or on appeal. If there is error, the error is one of
law: O0oper’s PL, 88-90.
[*275] *H. M Walker, for Elmore:
1
. The defense of one party avails his co-defendant, if the
cause depends upon the same facts: 1 Hofm. I52, 554," 10
Johns. Rep, 584.
2. A cause cannot be heard against several defendants in the
absence of the rest, although no decree be asked against them.
The bill must first be formally dismissed as to them: 2 Paige,
572; 1 Paige, 548, 549,- 5 Paige, 638; 2 Johns. O'h., 614.
Tnn CHANCELLOB2
The principal question involved in this case is whether, where
there are joint defendants, upon a pro confesso being obtained
against one defendant, and before cause is at issue, or in readi
ness for a hearing, against the other defendant, the complainant
may enter a final decree, and issue execution against the party
against whom the bill has been taken as confessed, and leave
the cause to proceed against the other defendant or defendants.
After a very careful examination, I have been unable to find
any case in which this question has been distinctly presented.
It is the uniform rule that a final decree, or an interlocutory
decree which in a great measure decides the merits of the cause,
cannot be pronounced until all the parties to the bill, and all
the parties in interest, are before the court: 5 Wheaten, 5.42.
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This rule is usually applied to cases where the com
plainant *has not made proper parties to his bill, or [*276]
where the proper parties have been made to the bill,
the complainant has not taken "the necessary steps to bring
them before the court; but does not the reason of the rule
apply to a case like the present? The party who has answered
in this cause, although as to that part of the bill which relates
to Elmore alone he denies the allegations upon his knowledge
and belief, has put in issue the whole merits of the bill.
Before the cause is ready for a hearing, the complainant
enters his final decree against the defendant who has not
appeared, and issues his execution thereon for the full amount
claimed, leaving the cause to proceed against the other defen
dant, before the parties, or rather before the merits of the
cause are before the court, so as to enable it to make a final
decree upon the whole case, when it may perhaps become the
duty of the court, upon the hearing, to declare that the com
plainants have no equity whatever. I think the rule above
stated goes to the extent that the court will not adjudge upon
a part of the case in this Way. It will not make a final decree
until the cause is properly presented in such a form as will
enable the court to make a final disposition of the cause, and
do justice to all parties to the suit. In 2 Paige, 572, City
Bank v. Bangs, it is decided that where the defendants, or
any of them, deny the allegations in the complainant’s bill, or
set up distinct facts in bar of his right to file the bill, he must
file a replication, give rules to produce witnesses, and close the
proofs before the cause is heard. It is settled that although a
cause may be in readiness for a hearing against one defendant,
when there are other defendants as to whom the cause is not
in readiness, the defendant who has appeared and answered can
not notice the cause for a hearing, but must move to dismiss the
bill for want of prosecution: Vermillyea v. Odell, 4 Paige,
122. This he cannot do if the cause is in such a situation that
it may be noticed for a hearing by either party. This is con
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firmatory of the rule that the court will not grant a final decree
until the cause is in readiness for a hearing as to all the parties.
It has been urged that the court cannot interfere in
[*277] this way, *but that the defendant must be left to his
appeal or a bill of review. And this brings us to an
other objection to this form of proceeding. I do not see how
an appeal can be taken in this stage of the cause. This case is
still pending and proceeding in this court as against one defen
dant, while it may be proceeding in the appellate court, upon
appeal, against the other defendant, if the appeal could be sus
tained by the supreme court. It would render the practice and
proceedings anomalous and inconvenient if this court were to
pursue this course and render final decrees, in succession, against
several defendants in this way, as fast as the complainant
should perfect his proceedings against each of the several de
fendants. A decree by default may be set aside on motion (1
Hofiinan’8 Pr., 419); and the court decides on motion, where
the facts appear, and there is nothing to dispute about but the
law of the ‘case: Ib., 420.
Some other questions were raised at the argument. It is
objected that the order to show cause was entered on motion of
Douglass and Walker, when H. N. Walker is the solicitor of
record. The papers are signed and notices given by H. N.
Walker, solicitor in the cause, and the order to show cause
being granted on motion of Douglass and Walker is immate
rial. The complainants could not have been misled, and the
order would have been valid without the insertion of the name
of any solicitor. The fact that the jurat annexed to the peti
tion was not annexed to the copy served would prevent its being
used as proof of the facts alleged in the petition, as the party is
bound by the copy served. But the motion is founded upon
the record and proceedings in the cause, as well as upon the
petition, which disclose the facts in the same manner. The
objection that the papers, being only entitled in the case of
Elmore and Hicks, cannot be used in the case against Elmore
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alone, is technically correct, and the order must be confined to
that case. But from the view I have taken that the decree
taken against Elmore in the case of Elmore and Hicks was
irregularly entered, and must be set aside, it must follow that
all proceedings founded upon that decree must fall
with it. *After the defendant has omitted to make [*278]
his defense, as has been the case here, I interfere in
this way with reluctance. But the case being presented, I am
bound to settle the practice of taking decrees against one of
several defendants in this manner, either in one way or the
other; and of the inconvenience and irregularity of this course
of proceeding I entertain no doubt. The final decree entered
in this cause against Elmore must be set aside and vacated,
leaving the order taking the bill as confessed against him, of
force, so that no obstacle may exist to taking a decree when
ever the cause shall be in readiness for a final disposition; or if
the complainant shall so elect, with leave to set aside the pro
confesso, and require an answer.
Decree set aside.
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Agnes McLean and others v. Jacob L. Barton and others.
Repeal of limitation acts. Whether by section three of the repealing act contained
in the Revised Statutes of 1838it was intended to continue in force the provisions
of the acts of limitation repealed by that act, where the time had “begun to
ru n," or whether the time prescribed in the Revised Statutes was intended as the
period at the expiration of which the suits should be barred, quwre. (a)
Lapse of time, how taken advantage of. The statutes of limitation and lapse of time
may be taken advantage of on demurrer. (b)
Laches a bar to relief. Where the action was not commenced for upwards of twenty
years after the right of action accrued, and no disability or excuse for the delay
was pretended, or new discovery of facts suggested, and both the person charged
with committing the fraud and his grantee were dead, the court refused to sus
tain the suit. by reason of the lapse of time, and held that the case could not be
aided by proof of facts which were not put in issue by the pleadings. (c)
A court of equity will lend its aid to detect and redress a fraud, notwithstanding the
lapse of time; but when the fraud is discovered the parties must act upon that
discovery within a reasonable time. The party seeking redress should not wait
until all those who were cognizant of the transaction have paid the debt of
nature, and until no one is left to deny or explain the allegations, unless satisfac
tory excuse can be given for the delay.
The bill in this case stated that in 1816 Robert Smart, now
deceased, obtained by fraud a deed of conveyance of lots num
bers 61 and 62 in section three of the city of Detroit, falsely
representing himself to be the assignee of Catharine Bailey, the
assignee of John Murphy, the assignee of David McLean, to
whom the lots had been granted by the governor and judges of
the territory of Michigan, acting as a land board, but that the
deed making said grant. was not delivered by the governor and
judges to said McLean.
The bill prayed for a conveyance of the lots to the complain
ants, the widow and legal representatives of David McLean.
The defendants put in a general demurrer.
(a) Statutes of limitation are to be construed to operate prospectively only, unless
the contrary intent clearly appears: Harrison v. Metz, 17Mich., 377.
(b) Followed in Campau 1.1.Ohene, 1Mich., 400.
(c) See Campau 1;. Van D1/lce,15Mich., 371; Disbrow 1:. Jones, supra, 102,and
cases cited in note.
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A. D. Fraser, in support of the demurrer:
1. Agnes McLean, the widow of David McLean, has no appa
rent interest in the controversy, nor any equity as against the
defendants or any of them, and therefore a general demurrer
will lie on the whole bill: 3 Paige, 336.
2. Under this demurrer, we rely on the statute of
limitations *as a bar to any relief. “ From the earliest [‘."280]
ages, courts of equity have refused their aid to those
who have for an unreasonable length of time neglected to assert
their claims, especially when the property in controversy has
passed to subsequent purchasers. Although statutes of limita
tions do not extend to suits in chancery, yet courts of equity
will acknowledge their obligationz” 5 Peters, 470," 6 I 5., 71.
The bar from lapse of time need not be set up by demurrer,
answer or plea, but may be suggested at the hearing: 1 Bald
win, 418, 419.
The statute of limitations may be urged as a bar of the
remedy in the form of a demurrer: 4 Wash., 639; 8 P. Wms,
287,- 2 Mad. Ch., 246.
In 1 Peters, $60, and 3 Peters, 44, the court say, “that the
statute ought to receive such a construction as will effectuate
the beneficial objects which it is intended to accomplish——the
security of titles and the quieting of possessionsz” '7 Johns.
Ch., 90, 122.
And courts give effect to its regulations upon equitable titles:
5 Mason, 112,- 2 Jae. <2 Wal., 137, 191; 1 Sch. cf
;
Lef., 41$,
428.
This suit should have been instituted within ten years from
the 5th of November, 1829: Laws 1833, pages 408, 409.
Now, if David McLean ever had any rights, they accrued, as
appears by the bill, on the execution of the deed by the gov
ernor and judges to Smart, dated 5th November, 1816. No
new right accrued to the party subsequent to that time.
3. It does not appear that McLean ever acquired title to the
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property, for it is expressly stated that the deed was never
delivered.
4. It is not shown by the bill that McLean was entitled to a
deed for a lot in Detroit: Laws 1820, p. 14.
Backus and Seaman, contra:
If a demurrer is general to the whole bill, as in this
[_*281] case, *and there is any part either as to the relief or
the discovery to which defendant ought to answer,
the demurrer being entire, must be overruled: Mitfi Pl., 8d
Am. ed., 214.
The deed executed by the governor and judges, and their
assigning and designating the lots as lots to be deeded to Mc
Lean, was in pursuance of the statute of the United States,
and of his assignment to them, and also in full payment for his
lot, and was therefore for a valuable consideration, and though
not good in law for want of delivery, was good in equity to
pass an equitable title to the premises to McLean: Wadsworth
v. Wendell, 5 Johns. Ch., 224.
We have alleged fraud on the part of Smart, and brought
notice of the fraud home to the defendants, which vitiates and
renders null and void the defendants’ title. Equity grants relief
not only against deeds, writings and solemn assurances, but also
against judgments and decrees obtained by fraud and impo
sition: Reigal v. Wbod, 1 Johns. Ch., 402; Barnesly v. Powell, 1
Ves., 287; Heirs of Ware v. .Brush,1 McLean, 534-538.
[*282] *The statute of limitations of November 6th, 1829,
on which the defendants rely to bar our action in ten
years, was repealed April 6th, 1838, which repeal took effect
August 31st, 1838. The second section of the repealing act,
R. S., p. 697, substituted the Revised Statutes, and limitation
therein provided; R. S., p. 578, § 1. We come within the first
section, within the twenty-five years.
The eighth section of Revised Statutes, p. 575, does not sub
ject us to the act of November 5th, 1829, because by the express
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terms of that section, all causes of action accruing previous to
the 31st day of August, 1838, shall be determined by the law
under which such right of action accrued; and our action
accrued long prior to the passage of the act of November, 1839.
See Tapper v. Tapper, 3 Ohio, 387.
*We do not deny the position that courts of equity [*283]
will carry into efiect statutes of limitation (though
they do not expressly apply to them) in all cases where the
statute would be a bar at law, if an action at law was brought
for the same subject matter. The decisions in 2d Jacobs cf:
Walker, 191, 1952; 7 Johns. Ch., 114-126; 5 Peters, 470,- 6 Peters,
71, are all put expressly upon the ground of the statute of
limitations, and that the statute would be a bar to a recovery
at law for the same subject matter.
A case cannot be found where mere lapse 'of time has been
held a bar in equity, unless the lapse of time has been so great
that the statute of limitations could be pleaded at law for the
same subject matter, or a court of law would presume an extin
guishment of the claim. Such was the express decision in 8
.P Wnzs., 287'; and such seems to have been the grounds of the
decision in all the cases, and particularly that in '7 Johns. 0'/0.,
118, 122.
If the statute were a clear bar, and could be pleaded as such,
it is possible the defendants might take advantage of it by
demurrer; but they can take advantage of mere lapse of time,
not coming within the statute of limitations, only on
the hearing upon answer *as evidence that the plain- [*284]
tifis’ rights have been extinguished by a convey
ance: 14 Peters, 152.
As to the lapse of time being presumptive evidence of
the extinguishment of the plaintifis’ claims, see the case of
Livingston 0. Livingston, .4 Johns. Ch., 287; such presump
tive evidence plaintiffs have a right to rebut, which they would
be precluded from doing if the lapse of time could be taken
advantage of on demurrer. The demurrer also admits the
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plaintiffs’ claims and rights as stated in the bill; and the
defendants are guilty of the inconsistency of admitting the
plaintiffs’ rights by the demurrer, and at the same time insist
ing that the lapse of time is presumptive evidence of an extin
guishment of these very rights which are thus admitted.
It is incontrovertible that the legislature, by the provisions
of the Revised Statutes, intended to reserve to suitors the benefits
of the statutes of 1820 and 1829 and all rights accruing under
them: Revised Laws, page 575, secs. 7 and 8; Laws of 1888,
571, sec. 6; Laws of 1838, 408, 409.
A reference to the provisions in regard to personal actions
clearly manifests this intention: Rev. Laws, p. 580, secs. 25, 27.
And this view is fortified by the fact that the Revised Sta
tutes are positive in their operation upon this subject, except
so far as the old statutes are declared to be the governing rule
as to past cases.
In putting a construction upon the provisions of the Revised
Statutes, the court must compare all the parts of the statute,
the different statutes in pari materia, to ascertain the intention
of the legislature. And may even recur to the situation and
history of the country to ascertain the reason as well as the
meaning of many of the provisions of a statute law.
It was clearly competent for the legislature to pass the act of
1829 now relied upon, and its provisions are reasonable and
proper, expedient and just, and are fully sustained by the high
est authorities: 8 Mass., 480; 2 Gallic, 141; 8 Peters, 290,
276; 5 Ib., 464; 3 Ib., 54.
[*285] *But independent of the statute of limitations,
which, it is insisted, constitutes a perfect bar here, this
court will refuse its aid to those who have for an unreasonable
length of time neglected to assert their rights, especially when
the property has passed to subsequent purchasers: 10 Wheaten,
152; 9 Peters, 416.
This court will not entertain stale or antiquated demands,
ass
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nor encourage laches and negligence: 1 Story Eq., 508, and
notes. _
There is no time fixed when it operates in equity: Baldwin,
419; 2 Sumner, 212.
It appears by the bill that the deed was never delivered by
the governor and judges to the complainant’s ancestor (McLean),
and consequently no title vested in him in his lifetime: 6
Mason, 60,- 12 Wenrl, 107, 108; 6 Gowen, 619.
Tan Cnxnonnnon:
This bill is filed to obtain the conveyance of lots Nos. 61 and
62 in section 3 in the city of Detroit.
The bill alleges that the lots in question were granted to
David McLean by the governor and judges of the then terri
tory of Michigan, acting as a land board; but that the deed
making said grant was not delivered.
That Robert Smart, now deceased, in December, 1816,
obtained a deed of conveyance of the lots in question, repre
senting himself as assignee of Catharine Bailey, assignee of
John Murphy, assignee of said David McLean.
It denies that McLean ever made any such assignment, and
avers that the representations of Smart to the governor and
judges were made to deceive them and defraud the complain
ants. The first question raised under the demurrer is the sta
tute of limitations.
The statute of the 5th November, 1829, required all actions
of this kind to be commenced within ten years from the pas
sage of the act.
This act was repealed by the Revised Statutes, the repeal to
take efiect on the 31st day of August, 1838.
The statute of the 15th May, 1820, required all suits of this
character to be commenced within 20 years. The suit in this
case was commenced on the 14th May, 1840.
The existing law, section 1st, part 3d, title 6, Re
vised Statutes, provides *that “no person shall com- [*286]
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mence an action for the recovery of any lands, nor make
any entry thereupon unless within 20 years after the right
to make such entry, or bring such action, first accrued, or Within
25 years after he or those from or under whom he claims, shall
have been seized or possessed of the premises, except as here
inafter provided.”
But by the 8th section of the same statute, it is provided that
“ where the cause or right of action or entry shall have accrued
before the time when this chapter shall take eifect as law, the
same shall not be afiected by this chapter, but all such causes
of action shall be determined by the law, under which such
right of action accrued.”
The last section of the repealing act provides that “in any
case where the limitations or period of time prescribed in any
of the acts hereby repealed, for the acquiring any right or the
barring any remedy, or for any other purpose, shall have began
to run, and the same or any similar limitation is prescribed in
the Revised Statutes, the time of limitation shall continue to
run and shall have the like efiect as if the whole period had
begun and ended under the operation of the Revised Statutes.”
Whether this section intended to continue in force the pro
visions of the acts of limitation thereby repealed, where the
time had “ begun to run,” or whether the time prescribed in the
Revised Statutes was intended as the period at the expiration
of which the suits shall be barred, is perhaps doubtful.
What time of limitation shall continue to run .7
’ I am inclined
to the opinion, from the whole of the provisions of the statutes,
that the intention of the legislature was to preserve the benefit
of the statutes of limitation which were repealed. But which
ever construction may be given will not, from the view I have
taken of the case, change the result.
Whatever right David McLean possessed accrued in 1809.
All of his right and title became vested in the present com
plainants, upon his decease, and before the deed from the gov
ernor and judges to Smart, in December, 1816. Their right of
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action then must have accrued at that time. No new or other
right has since accrued.
There is no allegation of any disability or excuse made or
attempted for the delay.
*The second ground urged upon the hearing is the [_*287]
presumption arising from the lapse of time.
There seems to be now no doubt that the statute of limita
tions may be taken advantage of upon demurrer; but whether
the same rule holds in this case, there seems to have been much
diversity of opinion. One of the earliest cases upon the sub
ject is the case of Deloraine v. Browne, 3 Brown C. C., 635.
The authorities are there collected in a note to the case made
by Lord Redesdale. The same learned judge afterwards, in
commenting on this case, in Hovenden 0. Lord Annesleg, 2
Schoales & Lefroy, 637, says: “In the case of Lord Deloraine
0. Browne, an attempt was made to take advantage of the
length of time by demurrer. The decision of that case, as
reported by Brown, does not convey much satisfaction to my
mind; and perhaps the note which follows will account for the
judgment of the court being delivered in somewhat of a hurry.
“The first judgment as reported is hardly intelligible, and
then there is an explanation given next day; it is
,
however,
rather contrary to what Lord Kenyon determined in Beckford
0. Close, which is cited in that case. This arose, perhaps, from
Lord Thurlow not having, under the peculiar circumstances in
which he stood, sufiiciently‘considered that this was matter of
the law of a court of equity. Lord Kenyon held that a demur
rer to a bill, because it did not show a good title to redemp
tion within twenty years, was a good demurrer. Why?
Because it was a rule of the court that no redemption should
be allowed after twenty years, and therefore the party should
be put to bring his case within that rule. Lord Thurlow’s
opinion was given in a hurry; and many cases were then pend
ing, in which much injury might have arisen to the parties if
the judgments had not then been given; but it seems to me
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that Lord Kenyon’s opinion was perfectly tenable on Lord
Thurlow’s own qualification ; that is, that when a party does
not, by his bill, bring himself within the rule of the court, the
other party may by demurrer demand judgment, whether he
ought to be compelled to answer. If the case of the plaintiff
as stated in the bill will not entitle him to a decree, the judg
ment of the court may be required by demurrer whether the
defendant ought to be compelled to answer the bill; that I take
to be the matter of the law of a court of equity to be
[*288] decided *according to its rules and principles. ‘How
ever, it is clear that in this case of Lord Deloraine 0.
Browne, Lord Thurlow was anxious that his overruling the
demurrer should not be considered as deciding upon the case;
and the cause never came on again, Lord Deloraine being
advised that the length of time was a bar.”
In the case of Cholmondeleg v. Clinton, 4 Bligh, 1, it is held
that where there has been an adverse possession, not accounted
for by some disability, for more than 20 years, a court of equity
ought not to interfere.
In the case of Tattle 0. lVillson, 10 Ohio, 26, it is said : “ It
is indeed well settled that a statute of limitations will now be
applied in equity where it would bar the claim at law: 1 Story/’s
Eq., 502; 2 Ib., 785 ; 6 Peters, 66. The complainant filed her
petition in 1838, a period of twenty-three years having elapsed
after her cause of action arose, and, in our view, the statute is
a bar to her claim. But if it were otherwise, the staleness of
the demand would be fatal to its farther prosecution, and, inde
pendent of the act of limitation, affords a complete defense.
Where rights are unreasonably neglected, the presumption is
legitimate of an intention to abandon them. ‘ Nothing,’ says
Lord Camden, in Smith '0. Clay, 3 Brown Ch. C., 640, ‘can
call forth this court into activity, but conscience, good faith
and reasonable diligence : where these are wanting the court is
passive, and does nothing. Laches and neglect are always dis
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countenanced, and, therefore, from the beginning of this juris
diction, there was always a limitation of suit in this court.’
“ This language of Lord Camden is cited with approbation
by the supreme court of the United States : 9 Peters, 416. In
7 Ohio, 62, the same principle is also recognized by this court.”
Demurrers have been uniformly allowed to bills to redeem
after the lapse of 20 years.
In the case of Hovenolen 11. Lord Annesley, before men
tioned, Lord Redesdale says:
“ This brings me to consider the case finally in another point
of view, supposing the plaintiff might have had relief on the
ground of fraud, if he had pursued his title with due dili
gence, the answer is
,
it appears that the alleged fraud
was discovered by the party at *least so long ago, [*289]
that, in 1735, a bill was filed, imputing fraud, and
impeaching the transaction on the same ground. Therefore,
the position that fraud is not within the statute, because it is
a secret thing, which cannot be discovered, is not applicable to
this case; for the fraud imputed in this case is represented in
the bill of 1735; that is
,
it is there stated that the release was
a release which the party conceived he had a right to impeach
on the ground of fraud, and for that purpose to obtain from
the opposite party a discovery of all the facts and circum
stances demonstrating the fraud. This was known to the per
son claiming in 1735. Therefore, whatever right of action
might have accrued on discovering any particulars of the fraud
different from what were apparent in 1726, must be taken to
have accrued in 1735; but was not pursued in 1794, a period of
near 60 years after the first bill filed. I hold it utterly impos
sible for the court to act in such a case. A court of equity is
not to impeach a transaction on the ground of fraud, where the
fact of the alleged fraud was within the knowledge of the
party 60 years before. On the contrary, I think the rule has
been so laid down, that every right of action in equity that
'~_20a
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accrues to the party, whatever it may be, must be acted upon
at the utmost within 20 years.”
That the presumption arising from lapse of time may be
taken advantage of upon demurrer, is settled also in the case
of Livingston v. Livingston, 4 Johns. Ch., 299; where Chan
cellor Kent says: “ The difierence between this case and the
one decided yesterday is very material; here is a demurrer to
the whole bill, and the great lapse of time taken as one ground
in support of it, whereas, in the other case the defendant, by
his answer, admitted the covenants to pay and put his defense
on counter claims.” And effect was given to this defense
under the demurrer. The bar, from lapse of time is a conclu
sion from acquiescence, an inference from facts, which need
not be set up on demurrer, answer or plea: 1 Baldwin, 418.
Where there are such conflicting authorities, I feel myself
at liberty to adopt the rule that appears to me the most reason
able and convenient. What is the case now presented to the
court? Here has passed by a. period of upwards of 23 years.
No disability or excuse for this delay pretended; no new dis
covery of fraud suggested.
[*290] *The parties lie by, until, as appears from the bill,
Smart, the party charged with having committed the
fraud, is dead. Campbell, his grantee, is also dead. No one
is left to answer these charges. If the lapse of time ought to
bar this stale claim, I see no reason or propriety in compelling
these parties further to pursue this litigation. If any disabili
ties existed, it would have been easy to have stated them. If
fraud has been recently discovered, it should have been so
alleged.
'
And this allegation not having been made, the case cannot
be aided by proof, for the proof to be admissible must be
founded on some allegation in the bill and answer: 1
McLean, 489.
A court of equity will lend its aid to detect and redress a
fraud, notwithstanding the lapse of time, but when the fraud
i_-ii
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is discovered, the parties must act upon that discovery within
a reasonable time. The party seeking redress should not wait
for a period of between 23 and 24 years, until all those who
were cognizant of the transaction shall have paid the debt of
nature, and no one is left to deny or explain the allegation,
without giving any excuse for this delay.
Demurrer allowed.
ms
O
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William Brown v. Solomon Gardner and others.
Indunction against public oflicers. The ground on which equity interferes to restrain
public officers who are acting illegally, is to prevent great and irreparable mis
chief. It will not interfere if the injury is slight or doubtful.
Where a.bill was flied and preliminary injunction obtained to restrain commission
ers of highways from laying out a highway through the orchard and garden of
complainant in violation of the statute, and it appeared that the road was actu
ally opened before defendants had notice of the injunction, the bill was dis
missed.
Jurisdiction for one purpose retained for another. The court, being satisfied that
the defendants had acted in good faith in laying out the road, refused to retain
the bill for the purpose of giving damages to the complainant. (a)
Bill filed March 5, 1839, for an injunction to restrain the
defendants from laying out and working a highway.
The bill states that the complainant is owner and possessed
of certain messuages or farms in the town of Cottrelville,
county of St. Clair; that he has improved and cultivated said
farms for many years past; that he has a garden on one of said
farms which he has cultivated for more than twenty years, all
of which time it has been used exclusively for that purpose;
that he has a garden on the other of the said farms, which he
has prepared and cultivated for more than a year past; that
there is a grove of maple trees on one of the farms which he
has cultivated and used for a sugar orchard; that he has also
an orchard on one of the farms of more than the growth of four
years.
That in the month of August, 1838, defendants, who are
commissioners of highways of Cottrelville, proceeded to lay
out a road upon and across complainant’s farms and through
said gardens and orchards; that complainant forbid the laying
out and working said road, and denied the right of defendants
to lay out or open the same.
States that the commissioners of highways have ordered the
(a) Asto retaining the case for an assessment of damages when the principal
relief sought is denied, see Carroll 1:.Rice, Wal. Ch., 578; Hawkins 1:.Ulermont, 15
Mich., 511; Whipple v. Fan-ar, 3 Mich., 436.
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overseers of highways to cause the highway so laid
out to be worked and opened. *That in the month of [*292]
February, 183 9, they actually commenced working the
road, and to open the same through the said farms, orchards
and gardens.
The bill charges that defendants did not pursue the course
pointed out by the statute in laying out said highway. Charges
that the necessity of said road was not certified by twelve
respectable freeholders sworn by an ofiicer duly authorized to
administer oaths. Also that the jury was not duly summoned
and drawn, and free from all legal exceptions, and were not duly
sworn by an oflicer authorized to administer oaths, to assess
complainant’s damages, and that the jury assessed no damages
to complainant. Also, that the road would be more than $200
damages to complainant, if worked through his orchards, gar
dens, etc., and that the damages in destroying his shade trees,
etc., would be irreparable.
The bill prays for injunction, and that defendants pay dam
ages and costs of complainant.
The answer states that defendants were duly elected and
qualified as commissioners of highways for the said township
of Cottrelville, the defendant Ward was also county surveyor,
that they had full and lawful authority to lay out said road.
Admits that complainant is possessed and owner of the mes
suages and farms, and that he has cultivated the same for many
years past. States that in consequence of the old road becom
ing impassable, owing to its having been washed away by the
water, it became necessary to lay out and establish a new road
in said town. That the old road was duly and legally discon
tinued, and application having been made by twelve respecta
ble freeholders of said township, certifying upon oath that such
road was necessary, defendants, as commissioners, ordered and
directed a new road to be laid out and established, which neces
sarily crossed the farms of said complainant in the bill alluded
207
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to. That the order was made and entered on or about the
twenty-first day of August, 1838.
That in November, defendants gave complainant notice to
remove his fences, etc., which he neglected to do; that defen~
dants then directed the fences to be removed and road to be
i
opened. That before doing so they applied to David
[*293] Cottrell, Esq., a justice of the peace of *said town
ship, to obtain a jury to assess plaintifi’s damages.
That the justice issued his warrant to a constable of the town
ship of Clay to summone nine jurors in a township other than
Cottrelville to assess complainant’s damages; that complainant
had due notice of the time and place, and attended; that on or
‘about the third day of March, 1839, the said justice drew by
lot six jurors; that they were duly sworn to assess the damages,
and after having viewed and examined the premises they
returned a verdict that complainant was entitled to no dam
ages, which verdict was certified by the justice and delivered
by him to defendants.
The answer further states that after the verdict of the jury,
defendants offered complainant $25 for his damages, which he
refused; that complainant appeared before the jury and claimed
a much higher sum.
The answer denies that the new road goes through any
orchard on the premises of the complainant of the growth of
four years, or through any garden that has been cultivated four
years or more.
Admits that on a small portion on front of one of said
farms which has never been under any inclosure, but forms a
part of a large field on the site of said road, the complainants
or his tenants might, on two or three occasions, and not oft
ener, as defendants have been informed, etc., have raised a few
potatoes and other vegetables, etc., but denies that it was then
or ever has been exclusive occupied as a garden.
Denies that there is any orchard or garden on the site of the
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new road, but admits that the new road passes through a grove
of maple trees on one of said farms.
Admits that complainant forbid defendants, and denied their
right to lay out said road.
States that before the service of the injunction, or any
knowledge thereof, the road had been opened; that the only
damage done was the cutting down of several of the maple
trees.
The case was brought to a hearing on pleadings and proofs.
Harrington and .Emm0ns, for complainant:
*1. The court of chancery has undoubted jurisdic- [*294]
tion where public ofiicers are proceeding illegally and
improperly under a claim of right to injure the property of
individuals, to restrain them from proceeding by injunction:
Cooper 'v. Alden, ante, 96; Devaum '0. Ottg of Detroit, ante, 98;
6 Paige, 83,- 17)., 262.
The statute (Laws o_/'1833, page 108, sec. 16) provides that it
shall not be lawful for the commissioners of highways to lay
out any road through any orchard or garden without the con
sent of the owner thereof, if such orchard shall be of the
growthof four years, or such garden shall have been cultivated
as such at least four years before such highway or road shall be
laid out.
The Revised Statutes of 1838 (page 121, sec. 4) contains the
same provision.
The bill states that the commissioners of highways of the
town of Cottrelville were proceeding to lay out and open a road
or highway through complainant’s garden, which he had culti
vated as such for more than twenty years, all of which time it
had been exclusively used for that purpose; also through an
orchard of more than four years’ growth.
This allegation clearly gave the court of chancery jurisdic
tion, and it properly exercised that jurisdiction in granting the
injunction to restrain the opening of the road through com
plainant’s orchards and gardens.
'
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2. Where the jurisdiction of the court of chancery has once
rightfully attached, and the equity which gave the jurisdiction
has subsequently been defeated or destroyed, the court will
retain its jurisdiction and do justice in the premises, although
there may be an adequate remedy at law: 1 Johns. Ch., 131,
2 Story’s Eq.. 104-109; 1 Fonbl. Eg., “ 59 " note (Z), and
authorities there cited.
3. The jurisdiction of this court in the premises is conceded;
and the complainant has waived no right to ask relief in this
court.
First. The objection to the jurisdiction of the court, that the
complainant has an adequate remedy at law, should be made
by plea or demurrer, or should be distinctly stated in the
answer: Wiswall v. Hall, 3 Paige, 313. No such objection is
made by the answer in this case. See also 4 Paige, 899.
[*295] *Second. The complainant has waived no right to
ask relief in this court.
There is an express averment in the bill which is admitted by
the answer that the complainant never gave his assent, but
always remonstrated against the laying out and working of the
road, and denied the right of the defendants so to do.
[*296] *Did the appearance of the complainant before the
jury, when notified by the commissioners to appear,
waive by implication a right, which he positively, expressly, and
at all times insisted upon, as admitted by the answer ?
The commissioners are the sole judges of the necessity or pro
priety of laying out the road. The province of the jury is to
judge only of the amount of damages. Suppose the complain
ant had objected to their assessing damages, such objection
would have availed nothing, for they had no power to judge of
the necessity or propriety of laying out the road. The jury
cannot lawfully decide that there shall be no road when the
commissioners have determined there shall be one: 11 Pick.
Rep., 269.
It was also held in the case of Hinckley et al., 15 Pick., 447,
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that the appearance of the town, before the jury ordered by the
commissioners to assess damages, was not a waiver by the town
of the objection that they had not notice. And the reason
given in that case is that the jury could not have acted upon
such objection.
A. D. Fraser, for defendants:
1. Contended that this court had no jurisdiction of the case;
that the statute (R. S. 125, sec. 30) gives a remedy to a party
who conceives himself aggrieved, by an appeal, and that where
the statute provides a remedy this court will not interfere: 7
Paige, 155,- 19 Ves., 448,- 6 VVen0l., 566,- 4 0ow., 202,- 3 Paige,
578,- 1 Ib., 114,- 10 W'enal., 174.
2. As to what constitutes an orchard within the meaning of
the statute, see 23 Wend., 360.
3. The evidence on the part of the complainant is not sufiici
ent to outweigh the answer of the defendants and their
testimony. It *is the province of the chancellor to [*297]
weigh the testimony and decide upon it. See 1 Bailey,
886,‘ Ib., 514. But even if the allegations in the bill were well
founded, it is shown that the complainant waived all objections
on that ground by preferring his claim for damages. See 1 O'0wp.,
410; 2 Ohitt. Oh. Dig., 1342-1344; 2 Hill Ch., 7; Ib., 416‘.
4. Chancery will not, except under particular circumstances,
as there may be upon a bill for a specific performance of a con
tract,direct an issue or a reference to ascertain damages: 17 Ves.,
277, 278; 14 Ib., 128; Fonbl. Eq., 59; 2 Story Eq., 107, 109.
The cases of Denton '0. Stuart, 1 Cox, 258, and Greenaway v.
Adams, 12 Ves., 395, are overruled so far as the principles there
laid down are not reconciled with the case in 17 Ves., 277, 278.
In a case where it would be difiicult to ascertain the injury
resulting from the breach of a contract or the sum in damages
by which the injury might be compensated, this court will not
themselves ascertain the injury nor the damages, nor direct an
issue quantum damnificatus: 9 Oranch, 456; 2 Story’s Eg.,
104-109,- 4Johns. Ch., 560; Ib., 195,- 1 C0w., 755 ,' 14 Ves., 129;
am
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17 Ib., 278-285; 1 Sch. and Lefroy, 25,- 5 Johns. 0/»., 194, 195,
8 Meriv., 248,- 4 Johns. Oh., 560.
Tnr: Cnarrcnrnonz
The bill in this case was filed to restrain the defendants, com
missioners of highways for the township of Cottrelville, from
opening a highway through premises, a part of which the com
plainant alleges has been used for a garden for some 20 years,
and a part as an orchard of more than four years’ growth.
The bill was filed under the provisions of the statute inhibit
ing any road from being laid out without the consent of the
owner through any orchard of more than four years’ growth, or
garden which had been occupied as such more than four years
before the laying out of such road.
The answer of the defendants, inhabitants and oflicers of said
town, expressly denies that the said road was laid out or opened
through any such garden or 0rcha1'd. Proofs on both sides
have been taken.
It is singular that in relation to the matter of fact
[*298] which from its very *nature we would suppose must
be apparent one way or the other, we should meet with
such direct contradiction as is found in the bill and the answer.
The proof, however, to some extent, but not altogether, ex
plains it. I shall not undertake to go through with the entire
mass of testimony taken in this cause. With regard to what is
called in the evidence the lower farm, it does not seem to me
that the road can be considered as passing through an orchard
of more than four years’ growth within the meaning of the act.
The statute must receive a reasonable construction. The
object of it was to protect orchards from being cut up and
severed without the consent of the owner. But one small tree
and one broken stump, and those as it would seem of less than
four years’ growth when the road was laid out, and detached from
the trees in an orchard adjoining, were included in the road.
There is some evidence of an intention to continue the appro
priation of this ground for the purpose of an orchard. But
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where the fact is one of so doubtful a character, and the injury
so slight, it does not seem to me that the court for this cause is
authorized to retain this suit, and close up this road which has
been laid out, made and fenced, or award an issue quantum
damnificatus.
As to the garden on the upper farm there is somewhat more
difiiculty. Many respectable witnesses residing in the immedi
ate vicinity say that the grounds in question have not been used
for a garden. Others swear positively that they have been so
used for several years. I am inclined to think, after a careful
examination of the testimony, that the new road does encroach
some thirty feet in the widest place upon what the last witnesses
mean when they speak of a garden.
Some culinary vegetables have been raised on different p01‘
tions of this piece of ground for many years; whether it has
been so used every year is very doubtful. The same portions
of the ground do not seem to have been occupied for these pur
poses each year. And from the testimony it would seem not to
have been very carefully cultivated, or to have produced much.
And this explains the testimony of those witnesses residing in
the immediate neighborhood, who testify that the road does not
pass through any garden. From the manner in which this
ground has been used, the manner in which it was
found, *or rather from the fact that during a portion [*299]
of the time it has been partially withoutza fence, it is
doubtful whether it can be called a garden within the meaning
of the act. It would appear that it was not regularly inclosed,
and set apart as a garden. But admitted that by possibility it
may be regarded as a garden, within the meaning of the act,
does this present such a case as calls upon this court to inter
fere, when if the complainant is entitled to any remedy, the
courts of law can afford the same relief which is now sought
here ? The injury, if any, isvery slight. Some of the witnesses
say that the complainant has sustained no injury; all place the
damages at a small sum. The jury who were impanneled to
18 m~ I
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assess the damages found that the complainant would sustain
no injury.
The jurisdiction of this court to interfere, and restrain pub
lic ofiicers who are acting illegally to the manifest injury of
others, is well settled. But the grounds on which this court
interferes in such cases is to prevent great or irreparable
injury. Such is not the case here. The road was laid out and
opened before the service of the injunction. There is nothing
in the case from which to infer that the commissioners acted in
bad faith or intended any wanton violation of the rights of the
complainant. The indispensable necessity for a change in the
locality of this road is established. I find no evidence of un
fairness or partiality in the summoning, or the conduct of the
jury summoned to assess the damages. But it is argued that
as the court has acquired jurisdiction for the purpose of grant
ing the injunction, it should retain it for the purpose of giving
damages to the complainant. It would be competent for this
court so to do. It is sometimes done. In a clear case of gross
and wanton injury by public oflicers, under color of their oflice,
if the purposes of justice would be better subserved than by
sending the complainant to a court of law, I should be disposed
to do so. --’3But in a case like this, when the officers seem to
have acted in good faith, when it is doubtful whether any tres
pass has been committed, and when, if it should be so found,
the damages, if any, must be very trifling, and a court of law
can afford the complainant an adequate remedy, I do not think
this court is called upon to keep these defendants here, and
send an issue to the county of St. Clair, first to try the fact
whether the land in question was a garden or not, and then, if
so found, to assess the damages.
[*300] *The convenient administration of justice will be
better subserved by leaving the complainant to his
suit at law in the county where the lands are situated, and
where the witnesses reside.
Bill dismissed.
274
THIRD crucurr. 301
Jonas v. Wise ANDDun.
Whitney Jones v. Wing and Dean.
Denialr by answer, how made. Where an allegation is made in the bill with diver!
circumstances, the defendant should not by his answer deny the allegation lit
erally as laid in the bill, but should answer the point of substance positively and
certainly.
Fraud, setting aside contract for. A stock of goods was exchanged by complainant
for land, which defendants represented to be pine lands, having a certain large
quantity of pine timber standing thereon. Complainant had never seen the
land, and relied upon these representations. It turned out that there was pine
on but about one-fourth of the land, and on that only about half the quantity
represented. The court decreed the contract rescinded, that the unsold portion
of the goods be re-delivered to complainant, and that he be paid for those sold,
and have a lien on the land as security until the payment was made. (a)
False representations: Scienter. Where the representations on which a.party relies
are untrue, it is immaterial whether the party making them knows them to be
so or not; the efiect upon him being the same in either case. (bi
Bill to rescind a contract on the ground of fraud. The state
ment of the case is sufliciently given in the opinion of the court.
Pratt and Lee, for complainant:
The conduct of the parties shows the merits of the case. The
complainant, as soon as he saw the lands, told the witness, Lyon,
that he had been cheated, and would have redress, and imme
diately on his return to Marshall, and meeting the defendant,
Dean, he asserted his rights, declared himself to have been
injured, and that he should apply to the laws for redress.
This he has done, and what is the duty of this court ?
No complex questions of artificial rights at law arise to inter
fere with the direct application of the principles of equity.
The jurisdiction of the court is unquestioned; equity will
always take cognizance of fraud, and grant relief where it is
proven to exist. The peculiar and special power of the court
is also properly invoked in compelling an account of the prop
erty received, and a canceling of the conveyance to the com
plainant.
(a) F1): another case of setting aside a land purchase tor fraudulent representa
tlons, see Rood 1:.Chapin, Wal. Ch., 79.
(b) Bee Converse 11.Blumrich, 14 1\Iich., 100; Beebe v. Young, 14Mich., 136; Tong
0. Marvin, 15Mich., 60; Comstock 1:.Smith, 20Mich., 338.
ma
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The fraud in this case was in a material point; the
[*302] complainant *trusted to it and was misled. He is
therefore entitled to relief: 6 Ves., 178; 1 Bro. Ch.,
546; Jacob’s Rep., 178,‘ 1 Fonbl. B., 1 Ch., 228,- 1 Storg/’s
E9, 201.
Whether the defendants knew their representations to be
false, or made the assertions without knowing whether they
were true or false, is immaterial, for the aflirmation of what
one does not know or believe to be true, is equally in morals
and in law as unjustifiable as the afiirmation of what he knows
to be positively false: Ainslee '0. Medlycott, 9 Ves., 21; Graves
v. W7zite, Freem., 57; Pearson c. Morgan, 2 Bro. Ch., 389.
And even if the party innocently misrepresents a fact by mis
take it is equally conclusive; for it operates as a surprise and
imposition on the other party: 2 Bro. Oh. R., 389,- 10 Ves.,
475,‘ 1 Ves. and B., 355; 3 Ves. and B., 111.
Fraud and damage coupled together will entitle the injured
party to relief in any court of justice: 7 Johns. Ch., 201.
Geo. Woodruf, for defendants:
[*303] *If the representations of the defendants were not
fraudulent, then the bill is not sustainable. If what
the defendants said is consistent with a mistaken judgment as
to the quantity of pine and a water power, and a. fraudulent
intent and act is not clearly proved, the complaint is not made
out, and no rule of equity can be shown which will relieve the
complainant from making out a clear case of positive fraud in
this case.
The statement must be of fact and not of opinion: 1 Story’s
La, 206.
Tun: CHANOELLOB-3
[*304] The bill in this case charges that the complainant *(a
resident of New York) on the lst of October, 1839,
had at Marshall, in this state, a large quantity of goods.
we
THIRD CIRCUIT. 304
Jonas v. Wmo um Dans.
That Wing and Dean (the defendants) were then merchants
at Marshall, and that the complainant intrusted a part of the
goods to them to be sold on his account.
'
That they proposed to buy the goods of the complainant,
and pay for them in lands in the county of Clinton, and with a
view to induce the complainant to take the lands, made to him
the following representations: That of the one thousand two
hundred acres, the northern six hundred and forty acres were
the most valuable pine lands in the state; that they would
average from seventy to ninety trees per acre, and those from
two and a half to five feet in diameter. That they had actual
knowledge of the quality of the lands from their own examin
ations, and that they would warrant there were forty trees per
acre on the six hundred and forty acres. And that they also
stated that there was a good mill site, by which a fall of six or
eight feet could be obtained on Maple river.
The sale was consummated on the eighteenth of December;
the complainant soon after went to examine the lands, when he
found, as is alleged, that out of the six hundred and forty
acres there was not more than one hundred and fifteen acres
of pine timber.
The complainant returned to Marshall in the month of Feb
ruary following, and saw the defendant Dean, to whom he
immediately represented that he had been defrauded, and
demanded restitution, which was refused.
The principal point in the case is as to the representations
made respecting the quality of the lands.
The answer of the defendants admits the sale of the goods
for the consideration stated in the bill. They deny that they
represented the six hundred and forty acres as the most
valuable pine lands in the state, and that they would average
from seventy to ninety trees per acre, and that they would war
rant there were forty pine trees to the acre, from two and a
half to five feet in diameter, on the whole six hundred and
forty acres. It is proper here to say, that the answer in this
an
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respect is not entirely satisfactory. If an allegation is made
with divers circumstances, the defendant should not
[*305] deny it literally as laid in the *bi1l, but should answer
the point of substance positively and certainly.
The defendants in their answer further say, that of the eight
lots they stated that four certainly had pine timber on them,
on another they thought there was pine, but were not sure; that
they had examined five, perhaps six, of the lots the summer
before, but had not examined the other two. That in Decem
ber, 183 9, they told the complainant in the presence of Samuel
Camp and R. B. White, that, as they thought, there were forty
pine trees on an acre on the land where the pine grew. There
are other allegations in the bill which are totally denied. There
is a great discrepancy between the bill and the answer, and we
are compelled to resort to the testimony, to ascertain the char
acter of the representations concerning the land which is the
principal subject of controversy.
The answer of the defendants refers to statements made in
the presence of White and Samuel Camp. Mr. Camp says “ that
Mr. Dean stated that that land of theirs up north would aver
age from sixty to ninety pine trees per acre, from two and a
half to five feet through, and from sixty to ninety feet to the
limbs; and this conversation was had but a day or two before
the bargain was consummated.” This testimony is substan
tially corroborated by that of White, and in some respects the
testimony of White is still stronger. On being asked what
proportion of the lots did Wing and Dean represent as having
pine on them, he replied that the expression was unqualified;
and it was that the pine lands would have from sixty to ninety
trees to the acre; and one of the defendants said he thought he
would not be afraid to warrant forty trees to the acre. On
being asked if the defendant referred to the whole or a part,
says he did not refer to any particular part.
The testimony of George E. Savage alone sustains to some
extent the ground taken in the answers. He left Marshall some
ms
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time before the conversation referred to by Camp and White,
and before the bargain was closed. He was examined a long
time after the transaction took place. But admitting his tes
timony to be substantially true, if the testimony of Samuel
Camp, White, and Hermon Camp of subsequent conversations
is also taken as true (and I do not see how it can be avoided),
it would not change the result.
Q
*The testimony of Hermon Camp of the conversa- [*306]
tion which took place at the time of the delivery of
the deed is important. At this time, it would appear by the
testimony of this witness, the defendants assured the complain
ant that there were six hundred and forty acres of good pine
land, which would average forty trees to the acre. He further
states that Jones said he had never been on the land, and that
he depended on the statement of the defendants.
There can be no doubt that the lands turned out to be very
different from such lands as the complainant would naturally
have been led to expect from these representations. The wit
nesses vary somewhat as to the quantity of pine lands. One of
the witnesses states that there may be in all one hundred and
seventy acres of pine, but of a quality inferior to the represen
tations. Another from one hundred and eighty to one hundred
and eighty-five, averaging from eighteen to twenty-two trees
to the acre. Another witness states the quantity at sixty
acres of good pine. The other witness, Lyon, says there may
be one hundred acres of pretty fair pine land, averaging about
twenty trees to the acre.
It would seem that but about one-fourth of the land has pine
timber upon it
,
and upon this not much more than half the
quantity which the complainant would have been led to expect
from the representations made; and the complainant was a
stranger, who had not seen the lands, and who relied upon the
representations of the defendants. Whether these representa
tions were made knowing that they were untrue, or were made
without knowing whether they were true or false, the effect
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upon the complainant is the same, and the consequence which
must follow must be the same.
The complainant, as appears from the case, trusted to them
and was misled. Some other points were made in the case, but
as their consideration cannot vary the result, it is not neces
sary further to refer to them.
The only doubt I have had in the case has resulted from a
slight degree of suspicion from the great degree of confidence
which seems to have been reposed in the defendants by the
complainant, that he may have seemed to rely on these repre
sentations, with a view to a resort to this mode of redress; but
there is not sufiicient shown in the case to authorize
[*307] this conclusion, and I think it is not so; and *there is no
alternative left to the co1n't but to declare the contract
rescinded, and to decree a re-delivery of the remaining portion
of the goods to the complainant, and award the repayment to
him of the value of the goods which have been sold by the
defendants, and to decree that until this payment shall be made
he shall retain his lien upon the lands as a security for the
amount due him for the goods which have been sold.
Decree accordingly.
aso
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Austin Wales v. The Bank of Michigan.
Ofllcera of bank, powers of. Where a.note is made payable at a bank, it is within
the ordinary scope ot the powers of the bank ofllcers to receive other notes as
collateral, on the understanding that they shouldbe placed in the bank tor col~
lection, and that when a sufllcient amount should be collected thereon for the
purpose it should satisfy the first note. (a)
Relief against judgment. Where a party is ignorant of the facts which constitute a
defense at law imtil after judgment is rendered against him, he may have reliet
in equity. (b)
The bill in this case states that complainant indorsed for the
sole benefit and accommodation of one Wessel Whitaker, a
note made by him dated July 5, 1837, payable ninety days
after date to the order of E. T. Clark and Isaac O. Adams, at
the Bank of Michigan, for the sum of $1,000. That the note
was indorsed by Clark & Adams as first indorsers, and Whit
aker delivered to complainant, to secure the complainant for
indorsing, one note for $600 or thereabouts, and another note
for $l,39l.36, with authority to collect a suflicient amount on
these notes to indemnify complainant for his indorsement.
That this agreement was communicated to E. P. Hastings,
president of the Bank of Michigan; and the notes were placed
in his hands to be so collected and applied. Complainant was
sued on his indorsement, and May 1, 1839, judgment was ren
dered against him for $1,131.21, and fi. fa. was issued thereon.
That after the fi. fa. had been issued, upon inquiry at the
bank, complainant ascertained that the note for $600 had been
collected, and the amount had not been applied. That the
bank had let Theodore Romeyn have the $1,391.36 note, and
had taken from him an agreement to pay the amount due
(a) As to the powers of bank ofllcers in general, see Farmers‘ and Mechanics‘
Bank u. Troy City Bank, 1 Doug. Mich., 457; Kimball 1:. Cleveland, 4 Mich., 606;
Peninsular Bank v. Hanmer, 14Mich., 208.
(b) See Wright 11.King, ante, 12; Mack v. Doty, poet, 366; Burpee v. Smith, Wal.
lOh., 327; Wixom 1:. Davis, Wal. Ch., 15; Roberts v. Miles, 12 Mich., 292',for other
cases ln which have been considered the circumstances under which equity will give
-relief to a party after judgment against him at law. And as to the granting by a
court of equity of a new trial at law, see Morris v. Hadley, 9Mich., 278.~.281
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thereon in sixty days, to which agreement complainant never
assented.
The bill prayed for a perpetual injunction, and for a release
and discharge of the judgment against complainant, and for
other relief.
To this bill the defendants demurred.
[*309] *Joy & Porter, in support of demurrer, cited 6
Peters, 51 ,' 1 Johns. Ch., 49, 820, 465 ,- 2 Ib., 228.
D. Goodwin, contra, cited 5 Peters, 99.
T111: GHANCELI-OBI
The grounds taken in support of the demurrer are these:
1. That Mr. Hastings, then president of the bank, was acting
as the agent of Wales, and not in behalf of the bank.
The question now presented is upon demurrer, by which the
allegations in the bill for the purpose of this decision must be
taken to be true.
The allegation is
,
that the notes which were held as collat
eral security “ were placed by the complainant in the bank,
with the said president thereof, to be by the said president,
directors and company used, held, collected and applied as
before mentioned; that is
,
for the purpose of paying the note of
Whitaker, of which Whitaker was indorser.
It further appears that one of the notes of about $600, so
deposited, has been collected, and that the proceeds have not
been applied to the payment of the note indorsed by Wales.
That the other note has been given up by the then president
of the bank, upon the undertaking of another individual to pay
to the bank the amount of Whitaker’s note, upon which Wales
was indorser.
Under these allegations, uncontradicted, it would seem that
these securities have been treated throughout as a part of the
security on which the bank relied for the payment of this note,
and that it comes fairly within the scope of the powers of the
2s2
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ofiicers of the bank; it was one of the most ordinary transac
tions, to Wit, taking security for a debt.
The fact that one of the notes has been collected and the
proceeds not applied as was agreed, and that the bank is still
proceeding to collect the entire judgment, must be fatal to a
general demurrer, unless it can be sustained on other grounds.
2. The other ground in support of the demurrer is that this
complainant comes too late. That he should have made his
defense at law.
*The rule
on_
this subject is very rigid, and should [*310]
be adhered to. But this seems to me to come within
the excepted cases.
The rule laid down in Lansing '0. Eddy, 1 Johns. Ch., 51, is
stated by Chancellor Kent to be, that this court will not relieve
against a judgment at law on the ground of its being contrary
to equity, unless the defendant below was ignorant of the fact
in question, pending the suit, or it could not have been received
as a defense. This relief is often also refused where the party
has been guilty of negligence.
The allegation here is that the complainant confidently relied
and expected the defendant would collect and apply the pro
ceeds of these notes to the payment of the note of Whitaker,
on which he was indorser, and did not know or suspect he had
any legal defense until after the judgment was rendered, when
he for the first time learned that one of the notes had been col
lected, but the proceeds had not been applied; and that the
other had been transferred upon the understanding of a third
person to pay this identical note, upon which the judgment is
rendered against him as indorser.
The circumstances were well calculated to lull the complain
ant into security. But for these transactions of the defendants,
there was no defense to the note; of these he knew nothing
until after the judgment was rendered, the complainant rely
ing, as he says, that the money would be collected upon the
collateral notes to pay off this liability.
The demurrer must be overruled, with leave to answer.
Demurrer overruled.
ass
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John Freeman v. The Michigan State Bank.
Amendment of plea. In an application to amend the defendant’a pleading, the pro
posed amendments should be set out. (a)
A plea may be allowed to be amended for the purpose of placing before the courtan
additional fact unknown to the defendant when the plea was flied, and consis
tent with the defense then made. But it will not be permitted for the purpose of
setting up a fact or state of facts inconsistent with the original defense.
This was a motion for leave to amend a plea. The motion
was based upon an affidavit, setting up certain facts which had
come to the knowledge of the defendant’s ofiicers after the
original plea had been filed in the cause, and which it was pro
posed to incorporate therein. The proposed amendment was
set out in the application.
Joy dc Porter, for the application, cited Story/’s Eq. Pl.,
secs. 701, 895, 896, 897', 902, 908,- 18 Ves., 438.
[*3l2] *1Z H Emmons, contra, denied that this was a
proper case for amendment. Pleas are only allowed
to be amended in case of surprise, mistake or inadvertence; not
to meet facts which defendant claims not to have known, but
which he might have known had he been sufliciently diligent.
He cited Star;/s Eg. PL, secs. 701, 896,- 1 .HofiI Oh. Pr., 226,"
O'ooper’s Eq. PL, $36, 837.
[_*313] *Tns. Crrxuc ELLORZ
Leave to amend is usually based upon mistake, inadvertence,
etc.
In this case it is sworn in the affidavit, that the additional
fact which it is desired to present to the court by this amend
ment, was unknown at the time of filing this plea.
Courts have always been rigid in requiring that amendments
of this kind should be stated in the application, and a defendant
(a) See Mason v. Detroit City Bank, ante, 222; Graves v. Niles, post, 332.
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will not usually be permitted to set up a fact or a state of facts
inconsistent with the original defense. But the amendment
here contemplated goes no further than to state an additional
fact unknown at the time of filing the original plea, and per
fectly consistent with it. , '
In examining all the cases cited, I can find no one where
leave to amend under circumstances analogous to these has
been refused, where the amendment is necessary to place the
grounds of defense fairly before the court.
The rule is stated in Oooper’s Pleading, 336, that it is not
usual to refuse leave to amend pleas, yet the defendant must be
tied down to a very short time in which to amend; and
this is fully sustained *by the case cited (2 Vesey, 85), [*314]
where leave was given to plead de no'0o.
This practice is consistent with the practice in permitting
amendments to sworn answers, and I can see no reason why the
rule should not be admitted in amending pleas as well as sworn
answers.
_ This is not a case where a party first obtains the opinion of
the court, and then sets up an additional fact known to him at,
the time of pleading, or a defense inconsistent with the first
plea.
It appears that this was unknown at the time of filing the
plea, but has since been ascertained. I can see no danger in
allowing an amendment in such acase when it seems absolutely
necessary to place the defense fairly before the court.
On the contrary, it seems to me to be in entire harmony
with the practice in analogous cases. If a plea may be amended
upon the ground of amistake or inadvertence, I do not see why
it should not be for the purpose of stating a newly discovered
fact necessary to the defense and consistent with the original
plea.
Amendment allowed if made within ten days.
I85
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Attorney-General v. The Bank of Michigan.
Corporations, jurisdiction over. The jurisdiction of this court over corporate bodies,
for the purpose of restraining their operations, or of winding up their concerns,
is based upon and controlled by the statutes of the state. It has no such juris
diction at common law, or under its general equity powers, and it will not inter
fere except when the case is fairly brought within the scope and object of the
statute conferring this special jurisdiction. (a)
The provisions of the act of June 21,1837,and the act of April IQ, 1841,in regard to
banks and incorporations, commented upon and explained.
Statutes, construction of. Where one part of an act is equivocal, other portions of
the act may be resorted to as a guide in construction. The occasion and the rea
son of the enactment, which is the same thing as the old law and the mischief;
the letter of the act, whether words be used in their proper or in a technical
sense; the context, the spirit of the act, whether statutes be in their nature rem
edial or penal, the subject matter and the provisions of the act, and the intent of
the legislature in passing it, are to be considered; which intent is not to be coi
lected from any particular expression, but from a general view of the whole of
the act. (b)
Forfeiture of corporate rights. If a corporation has forfeited its rights by mlsfeas
ance, or non-feasance, such forfeiture must be shown by the pleadings; it is not
to be presumed; the legal presumption is otherwise.
The fact that a bank not protected by statute authorizing a suspension of specie
payments, has stopped payment, is not of itself conclusive evidence of its ina
bility to pay its debts, but is prima facie evidence of inability or insolvency. (c)
I1l]'M.'|'|.CtiO7lagainst suspended bank. The rule adopted in this state has been not to
grant an injunction in the first instance upon the allegation alone that a.bank
has stopped payment, but to grant a.rule to show cause and require notice to be
given to the defendants. If not explained or excused in cases where the banks
are not protected from a forfeiture of their charters by reason of a failure, the
court would be authorized to grant an injunction and appoint a receiver. But
when banks are authorized to suspend specie payments, such refusal is not even
prima facie evidence of insolvency.
The true construction of the sixth section of the suspension act of April 12, 1841,is
that the statements should be made out and transmitted to the secretary of state
on the days specified, or as soon thereafter as the same can be made out and
stated.
Statutory condition, when to beperformed. Where no time is prescribed in which
an act is to be done, it must be done in a reasonable time. (d)
(a) See also Attorney-General v. Oakland County Bank, Wal. Ch., 90.
(b)See Sibley v. Smith, 2Mich., 486,which is to the same eflect.
(c) See Barnum v. Bank of Pontiac, ante, 116.
(d) SeeB]/ram v. Gordon, 11Mich., 531,and Stan-ge1:.Wilson, 17Mich., 842;where
the same rule of computing time was applied under contracts.
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Motion by complainant for a receiver, and on the part of the
defendant for a modification of the injunction.
The bill states that December 19, 1817, the Bank of Michi
gan was incorporated, with a capital of $100,000; was organized
and went into operation.
*That in accordance with the provisions in its char- [*3l6]
ter, the capital was afterwards augmented to the sum
of $5 00,000. -
That February 25, 1831, the charter was continued for 25
years from and after the first Monday in June, 1839.
That ever since they commenced doing business, and down to
the present time, they have had a banking house in Detroit, and
have done an extensive banking business. That down to 1837,
they were unembarrassed, and were able to meet and pay all
their liabilities upon demand. But ever since that period, and
down to the present time, they have labored under embarrass
ments, and have been unable during the greater portion of the
last mentioned period, and are now unable to meet and pay their
liabilities; and that their ofiicers have for some time past refused
and still continue to refuse to pay the debts of the corporation;
and that they have almost ceased the transaction of any busi
ness as a bank.
That the present liabilities of the bank are large; that its bills
issued and in circulation amount to upwards of $200,000; that it
is indebted largely to depositors, and otherwise; all of which
are payable on demand.
That the state of Michigan is a creditor as bill holder to over
$20,000. That June 11, 1841, complainant demanded pay
ment or security, which was refused by the president and cash
ier of the bank.
Complainant charges insolvency, and avers that the interests
of the state require that it shall be enjoined, and a receiver
appointed.
That in consequence of the refusal to redeem its bills, numer
ous suits have been commenced against it
,
and its cash funds
I
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are becoming diminished, and some creditors receive the full
face of their debts, while others may ultimately receive but
partial payment. That a due regard to the interest of the
creditors generally requires an injunction to prevent the inequit
able distribution of its cash means.
That in and by the act entitled “ An act to provide for pro
ceedings in chancery against corporations,” etc., approved June
21, 1837, the chancellor has power to restrain by injunction any
bank from exercising any of its banking powers, and from
receiving or paying out anything whenever the attor
[*317] ney-general upon bill filed shall furnish *satisfactory
proof that such bank has become insolvent, or unable,
or has refused, to pay its debts. And in and by the seventh
section, the chancellor may compel such bank to discover any
stock, property, moneys, things, choses in action or effects
alleged to belong to it, or in any manner liable for the final
payment of its debts, the transfer and disposition thereof, and
all the circumstances of such transfer and disposition; and that
every such ofiicer, agent or stockholder may be compelled, at the
discretion of the chancellor, to answer any bill filed to obtain
such discovery.
The bill prays that defendants be required to answer all the
allegations in the bill, and particularly that they answer and
discover as particularly required in and by the seventh section.
as above quoted.
The bill prays the granting of writ of injunction, etc., res
training them from exercising any of their corporate rights,
privileges or franchises, and from collecting or receiving any
part of their debts due or to become due; and from paying out
or in any way transferring any of the money, property or effects
of the bank.
Also for the appointment of a receiver or receivers, in pursu
ance of the fifth section of the act last aforesaid, in order that
the assets of the bank may be applied in an equal and propor
tionate manner to the payment of its debts.
T
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A temporary injunction was granted.
The answer admits the organization of the bank, the augmen
tation of stock, the extension of the charter; that it was unem
barrassed up to 1837; that since that -time it has been embar
rassed and unable to meet and pay its liabilities, and has refused
so to do. That the present liabilities of the bank are large, but
insists that its liabilities are now less by $1,200,000 than in 183 7,
and $70,000 less than they were four months ago; and that for
many years past their aggregate“ liabilities have not been so
small as now.
Admits indebtedness to the state of Michigan to amount over
$20,000. And that the bank ofiicers did refuse to pay the same
as stated by complainant, and did decline to execute securities
for the future payment of the same in specie; but that although
they may have declared their inability to do so, as charged in
the bill, it was not because the bank was not possessed of that,
and a much larger amount in specie, but because they
did not deem it their duty to pay *the state of Michi- [*318]
gan in specie, when they could not pay all bill holders
in specie. But they aver that they did offer the attorney
general to turn out assets of the bank in payment; and that he
might have selected from all the assets, amounting in all to
nearly a million of dollars, and of a value very much more than
suflicient to cover and pay all the debts of the bank.
Expressly denies insolvency, and avers that the contrary is
the fact. That on 15th February last, upon the examination by
committee of the legislature, the said committee and oflicers of
the bank made a scrutinizing examination into the situation of
the bank, and of all its assets; by which investigation it was
ascertained as certainly as such a fact could be, that the assets
were suflicient to pay oif and discharge all its liabilities; and
not only so, but also to leave a surplus, after being converted
into cash funds, of more than $400,000, to be divided among
the stockholders. That since said 15th February last, no material
change has taken place in the condition or value of said assets,
10 289
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or to depreciate them, unless it be that the two-thirds or ap
praisal law passed last winter may operate injuriously. That
some of their securities have been changed—some of the paper
then held by the bank has been paid; but no change has taken
place so great as to render the insolvency of the bank a prob
able fact, although the stockholders may be aflfected. That the
bank has in its vaults in specie funds about $50,000.
Admits that numerous suits have been commenced and con
tinue to be, to the injury of the bank, by accumulation of costs
and expenses.
Answer avers that although now embarrassed, the bank is able
and willing to pay and redeem all its bills by turning out its
assets. That many of its creditors are desirous of being thus
paid, and the interests of the public cannot be injured by it.
That the bank has made great efforts to pay ofi their large lia
bilities which it had created in 1886-7; and has succeeded in
liquidating almost entirely those which were the largest and
most pressing, and is now comparatively free from the pressure
of large debts.
States that the appointment of a receiver would be ruinous
to the interests of the stockholders, and could not be
[*319] beneficial to the public, *the state of Michigan, or
the creditors of the bank. That a sudden and forced
winding up of its afiairs by a receiver would be productive of
mischief and injury to the bank, stockholders and creditors.
Attorney- General, in person:
Insolvency is defined to be inability or refusal to redeem.
Both are charged, and both admitted.
Suspension of payment is evidence of insolvency, which
cannot be rebutted by the naked assertion of its ultimate ability
to pay. Such an assertion is nothing more than an expression
of an opinion as to the future value of the assets. V
Whether such opinion is well or ill founded depends upon the
final result, and cannot be known until the usual process has
been gone through of converting them into money.
~—
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The statements in the bill furnish evidence of insolvency.
The mortgage to the Dwights is evidence of insolvency.
If, then, there is good reason to believe the bank insolvent,
by whom shall its afairs be wound up .9
It is not proper to leave the bank in the hands of those ofii
oers under whose administration it has failed.
The appointment of receivers is necessary for this purpose.
The directors and ofiicers of the bank are appointed by and
represent the stockholders. Their sympathies and prejudices
are with them, and are adverse to the bill holders.
The appointment of strangers will secure a fearless investi
gation of its affairs, which the public have a right to expect.
It may become their duty to institute proceedings against the
directors and officers.
The facts cannot be known until the receivers investigate.
In the language of Chancellor Walworth, “ Those creditors
who have been stripped of their property by the failure of the
bank, have a right to claim from the court the appointment of
receivers upon whose impartial investigations they can rely,
and who could have no interests in opposition to theirs:” 1
Paige, 517; 3 Wend., 588.
Chancellor Walworth says: “ If the interests of
stockholders were first *consulted, it would be proper [*320]
to give to those indebted to the bank, and in poor cir
cumstances, sufiicient time to buy up the bills from honest
creditors at a great discount, and thus restore the broken insti
tution to a state of solvency. But in such case the real cred
itors would lose the greatest part of their debts, although the
stockholders in the end might save something of the stock. It
is therefore necessary and proper, in every case of this kind,
for the protection of the creditors, who have the first claim to
the property, to turn its efects into cash with the least possible
delay, so that a distribution may be made before their necessi
ties or fears compel them to sacrifice their demands.”
The bank now seeks to obtain from the chancellor what the
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legislature refused to grant them, to wit, immunity against its
bill holders.
Joy <5:Porter, for defendants:
As to the jurisdiction of the court, it is limited by the statutes.
1 Edwards Rep, 8'7, and cases there cited, are conclusive.
The extent of the authority conferred is settled by this court
in the case of Barnum v. Bank of Pontiac, ante, 116.
As to the proof of insolvency upon which charge alone the
injunction rests, see 1 Paige, 515 ,' 3 Wend., 590; 1 Edwards,
92,- 2 Edwards, 286'.
A receiver, then, cannot be appointed. Will the court
modify the injunction? It must dissolve it on motion, why not
then modify? The answer is ample and complete as to the
only charge upon which the bill rests; the whole equity of the
bill is denied.
The only real question is whether the court will hear this
motion at this time. We say it will, because the whole equity
of the bill is denied, and exceptions can avail the complainant
nothing if they are taken; they will only cause injury to the
defendant without object. The rule relative to exceptions does
not apply in such a case: 4 Paige, 111 ,' ante, 162.
Besides, the court reserved by its own order the power to
modify at any time: Swanst, 228; Merivale, 29 ,' Eden,
[*321] 122. *As to the suspension law, the court must pre
sume that the bank is under it
,
until the attorney
general shows that it is not.
So far as the Bank of Michigan is concerned, the terms of
the law are express, and include the bank by name. The court
will say and presume that the bank has accepted a law enacted
for its benefit, unless the contrary appear. The answer was
only to the bill filed. The bills neither of them charge that
the bank has not accepted or availed itself of the suspension
law, and it must of course be taken to have done so unless
the contrary be stated or in some way appear.
Li
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It does not fall upon us to show that we are under the pro
tection of a law passed for our express benefit, unless the
opposite party charges that we are not under it. We are there
until they show that we are not.
A corporation will be presumed to have accepted of the terms
of an act passed for its benefit, until the contrary appear. This
is reason, and the principle has been repeatedly decided in the
supreme court of the United States. Indeed this must be so,
because otherwise the bank could not show the fact before July.
The question of filing a statement does not come up because it
does not ajqaear to the court that it was not properly filed. And
had any such charge been made, we should have shown that it
was properly and duly filed under the law.
Tun Cnxnonnnoa: ’
Before proceeding to the examination of the facts disclosed
by the pleadings in this cause, it will be necessary to examine
the statutory provisions which have a bearing upon the question
presented. The jurisdiction of this court in this class of cases is
based upon and controlled by the statutes. It has no such
jurisdiction at common law: The Attorney General v. The
Uiica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch., 371; Same v. Bank of Niagara,
Hopk., 354; Verjplanck '0.Mercantile Ins. 00., 1 Edw., 87. In
the last mentioned case the chancellor says: “After such
repeated decisions expressly disclaiming all jurisdiction over
corporate bodies for the purpose of restraining their operations,
or of Winding up their concerns under the general equity powers
of the court, the complainants must not expect any in
terference, except it be under special authority of *ex- [*322]
isting statutes, and when the case is fairly brought
within their scope and object.” The proceedings in this case
are based upon the provisions of the act of June 21, 1837.
This imposes upon the court the duty of inquiring how far the
powers and duties of this court are controlled by subsequent
legislation. By the first section of the act of April 12, 1841,
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it is enacted that every provision of law in force requiring or
authorizing proceedings against the Bank of Michigan and the
Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Bank of Michigan and their branches,
with a view to forfeit their charters or wind up their concerns,
or which requires them to suspend their operations and pro
ceedings in consequence of a refusal to pay their notes or evi
dences of debt in specie, is hereby suspended. Section three
requires the Bank of Michigan to lessen its liabilities at the
rate of $20,000 quarter-yearly. Section four prohibits any bank
from dividing or paying to its stockholders or to any person for
them any dividends, profit, or interest, until after it shall have
resumed paying its debts and liabilities in specie, and shall have
continued to do so in good faith for three months. Section five
inhibits the banks and their oflicers from selling specie or bul
lion at a premium, and from purchasing its notes at a discount;
and provides that “ every violation of this section shall be a
forfeiture of its charter.” Section six is
, “That every such
bank or branch shall transmit a statement under oath of the
president, cashier, and a majority of the creditors, of its true
condition, once in every three months, viz.: On the first day
of January, April, July and October, to the secretary of state,
who shall cause the same to be published in the state paper; and
the expense of such publication shall be paid by the banks
respectively.” Section seven is as follows: “ It shall be the duty
of the secretary of state, on the receipt of each quarterly state
ment provided for in the sixth section of this act, to transmit
as soon as practicable, to the governor, lieutenant-governor,
auditor-general and treasurer of this state, each a certified copy
of such statement; and if on examination of the same, it shall
appear to any one of said officers, including the secretary of
state, that any bank availing itself of the provisions of this act
is, or has been so conducting its business, as in their opin
[*323] ion to endanger the interests or security of the *public;
or those holding its notes or other evidences of debt,
or in any way improperly to abuse the privileges by this act
294
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granted; or if from any other cause any such officer shall have
good reason to believe that any such bank has so improperly
conducted, that it shall be the duty of such ofiicer, with the
advice and consent of one or more of his associates above named,
forthwith to cause an examination to be made of the conduct
and aflfairs of such bank; and in case it shall thereupon appear
to the satisfaction of three or more of said officers, that such
bank is
,
or has been conducting its business improperly as afore
said, it is hereby made their duty forthwith to report such fact
to the attorney-general, who is hereby required to proceed
against such bank as directed in the tenth section of this act.”
Section eight provides that the Bank of Marshall, the Bank of
Adrian, the Merchants’ Bank of Jackson County, the Bank of
Constantine, and the Erie and Kalamazoo Railroad Bank, may
avail themselves of the provisions of this act, by conforming
to its requirements, upon obtaining the certificate of the audi
tor-general, state treasurer, and secretary of state, that their
business has been honestly managed, and that they are in a
sound condition. Section nine provides, that the auditor
general, state treasurer and secretary of state, before they pro
ceed to examine such banks as may apply to them for
that purpose, shall make oath before any person authorized
to administer the same, that they will not grant a certificate
to any bank unless they shall be perfectly satisfied that the
resources of such bank are, and will be adequate to the ultimate
payment of its circulation and all other liabilities permitted by
this act. Section ten authorizes the attorney-general to pro
ceed against any bank availing itself of the provisions of this
act, and which shall directly or indirectly violate the same by
injunction, guo warranto, or otherwise, in the same manner as
if this section (probably a misprint for act) had not passed.
The act of April 12, 1841, in its material provisions is a literal
copy from the suspension law of New York of May 16, 1837.
The first section is identical except that the names of the Bank
of Michigan and the Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Bank are intro
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duced. Of the construction of the New York statute there is
no doubt. In respect to a portion of the banks in that
[*324] state, the law *requires that a bank “which shall suspend
specie payments shall, on pain of forfeiture of its char
ter, “ wholly discontinue and close their banking operations.”
What was intended by the provision of the ninth section of the
suspension law of New York, placing the banks under the
supervision of the bank commissioners, and authorizing them
to institute proceedings against any bank in dangerous or insol
vent circumstances? It could not have intended an inability
to pay their liabilities at the time, as the very object of the law
was to relieve the banks from the penalties they incurred by
reason of such inability. It must have contemplated ultimate
insolvency. By our statute the ofiicers who are constituted
special commissioners for this purpose may, if they are satisfied
any bank is so conducting its affairs as to endanger the secur
ity of the public or those holding its notes, institute an exam
ination, and upon the concurrence of three of them proceedings
may be instituted under the provisions of the act. There can
be no doubt that the construction of the first section of the
New York statute is, that every provision of law requiring or
authorizing proceedings against banks with a view to forfeit
their charters or wind up their concerns, and that every pro
vision of law which requires them to suspend operations and
proceedings in consequence of a refusal to pay their notes and
evidences of debt in specie is-suspended. I do not well see
what other construction can be given to this section either in
the New York act or our own. The words “or which ” must
refer to the provisions of law which were intended to be sus
pended. Where one part of the act is equivocal, other por
tions of the act may be resorted to as a guide. “ The occasion
and the reason of the enactment (which is the same thing with
the old law and the mischief), the letter of the act (whether
words be used in their proper or technical sense), the context,
the spirit of the act (whether statutes be in their nature reme
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dial or penal), the subject matter and the provisions of the act,
have all to be considered. Again, the intent of the legislature
is not to be collected from any particular expression, but from
a general view of the whole of the act:” Per Best, Ch. J, 3
Bing., 196," Dwarris on Statutes, 47, 48. The ninth section of
the law of New York places the suspended banks under the spe
cial supervision of the bank commissioners. The sixth
section of our law requires the suspended banks *to [*325]
transmit a statement of their condition once in three
months to the secretary of state. Section seven contemplates
that the oflicers therein mentioned, and to whom a copy of each
statement is to be transmitted, and each of them, shall exercise
a supervision over those suspended banks, and if in the opinion
of either of them, any bank is
,
or has been so conducting its
business as to endanger the interests or security of the public
or those holding its notes or other evidences of debt, any such
oflicer, with the advice and consent of one or more of his asso
ciates, may institute an examination of its affairs. It has been
shown that in the construction of statutes which may admit of
doubt, we must resort to the object and intent of the legislature,
the mischief to be obviated, and the remedy contemplated.
It appears from the pleadings in this cause that the legislature
had instituted a careful investigation of the afiairs of this bank.
The condition of its assets was not then materially variant from
the present. Its liabilities have since that time been dimin
ished some $120,000, and it appears that for many years no
part of its assets have been used otherwise than for the pay
ment of its liabilities. The legislature must have been aware
of the inability of the bank to pay off its liabilities immedi
ately, though they seem to have entertained no doubt of its
ultimate solvency. Can it by any possibility be inferred that
the legislature contemplated or intended by this legislation that
this bank should be wound up on the ground of insolvency
under the state of facts here presented? The insolvency is
again and again denied in every form by the president and
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directors, who must be deemed better able to form an opinion
than strangers unacquainted with its concerns, and this, too, after
a full, careful, and detailed investigation of all their assets and
liabilities. Not only is insolvency denied, but it is alleged that
there will remain a large surplus after the payment of all their
debts and liabilities. Did the legislature intend to treat the
several banks which should become subject to the suspension
act unequally ? This cannot be supposed. The ninth section
provides, that the banks which are named in the eighth section
shall satisfy the auditor-general, state treasurer and secretary
of state, “that the resources of such bank as shall apply to
them for that purpose, are, and will be adequate to the ultimate
payment of its circulation and all other liabilities per
[*326] mitted by this act.” This is in harmony *with the
supervision vested in those oflicers by the seventh sec
tion. Under that section, if they, or any three of them should
become satisfied that from the conduct of the bank or the con
dition of its afiairs, legal proceedings were necessary to effect
an equality of distribution or a.proper application of its means,
it would then be competent for them to direct proceedings to
be instituted under the provisions of that act. For the purposes
of this motion it should be remarked that this bank must be
considered as under the provisions of the suspension act. It was
placed expressly under it in terms, from and after the passage
of the act. If it has forfeited its rights under it by misfeasance
or non-feasance, such forfeiture must be shown. No allusion
is made in the pleadings to any act of omission or commission
by which such forfeiture has been incurred. It is not to be
presumed. The legal presumption is otherwise. It has been
held that grants beneficial to corporations may be presumed to
have been accepted, and an express acceptance is not necessary:
Charles River Bridge '0. Warren Bridge, 7 Pick., 344; Dart
mouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat., 688; U1 S. Bani: '0.
Dandridge, 12 Wheat., 71. But admitting that the opera
tion of the first section of the suspension act should be lim
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ited to the failure to pay its notes or evidences of debt in
specie, which from a careful examination I think it can
not, would the result be varied? The legislature could not
have intended to apply one rule to the banks specially
named in the first section of the act, and which were undoubt
edly the principal objects intended to be benefitted by it and
another to the other banks named in the act. We have seen
that those banks were required only to satisfy the oflicers before
named of their ability ultimately to pay their liabilities. We
have seen this ability in the case under consideration asserted
and re-asserted in the broadest and most comprehensive form
by those best acquainted with its condition. The answer, for
the purpose of the present motion, must be taken as true.
Under either construction of the act, then, the motion must
be denied. Some misapprehension seems to have been enter
tained upon the efiect of the refusal of any bank not protected
by statute to pay its debts or liabilities in specie. The rule
adopted here is the same as in New York. In the case of the
Att0rney- General v. The Bank of Columbia, 1 Paige, 511, the
chancellor says, that the fact that the bank has stopped
*payment is not of itself conclusive evidence of its [*327]
inability to pay its debts, but is prima facie evidence
of inability or insolvency. In the case of Stuart '0. Mechanics’
Bank, 19 Johns., 497, it is said “ a bank may be quite solvent
notwithstanding it fails to redeem its bills. This we know to
have happened in several instances where the ability and sol
vency of the banks have been afterwards fully established.”
The rule adopted here has been not to grant an injunction in
the first instance upon this allegation alone, but to grant a rule
to show cause and require notice to be given to the defendants.
If not explained or encased in cases where the banks are not pro
tected from a forfeiture of their charters by reason of a failure
to pay specie, the court would be authorized to grant an injunc
tion and appoint a receiver. But where banks are authorized
to suspend specie payments, it is not primafacie evidence of
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insolvency. It may be proper to say that the result to which I
feel myself compelled, by the provisions of law bearing upon
this case, to arrive, in my opinion. will be better for the inter
est of the bill-holders and creditors of the bank than would be
the usually disastrous measure of appointing receivers. It must
be apparent that in the present condition of the country such
a measure must result in great losses, and that heavy expenses
must be incurred, and if by such means the resources of the
bank should be found insufiicient to pay its liabilities, the loss
must fall upon its creditors. The entire resources of the bank
have been thus far applied to the payment and security of its
debts, and the officers of the bank in their answers state their
intention to continue so to do. The aggregate amount of the
indebtedness of the directors is small. No part of the resources
of the bank has been diverted to pay dividends, and I can per
ceive nothing in the case as presented before me to lead to the
belief that the affairs of this institution have not been honestly
and in good faith administered. But these remarks, which
would apply properly in a case for the exercise of discretion
in the appointment of a receiver, are perhaps unnecessary in
the present case, as, from the view I have taken of the law
bearing upon it
,
and from which I cannot escape, there is no
room for the exercise of this discretion in the case. The law
being positive, the rights of the defendants are fixed, and the
duty imposed upon the court imperative. A question
[*328] has been incidentally *raised as to the construction of
section six of the suspension act, but as it is not neces
sary to the decision of the case, I have had some doubt as
to the propriety or necessity of expressing an opinion upon it.
The facts do not appear as to when this bank filed its state
ment of the condition of its affairs. The question is, are the
banks compelled to transmit a statementof their condition on
the first days of January, April, July and October, or are they
to transmit a statement of the condition they were in on those
days as soon as the same can thereafter be made out and stated?
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It would of course be impossible to ascertain their condition
on a particular day and make and transmit a statement on the
same day. If the statement is to be transmitted on those days
it must be of their condition on some previous day, and each
bank must be left to select its own day. This would certainly
open the door for transfers from one to the other, and might
lead to inconveniences which the legislature intended to guard
against by requiring a simultaneous statement of the condition
of all the banks on the same day. Some of the banks contem
plated by the terms of the act are situate some one hundred
and fifty miles distant from the ofiice of the secretary of state.
Are those banks required to file on that day a statement of
their condition, or on some indefinite previous day of their own
selection, or must they “ transmit ” by mailing their statement
on that day, or was it the intention of the legislature that they
should transmit a statement of their condition on the particu
lar days indicated by the act ? The statute requires that the
statement of the condition of the banks shall be made under
oath of the president, cashier, and a majority of the directors.
Should this be impossible, from the absence or sickness of the
president or cashier, or a portion of the directors, must the
statement be actually transmitted on this particular day under
pain of a. forfeiture ? The language and object of the act,
the security intended to be afforded to the public, the incon
venience, if not impossibility of otherwise conforming to its
terms, all concur in leading to the construction that the state
ments shall show the condition of all the banks under the sus
pension law at one and the same period of time; and that their
statements shall be filed as soon as they can properly be pre
pared and examined by the difierent oflicers required to make
oath to the truth of the statements of their condition
*on those days. Where no time is prescribed in [*329]
which an act is to be done, it must be done in a rea
sonable time, and this must be determined by the tribunal
before which the question may be made: 9 Picla, 404; Coke
s01
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Litt., 208. But if the construction should be otherwise, I do
not perceive how a failure to conform to this section on the
particular days mentioned can be held ipso facto to work a for
feiture. The rights and immunities conferred upon this bank
by the first section of the suspension act are positive and
unconditional. The fifth section provides that a failure to con
form to the provisions of that section shall work a forfeiture.
The sixth section is directory, and imposes no penalty or for
feiture. The consequence of a failure to conform to the
requirements contained in that section, therefore, would subject
the delinquent bank to be proceeded against under the provi
sions of the tenth section of the act, and the failure to conform
to the provisions of the act must be averred and shown. The
bill, as before stated, contains no such averment, and as the
question is not necessarily involved in the decision of this
motion, I should not have deemed it necessary to express an
opinion upon it
,
but from the consideration that as the views
I have taken of the law must be conclusive upon the principal
object of the bill, the complainant, if any doubt is entertained
of the correctness of the conclusion arrived at, maybe disposed
to take an appeal to the supreme court; and in that case it will
be desirable that this question, as well as the others, should be
presented and settled in the appellate court.
Having now said all that can be material to a decision of the
question presented, it would have been certainly gratifying, if
consistent with my views of duty, here to pause. But with
the hope that it may not be without its utility hereafter, I
think it my duty to refer to the unusual and extraordinary
course which has been pursued during the pendency of this
controversy, having a tendency to create excitement and pre
occupy public opinion. Minatory articles have from time to
time appeared in the public papers. The consequences of fail
ing to yield to this artificial excitement have been shadowed
forth. Various interests and considerations, very far from be
ing properly connected with any question of legal right involved
aos
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in the cause, have been enlisted. A detailed recital of
the circumstances referred to is not *deemed neces- [*330]
sary, and would afiord no pleasure. It would have
been easy to have acquired cheap temporary applause by yield
ing to the current. But the court has a higher duty to perform.
It is bound to declare the law as it is, and to vouchsafe to every
one his rights under the law without regard to consequences.
Whenever the rights of litigant parties shall be surrendered to
any such extraneous influences there is an end of all security
and of all confidence.
This is the first time I have had occasion to recur to impro
prieties of this character. It is painful to do so now; I trust it
may never again be necessary. ,
The result is that the motion for the appointment of receiv
ers must be denied. A motion was submitted at the same time
for a modification of the injunction, but as the attorney-general
expresses his election that if the motion for the appointment of
receivers is denied, the injunction should be dissolved, and as
from the views expressed, such must be the final result, the
order will be entered accordingly, except so far as relates to the
assigned assets. That presents a distinct question which has
not been considered, and the injunction will be so far retained
until the further order of the court.
ma
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Supplemental bill, what may embrace. If material facts have occurred subsequent
to the commencement of the suit the court will give the complainant leave to file
a supplemental bill, and where such leave is given the court will permit other
matters to be introduced into the supplemental bill, which might have been
incorporated in the original by way of amendment; and this is especially proper
where the matter which occurred prior is necessary to the properielucidation of
that which occurred subsequentto the filing of the original bill.
Supplemental answer, leave to file when allowed. An application to file a supple
mental or amended answer is seldom granted, and never without the utmost
caution, and when a.just and necessary case is clearly made out, and it is then
generally confined to a clear case of mistake, as to matter of fact, and as to that
only; and the court is still more cautious in granting such an application after a
cqpsiderable lapse of time from the filing of the bill or original answer in the
case.
Where a motion was made to file a supplemental or amended answer in which it was
proposed to take entirely new ground, and change entirely the character of the
defense, and this not upon the ground of any actual mistake in a matter of fact,
or upon any discovery of new facts but upon the ground that the defendant did
not mean to be understood to state as he had stated in his answer, the court
denied the motion.
But where there was doubt in regard to the proper application of certain moneys
admitted to have been received by the defendant, and the answer was obscure,
and there was a possibility that great injustice might be done to the defendant,
the court granted an order with reluctance, permitting a separate supplemental
answer to be filed, as to this particular, and explaining this ambiguity.
Where a defendant had leave to file a supplemental answer to explain certain ambi
guities in his original answer, and he incorporated other matters of defense in
his supplemental answer, on motion of the complainant the supplemental answer
was ordered to be taken oft the files.
This was a demurrer to a supplemental bill filed by leave of
the court. The case is stated in the opinion.
A. D. Fraser, in support of the demurrer:
1. That the bill is exceptionable on the ground that the com
plainants have incorporated in it as well matter which occurred
previous to the filing of the original bill, and which might be
introduced by amendment, as things which occurred subsequent
to the filing of the original bill, and which should come in by
way of supplement: 1 Paige, 200,- 8 I b., 294,- 4 Ib., 127; Mit
ford’s Pl., 165; 17 Vesey, 148.
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2. That the new matters introduced are not material and
necessary to the complainants in the prosecution of this cause:
17 Vesey, 148; 1 Sm'lth’s P;-., 204.
D. Goodwin, contra :
The demurrer in this case should be overruled as
frivolous:
*1. Leave was granted to file this identical bill. [*883}
Such is the order, and it cannot be otherwise con
strued. The whole proceedings were one act, to wit, the leave,
the filing and the granting the injunction. And if there were
ambiguity, the court knew the facts, and would so construe it;
and would do so even if there were a clerical mistake in the
entry.
2. In the supplemental bill, which contains new matters,
after the filing the original bill, other facts previously existing
may be introduced in connection with the new matter. Such is
the general practice. No case has been or can be shown to the
contrary. The case cited of Staforol v. Hbwlett, 1 Paige, 200,
Ls with us. The chancellor says: “ If it appears upon the face
of the supplemental bill that the whole of the matters charged
therein arose previous to the commencement of the suit, and
that the situation of the cause is such that they may be intro
duced into the original bill by amendment, the defendants may
demur.”
Zlvo things must concur to sustain the demurrer. 1st. The
whole of the matters stated must have existed prior to the com
mencement of the suit. And 2d. The situation of the cause
must be such that they may be inserted in the original bill by
amendment: Lewellen v. lllackworth, 2 Atkyns, 40; Baldwin
v. Mackown, 3 Atkyns, 817; 2 2!/[a0l., 510; O'ooper’s PL, 75.
8. The matters alleged to have previously existed are merely
introductory to and explanatory of the new facts, and neces
sary to their understanding, and the repetition for that purpose
of facts stated in the answer.
r
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The principal ground relied on in support of this demurrer
is, that the complainants have interposed in the supplemental
bill, matters which occurred prior to the filing of the original
bill. The supplemental bill in this case was filed by leave of
the court.
The matters which are stated in the supplemental bill, and
which occurred prior to the filing of the original bill,
[*334] are to some extent *connected with those matters
stated as having occurred subsequent to the filing of
the bill and necessary to their proper explanation. If material
facts have occurred subsequent to the commencement of the
suit, the court will give the complainants leave to file a sup
plemental bill, and where such leave is given the court will
permit other matters to be introduced into the supplemental
bill, which might have been incorporated in the original, by
way of amendment: Staford et al. v. Howlett -cf: West, 1 Paige,
200. This is certainly proper, where the matter which occurred
prior is necessary to the proper elucidation of that which
occurred subsequent to the original bill. .
This bill was filed in pursuance of leave granted, and under
this leave it was competent to insert the allegations contained
in it. The bill in other respects contains suflicient to sustain it
upon general demurrer.
Demurrer overruled, with leave to answer on the usual terms.
After the answer had been filed a motion was made on the
part of the defendant for leave to file a supplemental or
amended answer.
A. D. Fraser, in support of the motion:
“Where there is a clear mistake in an answer, and proper to
be corrected, the practice is to permit the defendants to file an
additional or supplemental answer:” 4 Johns. Ch., 875; 8
Vesey, 79," 10 Ib., 284, 401 ,- 1 Dick., 33, 85, 285 ,- 2 Dick, 486;
2 Atk., 294; 1 Brown C’. Cl, 418.
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“Where a party has omitted to lay before the court as he
ought, a case, admitting a mistake and desiring leave to rectify
it
,
the proper course is to put in an explanatory answer upon
which the court will judgez” 19 Vesey, 584.
Where a party is negligently or fraudulently led into a mis
take the court will permit him to file a supplementary or addi
tional answer: 19 Vesey, 628; 10 Vesey, 401.
R. Manning, of counsel, argued this motion on the part of
the complainants:
The defendant’s motion should be denied.
1
. The principal facts on which the defendant bases his
application are denied by the affidavit of Mr. Porter.
2. Two years have elapsed since the defendant filed his
answer, and he shows no good reason why he has not
applied to the court before *for what he now asks. [*335]
In Curling v. Marquis Townshend, 19 Ves., 628, the
lord chancellor says: “ I dare not in such a case, let it be in
fact what it may, lay down a principle that could form a prece
dent for permitting an answer, after the lapse of two years, to
be altered in efiect from one end to the other.”
3. The defendant does not specifically state in his aflidavit
the whole of the matter he wishes to place upon the record by
his additional or supplemental answer, as he should have done,
to enable the court to judge of the reasonableness of his appli
cation: 19 Vesey, 631.
4
. The answer of the defendant is clear and consistent with
itself, and not contradictory in any of its material parts. But,
in connection with the explanatory matter set forth in the
defendant’s aflidavit, it would be vague, uncertain and indefi
nite.
5. The answer and explanatory matter, taken together, show
the defendant to be guilty of a conspiracy, with Turner & Col
lins, to defraud Hatch, Scrantom & Kimball.
6. In cases of this description, when the granting of the
am
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motion will operate to the prejudice of the complainant, the
court will deny the application, unless under very peculiar cir
cumstances, and where the defendant makes out a strong case:
Wells v. Wood, 10 Ves., 401; Bowen v. Cross, 4 Johns. Ch., 375;
Greenwood v. Atkinson, 4 Simons, 54; Curling v. Marquis
Townshend, 19 Ves., 02s.
THE Cnmcnuox: ’
This is an application seldom granted, and never without the
utmost caution, and when a just and necessary case is clearly
made out.
In the case of Bowen v. Cross, 4 Johns. Ch., 875, an amended
answer as to a clear case of mistake as to matter of fact, and
as to that only, was permitted.
Lord Eldon, in the case of Curling v. The Marquis of Towns
hcnd, says: “It would be very difiicult, even upon negligence,
unless the party was led into it
,
to have the records of the court
altered, and I dare not in such a case, let it be in fact what it
may, lay down a principle that would be a precedent for per
mitting an answer after a lapse of two years, to be altered in
efiect, from one end to the other.” And he further
[*336] says, although he has been said to have *been too
liable to hesitation and doubt in his decisions: “ I
should be sorry to be thought to have much doubt upon a
point of so much importance.”
What is the case here? In the fifth folio of his answer the
defendant says that in July, 1836, he, together with Turner
and Collins, the two partners in these transactions, met together
in Detroit, and that the said Collins then and there sold his
interest in all the said parcels of land above described, and in
the joint funds in the hands of this defendant, as he then
informed this defendant, to one A. W. Hatch, either for the
benefit of said Hatch or for and on account of Henry Scrantom,
and D. F. Kimball, of Buffalo, for whom said Hatch was agent,
and goes on to state the mode of payment.
ans
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Again, in the tenth folio, he states that having been informed
and believing that said Collins had sold all his interest in said
property and investment to said Hatch or Scrantom & Kimball,
etc. He also denies all further interest of said Collins or his
assignees in the investment thereinafter mentioned.
It is now sought by the proposed amendment, or supplemen
tal answer, to take entirely new ground, and change entirely
the character of the defense, and this not upon the ground of
any actual mistake in a matter of fact, or upon any discovery
of new facts, but upon the ground that he did not mean to be
so understood, and “ he intended merely to state that said Col
lins had no avowed interest in said investment and purchases,
as it was understood between said Turner and Collins that said
Turner should take the interest of said Collins, but upon what
secret trust or qualification in favor of said Collins this defen
dant is unable to set forth.
This is not very distinctly stated, and perhaps, as to this
part of the amendment sought to be made, this would be a
sufiicient answer.
But I am disposed to place it upon other grounds. It is
entirely inconsistent with the version given in the original
answer. There is no mistake of any facts shown, nor any new
discovery suggested.
From the aflidavit of Mr. Porter the answer seems to have
been examined by this defendant, before it was engrossed as
well as afterwards, at least with usual care and attention; and,
although this defendant may possibly have been so unfortunate
as to have entirely misapprehended the purport of the
answer in this respect, yet, regarding *the general in- [*337]
terests and rights of suitors, and the proper adminis
tration of justice, it would be establishing a precedent of the
most dangerous tendency, after the lapse of two years, and
after the circumstances and the property may have changed, to
permit such a change of the record when it may so materially
affect the rights of the complainants.
soc
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The new aspect sought to be given to the defense strikes me
as somewhat unfair toward the vendees of Collins, on the part
both of Niles and Turner, and the application may not, on that
account, acquire any additional claim to a favorable considera
tion.
There is one portion of the amendment sought to be made
which, however, has pressed more strongly upon me. The
defendant admits the receipt of $4,995, on account of, and in
full for the proceeds of Hatch’s note, indorsed by Scrantom and
Kimball, and confesses himself liable and ready to account to
any person or persons entitled thereto, under the decree of this
court. It is very possible that it may turn out that the defen
dant was entitled to apply this money to the purposes for which
this association was formed, either in liquidating liabilities
already incurred, or in improving the property according to the
original agreement; and, if it has been so applied, if the ven
dees of Collins should be entitled to his proportion of this
investment, it would be unjust to hold him also to account for
the money, under this equivocal expression in the answer.
But, if it has been properly and lawfully expended upon the
property, to a portion of which these vendees may be entitled,
it does not strike me that this defendant would be estopped by
expressing his readiness to account for it to any persons entitled
thereto under the decree of this court.
But as it is possible that great injustice may be done to this
defendant in this respect, and as he now swears that he meant
no more by this expression than to express his readiness to
account for the manner of his expenditure upon the joint prop
erty under the agreement; and, as there is a supplemental bill
to be answered, so that the complainants will not be delayed
thereby, I am disposed, but with some reluctance, to permit a
supplemental answer to be filed, as to this particular, and
explaining this ambiguity, but limiting it to this only;
[*-838] *and to this extent we are perhaps sustained by the
case of Livesey v. Willson, 1 Vesey & Beames, 149.
am
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The original answer will remain on file unchanged, and the
efiect, to be given to either the one or the other, must be
reserved until the explanation is before the court.
Whereupon the following order was entered:
“ Ordered, that leave be granted to said Niles to file a supple
mental answer in explanation of that part of his answer, now
on file, which confesses and acknowledges his liability and read
iness to account for the sum of $4,995 to any person or persons
entitled thereto under the decree of this court, but that, in
accounting for the whole or any part of said money by said
supplemental answer, he be restricted to showing an applica
tion of the money to the purposes for which the association
between himself, Collins and Turner, was formed, either in
liquidating liabilities already incurred at the time he alleges
Collins sold out his interest to Hatch, or in improving the prop
erty according to the original agreement that had at that time
been purchased for the association, and the effect, to be given
to either the original or supplemental answer, is reserved until
such supplemental answer is before the court.”
A supplemental answer having been filed under this order,
explaining the ambiguities contained in the original answer,
and incorporating other matters of defense, the complainants
moved to take the supplemental answer oif the files, and upon
this motion the following opinion was delivered.
THE CHANCELLOR2
The grounds of the order permitting this supplemental answer
to be filed seem to me to have been distinctly stated.
The propriety of that order is not now under discussion, but,
from further reflection, and without reference to this particular
cae, I am satisfied that a departure from the rule there estab
lished would open a wide door for fraud, and aflford strong
temptations to perjury; its inconveniences and dangers are
obvious.
an
338 CASES IN CHANCE-RY.
Gmvus v. Nrnms.
'
But the question now presented is
,
does the answer go beyond
the order? It manifestly does so. The order was
[*339] limited to the explanation *of the manner of the
expenditure of $4,995. This answer attempts to do
inferentially, if not directly, what is expressly said it is incom
petent to do—to change entirely the attitude assumed in the
former answer. It purports not only to show the expenditure
of upwards of $10,000, but to show that this was done on
account of, and with the concurrence of those whose interest is
denied in the first answer.
I am unwilling to deprive the defendant of the benefit of the
first order. It is impossible, by expunging aportion of this, to
leave the answer intelligible, and I see no other mode of cor
recting the error but to grant the motion to take the answer
from the files, with leave to file a supplemental answer in
twenty days, in conformity with the directions given in the
former order.
an
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Silas Toplifl‘ v. Albert L. Vail and others.
Partnership: Equities of individual and partnership creditors. As between bond
fide creditors of a previous firm and the separate creditors of a partner who con
tinued the business and was the sole visible owner of the property employed in
trade, and where the separate creditors had given credit, relying on the property
' employed in trade tor payment, such creditors should be preferred to the cred
itors of the previous firm.
The creditors of a partnership have a right to payment out of the partnership effects
in preference to the creditors of an individual partner.
In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, it is fair to presume that a retiring
partner does not intend that the partnership property shall be used for the indi
vidual beneflt of a partner who continues the business, leaving the debts of the
firm unpaid; and this was held to be the presumption where the retiring partner
transferred the partnership eflects to a partner continuing the business, who
agreed to pay the partnership debts and gave bond to that eflect.
The bill in this case states that the complainant and defend
ant Albert L. Vail, being copartners, on June 25, 1840, dis
solved. That the complainant sold out his interest in the co
partnership property to said Vail, and received from Vail
his pay therefor, and that Vail, at the same time, executed
to the complainant a bond in the penal sum of $5,000, condi
tioned that said Vail should pay all the partnership debts.
Alleges that Vail has since fraudulently transferred the part
nership effects to the other defendants for the purpose of pre
venting their application to the payment of the partnership
debts; that Vail had absconded, etc. Prays that the partner
ship property be applied to the payment of the partnership
debts for which the complainant is liable, and for an injunction
to restrain misapplication.
Upon this showing an injunction was granted, and the defend
ants moved to dissolve the injunction for want of equity in the
bill.
R. Manning, in support of the motion:
The sale changed the copartnership property into the indi
vidual property of Vail. It was no longer the property of the
copartnership, but the property of Vail, who had purchased
us
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out the interest of his copartner: % parte Rufiin, 6 Ves., 119;
Ev parte Fell, 10 Ves., 347; Ev parte Williams, 11 Ves., 3.
This is the case of one copartner selling his interest in the
firm to another who is to continue the business on his own
account. It is not a dissolution of the copartnership and a
placing of its effects in the hands of one of the copart
[*341] ners to pay the debts and wind up the *business; when
that is the case, the ownership of the property is not
changed, but what was copartnership property at the dissolu
tion continues to be such until it is used to pay the debts, or a
division of it is made. The individual left in possession of it
holds it in trust for that purpose. The case of Devcau v. Fow
ler, 2 Paige, 400, is a case of this description. On no other
principle can it be reconciled with the cases in Vesey. The
cases we have cited were not decided by Lord Eldon on any
principle of law peculiar to the bankrupt law of England.
The facts in the case of Deveau v. Fowler are not fully stated
by the reporter. It appears from the case that “ on dissolution
of the copartnership it was agreed that the defendant should
take all the stock and effects, and pay off all the debts due by
the firm, and indemnify the complainant against the same.”
It does not appear in that case, as in this, that the complainant
received anything for his interest in the copartnership effects,
or that he took a bond from the defendant for the payment of
the copartnership debts, or that the copartnership property
was left with the defendant with a view to his continuance of
the business. The only inference to be drawn from the case is,
it would seem, that the defendant was to pay the debts with
the copartnership efects, which were to be used for that pur
pose and no other. This appears to have been the light in
which Chancellor Walworth viewed the facts in that case, for
he says: “The fair presumption in the absence of any express
agreement to the contrary, therefore, is
,
that it was not the
intention of the complainant that the efiects assigned to the
defendant shonld be appropriated to the private use of the lat
an
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ter, leaving the debts of the firm unpaid.” See also Oollger on
Partnership, 91 ,' Ib., 504 to 509.
Baker cf? Jllillerd, contra :
It is alleged as the ground of this motion, that the sale by
Toplifi to Vail converted the partnership property into indi
vidual property, and that thereafter the complainant had no
lien or equity to demand that the property should be appropri
ated to the payment of partnership debts.
We think it clear that such was not the effect of the trans
action.
*The bill states he sold and assigned the partnership [*3-12]
effects. But this was upon the agreement of Vail to
pay the debts of the partnership. This was an entire transac
tion.
Vail was to take the property and pay the debts, and any
surplus that might remain was to belong to him.
Topliif received no security for the payment of the debts,
and no indemnity against them, except the agreement and indi
vidual responsibility of Vail, which agreement was a condition
of the sale. All that Vail would be entitled to under this
arrangement would be the surplus after paying the debts of
the firm.
The cases cited in support of the motion, Es: parte Rufiin, M
parte Pbll, E2: parte Williams, etc., are none of them like this.
They are all bankruptcy cases, where the question arose not
between the partners, but between the joint creditors of the
partners, and the separate creditors of the bankrupt partner.
In Rufiin’s case (and all the others are similar) one of the part
ners sold out to the other and retired from the business—the
latter agreeing to pay the debts, etc. The purchasing partner
continued the trade for a year and a half, and then became
bankrupt. The joint creditors presented a petition praying
that the partnership effects remaining in specie might be appro
priated to the payment of the partnership debts in preference
. am
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to the separate creditors of the bankrupt. As between them
the question was materially difierent from the question between
the parties to this suit.
In the first place there was no pretense of fraud or bad faith
in that case, in any quarter; whereas fraud and bad faith on the
part of the defendants form the very foundation of this suit.
It is admitted by counsel against the petition in Rufiin’s ease,
that fraud would vitiate all transactions of this kind; but his
claim was placed on the ground that there was no fraud in the
case. And also on the ground that to admit the claim of the
petitioners, and to give the joint creditors a lien on the property
after a sale, and after the trade had been continued for years
by the purchasing partner (and in that case it had been with the
knowledge of the joint creditors), would operate unjustly and
as a fraud upon the separate creditors of that partner, who
were presumed to have given credit to him upon
[*343] *the faith of what they saw as separate property, the
purchasing partner being the visible owner. In this
case there are no separate creditors, and therefore no such
equities exist.
The decisions in the cases cited all evidently turn upon the
construction given to a certain provision in the bankrupt act
(21 James 1, ch. 10, secs. 10, 11), by which all the property
which remains in the possession, order and disposition of the
bankrupt at the time of the bankruptcy, is made to pass by the
assignment to the assignee. See Jones '0. Gibbons, 9 'Vesey,
407. See also the case of Shakeshaft et al., cited by Mr. Mans
field in Ruflin’s case, in which Lord Thurlow said that he could
not take accounts between the respective partners, but finding
the effects in the hands of one, whatever might be the demands
of the others, or the consequence to the joint creditors, the
goods were the separate property of that one, and must be
applied to his separate debts. ' In that case the bankrupt part
ner happened by accident to have the property in his hands-—
are
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there had been no purchase or payment by him. So far was
the provision in the bankrupt act referred to held to extend.
But even in the case of Rufiin, notwithstanding it was a
bankruptcy case, and notwithstanding this statute, the lord
chancellor does not express a decided opinion. He denies the
relief sought on the petition, because it was a matter of doubt
whether they were entitled to it
,
and therefore that it would be
better to leave the parties tofile a bill.
Eh: parte Fell, 10 Vesey, 347, differs but little from Rufiin’s
case, except that the retiring partner received security for his
indemnity, and for the payment of the debt, besides the agree
ment and individual responsibility of the remaining partner.
His equities upon the property would therefore be less strong
than in Rufiin’s case.
But another thing that renders those eases unlike the present
is that the petitioners were the creditors of the partnership, and
they had another remedy, for the selling partners were sol
vent, and they could collect their debts of them.
We rely on the case of Deveau o. Fowler, 2 Paige,~400, and
on the case of Smith '0. Haviland J; Fields there cited. These
cases are precisely in point, and the former is identical with
this in almost all its circumstances, so far as this branch
of the case is concerned. *The great difference between [*3-14]
this case and also the one in Paige and the cases in
Vesey, etc., is that in the latter the question was between bona
fide creditors, and the rights of bona fide holders of property
were to be aiiected; whereas in these no such rights are to be
affected so far as appears upon the bill, and the suit is against
a partner fraudulently seeking to smuggle the property and to
appropriate it
,
not to pay his separate creditors but to his own
use, and against others fraudulently conniving with and aiding
him in this object. The equities, therefore, in the two classes
of cases, without reference to the provisions of the bankrupt
act, are widely different.
But there is another branch of this case left out of view by
arr
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the counsel for the motion. The equity of the bill does not
rest alone in the equitable lien of the complainant as a partner:
on the partnership property. It rests also upon the liability of
the complainant to pay the debts, upon the fact that the defend
ant, Albert L. Vail, is legally and equitably bound to the com
plainant to pay them and save him harmless, upon the fraud of
Vail in assigning and disposing of his property and himself
absconding, so as to deprive the complainant of all remedy at law.
Certainly these peculiar circumstances would give a court of
equity jurisdiction of the case, and would entitle the complain
ant to come into court and obtain a discovery and
[*345] relief, even though there were *none of the partner
ship property left, or though there had been no part
nership. He would be entitled to come in and file his bill for
the purpose of setting aside this fraudulent conveyance, and
obtain an injunction against removing or disposing of the pro
perty—particularly as both the assignor and assignee are out
of the jurisdiction of any court of law of this state.
Tm: C1-1nrcnnnon :
I can see no well founded distinction between this case and
the case of Deveau o. Fowler, 2 Paige, 400.
The cases cited from Vesey, I am inclined to think, stand on
a different ground.
As a question between bona fide creditors of the previous
firm and the separate creditors of a partner who continued the
business, and was the sole visible owner of the property em
ployed in the trade, I should concur in the view that where the
separate creditors had given credit relying upon the property
employed in the trade for payment, they should be preferred
to the creditors of the previous firm. But no such question
arises here as the case now stands. The whole transaction is
alleged to be fraudulent, that the remaining property of this
firm has been fraudulently transferred, and without considera
tion, to prevent its application to the payment of the partner
818
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ship debts; and this for the purpose of this motion must be
considered as admitted.
The creditors of a partnership have a right to payment out
of the partnership effects, in preference to the creditors of an
individual partner.
In Deveau '0. Fowler, the partnership efiects were transferred
to the partner continuing the trade, and he agreed to pay the
partnership debts; and that is this case. The circumstance of
taking the individual bond or guarantee of this partner does
not vary the case.
I think the chancellor was right in the last mentioned case,
in saying that in the absence of any agreement to the contrary,
it is the fair presumption that the retiring partner did not
intend that this property should be used for his individual pur
pose, leaving the debts of the firm unpaid. This case as it now
stands is stronger than the case of Deveau v. Fowler.
Here it is alleged that Vail has fraudulently trans
ferred the assigned *e-ifects for the purpose of prevent- [346]
ing their application to the payment of the partner
ship debts, and that he has absconded.
The complainant does not ask that the ‘partnership property
shall be reconveyed to him, but applied to the payment of the
partnership debts, for which he is liable. If the goods were in
the hands of a bonafiole purchaser, it would present a very dif
ferent case.
Motion denied.
s19
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Richard Suydam and others v. Antoine Dequindre and
others.
Bill to enforce a trust: Parties. To a bill to enforce a trust, it is not necessary to
join as defendants parties having a prior interest subject to which the assign
ment was made. (a)
The trust being under a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, some of
the creditors filed a bill to have the assignment set aside as fraudulent, or, in
case it was sustained, then to the trust enforced. The bill averred that certain
other creditors had been paid their demands in full: Held, not necessary to
make such persons parties to the bill.
One of the creditors who had not been paid was made a defendant instead of com
plainant: Held, that as complete justice could be done between the parties on
this bill. the fact of his not being madd complainant was not good cause
of demurrer.
The fact that a time is limited in the assignment for the closing of the trust, will not
preclude the filing of the bill before that time has expired, where the bill alleges
that the assignee has done nothing in the execution of the trust.
Assignment: Acceptance. An assignment for the benefit of creditors absolute in
its terms, and which is accepted by the assignee, dedicates the property abso
lutely to the purposes of the trust, notwithstanding it is made without the
knowledge or concurrence of the creditors.
By the execution and delivery of the assignment the relation of trustee and ceatui
que trust is constituted at once, without any express assent of the creditors
and it cannot afterwards be revoked except upon the dissent of creditors.
Assignment for the benefit of creditors : Receiver. The court in decreeing the exe
cution of the trust under an assignment, under the special circumstances of the
case, appointed a.receiver for the purpose.
The complainants in this case file their bill as creditors of
Antoine Dequindre, seeking to have an assignment made by
him to Peter J. Desnoyers (who is made defendant), and which
purports to be for the benefit of his creditors generally, set
aside as fraudulent, or, in case it is sustained, then to have the
execution of the trust thereunder compelled, and for the
appointment of a receiver for the purpose. James Boyd, jr.,
one of the creditors, was made a defendant; others were not
made parties at all, the bill averring that their demands had
been paid in full. The assignment was set out in full; it bore
(a) Only those whose interests would be affected by the decree need be made
parties: Norris v. Hard, Wal. Ch., 102.
320
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date October 24, 1836, and the trustee was directed to proceed
to sell the assigned property at private sale, and that such of
it as should not be thus disposed of within eighteen months
should be sold at public auction within two years thereafter.
The bill was filed before this two years had expired. The
Detroit and Pontiac Railroad Company, which appeared by
the recitals in the assignment to have rights in some of the
assigned property, was not made a party. The bill averred
that the assignee had taken no steps in execution of the trust.
The defendants demurred to the bill.
A. D. Fraser, for defendants.
E Cl Seaman, for complainants.
Tun CHANCELLORZ
The first point made in support of the demurrer *is [*348]
that the time limited in the deed of assignment for
closing the trust had not expired at the time of filing the bill
in this cause. The deed of assignment was made on the
twenty-fourth day of October, 1836; the time limited for clos
ing the trust expired on the twenty-fourth day of April, 1840,
and the bill was filed on the ninth of March, 1840.
The bill alleges that the assignment was fraudulent, and it is
further alleged that the trustee, up to the time of filing the
bill, had neglected to take possession of the property, or to
take any steps towards executing the trust, and had declared
his intention not to execute it. The demurrer cannot be sus
tained on this ground. The complainants who are judgment
creditors were authorized under these circumstances, and before
the time had expired for closing the trust, to resort to this
court either for the purpose of setting aside the assignment or
to procure the aid of this court to compel an execution of the
trust. Other causes of demurrer were suggested ore tenus:
First, that the Detroit and Pontiac Railroad Company should
have been made parties. I think this was unnecessary. Their
21 a21
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rights accrued prior to the execution of the deed of assignment,
and are set forth in that instrument, which is recited in the
bill, and if a sale of the premises shall become necessary, they
must be sold ubject to the rights of the company: Eagle
Ere Company '0. Lent et al., 6 Paige, 635. It is also urged
that several persons who were named as creditors in the assign
ment are not made parties to the bill; as to all those persons it
is alleged in the bill that the debts due to them have been paid
and extinguished. This is suflicient upon demurrer. If the
allegations in the bill in this respect prove true, it was not
necessary to make them parties. The other objection is that
James Boyd, jr., should have been made a complainant instead
of a defendant. It would seem to me to have been perferable if
the bill had been so framed, but he has been made a party, and
the court will be able to settle and adjudicate on his rights in
the case, under the present bill. It is merely a technical objec
tion, and not suflicient to sustain the general demurrer.
Demurrer overruled and leave to answer.
[*349] *The defendant Dequindre. put in an answer deny
\ ing all fraud, and claiming the right to revoke the
deed of assignment on the ground that the creditors were not
parties or privies to the deed, and never claimed any benefit
under it until about the time of filing the bill in this case.
After the filing of this answer, the complainants’ solicitor
moved for the appointment of a receiver.
E 0'. Seaman, in support of the motion:
1. The deed from Dequindre to Desnoyers created a trust,
which Desnoyers accepted by executing the deed and putting
the same on record. See Jeremy Eg., 188.
2. Desnoyers, having accepted the trust, was bound to exe
cute it faithfully, and a court of equity has power to enforce
its execution in behalf of the cestui gue trust: 2 Story’s Eq.,
308, 804; Jeremy Eq., 20," Sands 0. Codwisc, 4 Johns., 536;
and if the trustee dies or is incompetent or refuses to act, or if
322
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there has been an omission to appoint one, the court will
appoint one: Jeremy Eq., 20, 168.
In this case Desnoyers utterly refused to act as trustee
before the bill was filed, and the time within which he was
authorized to sell expired in April, 1840, and he is now a naked
trustee holding the legal title without the power to sell.
3. As Desnoyers has refused to act, and his power to act has
expired, a receiver should be appointed to collect the rents and
profits for the benefit of the creditors, as well as to take charge
of the property.
In all cases where there is danger of trust property being
squandered, a court of equity will appoint a receiver: Story
Eq., §§ 827-829, 836,- Jeremy Eq., 1'74, 248,- 2 Madd. Ch.,
189; 12 Vesey, 4; Hart v. Crane, 7 Paige, 87.
4. Desnoyers, as well as Dequindre, is liable for the rents
and profits of the trust property accruing since the execution
of the trust deed, and should be ordered to pay the same forth
with to a receiver for the benefit of the creditors: Sands o
Oodwise, 4 I R., 536; Ib., 604, 605 ,' and a court of equity wil.
hold a trustee responsible for the consequences of a
breach of trust, whether he derives any benefit *from [*350?_
it or not: 2 Madd. Ch., 118; Adams v. Shaw, Schoales
d1 Lefroy, 2'72; 17 Ves., 489; 2 Story Eq., §§ 1268, 1269,
1b., 1275, 1276.
A court of equity will also hold a trustee responsible for
losses resulting from a willful default: Osgood v. Franklin
2 Johns. Ch., 27. And where a trustee keeps a trust fund in
his hands for a year, and omits to pay over the proceeds, the
court will charge him with interest: Gray v. Thompson, 1
Johns. Ch., 82.
A. D. Fraser, contra: '
1. The deed was executed without the privity of any of the
creditors ; they are not parties thereto, nor ever assented to it
,
aaa
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or until now claimed the benefit of it
,
and it was without any
consideration. He may therefore revoke it.
Where a person does, without the privity of any one, with
out receiving consideration, and without notice to any creditor,
himself make a deposition, as between himself and trustees,
for the payment of his debts, he is merely directing the mode
in which his own property shall be applied for his own benefit,
and that the general creditors or those named in the schedule
are merely persons named there for the purpose of showing
how the trust property, under the voluntary deed, shall be
applied for the benefit of the volunteers: Garrard v. Lord
Lauderdale, 3 Sim. Ch., 1; Walwyn v. Uoutts, 3 Meriv., 707 ;
S. Cl, 3 Simons, 14.
The deed in this case was a voluntary deed.
Dequindre was dealing with his own property for his own
personal benefit and accommodation in paying his creditors as
he thought proper: Page o. Broom, 4 Russ, 6. The creditors
never submitted or assented to take the benefit of the deed,
or conformed to its terms, or abstained from suing him in con
sequence: J2 Sugden, 187.
If property be conveyed by a debtor in trust for the benefit
of creditors who are neither parties nor privy to the deed, the
deed merely operates as a power to the trustees to apply the
property in payment of debts, and such power is revocable by
the debtor: Acton v. Woodyate, 2 Mylne & Keene, 492.
[*351] *2. If the creditors are entitled to any benefit under
the deed of assignment, the remedy is at law, as there
is a covenant on the part of Desnoyers to execute the alleged
trust.
If a trust is made, and no agreement to execute it, the trust is
in equity, but if there is it is to be enforced at law: Baldwin,
422.
"
3. Even if complainants should be entitled to relief, and
this should be the competent mode, yet it is insisted that this
bill was prematurely filed-—the bill being filed on the 9th of
$24
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March, 1840, although the alleged trust did not expire till 24th
April, 1840.
A plaintiff must have the right he asks when he puts his bill
upon the file: 4 Russ., 355.
4. In any stage of the case the want of equity is fatal: Bald
win, 416‘.
Tun CHANCELLORZ _
On the twenty-fourth day of October, 1836, Dequindre, one
of the defendants in this cause, made an absolute assignment
and conveyance of certain real and personal estate to the
defendant, Desnoyers, for the purpose of paying his debts, as
designated in schedules attached to the deed of assignment.
The directions in the deed of assignment were that the trus
tee should sell at private sale, and that such portions of the
property as should not have been sold at the end of eighteen
months should be sold at public auction within two years there
after. Among the creditors who were directed to be paid from
the proceeds of such sale were the complainants in this cause.
Desnoyers accepted the trust expressly, was a party to, and
signed and sealed the deed of assignment at the time it was
executed; but, as appears from the bill and the answers in the
cause, has never either taken possession of the property
or sold or disposed of any *part of it
,
or, indeed, done [*352]
anything toward carrying the objects of the trust into
execution. The two years within which he was to have closed
the trust, by sale at auction, of whatever should not have been
sold at private sale, expired on the twenty-fourth of April,
1840. On the ninth of March, 1840, this bill was filed for the
purpose of either coercing the application of this property to
the purposes expressed in the deed of trust, or to have it set
aside and vacated. A preliminary objection was made that
this bill was prematurely filed; but I have no doubt that after
so long a time had elapsed, and after the trustee had refused to
proceed in the execution of the trust, the complainants could
1:25
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institute proceedings to set aside the deed or compel the exe
cution of the trust.
But this motion is resisted principally upon the ground that
the deed of trust was voluntary, that the creditors were not
parties to it
,
nor ever assented to it
,
and have not, until n0W,
claimed the benefit of it; and, therefore, that Dequindre may
revoke it. There is an apparent, and, perhaps, an actual con
fiict of the authorities on this subject.
The case of Walwyn v. Coutts, 3 Meriv., 707, seems to be
the case referred to in subsequent decisions as the basis of this
doctrine. In that case the deed of trust was voluntary and
without the knowledge of the creditors, and, before assent had
been expressed or any rights acquired, new deeds had been
made, materially varying the trust, and, in fact, in substance
revoking the first deed. The case of Garrard '0. Lord Lauder
dale, 3 Simons, 1, may be distinguished from the case under
consideration. It was an indenture of three parts, the grantor,
the trustees, and the creditors. The creditors had not executed
the deed, and, before the bill in that case was filed or any assent
expressed, a different disposition had been made of the prop
erty, and the assignment in fact revoked. Some other cases
have been referred to to sustain this proposition.
On the other hand, the cases are numerous affirming a con
trary doctrine, or, if not directly adverse, at least difiicult to be
reconciled with the cases before referred to.
In Cumberland '0. Uodrington, 3 Johns. Oh., 261, it is said
that where a trust was created for the benefit of a
[*358] third person, he may affirm the "‘trust and enforce its
execution. It has also been held that when the deed
of trust is absolute in‘ its terms, the assent of the creditors is
not required, that the relation of trustee and cestui Que trust
was at once constituted so that the assignor could not recall
the deed: Ellison v. Ellison, 6 Vesey, 656. Many other cases
may be referred to sustain this ground. Without undertaking
to reconcile the cases of Walwyn v. Coutts and Garrard v.
320
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Lord Lauderdale with the cases last above referred to (and it
seems to me it would be difficult entirely to do so), it is sufli
cient to say that those cases differed in many essential particu
lars from the other class of cases, and also from the one under
consideration.
The deed in this case is absolute in its terms; no assent of
the creditors is required. Desnoyers, the assignee, positively
and expressly accepted the trust. The property is
,
in fact, ded
icated to the payment of the debts of these, among other cred
itors. Before filing the bill a portion of the creditors require
the trustee to proceed in the execution of the trust, which he
declines to do. The deed of trust is not revoked. No step of
that kind is taken or intimated. The creditors find themselves
estopped by this deed from collecting their debts by the ordin
ary course of proceedings at law, and the property remains
sheltered and locked up in the hands of the assignee.
Under this state of things there can be no doubt that it is the
duty of the court to enforce the execution of the trust or to set
aside the assignment as intended to hinder and delay the cred
itors. The provisions of the assignment are fair and equitable,
and such as there can be no objection to carrying into effect.
I am disposed to take the ground that where the conveyance
is absolute, vesting the property in the assignee, as in this case,
no express assent of the cestuis gue trust is required—and, while
the property remains unchanged, the cestuis gue trust, although
the instrument was made without their concurrence, may require
and coerce the execution of the trust. I am inclined to the
opinion that the relation of trustee and cestuis gue trust was
constituted at once on the execution of the deed, and that it
could not afterwards have been revoked or varied except upon
the expressed dissent of the cestuis gue trust.
As to whether the trustee shall be required to pro
ceed and execute *the trust, or a receiver be appointed, [*354]
I have had some hesitation, but, as it seems that the
trustee, on being required, refused to proceed in the execution
an
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of the trust, and states that he accepted the trust only on con
dition that he should not be required to devote his personal
attention to this business, it will be necessary that a receiver
should be appointed, over whom the court can exercise a direct
control.
I shall at present limit the order to the appointment of a.
receiver to receive the rents and profits of the assigned prop
erty, and, as the amount of debt has not been precisely ascer
tained, it will be necessary that a reference should be made to
ascertain the amount still unpaid. And, as it cannot now be
ascertained how much of this property it will be necessary to
sell, the directions as to the amount to be sold, and the manner
in which it shall be sold, will be reserved until the coming in
of the report.
Order accordingly. _
8%
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Ihmd: Remedy at law. Where the transactions stated in the bill, by which cer
tain notes were obtained, presented a case of fraud, although, from the case
made, it was doubtful whether the complainant could defend successfully the
full amount of the notes, and a general demurrer was interposed, the court
refused to sustain the demurrer, and required the defendant to a.nsw_er.
In cases of fraud where it is doubtful whether the defense would be good at law, the
court of chancery will entertain jurisdiction. (a)
Bill to annul and set aside a contract, and to compel certain
notes to be delivered up and canceled. States that in Febru
ary, 1839, complainant entered into an agreement with defen
dant to purchase certain lands which defendant represented as
belonging to him, as being good land situated near a mill, with
some thirty acres cleared or improved land. That in the spring
of 1840 complainant executed to defendant three several prom
issory notes for fifty dollars each, payable in six, twelve and
eighteen months, in consideration that defendant would cancel
and destroy the agreement to purchase; that soon after he had
executed the notes, he ascertained for the first time that defen
dant had no title to a part of the lands contracted to be con
veyed, that there was no clearing or improvement as repre
sented, and that the lands were entirely different from what
they were represented to be, and he charges that he was
induced to enter into the contract by fraud. The bill further
avers that there was no other consideration for the notes except
as above stated, and prays that they may be decreed to be deliv
ered up for cancelment.
To this bill the defendant demurred.
A. Davidson, in support of the demurrer.
J. S. Abbott, contra.
(a) See Barrows v. Doty, ante, 1, and cases cited in notes.
B29
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The principal ground relied upon in support of the demurrer
is that the facts stated in the bill would constitute a good
defense at law.
The transactions stated in the bill, by which the notes were
obtained, present a case of fraud, and for the purpose of this
argument are admitted by the demurrer. It may, perhaps, be
doubtful whether the complainant could defend successfully for
the full amount of the notes. ,
In the case of Hamilton 2:. Cummings, 1 Johns. Ch.,
[*356] 523, the *rule is stated to be, that in cases of fraud,
where it is doubtful whether the defense would be
good at law, the court of chancery will retain jurisdiction. And
a still stronger case is cited from Peere Williams, where the
lord chancellor canceled a bond without sending the parties to
law, although he was inclined to think the bond void at law as
well as in equity.
There is another reason for retaining jurisdiction in this case,
as the complainant is likely to be harrassed with a series of
suits upon these notes, confessedly fraudulent under the case
made by the bill, and this, too, perhaps, after the witnesses
may be beyond his reach.
Demurrer overruled, with leave to answer
880
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Edwin Jerome v. Charles Seymour.
Release of mortgage by quit-claim deed. Where the holder of a mortgage executes
a quit-claim deed of the mortgaged premises to one who has received a deed
thereof under an agreement that he shall pay the mortgage, the effect is to dis
charge the lien of the mortgage.
A subsequent assignment of the mortgage to a third person will not entitle the latter
to enforce it.
The bill in this case states that on the 20th December, 1836,
Cyrus Shepard executed to Horace R. Jerome two notes : one
for $240 payable in one year, the other for $240 payable in two
years; that on the 16th January he executed to said Jerome a
mortgage to secure the notes.
That on the 2d of April, 1838, Horace R. Jerome sold and
assigned the notes and mortgage to complainant, for the con
sideration of $500. It then states that February 23, 1837,
Charles Seymour purchased the mortgaged premises from
Cyrus Shepard, and they were conveyed subject to the mort
gage. That Seymour paid no consideration, except the notes
and mortgage.
That immediately previous to the purchase, Shepard, H. R.
Jerome and Seymour were the joint owners, and they were
jointly building a saw mill. After the sale, above mentioned,
Seymour owned two-thirds, and H. R. Jerome one-third, and
they continued on with the work in 1837.
That Seymour, with intention to defraud H. R. Jerome, pre
tended to him that his deed of the mill property was defec
tive, and desired said Jerome to make out a quit-claim, for the
purpose of correcting errors and without intending to afiect
the mortgage and deed executed February 27, 1837.
Complainant states that Seymour paid no consideration for
this quit-claim deed, and it was not supposed by said Jerome
that deed would operate to release the mortgage ; and that if
Seymour procured the deed for such purpose, "or supposed it
would efiect such purpose, he fraudulently concealed the same
Li
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from said Horace. That Seymour, both before and after
wards, promised Jerome he would pay the notes, and
[*358] in the fall of *1837, Seymour stated he had advanced
more than his share towards the mill, and being so in
advance, ought not to pay interest on said notes unless he had
interest on the balance due him, and Seymour claimed a written
stipulation, which Horace then gave him, not to charge interest
in case Seymour paid said notes within some time there stated.
The terms of said stipulation are demanded by said bill.
Complainant charges there is no balance due Seymour from
Horace R. Jerome, independent of said notes; but that, on the
contrary, Horace R. Jerome claims a balance due from Sey
mour. In case Seymour claims a balance to set oif against the
notes, complainant offers to submit the matter to a master to
state the accounts, and in such case prays that said Horace may
be made a party. Complainant also states that in the winter
of 1838 he attempted to settle with Seymour; accounts were
exhibited, and Seymour examined and took a statement of the
same; that he did not dispute his liability to pay the notes,
but claimed he had a stipulation or agreement from Horace R.
which exempted him from interest.
That he attempted again to settle in the winter or spring of
1838, as the agent of Horace, and the accounts were looked
over at the house of complainant in Detroit; that the notes
were talked of and admitted as a subsisting claim.
Complainant charges that both before and after the transfer
of said notes and mortgage, Seymour has frequently admitted
to complainant his liability to pay the notes; that Shepard, the
maker, is insolvent, and a resident of the state of New York.
The defendant by his answer admits the indebtedness of
Cyrus Shepard to Horace Jerome, as stated in the bill; admits
giving the mortgage to secure the debt, also the acknowledging
and recording, and that the same was for purchase money.
Admits that complainant holds the assignment of the notes
and mortgage, but denies that the same were assigned on the
ass
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day stated, and denies that $500 or any other sum was paid for
the assignment. For answer, says he was informed by the
complainant that the notes and mortgage were given to him in
the winter or spring of 1837, as agent, to settle; therefore
denies that complainant was ever the bona fide assignee.
Admits that said mortgage was on record at the
time he bought out *Cyrus Shepard, and that Shepard [_*-359]
gave him a deed; but denies the same was subject to
the payment of the mortgage, but states that such conveyance
was in terms full and entire.
Admits that at the time of the purchase made of Cyrus
Shepard, he had knowledge of the notes and mortgage. He
also admits that he agreed to pay the mortgage, which agree
ment is in writing.
Denies that the agreement with Shepard to pay said notes
and mortgage constituted the whole or a considerable portion
of the consideration, but that he paid him some $1,600 in
money, and property besides. States that before the agree
ment to buy out Shepard a co-partnership was formed, to wit,
on the twentieth day of December, 1836, between Cyrus Shep
ard, Seymour and H. R. Jerome, which was in writing, one
provision of which was that Seymour and H. R. Jerome should
furnish each one-half of the means to erect a saw mill and
dam, and reimburse themselves from the earnings.
Avers that it being understood that the description of the
premises was defective, it was agreed if Seymour would buy
out Shepard, Jerome would give a conveyance that was correct.
About February 23, 1837, he did purchase Shepard’s interest,
and receive a conveyance; sets out the consideration, and refers
to the agreement in writing.
Admits that immediately previous to buying out Shepard all
three were joint owners and engaged in putting up the mill,
and after the purchase, defendant owned two-thirds and H. R.
Jerome one-third, and that defendant and Horace R. continued
their work through 1837.
ma
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That after the purchase it was proposed by said Jerome that
new articles of agreement should be made, by which defendant
should be obligated to advance according to his interest; this
the defendant declined to do, but still proposed if H. R. Jerome
would release the mortgage so that the property would be
clear, etc., he would enter into such agreement; this was agreed
to, and thereupon the copartnership agreement was made.
That on the same day, in pursuance of the original agree
ment, and in consideration that said defendant had entered
into the agreement by which he bound himself to pay two
thirds of the expenses, and for the further consideration in said
deed expressed, the said H. R. Jerome, on the 27th day of
February, 1837, by deed signed by himself and
[*360] *wife, quit-claimed two-thirds of the mill property to
defendant, and the deed was acknowledged‘ and re
corded, and then in defendant’s custody. Defendant admits
the prior deeds were defective, also that he paid to the said
Horace R. Jerome no pecuniary consideration for the execu
tion thereof; that one object of the quit-claim was to correct
the error. But denies all fraud, denies that the main object
was to correct the error, but states the main object was to have
the premises discharged from incumbrances, and Horace R.
Jerome designed and intended in executing the quit-claim deed
to discharge the mortgage.
Admits he promised H. R. Jerome he would pay the notes
both before and after quit-claim deed.
Admits in November, 1837, he had an interview with H. R.
Jerome at Flint, concerning notes and advances, in which
defendant claimed he had advanced more than his share, which
said Horace R. admitted, and desired defendant to take said
two notes and pass to his credit, but neither of said notes being
due, and defendant wanting cash, he declined, saying they
might come in after due. But finding he could get no money
he agreed to take one; afterwards it was found the notes were
at St. Clair. Then he concluded to take both and apply them
384
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in the manner proposed, and drew upon the back of the state
ment of advances an agreement, on the part of H. R. Jerome, to
deliver both notes, which was signed by H. R. Jerome. Defend
ant denies that any such stipulation in relation to said notes as
stated in the bill was made at any time. Avers that after the
above interview he went on in 1838 and made further advances,
and by the winter of 1839 completed the mill and dam, and
claims a large balance against H. R. Jerome over and above
said two notes.
E C’. Seaman, for complainant.
Lee, Hale (f
;
Harding, for defendant.
Tun CHANCELLOB2
From the statements contained in the answer I think there
is a good reason to doubt the allegation that the complain
ant is the bona fide holder of the notes and mortgage in ques
tion.
*1 should rather be inclined to the belief that he [*361]
was acting in the capacity in which_he led the defend
ant to believe he was acting until a short time before the com
mencement of the suit, merely as the agent and attorney of
Horace R. Jerome. But admitting him to be the actual holder
of these papers, how would the case stand ? As between the
complainant and defendant, the present complainant can have
no greater equity as agent of this defendant than could his
assignor, H. R. Jerome.
That the property upon which the mortgage was based was
discharged by the quit-claim‘, I entertain no doubt; that it was
the mutual understanding and intention of the parties that
such should be the operation and eifect of the deed, must be
conceded. The effort, then, to subject the land to the payment
of the mortgage is out of the question.
But it is said that as a part of the purchase money to an
amount equal to the notes remaining is in the hands of the
defendant, the court should treat this as a trust fund, and
enforce payment out of this to the present complainant. Shep
ard, the grantor of the defendant, is not a party in this suit.
It is true the defendant admits that he promised at the time
_ ass
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of the purchase to Shepard, to pay these notes then in the
hands of Horace R. Jerome, the assignor of the complainant.
In the course of their mutual dealings as copartners it was
expressly agreed in writing that these notes should be credited
to Horace R. Jerome and charged to the defendant in consid
eration of advances made by defendant to the said copartner
ship.
The agreement is in these words: “ I am to deliver to Charles
Seymour the two notes I hold against Cyrus Shepard for $240
each, and charge them against the balance he may have fur
nished for the mill over his share without interest.
“H. R. JEROME.”
It is averred that the advances were made to an amount
greater than the notes.
How, then, can this complainant, standing in the place of
H. R. Jerome, be entitled to a decree? If the notes which the
mortgage was given to secure were the notes of the present
defendant, negotiable, and negotiated before due, the
[*362] defendant would of course *have been liable upon
them in the hands of the holder. But they are not
the notes of this defendant, but of Shepard. The promise to
take them up was made to Shepard while they were in the
hands of H. R. Jerome, his partner.
According to the answer, which for this purpose must be
taken as true, they were actually paid. Shepard is not a party
to this suit, and it is not proper or necessary in this stage of
the proceedings to decide what may be the equity between him
and Seymour, but it is quite certain, as the case now stands,
the present complainant is not entitled to a decree against
defendant upon these notes.
I have had some hesitation as to what order to make.
Whether to direct the notes and mortgage to be canceled, or
to permit the cause to stand over with leave to make Horace
R. Jerome a party, with the view to a settlement of the account
for advances made by Seymour, as stated in his answer, which
it was stipulated should apply in payment of these notes. The
latter, perhaps, may be the safer course, and cannot prejudice the
rights of either party. Let the order be entered accordingly.
aae
Wane v. Lrox.
Nathaniel Weed and others v. James Lyon and others.
Recording acts of 1827. The act of April 12,1827,entitled “ An act concerning mort
gages," prescribes the manner in which mortgages may be registered, and, being
an act expressly in relation to mortgages, and general in its terms, isnot con
trolled in relation to the record of mortgages by the act of the same date, entitled
" An act concerning deeds and conveyances ;” and a compliance with the flist
mentioned act in the record of a.mortgage is sufficient.
The bill of complaint in this case was filed November 16,
1840, and sets forth that on the 6th day of June, 1837, John
Hale was indebted to complainants, in the sum of $3,038.37, for
goods, etc., and the said Hale, being seized of, or pretending to
be seized of, the fee of lots 16, 17 and 18, on the Military Res
ervation, so called, on the south side of Congress street, in the
city of Detroit, free from all incumbrance, executed, with his
Wife Felicite, a mortgage on the premises, which was recorded
in the ofiice of the register of deeds for the county of Wayne,
on the 17th of June, 1837.
That default having been made in the payment of the bond
and mortgage, a foreclosure was commenced by advertisement
on the 17th day of June, 1839, and the lots were struck oif to
the complainants, and they became the purchasers, on the 31st
day of August, 1839, and received a certificate from the sheriff,
that, unless the land was redeemed according to law, the pur
chasers would be entitled to a deed in two years from the date
of said purchase; that the certificate of sale from the sherifi
was duly recorded in the oflice of the register of deeds of the
county of Wayne; that the property had not been redeemed,
and there was no probability of its being redeemed, as Hale, the
mortgagor, was dead, and his estate insolvent, and complain
ants aver they hold no other security for the payment of the
demand or debt, or any part thereof. The bill then states that
complainants were greatly surprised recently to learn there was
aprior incumbrance in favor of the defendant Lyon, which was
made about the 13th of November, 1828; and upon examin
22 -387
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ing the records of Wayne county, they find such to be
[*364] the *fact, and that certain proceedings were instituted
in behalf of said Lyon, to foreclose the mortgage, and
that the said premises were bid ofi on the 21st of November,
1838, and that the sheriff gave a certificate stating that James
Lyon, the purchaser, would be entitled to a deed in two years,
unless previously redeemed according to law. An assignment
was made in January, 1840, to Thomas Beals, by Lyon, and the
complainants charge that Beals or Lyon contemplate applying
to the sheriff of the county of Wayne, for a deed, on the pre
tense that the premises have not been redeemed, thereby
utterly disregarding the rights and interests of the complain
ants; and they charge, if such deed is procured, it would preju
dice their claim on the premises.
The complainants then set forth that it was provided, in an
act of the legislature, that there should be a city register’s
oflice in the city of Detroit, which law was in force at the time
of the execution of said mortgage to Lyon, requiring it to be
recorded in the city register’s otfice, and declaring such convey
ence to .be fraudulent and void, unless it should be recorded in
the city register’s ofiice before the “ recording ” of the deed or
conveyance of a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee. They
then state that at the time complainants took their mortgage
they ‘examined the city records, and that Lyon’s mortgage
never was recorded in the ofiice of the city register, and that
they had no knowledge of the same until June, 1840, and they
claim that the Lyon mortgage should be considered as fraudu
lent and void.
Bill charges that the statutory foreclosure is void as against
the complainants, for the reason that the mortgage of Lyon was
not recorded in the city registry. And it prays that the mort
gage made by Hale and wife to Lyon be adjudged null and
void as against the complainants, or considered as subject to
complainants’ mortgage; and that the statutory foreclosure be
set aside and declared void, and for other relief. -
ass
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The defendants demurred.
H. M Walker, in support of the demurrer.
A. D. Fraser and Geo. C’. Bates, contra.
Tm: Onnzcnnnon:
The act of April 12, 1827, entitled “ An act concerning
mortgages,” prescribes the manner in which mortgages
‘may be registered. This being an act expressly in ["‘365]
relation to mortgages, and general in its terms, is not
controlled in relation to the record of mortgages by the act
of the same date, entitled “An act concerning deeds and con
veyances.” Therefore, the record of the mortgage of Lyon in
the county registry, according to the requirements of the act
first mentioned, was legal and valid, and a constructive notice
under the statute to any subsequent mortgagee or grantee of
the same premises. As this conclusion upon the construction
of these statutes is conclusive upon the equity of the case made
by the bill, the demurrer must be allowed and the bill dismissed.
Bill dimissed.
as
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Mack 8: Davis v. Ellis Doty.
Relief against judgment at law. The court will not relieve against a. judgment at
law on the ground of its being contrary to equity, unless the defendant was ignor
ant of his defense, pending the suit, or the facts could not be received as a de
fense at law, or unless, without any neglect or default on the part of the defend
ant, he was prevented by fraud or accident, or the act of the opposite party.
from availing himself of his defense. (a)
But where the defendants were prevented from making their defense at law by the
acts of the plaintifl until the only witness, by which the defense could be proved.
was dead, and a resort to this court, in consequence thereof, became indispens
able, it was held that the complainants were entitled to relief in this court, and
that it was not necessary for them to appeal the case at law, and then apply to
this court for a discovery, in order to entitle them to equitable relief.
Where it appeared by the bill that the complainants became security for a.third
person to the defendant on two promissory notes, and that the defendant extended
the time of payment three several times for ninety days each, without the know
ledge or assent of the sureties, and the maker of the notes at the time of the
extension was able to pay, but, at the time to which payment had been extended
he had become insolvent, and the defendant had commenced two several suits
before a justice of the peace to recover the amount of the notes against the sure
ties, and they appeared and defended, and, after the testimony was taken, the
defendant, who was plaintifl! in the justices court, discontinued his suits, and,
after the decease of the only witness on the part of the defense, new suits were
commenced, upon which judgments were recovered, the suits being undefended;
upon demurrer, it was held that the case made by the bill was such as entitled
the complainants to relief in equity, and that it was competent for this court to
afford that relief in any stage of the proceedings, as well after as before judg
ments at law.
Demurrer to a bill for discovery and relief against judgments
at law. The opinion of the court contains a sufiicient state
ment of the case.
A. D. Fraser, in support of the demurrer.
The bill seeks to enjoin two judgments recovered before a
justice of the peace by default.
The fact alleged might constitute a good defense at law, if
pleaded. No reason is assigned for not making a defense at
law, nor does it appear why a discovery was not sought while
the action was pending at law, and before judgment rendered.
(a) See Barrow: 0. Doty, ante, 1, and cases cited in note.
I40
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It is conceded that the court would coerce a discovery in aid
of inferior courts, and that the amount in controversy alone
constitutes the test of jurisdiction. At all events it
was the duty of the complainants *to have appealed to [*367]
the circuit court, and then come to this court for a dis
covery: 1 Eq. Abr., 181," Jer. Eq. Jun, 268, 269; 1 Madd.
Ch., 195; 1 Chit. Di_q., 591, etc.,‘ 1 Paige, 287.
This court will not afford relief against a judgment at law,
on the ground of ignorance of facts, mismanagement of attor
ney, nor even when perjury has been committed. There must
be a clear case of accident, surprise or fraud, before equity will
interferez‘ 2 Vern., 696,‘ 6 Johns. Ch., 87,‘ 10 Pet. 505 ,
Fonbl., 26, 27, 656, 657,- 2 Paige, 321,- 1 Johns. O'as., 492, 502,
3 Johns. Ch., 352,- 1 Johns. Ch., 51, 320, 395, 465; 4 I6., 510,
566,- 7 Ib., 135, 837.
The parties should have put themselves in a situation to try
the case by filing a plea: 6 Johns. Ch., 480, 481.
Goodwin dc Hand, contra:
If an obligee does an act to the injury of the surety, or varies
the terms of his obligations, or enlarges the time of perform
ance without his consent, the surety will be discharged: 2
Bro. C’. Cl, 5'79,‘ 6 D0'w., 540,- 2 Ves., 540," 10 Johns., 587; 8
Kent, 111 ,' 12 Wheat., 554; Chit. on Bills (8th ed.), 442, and
cases cited,‘ 2 Swanst, 539," 2 Hov. on Fiauds, 71, and cases
cited; 4 Barn. cf: C'res., 506.
The rules as to the relief of a surety are the same in a court
of equity as in a court of law, when the facts are the same:
2 Johns. Ch., 554; 17' Johns., 384.
When the sureties on the face of the instrument appear as
swreties, the defense may be set up at law; when they do not
so appear, it is doubtful as to whether the defense be available
at law; in such case the jurisdiction of a court of equity is
undoubted, and in the other case this court would seem to have
a concurrent jurisdiction, especially when a discovery is neces
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sary. In this case the character of the complainants as securi
ties does not appear on the notes: 4 Barn. cf; Cres., 506,- 2
Swanst., 589.
[*368] ‘Tun CHANCELLORZ
The bill alleges that the complainants became sureties for
one McKinney to Doty, upon two promissory notes, for fifty
dollars each. Doty, at three several times, extended the pay
ment for ninety days each, without the knowledge or assent of
the complainants. That, at the time said extension was
granted, McKinney was able to pay, but, after the time to
which payment had been extended by Doty had elapsed, was
insolvent. That, at two several times, Doty commenced suits
upon said notes before Robert Abbott, magistrate. That the
complainants appeared and set up their defense, to wit, that
they were sureties, and the extension of the time of payment
by Doty. That the only witness to support their defense (the
agreement to extend the time of payment) was one Sidney S.
Hawkins (since deceased), who acted as the agent of McKin
ney in that behalf, and was on one occasion sworn, and gave
his testimony; and, after the witness was examined, Doty dis
continued his suit. That the parties appeared on both occa
sions, and were ready to make their defense, etc., and the suits
were discontinued. That, after the decease of said Hawkins,
the only witness, new suits were commenced, on which judg
ments were recovered, the said suits being undefended. To
this bill there is a general demurrer. The ground of the
defense is that this court will not relieve against a judgment
at law on the ground of its being contrary to equity, unless the
defendant in the judgment was ignorant of the fact in question,
pending the suit, or it could not be received as a defense at
law, or unless, without any neglect or default on his part, he
was prevented by fraud or accident, or the act of the opposite
party from availing himself of the defense. This is undoubt
edly the true rule; it has been frequently so held by this court.
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See Barrows v. Doty, ante, page 1; Wright v. Ifing, ante, page
12, and notes.
It is insisted, however, that this case does not come within
it. That the defendants below have been prevented from mak-
ing their defense by repeated discontinuances, when the parties
appeared to make their defense, until the death of the only wit
ness. That from the constitution of justices’ courts, a continu
ance cannot be had for a sufiicient time to obtain a discovery.
That courts of chancery interfere with reluctance with
inferior jurisdictions, and that this being *2. case of [*369]
original chancery jurisdiction, this court should now
entertain this bill and grant relief. In support of these grounds,
the cases of Rat/zbone 2:. Warren, 10 Johns., 396; Bog/ce’s Ike
cutors v. Grundy, 3 Pet., 214; 2 Swanst, 539, are cited. It is
clear, from the case made by the bill, that the complainants
were discharged from their liability. It is also undoubtedly true
that courts of chancery have always sustained their jurisdiction
in this class of cases. A court of chancery was formerly the
only tribunal which could afford adequate relief. But recently
courts of law have also given eifect to defenses of this kind.
The court of chancery, having originally exclusive jurisdiction,
still retains it. But if the party has a good defense at law,
and it is in his power to make it there, Without a resort to this
court, and he permits a judgment to pass against him, a court of
chancery would not relieve him. It is apparent, from the case
as made, that the defendants, by the act of Doty, after having
two suits commenced, at two several times were deprived of
making their defense, by the discontinuances, until the death of
their only witness. That a resort to this court was indispensa
ble, and that this necessity has resulted from the act of Doty,
the plaintifi below. The only doubt in the case is
,
were the
parties bound to apply to this court before judgment rendered
in the court below. It has been urged that the defendants
below could have taken appeals to the circuit court, and could
have then applied to this court for a discovery, and would
848
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have been entitled to their remedy. I have entertained much
doubt whether this case comes within the exceptions to the gen
eral rule as stated in the case in 10 Johns., 590, and 3 Pet., 214.
Was it necessary ? Was it incumbent upon the parties to adopt
this more expensive and circuitous proceeding to make their
defense, after having, on two several occasions, appeared, in
both suits, made their defense, and produced their witness ? I
am inclined to think not. The necessity for a resort here at
all has been caused by this extraordinary and unjust proceed
ing on the part of Doty, the defendant. In the case in 3 Pet,
214, where the court did relieve against a judgment, the judge,
in delivering the opinion of the court, says: “It is not enough
that there is a remedy at law, it must be plain and adequate;
in other words, as practical and eflicient to the ends of justice,
and its prompt administration, as the remedy in
[*370] equity.” He *say's, also:
“ Although the defense
might have been made at law, the complainant would
still have been left to renew the contest upon a series of suits;
and that, probably, after the death of witnesses.” The case in
10 Johns. was a case against bail, where the time had been
extended. There had been a judgment in the supreme court
against the bail, but relief still was granted. Here the com
plainants were prevented from taking their defense by the act
of the defendant. This was a case in which it would have
been competent for this court to afford relief in any stage of
the proceedings, and the resort here having been rendered
indispensable by the act of Doty, it will be unjust and inequit
able to permit him to take advantage of his own wrong.
Demurrer overruled.
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Richard H. Connor and others, administrators of Henry Con
nor, v. John Allen.
Partnership: Right of survivor to possession of assets: Receiver. A surviving part
ner having the legal right to the possession of the partnership property, the
court will not deprive him of that right, unless upon proof of mismanagement
or danger to the partnership efiects.
Motion for receiver, aflldavits on. Affidavits are not admissible to contradict the
answer upon a motion for the appointment of a receiver.
The bill states that, in 1838, Henry Connor and John Allen
were partners, owning certain mills and other property to a con
siderable amount; that they carried on the milling business as
partners until September, 1840, when Connor died; that Allen
had always been in actual possession and occupation of the
premises, and still was in actual possession and occupation, and
was running the mills and manufacturing lumber from logs
cut on the partnership lands, and on the lands belonging to
Connor alone, and was using and appropriating the proceeds to
his own use and benefit; that complainants have been duly ap
pointed administrators upon the estate of Connor, and, as such,
are entitled to an account. And it prays for an account, injunc
tion and receiver. .
An injunction was granted.
The answer admits the partnership and the death of Connor,
but states that the partnerhip is largely indebted to the defen
dant
The defendant moved to dissolve the injunction on the com
ing in of the answer, which motion the complainants resisted,
and moved for a receiver on the pleadings and aflidavits.
The motions for a receiver and to dissolve the injunction both
came on to be heard at the same time.
A. U. Smith, for complainants.
Van Dyke d: Harrington, for defendant.
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The answer denies the wholeequity of the bill, and states
the further fact that the partnership is indebted to the defen
dant in a considerable amount. The surviving partner having
the legal right to the possession of the property, the court will
not deprive him of that right unless upon proof of mismanage
ment or danger to the partnership efiects: Gow on .Part., 882.
The afiidavits are not admissible in contradiction to
[*372] the answer upon *the motion to dissolve the injunc
tion, and the answer being full, the injunction must be
dissolved. Aflidavits may be read upon a motion for the
appointment of a receiver. But I do not think the afiidavits
presented show such a case of mismanagement, or danger to
the fund, as will justify the court in the appointment of a
receiver under the rule as before stated.
Injunction dissolved.
W .
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Jesse Millerd v. Norton R. Ramsdell and others. (Cross-bill.)
Answer, when responsive to bill. Complainant, by his bill, averred his right to cer
tain shares in a partnership, purchased by him of the heirs of a former partner.
The answer of defendant set up an agreement by which these shares were to
be purchased by complainant for himself and defendant jointly: Held, that as
to this agreement the answer was not to be regarded as directly responsive to
the bill, and, therefore, the agreement was not proved by it.
Contract for lands: Specific performance. If an agreement for the purchase of
lands be vague and uncertain, or the evidence in support of the same unsatisfac
tory, a.court of equity will not enforce it, but leave the party to his remedy at
law.
Parol contract for lands: Part performance. Part performance, to take a parol
contract for the purchase of lands out of the statute of frauds, should be of une
quivocal acts that conflrm the existence of the contract. (a)
Continuance ofpartnership business after death of one: Rights of representatives
of deceasedpartner. Where one of several partners dies and the business of the
copartnership is carried on by the surviving partners without the assent of the
representatives, they have as a general rule their election to demand interest on
the amount of the share of the deceased, or to take a share of the profits; but
where the interest of the deceased partner had become vested in one of the sur
viving partners, who consented to the continuance of the copartnership, it was
held the rule did not apply, and his only right was to share as partner.
The original bill in this case was filed in June, 1837, by Sal
mon H. Matthews.
In July following, a cross-bill was filed by Millerd, the prin
cipal defendant in the original suit; answers were put in to the
two bills by Matthews and Millerd respectively; as to the
others, the bills were taken pro confesso.
Subsequent to the putting in of the answers in both cases
Matthews died, and the suits were revived and continued by
and against his personal representatives, Norton R. Ramsdell
and Asa Williams, administrators, and Arabella Matthews, ad
ministratrix.
The case will sufiiciently appear from the cross-bill and
answer.
It appears from the cross-bill that in November, 1835,
Matthews and Edwin Bond, one of the defendants, entered into a
(0) See Burtch v. Hogge, ante, 81,and easel cited in notes Dand c.
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copartnership with Millerd. The articles of copartnership were
reduced to writing, and are as follows:
“ This article of agreement, made the first day of November,
1835, between Jesse Millerd, late of Auburn, N. Y., and Sal
mon H. Matthews and Edwin Bond, of Dexter village, M. T.,
witnesseth, that the said parties have this day mutually entered
into a copartnership, under the firm of J . Millerd
[*374] & Co., for the purpose of carrying *on the mercantile
business and the grist mill and saw mill business, and
all other business which may be, by said firm, considered neces
sary in connection with said branches to promote the interests
of said firm, for the term of four years from the above date, on
the following terms, viz.: their capital is to be $21,000, or
$7,000 to each person.
“ The said Matthews and Bond now own in the said village of
Dexter, a grist mill and sawmill and tavern stand, and the nec
essary buildings thereon, containing about five acres of land,
more or less, according to their deed of said property, executed
to them by Samuel W. Dexter, on the 7th day of April, 1834,
which property, together with the appurtenances and water‘
privileges thereunto belonging, is estimated at fourteen thou
sand dollars, which the said Matthews and Bond are to furnish
as a capital for the benefit of said firm, as their shares, and for
which, whatever may be due, or to become due to said Dexter,
they, the said Matthews and Bond, are themselves to cause to
be punctually paid to the said Dexter, without cost or inconve
nience to the said firm or the said Millerd.
“And the said Millerd is to furnish seven thousand dollars
worth of goods as his share of said capital stock of said firm,
and the said partners are mutually bound to each other to do
and perform all necessary services in their power, for the pro
motion of the above business. All the loss or gain to said bus
iness is to be mutually shared by the said partners, and all nec
essary expenses in said business are to be borne by the said firm,
from and after the said date first above mentioned.
as
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“And, as the said Matthews and Bond are indebted to the
said S. W. Dexter for the said premises and for the payment
of said debts, they have executed a bond and mortgage to the
said Dexter for payment thereof, and as the said Millerd on
his part furnishes his share of the said capital stock at the
commencement of said firm: Now, therefore, it is hereby
agreed by said Matthews and Bond, that they will, for the pur
pose of securing said Millerd against any loss he might sustain
by their failing to pay for the said premises, according to the
condition of said bond and mortgage, execute to him, the said
Millerd, awarranty deed of the said premises; and they, the said
Matthews and Bond, also agree, that in case of their
failure *as aforesaid, to make payment for said premi- [*375]
ses whereby the said Millerd’s interest shall be injured;
that then, in such case, he shall have a claim to secure himself
from any personal‘ property in the possession of said firm, or
from the property owned by either or both of the said Mat
thews and Bond in their private capacity.
“In witness whereof, the said parties have hereunto set their
hands and seals at Dexter village, on the date first above men
tioned, in presence of O1-ms. D. MILLERD.
(Signed) “J. MILLERD.
“ S. H. MATTHEWS.
“EDWIN Bonn.”
The cross-bill states that Matthews and Bond were at the
time of executing said agreement joint owners of said real
estate, and copartners in the grist and saw mill business and
tavern, under the firm and style of Matthews & Bond; that
said firm were then indebted to different persons in a consid
erable amount; that by the formation of said copartnership the
firm of Matthews & Bond was dissolved.
That Millerd did furnish his share of capital according to
agreement, and the goods were placed in the store of the firm.
That Matthews and Bond did,;in pursuance of the agreement
on their part to furnish, etc., on the 12th of January, 1836,
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execute to Millerd a deed of one undivided third of said real
estate.
That at the time of the execution of said agreement, said
Matthews and Bond proposed to Millerd that he should become
joint owner with them of another parcel of land in Dexter, on
which was a dwelling house and store, etc. (the Brower lot);
that Matthews and Bond then held a deed of same, but had
not paid the purchase money; that it was agreed that Millerd
should own one-third of it and pay one-third of the said pur
chase money; that the same was included in the said deed from
Matthews and Bond to Millerd; that part of said purchase
money had since been paid out of the partnership funds, the
remainder not yet paid and not all due.
Sets out the covenants in said deed on the part of Matthews
and Bond, which are:
1. Seizin in said Matthews and Bond.
[*37 6] *2. Freedom from incumbrances, except a mortgage
to Dexter of $10,750.
3. That said Matthews and Bond would pay said mortgage
and indemnify Millerd against the same.
4. Right of said Matthews and Bond to sell.
5. Covenant of warranty.
That said deed was intended as an absolute conveyance of
said one-third; that said Matthews and Bond have never exe
cuted any deed as security to Millerd, as against the Dexter
claim.
That the partnership commenced immediately on executing
the agreement, and that the goods were offered for sale in the
store of the firm; that the same had been replenished from
time to time, by and on account of the firm; that Matthews
and Bond had at all times participated in the profits thereof.
That Matthews and Bond were not acquainted with the mer
cantile business, and therefore chose to attend to the other
branches of the business of the firm, and that Millerd attended
principally to the store.
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That regular invoices were made of the $7,000 worth of
goods, and copied into a book in the store; and that similar
bills were made of the goods since purchased; and that all of
the bills or invoices were kept in the store with the other papers
of the firm; that books of account and a cash book, etc., were
kept in the store, and remained there up to 27th of June; and
that Matthews and Bond had access to them at'all times; ‘that
said invoice book was delivered to Matthews at his request:
that Matthews carried it away, and still has it.
That in the summer of 1836, an addition was built to said
tavern house by the firm, and out of their funds, at an expense
of about $1,000; that during the same year a store was in the
same way built on said five acres of land, at an expense of
about $3,000; that no account was kept of the expense; that
about the 1st of September, 1836, a contract was made by Mil
lerd and Matthews in the name of the firm with one J . Ranney
to sell him a village lot for a tannery, being part of said five
acres, which contract the parties agreed to reduce to writing
at some future time; that the same has not yet
*been done, but that said Ranney has taken posses- [*377]
sion of the lot by the concurrence of said Matthews
and Millerd, and paid part of the purchase inoney, for which
receipts were given in the name of the firm, and the money
appropriated to the use of the firm; charges that all this was
done with the consent and approbation of Matthews, and that
Bond, during his lifetime, and Matthews and Millerd did agree
during his lifetime to build said addition and said store.
That said firm did, about the 12th of January, 1836, purchase
of S. W. Dexter certain premises and water privilege, contigu
ous to the village on Huron river, for $3,000, and took a war
ranty deed; that the whole of the purchase money is yet unpaid
and not yet due; that at and previous to the commencement
of the partnership, Matthews and Bond were negotiating with
Dexter for the purchase from him of one-half the unsold lots
of Dexter village, and also 40 or 50 acres of land north of said
'
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village; that it was agreed between Matthews and Bond and
Millerd, that the latter should be admitted to participate in
said purchase; that the same was not consummated during
Bond’s lifetime, but that after his death Matthews and Millerd
completed the purchase in their own names, and a contract for
the same was executed by said Dexter, Matthews and Millerd,
whereby Dexter obligated himself to execute to Millerd and
Matthews a deed of the same upon the payment of $2,000;
that the same is still unpaid; that the said premises have risen
in value and are now worth at least $7,000.
That in January, 1836, Millerd had occasion to go to the
state of New York after his family, and to purchase goods for
the firm; that it was agreed between all the parties that he
should go, and that the business should be left in charge of
Matthews and Bond, and the clerks, that Bond died during Mil
lerd’s absence, in April or May, 1836; that Millerd was on his
return when he heard of his death, and immediately returned.
That after Bond’s death, Millerd and Matthews agreed to
continue the business of the partnership under the same style
and firm as before, and for their joint benefit; that they did
so; that Bond left certain heirs; that soon after his death it
was agreed between Matthews and Millerd, that Matthews
should purchase of the heirs their shares or interest
[*378] in said concern, and pay for the same out *of Mat
thews’ own funds; that Millerd should pay Matthews
one-half of the purchase money and expenses; that Matthews
should proceed to buy out the same on the best terms he
could, in the names of Matthews and Millerd, and for their
joint benefit; that Matthews should be allowed to absent him
self a suflicient time for that purpose.
That in September» or October, 1836, Matthews left Dexter to
go to Massachusetts for the purpose of ‘buying out the heirs
living there, for their joint benefit.
That Matthews did fraudulently purchase of some of the
heirs their interests, and took deeds therefor in his name alone;
we
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and th'at Matthews claims that by virtue of said deeds he is
entitled to six undivided ninths of said real estate; and in
right of his wife to a life estate in another ninth; and also
claims to be beneficially interested in seven-ninths of the per
sonal property of Bond, and that these claims are founded on
the following deeds and releases:
From Richard Bond and wife; from S. W. Dexter and wife;
from J. Carrier and wife; from Q. Hitchcock and wife; from
A. Williams and wife; from Hannah Bond.
The names and residence of Bond’s heirs are given; that
Russell Cooley is guardian of certain heirs named, who are
minors.
That Matthews has been appointed administrator of Bond.
That soon after Bond’s death, his brother King E. Bond
died, leaving his wife and two children heirs; R. Cooley is his
administrator.
That since Matthews’ appointment as administrator of Bond,
he and Millerd have continued the business as before.
That Millerd has never drawn from the partnership more
than his share of the profits.
That soon after Matthews’ return from Massachusetts, Mil
lerd learned for the first time that Matthews had taken the
deeds in his own name; that Millerd trusted to his good faith,
and was not alarmed, until about February, ‘1837,
when in a conversation with Matthews, *Millerd [*379]
learned for the first time that he intended all of said
purchases for his sole benefit.
That the real estate has risen in value greatly, and is worth,
besides the erections recently made, $17,000.
That Matthews, as part of the consideration of said pur
chases, assumed the .debts due from the firm of Matthews dn
Bond.
That the amount of consideration expressed in the several
deeds from the heirs is $900; that Millerd has ofiered to pay to
Matthews one-half of all the cost of said shares, and demanded
2a ass
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a deed of one-half thereof; that Matthews refused to make the
deed.
That about the tenth of June, 1837, Millerd was taken ill and
was confined to his house two weeks; that when he left the
store there was a large stock of goods on hand—about $10,000
worth—account books, bills, notes, etc., etc., to the amount of
$15,000 or $20,000, and about $2,000 in cash.
That about the 19th of June, 1837, Matthews took from the
store $1,000, for the purpose of paying a bank note at Wash
tenaw bank due from the firm; that Millerd learned afterwards
that he had not paid the same.
That on Sunday evening, June 25, Matthews removed the
books and papers from the store, and also the keys to the safe,
and on Monday Matthews dismissed the clerk and employed
another. _
That at this time there was in the store about $1,050 in cash.
That during Millerd’s illness, Matthews took and appropri
ated to his own use large sums of money.
That on the 28th of June Millerd called at the store, and
was denied access to the books by Matthews, and prevented by
force from making any examination.
That there is no person in the store or mills to look after
the interests of Millerd; that Millerd is unable to attend to
the same in person; that Matthews refuses to permit any one,
ete.; that the cash receipts in the store are about $80 per day,
and that on the evening of June 27 there was in the store $800
in cash.
That Matthews is illiterate, and incompetent to carry on the
business of the firm.
[*380] *Prays for an account; that Millerd may be decreed
entitled to one-half of the profits since Bond’s death;
for the establishment of said deed from Matthews and Bond to
complainant as an absolute conveyance; that Matthews be
decreed to convey to complainant one-half of the real estate
purchased of Bond’s heirs; for a partition of the real estate or
W
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sale; for a dissolution of partnership, and for the appointment
of areoeiver; for an injunction upon Matthews.
The answer of Matthews admits the copartnership and the
articles.
Admits that previous to and at the time of executing said
articles, the defendant and Edwin Bond were joint owners of
the five acres of land in bill mentioned, and were copartners
in grist and saw mill and tavern stand under the firm of Mat
thews 85 Bond, and that the firm were then indebted as in
the bill mentioned, and that by the formation of said firm of
J. Millerd & O0., the firm of Matthews & Bond was dissolved.
Denies that complainant ever furnished as his share of the
capital stock $7,000 worth of merchants’ goods; admits that
complainant did, shortly after the execution of said articles,
furnish and place in the store of the firm a stock of goods not
exceeding, as defendant verily believes, $4,000 or $5,000 worth,
and by far the greater proportion thereof were remnants and
other refuse goods of an old stock unsuitable to the demand,
and different in nature, quality and value from what the
complainant had promised to put into the partnership,
*and such as did not, according to their agreement, [*381]
entitle him to one-third of the rents of the mills and
tavern, the said agreement in fact imposing on complainant an
obligation to furnish a substantial and fresh stock of goods
suitable to the wants of the country, and worth at first cost
prices and transportation $7,000.
Admits that after the execution of the articles, and in pur
suance of the agreement therein, defendant and wife and Edwin
Bond executed a deed in fee simple of one-third of the five
acres as in the bill stated, but says that the deed, though abso
lute in terms, was not intended to be so in fact, but only to
operate_ as a security to indemnify complainant against the
claim of S. W. Dexter in the articles mentioned; and to a par
ticipation of one-third of the rents and profits of said property
for four years; and complainant acquired an estate therein only
ass
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for the aforesaid purposes upon the express condition that
money to pay Dexter should be drawn from the partnership
funds, and on the faith that complainant would fully comply
with his aforesaid contract by delivery of the stipulated stock
of goods, etc., and the property was estimated at a price below
its real value, on the further faith that the goods would be of
the quality and prices before mentioned; and states that the
deed was drawn by complainant; does not recollect what the
covenants were.
Admits that at the execution of the copartnership articles,
defendant and Bond proposed to complainant to become jointly
interested with them in the Brower lot; that defendant and
Bond then held a deed therefor as in bill stated, and subject to
the payments therein mentioned, for which three weeks’ notice
was given. That complainant, at the time mentioned in bill,
concluded to purchase and pay as therein stated, and that the
first of said notes has been paid; the others are unpaid, and
only one due.
That defendant cannot state positively what covenants are
contained in the deed, but believes they are as set forth in
the bill; denies that defendant and bond, or either of them,
have executed to complainant a warranty deed of the premises
mentioned in copartnership articles except as security;
[*382] avers that there never was any conversation *between
the parties by which complainant was entitled to any
other deed than the one he received, nor was there ever any
complaint by complainant that he had not received all and
every deed he was entitled to.
Avers that complainant has in fact received the deed men
tioned in the articles of agreement and none other, and for the
sole purpose therein mentioned, and he never demanded any
other.
That the partnership of J. Millerd & Co. commenced imme
diately on the execution of the articles of agreement, and goods
of said firm were sold at their store and replenished from time
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to time from different places, but to what extent defendant
cannot state; that defendant has received or expects to receive
his own share of the profits, and also seven-ninths of those due
to Bond at his death, to which he is entitled in virtue of the
several assignments, as also two-ninths more which he has this
day purchased, being all of said Bond’s interest, but denies that
complainant put in $7,000 worth of goods, or that defendant
has shared in the profits of such an amount.
Admits that defendant and Bond were unacquainted with
mercantile business, and that he chose to attend to the other
branches of the business, and that complainant should give his
attention to the store, intending thereby that such attention
should be proper, etc., and that complainant would be respon
sible for such attention, but defendant avers that the store has
been very inadequately and improperly attended by complain
ant and sons, to the detriment of the concern.
Denies that regular and correct bills or invoices were made
of the $7,000 worth of goods, so said to be furnished by com
plainant, and were copied into a book in the store; denies that
the stock was at all furnished. Defendant says he never knew
until the time hereinafter mentioned, that an invoice or bill of
any kind had been made by complainant of the goods which
he did furnish; says that no bills of the goods so furnished were
ever made out by the persons who sold the same to complainant,
as defendant verily believes, and if they were made out they
were never shown to, or seen by defendant, and defendant
believes and avers that there never was a just and true invoice
made out by complainant, or on his behalf of said
goods. *But defendant admits that about the 16th of [*383]
June last, complainant showed defendant a small book
purporting to be an inventory of goods made out at Auburn,
New York, which was made out chiefly in gross sums, omitting
the details necessary to render it satisfactory, and to test its
correctness; that the entire was made out by complainant with
out reference to original bills, but with a view to establish a par
at?
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ticular result, and afforded no evidence of the actual amount;
that this was all the invoice ever shown to defendant, and he
believes the same was not completed until long after the com
mencementof the copartnership; that the defendant retained same
in his possession a few days, when he returned it to complainant,
or into his possession at the store, about the 20th June last, and
defendant believes the same is now in the store or in complain
ant’s possession. Defendant believes that bills were made of
the goods since purchased at New York and elsewhere, and that
all of said bills have been kept with the other papers of the
firm in the store. .
Denies that regular books of account of sales or credit made
at said store were kept, or that any of the other books men
tioned in bill were regularly kept, but admits that books pur
porting to be those in_the bill mentioned, and for the time
therein stated, were kept, not in a regular, business-like man
ner, but very irregularly, defendant believing that not more
than one-tenth of the several accounts purported to be kept
thereby were in fact entered on said books.
Admits that all the books were kept in the store, and were
open to inspection of defendant and Bond, with exception of
said invoice book, which was, at defendant’s request, delivered
to him for the purpose in the bill alleged, and was returned by
defendant.
Denies that the defendant or Bond had the control of any of
the books, although they were open to their inspection ; they
remained in the exclusive possession and under the exclusive
control of complainant, or his sons, who acted as clerks in the
store, and although they were nominally clerks of the company,
yet they in reality consulted their father's interest in all cases
when that was at variance with the interest of the other partners.
Admits the building of the addition to tavern and the store,
both after Bond’s death, at the time and expense stated in the bill.
Admits the contract of sale of avillage lot to Julius
["384] Ranney as in *bill stated; says that complainant’s
ass
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participation in said transaction arose not from his right
as a proprietor in the lot, but from his interest as a part~
ner, and of the firm having a temporary and qualified interest
as before stated, which rendered his assent necessary.
Admits that said lot was taken possession of, and part of the
purchase money paid, receipted and_ appropriated as in the bill
stated, but that defendant consented to such appropriation not
from any right of the firm thereto, but because same was small
in amount; that at the time of the contract defendant told
Ranney that the company could not give a deed, but that at
some future time defendant individually would see that he
received a deed.
Admits that the addition to tavern and store were built and
paid for, and said lot sold and receipts for purchase money
given in all particulars as stated in the bill, and that the par
ties therein mentioned did agree to erect said buildings.
Admits the purchase from Dexter as in the bill stated; that
the deed is,in defendant’s possession; the purchase money yet
unpaid, and no part due at time of filing the bill, but defendant
believes one payment has since become due.
Admits that at and previous to the commencement of part
nership, defendant and Bond were in negotiation for the pur~
chase of village property of Dexter as in bill set forth, and the
agreement between complainant, defendant and Bond, as in the
bill stated, and that the purchase was not consummated during
Bond’s lifetime, and states it never was consummated, but the
agreement then made fell through, and a new bargain was
made therefor after Bond’s death; that the premises were pur
chased by complainant and defendant, not in their copartner
ship character, but as individuals; admits'that complainant
and defendant did complete the purchase as stated in the bill,
and that the contract was then in defendant’s possession; admits
that the premises have risen in value; cannot say whether they
are worth at least $7,000, but believes they are worth $5,000.
Admits that complainant had, as he alleged, occasion to go to
no
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the state of New York at the time and for the purposes men
tioned in bill, and that defendant made no objection thereto,
though he conceived complainant’s going to be in violation of
their copartnership articles; defendant regarded his
[*385] departure as being caused in reality by the necessity*of
moving his family, and that the purchase of goods was
only a pretext; that if sudh purchase was really necessary it
was in consequence of complainant having failed to furnish
his $7,000 worth of goods; that though there was no express
agreement, as mentioned in the bill, in regard to conducting
the business during complainant’s absence, yet it was generally
understood as unavoidably resulting from such absence that
the store should be left in charge of the defendant, and Bond
and the clerks; and that defendant and Bond should take charge
of the other branches of the business, and that complainant
should be permitted to take the journey.
Admits that Bond died at the time mentioned in the bill;
defendant does not know whether complainant was on his
return when he heard thereof, but admits that he did return
soon after.
Admits that after Bond’s death, defendant was under the
impression from the representation of others that he was
bound to continue the partnership to the end of the four years,
and under that impression he did continue the business with
complainant, without any new agreement, for their joint benefit
and under the same firm name as before, and the business was
continued and carried on as before; denies that it was under
any new agreement independent of the original articles.
Admits that Bond left heirs; denies wholly any agreement
or conversation in reference to the purchase of their rights for
the joint benefit of complainant and defendant; that defendant
has, since Bond’s death, purchased of the heirs, and become
entitled to the whole of Bond’s interest, and that the same was
purchased for his sole benefit.
Admits defendant’s leaving Dexter at the time, and for the
aso
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purpose in the bill mentioned, and that he procured from Bond’s
heirs, deeds and releases, to be executed to him in his own
name, and that he claims as in the bill mentioned; denies that
his so doing was in violation of agreement, or with intent to
deceive or defraud complainant.
Admits that defendant derives his said claims under and by
virtue of the several deeds in the bill set forth.
Admits that Bond’s heirs are correctly set forth in bill, and
that defendant is administrator of said Bond, and that King E.
Bond died intestate, leaving the persons named in the bill his
heirs.
*Admits that ever since defendant’s appointment as [*386]
administrator of Bond, he has continued .the business
with complainant; but defendant did so in his individual, and
not in his oflicial capacity as administrator.
Defendant believes complainant has drawn more than his
share of profits, and therefore denies that complainant has
never drawn more than his share.
Defendant cannot form any belief whether or not, soon after
his return from Massachusetts, complainant learned for the first
time that defendant had taken deeds in his own name, nor
whether he relied on the good faith of defendant, and was not
alarmed, etc., nor whether, until the conversation in the bill
mentioned, complainant learned that defendant intended all of
said purchases for his own benefit.
Defendant believes that complainant never entertained the
least idea that any of said shares were purchased for his benefit.
Admits that since November, 1836, the real estate mentioned
in the deed from defendant and wife and Bond to complainant
has risen in value, independent of the erection thereon; defen
dant cannot say how much, or whether they are worth the sum
mentioned in the bill.
Denies that defendant ever told complainant that, on the pur
chase of the rights of Bond’s heirs, he assumed as part of the
consideration of the purchases the payment of the debts due
361
386 CASES IN CHAN CERY.
Mmnnnn v. Rmsnsnn, AND Ransnnu. v. Mrnnnnn.
from the firm of Millerd & Bond, and that the consideration
expressed in the deeds was the amount actually paid over and
above the debts; that such was not the fact; but defendant
admits that he may have told complainant that as a part of the
consideration he was to assume the debts, but the amount of
consideration expressed in the deeds was inserted in a round
sum, without regard to the sum actually paid, which in some
instances exceeded the amount stated.
Admits that the whole amount of consideration expressed in
said deeds is two hundred and fifty dollars; but, for the reasons
before stated, defendant wholly denies and repudiates the pre
tended claims of complainant to any participation in the prop
erty acquired by said purchases, and denies that complainant,
by virtue of any agreement with defendant, and of any right
as surviving partner, and by paying to defendant the half
of the sums in the bills mentioned, or otherwise,
[*387] *would be entitled to half of said property, or any
part thereof.
Denies that any tender was ever made as stated in the bill,
but admits that, at or about the time stated in the bill, com
plainant did make the demand stated in the bill relative to said
property, and that defendant refused.
Admits the illness of complainant, as stated in the bill, and
that the store was left in care of his two sons, and there was in
the store a large stock of goods. Does not know the amount,
or of what they consisted. Also, books of account, notes,
etc., together with a certain sum of money. Defendant cannot
set forth the particulars or amount; all such matters remained
under the control and management of the complainant, as well
during his temporary illness as before.
Admits that defendant did take the sum of one thousand dol
lars as stated in the bill, and for the purpose therein mentioned,
and which was not a mere pretense, but that he did actually
pay the bank note therewith.
A
Admits that defendant did enter the store in the absence of
_ ____
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complainant and the clerks, as stated in the bill, and put into
an iron safe therein the books, notes, etc., and removed the key
of the safe in which the money was kept, but all this was done
in pursuance of the consequences of the writ of injunction, etc.,
and in accordance with the prayer of a bill which defendant
was coerced to file by the conduct of said complainant, etc.,
and because defendant apprehended if he had notice of the
issuing of the writ, he would seize upon the portable and val
uable property of the firm, etc., and defendant, in order to pro
tect them, locked them up, and after service of writ removed
the same to his house, the complainant having obtained a key
of the safe, and dismissed complainant’s sons, as stated in the
bill, because he had not confidence in them, and placed in said
store a competent and trusty clerk, and assumed the entire con
trol and management of the business; defendant submits that
he was justified, etc., and exercised only his legitimate power.
Admits that at that time defendant received from the safe in
said store, about sixteen hundred dollars.
Admits that during complainant’s illness defendant
took and appropriated *to his own use various sums of [*388]
money, as he was justified in doing by virtue of his
rights as a partner, and by virtue of articles relative to the pur
chase of the Brower lot; all of which were entered upon the
books; avers that the whole did not exceed the proportion of
defendant.
Admits that on the 28th of June, defendant being in posses
sion of the store, complainant did call at" the store and requested
as stated in the bill, and that defendant did refuse said requests,
which he was induced to do because he wished to make an in
ventory thereof previous to the access of complainant thereto,
whom he suspected of a design to alter the same and make
entries thereon, which entries complainant did afterwards make
as hereinafter stated, and defendant did not think complainant
was entitled to have access to the books until they were in the
hands of a receiver, and defendant removed them to his own
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house until a receiver was appointed, and then delivered them
to him. "
Denies that there was no person in the employment of the
firm to take care of the interests of complainant; that defendant
employed a trusty and competent clerk to act for the entire
concern, and gave his own time and attention to the business,
but defendant did, as stated in the bill, refuse to permit any
person appointed by complainant to attend, etc.
Admits the receipt of money and the state of funds as stated
in the bill.
Admits that defendant, though not an illiterate man, is unac
quainted with the mercantile business.
Denies that complainant has any well grounded apprehen
sions of being defrauded by defendant-.
Admits that no account was ever settled between them.
Defendant avers that complainant has, during the partnership
applied to his own use sums of money, and exceeding his pro
portion, to an amount unknown to defendant; and that he per
mitted his sons, being minors, and irresponsible, to take out of
store goods, and charged them to their account; and also that
complainant furnished articles for the use of the concern, and
charged more than they were worth.
Insists and avers that the partnership was dissolved
[*389] by Bond’s death, *and all of complainant’s right to a
share of the profits of mills, etc., became extinct.
Admits that complainant, although not entitled to any par
ticipation in the fee of said real estate, is entitled to an account
of the proportion of his funds, if any, drawn from said concern,
for improvements of said estate; but defendant says that said
sums should have been charged to him and Bond, and, if not
already charged, should now be so charged, etc.
Admits the institution of proceedings in this court, as stated
in the bill, and that a receiver has been appointed, to whom
defendant gave up the premises, books, money, etc., and the
receiver now conducts the entire business.
s64
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The complainant, having expressed anxiety to help the
receiver, and been permitted to have access to the books, took
advantage thereof to make some entries thereon, materially
affecting the nature and statement of some of the accounts,
and did the same in a clandestine, illegal manner; defendant
does not know the nature or amount thereof.
Defendant prays the dismissal of complainant’s bill, and the
relief prayed by the defendant’s original bill.
General replication filed, and the case brought to a hearing
on pleadings and proofs.
G. Miles and A. L. Zllillerd, for complainant.
Kingsley, I/laser and Romeyn, for defendant.
THE CI-IANCELLORZ
It is not necessary in this stage of these causes to enter at
length into a detailed statement of the pleadings, and the very
voluminous proofs and exhibits which the cases present.
The first question presented, which it is necessary to decide
before the accounts are stated, is, did Millerd comply with the
conditions of the articles of copartnership by furnishing goods
to the amount of $7,000, and thus entitle himself to the one
third of the real estate, and to an equal share of one-third
in the efiects and profits of the copartnership.
*Au inventory is exhibited, by which it appears that [*390]
the cost of the goods furnished by him was $5,389.54,
exclusive of the cost of transportation, insurance, etc., and
that a general charge was added of thirty-three and one-third
per centum for freight, purchase of goods, insurance, etc., mak
ing $1,796.51, which two sums make in all $7,186.04.
It appears by the proofs in the cause that from eight to ten
per cent. should cover these charges.
It becomes necessary to determine the question whether the
goods thus furnished were accepted and received by Matthews
and Bond as a fulfillment of this part of the agreement on the
part of Millerd. It may be proper to say, from my view of
ms
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the terms of the contract, that if Matthews and Bond had dis
sented at the time the goods were furnished, and had refused
to proceed further until the question of the amount to be
charged for purchasing the goods, freight, etc., had been set
tled, and the deficit supplied, they would have been entitled to
have the amount of goods stipulated for, at cost, and reasonable
charges and expenses, without any addition by way of profit.
But, from the testimony of King and C. D. Millerd, confirmed
to some extent by that of John Williams, there are strong
grounds of probability that the exhibit, containing an inventory
of the goods, and in which this charge of 81,7 96.51 occurs, was
the one used at the time the goods were received at Dexter.
The testimony of Cyrus Loomis of the admission of Matthews
that Millerd had fulfilled on his part, confirmed, as it is, by the
prominent fact that the deed of the one-third part of the prop
erty was executed by both Matthews and Bond some time after
the goods were received, without any further stipulation or
reservation, altogether furnish a very strong presumption that
the parties themselves regarded this part of the contract as
fulfilled and settled. Whatever may have been the fact, in a
doubtful question of this kind, it is much the most safe to abide
by the unequivocal acts of the parties themselves, than at this
late period to attempt to open this matter.
That the parties executed and delivered the deed admits of
no doubt.
[*391] *As to the alleged agreement for the purchase of
the interests of the heirs of Bond:
It is urged that this agreement is made out by the answer of
Millerd, and that it is taken out of the statute of frauds by part
performance. Millerd, the defendant in the first suit, and
complainant in the other, insists, in his answer in the one case
and in his bill in the other, that it was agreed between himself
and Matthews, after the death of Bond, that the interests of
the heirs of Bond should be purchased by Matthews for the
benefit of both. This is denied in the most positive terms by
ass
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the answer of Matthews in the second suit. It was insisted at
the argument that Millerd’s answer, being responsive to the
bill and not disproved, must be taken as true. Matthews
alleges, in his bill, his right to certain shares purchased of the
heirs of Bond. This Millerd denies, and, by way of avoidance,
sets up this independent contract by way of showing himself
entitled to the one-half of these shares. This I am inclined to
regard as not coming within the rule of being directly respon
sive to the allegations of the bill. It sets out a new contract,
and should be proved. The testimony of the witnesses is not
positive and conclusive. They do not testify as to the terms
used by the parties in making the contract.
C. D. Millerd says, in general terms, that it was agreed that
the interests should be purchased for the benefit of both, as he
understood it-—giviug the understanding of the witness, and
not the words used by the parties.
The testimony of B. King, as to the purchase, is still less
explicit.
It seems strange that a transaction of this importance should
have taken place Without a written contract, or, at least, a ver
bal one more clear and explicit. It has rather the appearance
of a conversation in relation to a contract, than a clear, definite
and complete agreement.
No entry on the subject is made on the books. The money
is paid entirely by Matthews; no charge is made to Millerd or
to the firm; and the title is taken to Matthews individually.
The claim, as alleged, is for an interest in the entire shares pur
chased of the heirs of Bond. The testimony relates only to the
shares of the heirs residing in Massachusetts, while several oth
ers were resident in the immediate vicinity of Dexter.
It will be perceived that *the contract is not proved [*392]
in that clear, full and precise manner which has uni
formly been required as the first step toward the establishment
of a parol contract for the conveyance of lands.
If the contract be vague and uncertain, or the evidence to
sew
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establish it insuflicient, a court of equity will not enforce it,
but will leave the party to his legal remedy: Colson '0. Thomp
son, 2 Wheat. R., 336. It was, however, insisted that there
had been such unequivocal acts of part performance as would
confirm the existence of the contract, and take it out of the
operation of the statute.
These acts consist principally in certain improvements upon
the property after the death of Bond, by the surviving part
ners, and without keeping an account of their expenditures.
The rule is that the act of part performance must unequivo
cally result from the agreement alleged. See Burtch '0. Hogge,
ante, 31; Bomier '0. Caldwell, ante, 67; MeMurtrie '0. Bennette,
ante, 124. It may have been so in this case; but this is not
one of those cases where the acts must necessarily have resulted
from this agreement, and are inconsistent with any other.
It will be perceived that, from the view I have taken of this
portion of the cause, this is not a case of parol contract clearly
proved and partly performed, which calls upon this court to
decree a specific performance. It is not clearly and distinctly
proved. It is positively denied by Matthews. The money
was all paid by him, and no charge made, either to Millerd or
to the firm. The title deeds were all taken in his name, and it
at least presents such a case of doubt as admonishes this court
of the danger of interfering to decree the performance of a con
tract which may never have had an existence.
Matthews, although he denies any new agreement, says he
believed at the time he was bound to continue the partnership.
It is not going too far, I think, to regard this to have been
the understanding of the parties, as the interests were subse
quently vested in Matthews, to accord to them an equal inter
est in the profits after the death of Bond.
Hence, it will result that, in taking the accounts, Millerd
must be regarded as having fulfilled on his part the original
agreement, and to be entitled to one-third of the real estate,
and to one-third of the profits of the co-partnership to the
ans
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death of Bond, and that the accounts *be stated to [*393]
that period. That thereafter the survivors, Millerd
and Matthews, share and share alike in the profits. That the
legal representatives of Bond be credited with interest upon
their share of the capital, and a reasonable rent for their pro
portion of the real estate, from that period to be ascertained by
the master. And as it appears that the repairs and improve
ments made to the real estate were necessary and useful, and
were made with the concurrence of Matthews, in whose estate
these shares are now vested, that the representatives of Bond
are to be charged in the account with one-third of their cost,
and that further directions be reserved until the coming in of
the report.
July 11, 1840, a rehearing was granted upon petition filed
for that purpose, and an order granted staying all proceedings
until the rehearing should be had. The following is the
opinion of the chancellor upon the rehearing:
THE Cnxnonuonz
Most of the questions raised upon the rehearing of this cause
were considered and disposed of when the case was before the
court upon the first hearing. It is not necessary, therefore, to
again go through the details of this complicated case. Upon a
review, I must confess I have had more hesitation‘ and doubt
upon the question as to whether Matthews ought not to be
held and considered as having purchased the interest of the
deceased partner for the benefit of the firm, and an equal divi
sion made, both of the property and profits, after the repay
ment of the money paid by him for the purchase of this interest.
But as there is no reasonable doubt from the entire case that
the purchase money was paid by Matthews, no charge or mem
orandum made on that account in the books, and no written
contract or memorandum between the parties, it is, perhaps, if
there be an error, erring on the side of safety to adhere to the
views then expressed upon this point, although it is with some
M we
393 CASES [N CHANCERY.
Mruamn v. Rsusnmnn, urn Rsxsnxnn v. Mrnumn.
doubt and hesitation. But the point made upon the rehearing,
and to which the petitioners must be confined, is that the repre
sentatives of the heirs of Bond are entitled to their election, to
take either interest or profits upon that share. It was held
upon the former occasion, as well from the pleadings and
proofs as from the whole course of the business of this firm,
that it was understood and agreed, on the part of
[*3§4] Matthews, that this partnership '*should be continued,
and that each party was entitled to share alike after
the death of Bond.
The interest of Bond being vested in Matthews, to give him
or his representatives this option now, would be contrary to
what, from the entire case, must be inferred was the contract
and understanding of these partners, inequitable and unjust.
Of the general rule that the representatives of a deceased
partner have this election, when the partnership is continued
without their assent, there is no doubt.
But here this interest is vested in one of the partners who
has consented to the continuance of this co-partnership; the
reason of the rule ceases, and he cannot be permitted to share
in a manner different from and in violation of the manifest
understanding of the parties.
Although not embraced in the petition for a rehearing, it is
urged that rent, instead of interest, should be charged upon the
share in the mills and real estate originally belonging to Bond.
Such was my first impression.
The whole matter of the negotiation after the death of Bond
is left very obscure; no terms or conditions satisfactorily estab
lished in the pleadings or proofs. The master, in fixing upon
a reasonable rent, must, in fact, resort to the profits made by
the mills, which formed the principal business of this co-part
nership, and it will, in fact, by changing the decree in this
respect, be but allowing profits by another name, which the
case made will neither call for nor justify.
There is much that is obscure in this case, but, upon the
whole, I think that the equity of the case does not call for or
justify the relief sought for by the petition for a rehearing.
Motion denied, and the order for a stay of proceedings
vacated.
are
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Plea, requisites of: Answer in support of. A plea of a stated account must aver
the accounts settled all the dealings between the parties; that the accounts were
just and fair, and due; and these averments must be supported by an answer to
the same eflect.
A plea of a release, unsupported by an answer, is insutflcient.
The bill of complaint alleges that on the 6th of March, 1836,
Tunis S. Wendell, who was then acting as trustee of the com
plainant, Catharine Schwarz, inquired of said Catharine whether
it was not probable that the interests which the co-heirs of
Abraham Sheridan held in common with said Catharine in 17
inlots and 4 outlots, in the borough of Erie, Pennsylvania,
could be purchased; adding at the same time that he had re
ceived an offer for the whole property. After some conversa
tion between the said Wendell and the complainant John E.
Schwarz, husband of said Catharine, it was proposed by Wen
dell and assented to by said John E. Schwarz without consult
ing Catharine Schwarz, the cestui qua trust, that he, Wendell,
should raise sufficient money to buy the interest in said lots,
not held and owned by said Catharine, and for that purpose,
he, said Wendell, should visit the city of Philadelphia, where
the persons owning the property resided, and endeavor to pur
chase the same; and for his trouble should receive one-half of
the profits arising from the purchase of said lots. That on the
day following this interview, the said John E. and Catharine
came to the city of Detroit at the solicitation of Wendell,
and the said Wendell then required said Catharine to execute a
note of that date for $4,000, payable in 90 days to him or his
order at the Bank of Michigan, to enable him to raise the nec
essary means to purchase the property. Against this proposi
tion John E. Schwarz protested, and said it was a variation
from his (Wendell’s) proposition of the day before, to furnish
the money, and that to require the said Catharine to furnish
the money, and give him, the said Wendell, a share in the
expected profits, would be unjust; to which Wendell replied,
am
395 CASES IN CHANCERY.
Scnwsnz v. WINDELL.
that he had made his calculations and preparations to commence
his journey, and if they declined sending him, $2,000 would.
not indemnify him against the damage he would there
[*396] by suflfer. The said *Catharine then, without under
standing the proposition or terms upon which Wen
dell proposed to buy said property, and being urged by her
husband, John E. Schwarz, and the said Wendell, and acting
on their advice, executed the said note and delivered it to
Wendell.
Immediately after the said Wendell drew up a memorandum
of agreement, set forth in the bill of complaint, between him
self and the said John E. Schwarz, on the part of said Cathar
ine, reciting that, as he had procured on that day $4,000 from
the Bank of Michigan for the- purpose of purchasing the iiiti-i-1:
ests of Richard P. Harding and John G. Thomas in the 17
inlots and 4 outlots, in the borough of Erie, Pennsylvania; that
he, said Wendell, should immediately proceed to Philadelphia
for the purpose of purchasing the said property; and that he
should have one-half of all the profits arising from the purchase
of said property, or if he succeeded in only purchasing part of
the property, he was to have one-half the profits on the portion
acquired, and his expenses. And it was further provided in
said agreement that if he did not succeed in making the pur
chase, said Catharine should pay his traveling expenses merely,
and it was also agreed that if he purchased any other property
it should be for the benefit of the said Catharine. The bill
alleges this memorandum was signed by the said Wendell and
John E. Schwarz without the knowledge, direction or consent
of the said Catharine. On the 8th March Wendell started,
having previously obtained the amount of the note made by
said Catharine of the Bank of Michigan. On the 19th March
he purchased of John G. Thomas and wife their interest in said
lots, being one undivided third part, for $1,200, and took the
title in his name as trustee of the said Catharine. Wendell then
made other purchases of real estate for said Catharine to the
872
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amount of about $1,600, and paid therefor out of the money
derived from said note of $4,000. Complainants cannot state
the amount precisely of all the purchases, as no account of said
$4,000 has been rendered, and all the deeds not being in the
possession of the complainants.
The bill further states that no part of said $4,000 note has
ever been repaid to the complainants, but alleges that a large
sum remains unexpended for the use of the said Catharine, and
unaccounted for by said Wendell. The $4,000 note became
due on the 10th of June, 1836, and on request of Wen
dell that some other person should be *procured as an [*397]
indorser on the note which was to be made to renew
the one falling due, the said Catharine procured Eurotas P.
Hastings to indorse the same. This renewed note, when it
became due at the bank on the 31st of August, 1836, was paid
by said Wendell out of money belonging to said Catharine.
The bill further states that Wendell, on or about September
3, 1836, mentioned that he had a chance to sell his share of the
Erie property to one Abijah Fross, who complainants believe
was a man of little or no credit or responsibility, for the sum of
$5,000, but ofiered to sell it to said Catharine, and take a cer
taih mortgage which she held against one Joshua Boyer, and to
receive the balance in a note of hand on long time, to which
said complainant John E. said he would consent if Catharine
was willing to agree thereto. In a few days after an assign
ment of the mortgage and a note for the balance of the $5,000
was prepared, which the said Catharine declined signing, say
ing that the said Wendell must wait for his share of the profits
until the property was sold.
The bill of complaint further states, that afterwards, and on
or about the commencement of 1837, John E. and Catharine
Schwarz on the one part, and Wendell on the other, became
dissatisfied with each other, and it was agreed between them
that the said Wendell should transfer all the trust property in
his possession to the complainant, Eurotas P. Hastings, ap
"
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pointed by said Catharine as her trustee to hold the same; and
papers, deeds and conveyances were prepared, and on the 28th
January, 1837, said John E. and Catharine and Eurotas P.
met said Wendell to have him execute the said deeds; that on
the same day after the deeds were laid on the table, but before
their execution, said Wendell presented and required said Cath
arine to sign as an implied condition of his transferring said
trust property, a note bearing date that day for $3,980.24, paya
ble in three years from date to said Wendell or bearer;that said
demand was a surprise upon complainants; the said Wendell
alo at the same time produced a memorandum not intelligible
to them, wherein he charged said Catharine $5,000 for his share
of the Erie property, and after deducting certain items pre
sented the said balance of $3,980.24.
The said Catharine insisted that the demand of said Wen
dell was unjust; but he insisting upon it, she, for the
[*398] purpose of avoiding any *difliculty, and to get the
property out of his hands, after hastily consulting
with John E. Schwarz, signed said note. Wendell, before
signing the deeds, requested said Hastings, as trustee of said
Catharine, to sign said note, and he without any knowledge of
the facts and circumstances, and at the request of said Catha
rine, signed it. The note was delivered to defendant, and the
conveyances executed and delivered. And the bill prays for
an accounting, and that the note be delivered up to be canceled.
To the bill the defendant filed a plea.
The plea states that at the time when the defendant assigned
the trust estate to Hastings, as is stated in the bill, he rendered
to the said Catharine and Hastings an account of all money and
property received by him as trustee, and an account was then
taken between the parties of all money received and paid out
by defendant as such trustee, and all his transactions as such
trustee, and on such accounting there was found due from said
Catharine to said defendant $4,160.63, and that balance was
stated, agreed upon and acquiesced in, by the said Catharine,
an
FIRST CIRCUIT. 398
Scnwssz v. Wsmnntn.
Eurotas P., and John E., and thereupon defendant took a note
from and executed by the said John E. for $180.59, and he
then took from said Catharine and Eurotas P. as trustee,
another note executed by them for $3,980.24, payable to defend
ant or bearer, three years after date, with interest at six per
cent per annum, and dated the same day, January 28, 1837, the
said two notes amounting together to the said sum of $4,160.83,
the former of which notes is in possession of defendant, but
the latter has been sold and transferred by him.
The plea avers the settlement of all things relative to the
trust, and the execution of an indenture by the said John E.
and Catharine, and the said Eurotas P. as her trustee, and the
said defendant, of the same date with said notes, wherein, after
reciting his having formerly acted as trustee, his having exe
cuted deeds, entered into covenants, and done other acts at the
request of said Catharine and John E. which might create a
personal liability on his part, and his having assigned the trust,
the said John E. for himself, his heirs, etc., in consideration of
the premises and of the sum of one dollar paid, covenanted
and agreed to save harmless and indemnified, and keep defended
the said defendant of and from all acts, deeds and covenants,
by him as such trustee done or executed, and from all
liabilities existing *or which might arise by reason of [*399]
his having acted as such trustee, and to reimburse him
for all losses he might be compelled to sustain by reason
thereof. And the said Eurotas P., for the like consideration,
covenanted and agreed in like manner as the said John E., so
far as the funds and property belonging to the said Catharine,
and in his hands, as trustee, would enable him, and to that
extent and no more.
Joy J; Porter, for complainants:
The plea is insufiicient, for two reasons.
1. It is not averred in the plea that the account which was
stated was a true and just account, to the best of the defend
ant’s knowledge and belief. This is necessary, although the
are
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bill does not impeach the account on the ground of fraud or
error: 3 Johns. Ch., 388-391; Beames .Pl., 230,- 8 Atk., 70,‘
Uoop. PL, 279,- Maj. PL, 260,- 4 Paige, 195.
2. The plea does not put in issue the matters charged in the
bill. It does not deny the constructive fraud alleged, nor the
imposition. The plea should deny the fraud charged, or the
facts which constitute the fraud: 4 Johns. Ch., 696,- 3 Paige,
277, 278; 2 Atk., 119.
D. Goodwin, in support of the plea:
The plea sets forth an accounting, settlement, notes for bal
ance, and an agreement by the complainants to indemnify the
defendant against all his doings as trustee, and all losses and
liabilities arising therefrom.
1. To a bill for an account, an account stated and a settle
ment constitute a good plea in bar, and such account can be
opened only in case of a palpable mistake or fraud. So a release
is a good bar to such or any bill, and can only be set aside for
fraud.
2. Here not only a settlement and a note for the balance due
and agreed upon on accounting are shown, but also an agree
ment by these very complainants to indemnify the defendant
in respect to the matters complained of. This is stronger than
a release. If complainants succeed, defendant has directly an
action against them co-extensive with their recovery. This a
court of chancery will never tolerate; on the contrary, if
complainants could, for the cause alleged, proceed and re
cover at law, a court of chancery would upon this
[*400] *agreement enjoin them from so doing and prevent the
cross actions. On the covenant Schwarz and Has
tings are personally liable, as Wendell was on the note he gave
to the bank: 2 Wheat., 45,- 2 Am. Com. Law, 193,- 8 O'ow.,
31; 9 J0hns., 334; 7 Oow., 458.
3. Upon the bill there is not enough shown to entitle com
plainants to relief. ’The settlement was long after the trans
actions out of which the complaint arises, and surely parties,
are
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cestuis qua trust as well as others, may settle their own affairs,
and here it is done: 1 Bald. O’. O’. R., 418. A cestui que trust,
whether fame covert or otherwise, is in equity owner of the
estate, and may devise, alien and encumber for debts. A mar
ried woman may even mortgage the estate held in trust for her
husband’s debts: 1 Madd. R., 458; 2 Kent, 162.
4. The agreement to indemnify (which is tantamount to a
release and more), is not mentioned in the bill. It must have
full and complete efiect. It forms a perfect bar, and could
only be set aside for fraud, clearly and conclusively shown, and
upon allegations and averments in a bill framed with that view.
Tun CHANCELLOBI
The plea in this case is insufficient. It merely sets up the
settlement, release and covenants, and that the note was given
for the balance found due to him. It does not state the man
ner in, which the account was rendered.
It is alleged in the bill that the claim for which the note in
question was given arose from the profits of the speculation
upon the Erie lots therein mentioned; that the profits, if any,
arose from the use of the funds of the cestui que trust, and that
the amount was presented on a slip of paper, and unintelligible,
and that the present trustee, Mr. Hastings, executed the cove
nant without any knowledge of the facts.
The rule is very well stated by Lord Redesdale in the case
of Roche v. Morgell, 2 Sch. & Lef., 726. He says:
“Upon the argument of a plea every fact stated in the bill
and not denied by the answer in support of the plea, must be
taken as true. The plea to the relief (of a stated account)
ought to have averred that the accounts settled all dealings
between the parties, that the accounts were just and
fair and due; and these averments *ought to have [*401]
been supported by an answer to the same effect.”
The same rule is also substantially stated by the same high
authority on the subject of pleading, in Mit. PL, 262, etc. There
are many other authorities sustaining this rule.
aw
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Without going into the consideration of the other point
raised at the hearing as to the relation of the parties as trustee
and cestui gue trust at this time (which would now perhaps be
admitted), I must say that this seems to me a very proper case
for the application of the rule. The covenant entered into by
Mr. Hastings, the new trustee, and the other complainants, under
the circumstances alleged in the bill, cannot vary the rule.
The plea must be overruled.
A rehearing of this cause on the plea filed was granted.
Joy cf: Porter, for complainants.
D. Goodwin, for defendants.
Tun CHANCELLORZ
A plea is a special answer to a bill demanding the judgment
of the court in the first instance, whether the special matter
urged by it does not debar the complainant from his title to an
answer which the bill requires.
The rule as to pleas which was stated on a former occas
ion is admitted to be the correct one; the propriety of its appli
cation to the case under consideration is
,
however, questioned.
It is not necessary to reiterate at much length the allegations
of this bill, as they were before fully stated. The allegation
that this claim of $5,000 in substance and fact arose from the
use of the trust funds, used in a supposed speculation in lands
at Erie, is not denied. It is further alleged that this demand
was unexpectedly made when the parties had met together to
execute the deeds. That it was a surprise upon the cestui que
trust, that the defendant insisted that the cestui gue trust should
purchase this interest, that he insisted upon its present settle
ment, that it
’
was yielded to hastily and for the purpose of
getting the property out of the hands of the defendant, that
the new trustee signed the note Without any knowledge of the
facts and circumstances stated in the bill. V
It is further charged that no part of the $4,000 received by
the trustee has been repaid to the complainants or any
an
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of them, and that *they fully believe that a large [*402]
balance of‘ said money still remains in the hands of
said defendant, and unaccounted for by him, and that the
account was presented on a slip of paper and unintelligible.
The bill also prays an account of this money, as well as to be
relieved against the note, and for such further and other relief
as the circumstances of the case may require. Now, whether
these allegations relate to one transaction or to one or more
items of a complicated account, can make no difference; and
without reference to the covenants set up by way of defense in
the plea, the plea unsupported by an answer cannot bar the
complainants from an answer to which they are entitled, and
the rules of pleading as before stated are correct, and applicable
to this case.
But it is insisted that the covenants, not being alluded to in
the bill, constitute a bar to the relief. The indenture contain
ing these covenants bears even date with the alleged settlement
and note. It is as follows, as stated in the plea (after the pre
liminary recital), that “this defendant had executed various
deeds, entered into several covenants, and done other matters,
at the request of the parties of the first part (the said Catharine
and the said John E.), some or all of which might then create
a personal liability on the part of the defendant, and that this
defendant had by deeds of equal date therewith assigned over
to the said Eurotas P., his heirs and assigns, at the request and
by the desire and appointment of the said Catharine, all the
said trusts and all the trust property belonging to the said Cath
arine heretofore vested in him; and that the said John E. in and
by the said indenture, in consideration of the premises and of
the sum of one dollar therein acknowledged to have been re
ceived from this defendant, did for himself, his heirs, executors
and administrators, covenant, promise and agree to and with
this defendant, his heirs, executors and administrators, that he,
the said John E., should and would well and truly save harm
less and indemnified, and keep defended this defendant and his
legal representatives of and from all acts, deeds, covenants and
other doings which he, this defendant, at any time theretofore
had done, committed, executed or entered into as trustee as
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aforesaid, or in the execution of the said trusts, and of and from
all consequences and liabilities of every kind or nature
[*-103] then existing, or which might thereafter arise, *for or
by reason of his (this defendant’s) having acted as such
trustee, and should and would reimburse this defendant and his
said representatives all such losses or sums of money, if any, as
he or they might be legally compelled to pay or sustain for or
by reason of his (this defendant’s), having accepted the said
trusts.”
It was held in the case of Roche 0. Morgell, 2 Sch. & Lef.,
721, that a plea of a release unsupported by an answer was
insulficient, although the same objection was there urged which
is now taken, that the bill did not refer to it
,
and pray that it
might be set aside.
Certainly no greater effect can be given to this statement than
to an express release. On the contrary, I have strong doubts
whether the covenants set out in this plea were intended to
extend to, or do in fact reach the case made by the bill at all.
The manifest intent and object of this instrument was to
indemnify and save harmless the trustee from any act done by
him in the execution of his trust. The prayer of the bill, among
other things, is that he may account for money belonging to
the trust fund, which they charge to be in his hands unac
counted for.
It would in my view be going very far to say that these
covenants shall bar and preclude the complainants from an
answer, when in fact they were intended for another and a dif
ferent purpose. But I do not intend to dwell upon this view of
the case, as it is not now intended to preclude the defendant from
whatever benefit he can properly derive from thisdefense when
supported by an answer.
Enough has been shown, I think, to justify the conclusion that
the plea is insufficient. To obviate any embarrassment which
may be apprehended from the form of the entry, the order will
be that the plea stand for an answer with liberty to accept. (a)
(a.) This case came on for final hearing on pleadings and proofs before Chancellor
Manning, and is reported in Walker-’s Chancery Reports, 267. The settlement relied
upon in this plea was there set aside, and an accounting ordered.
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Daniel D. Sinclair v. Addison J’. Comstock and others.
Town plat: Dedication. Where the proprietors of a village plat have made a plan
by which they have dedicated land for streets, or for a public square, and have
sold lots in reference to such plan, they cannot afterwards resume and exercise
acts of ownership over the land thus dedicated, which will deprive their grantees
ot any privileges or advantages which they might derive from having the streets
or square kept open. (a)
But in every such case the intention to appropriate the land for the purpose claimed
must be clearly apparent. (b)
Dedication: Refusal to accept. Where a lot was marked on a town plan as
“ Court
House Square," the purpose being to donate it to the county tor the erection of
a court house and jail thereon, and the county erected these buildings on another
lot, it was held, that this constituted sufilcient evidence of the refusal of the
county to accept the donation, and the proprietors were at liberty to appropriate
it to other purposes.
After such refusal, the purchasers ot other lots on the plat have no right to insist
that such lot shall be kept open as public grounds.
Motion to dissolve injunction on bill and answer.
The bill of complaint alleges that the plan or plat of the vil
lage of Adrian was laid out in 1827-8 by Addison J. Comstock,
one of the defendants, who was the owner of the lands consti
tuting the same; that the plat of said village was duly recorded
in the register’s ofiice as required by the statute; that on the
plat lot number 14 was given by the proprietor to the county
of Lenawee, for a court house and jail; that at the time the
village of Adrian was laid out the county seat of said county
was at Tecumseh; and it was the intention of the proprietor
that lot 14 should be used as well for a public square as for a
court house or jail; that it had been so used from the time
said village was laid out, with the knowledge and assent of the
defendant.
The bill states that the defendant sold lot 49, adjoining lot
14, and described the same as bounded on the north by the
(0.)See Smith t. Lock, 18Mich., 56.
(b) See People v. Jones, 6 Mich., 176: People v. Beaubien, 2 Doug. Mich., 256; Cook
v. Village of Hillsdale, 7 Mich., 115; Lee v. Lake, 14 Mich., 12; Tillman v. People,
12Mich., 401; Baker v. Johnston, 21Mich., 319.
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public square; that lot 49 had been subdivided and sold, and
the purchasers had erected on the same valuable buildings
fronting on the public square as described in the deed of lot
49, with the full belief that lot 14 would always remain a pub
lic square for the common benefit of the inhabitants of said
village. The bill alleges the defendant had full knowledge of
the expectation of those who erected the buildings fronting lot
14, and made no objection thereto.
The bill also alleges that the defendants, with others, made
additions to said village plat, and procured to be pub
[*405] lished a map of the said *village, upon which lot num
ber 14 was designated as a public square, and another
lot was designated as the site of the court house and jail, and
called Court House Square.
That the complainant, believing lot 14 would always remain
open, purchased one of the subdivisions of lot 49, fronting on
the public square, or lot 14.
By an act of the legislature approved 21st March, 1836, it
was declared the county seat should be established at Adrian,
from and after the first Monday of November, 1838. On the
6th of June, 1837, defendant Comstock deeded to the super
visors of the county of Lenawee a piece of land at or near the
village, for a court house and jail. On the 5th of June, 1837,
defendant Comstock deeded lot 14 to George Crane, his heirs
and assigns, in fee simple, without consideration. Immediately
after this conveyance Crane caused public notice to be given that
he would sell at public auction lot 14, the same having been sub
divided into ten lots. The complainant, and others also, who
had purchased parts of lot 49, as subdivided, caused public
notice to be given before and at the time of the selling of the
subdivisions of lot 14, that Crane had no right to sell and cou
vey the same, as it was reserved for a public square, and pri
vate buildings could not be erected thereon, and that his right
to the same would be litigated. Lot 14 as subdivided was sold,
however, and the defendants became the purchasers. The bill
ass
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charges that the defendants are about to erect buildings on lot
14, as subdivided, by which the complainant will be greatly
injured, etc. And it prays injunction to prevent such erections.
A preliminary injunction was granted.
The answer admits the village of Adrian was laid out as
stated, and that lot 14 is on the plat reserved to the county of
Lenawee for a court house and jail. At the time of the laying
out of the village of Adrian the county seat was at Tecumseh,
and it was understood and declared that lot 14 was only to be
used by the county for a court house and jail, and for no other
purpose whatever; and the statement was repeatedly made to
the citizens of Adrian, and the defendant expected, if the same
was not used for the purposes for which it was reserved, it
would revert to him. The answer admits that on the first of
March, 1828, defendant Comstock acknowledged the plat of
the village of Adrian, and under his hand and seal granted the
streets and lot 14 for the purposes named and expressed
on the map of the plat *of said village, which was [*406]
duly recorded. Lot 14 has been open from that time
until the present, with the knowledge of the defendant, but
without any express assent; admits there was a bond or agree
ment as set forth in the bill to sell lot 49, in which it was
described as bounded on the north by the public square, and
on December 28, 1835, in accordance with the provisions of the
bond, a deed was made bounding it in the same manner. The
subdivision of lot 49 is admitted, and the sales to the complain
ants and others, and the erection of buildings; but it is denied
that the complainant had any assurance that lot 14 would
remain open, nor had he any reason to believe the defendants
would ever assent to it remaining open and unoccupied, for
Comstock had asserted and given notice before and at the time
of the sale of lot 49, and before and at the time of the erection
of the buildings thereon, that he should claim lot 14 if the
county did not use it for the purpose specified in the grant to
the county. The answer admits the making of an addition to
883
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the village, the publishing a map, as alleged in the bill upon
which lot 14 is designated as a public square, and another lot
is called “ Court House Square,” but denies that Comstock, the
defendant, ever assented to the map being made, and avers
that it does not correspond with the original on record; admits
the change of the county seat from Tecumseh to Adrian in
November, 1838; admits that defendant Comstock did convey
to the county of Lenawee a lot for a court house and jail in
June, 1837; admits that defendant Comstock, on June 5, 1887,
conveyed lot 14 to Crane; says that by act of the legislature
the board of supervisors had the authority to fix the county
seat or court house on such lot as might be conveyed to them,
and that they did so fix the same on a lot between Front and
Toledo streets, and the defendant conveyed the same to the
supervisors on the 7th of March, 1837, and that it was under
stood by the board of supervisors, as well as defendant Com
stock, that lot 14 reverted to defendant Comstock; but he
agreed at that time to give lot 14 or the avails thereof to the
board of supervisors for the purpose of erecting the county
buildings; and George Crane was agreed upon as commissioner
to receive the title and sell and dispose of the same for the ben
efit of the county. The deed was made to Crane on the day
mentioned in the bill, and Crane gave back an instrument
declaring he held the same in trust for the county, to
[*407] be disposed *of, and the avails used in erecting county
buildings; admits that Crane gave no other considera
tion than as above mentioned, and that he sold the same as
trustee for the county duly appointed, at public auction, as
alleged in the bill; admits the complainant gave notice that lot
14 wasia public square, etc., as mentioned in bill of complaint;
admits defendants are about to erect buildings on lbt 14, as
subdivided, but denies that it will materially obstruct the view
of the complainant from lot 49, as there is a street 30 feet in
width running on the line of lot 14, and between that and lot
I81
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49. The defendants pray to have the same advantage as
though they had demurred to bill of complaint, etc.
A. Felch, in support of the motion:
The original grant of the lot in question (No. 14 in the vil
lage of Adrian) was a conditional one, being given for a court
house and jail.
Whether a condition be precedent or subsequent will depend
on the intention of the parties creating the estate: Finlay '0.
lfiing, 3 Pet. R., 346.
The county seat could not be changed without an act of the
legislature, nor could the lot in question be used for the purpose
designated without such an act. The intention of the parties
must have been, therefore, to set apart this lot for the purpose
of putting upon it a court house and jail, if the legislature
should pass such an act. The building of a court house and
jail, or at least an acceptance of the grant for that purpose,
was necessary before the grant took effect, and, until that was
done, both the fee and the possession remained in Comstock.
In the case of the Iilirst Parish in Sutton v Cole, 3 Pick., 232,
land given for the use of schools, it was decided, could not be
recovered by the donors until they had accepted the grant or
made an entry under it.
In Hayden v. Ink. of Stoughton, 4 Pick. R., 528, there was
an acceptance of the grant by vote of the defendants..
The act of the legislature passed in 1836, establishing the
seat of justice at Adrian from and after November 1,
1838, gave to the supervisors *the right to put the [*408]
county buildings on this lot, or such other lands as
might be given for that purpose, in the village of Adrian.
They were subsequently placed by them on another lot, which
was deeded for that purpose by said Comstock, March 7, 1837.
The object for which the lot in question was given was, there
fore, never accomplished; the lot was never accepted nor used
for a court house and jail; on the contrary, the act of the board
25 ass
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of supervisors was an express rejection of the lot, and an
acceptance of another from the same donor.
A condition precedent must take place before the estate can
vest or be enlarged, and, until the condition be performed, the
estate cannot be claimed to vest: 2 Black C0m., 154.
The condition must be literally performed, and even a court
of chancery will not vest an estate when, by reason of a con
dition precedent, it will not vest in law: Popham 0. Bamp/ield,
1 Vern., 83; 4 Kent, 125: Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. R.,
317; Shep. Touch., 450.
2. If it be conceded that the grant took effect immediately
on recording the map of the village, the occupation of the lot
for a court house and jail was a condition subsequent, and the
location of the county buildings on another lot was a relin
quishment of all right under the grants, and the premises
reverted to the donor.
On condition broken the whole property reverts: Shep.
Touch., 120,- Gray '0. Blanchard, 8 Pick. R., 284.
Lands given on condition that the public buildings of the
parish be erected thereon revert to the donor if the seat of jus
tice of the parish be removed by an act of the legislature: 4
K¢2:nt,126.
So a neglect to comply with the condition to build a school
house for twenty years operates as a forfeiture of a grant:
Hayden '0. Inh. of Stoughton, 5 Pick. R., 228; Lessee of Sperry
v. Pond, etc., 5 Ohio R., 387; Heirs of Sullivant 0. Commis
sioners of Franklin 00., 3 Ohio R., 89.
This, too, is the express provision of the statute of the state
under which the grant was made: Statutes 1833, p. 185.
[*409] 3. Deeding premises *described as bounded on the
north by the public square gave no right as to lot No.
14. It was a mere description of the lot conveyed. The sale
was made of a village lot by its number, and in reference to
the village plat on record. The record showed the true char
acter of the grant of lot No. 14, and the term “ public square ”
ass
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could have been understood only as applying to lot No. 14, as
there given, and not otherwise. The record showed that the
only interest which the public could have in it was to occupy
it for a court house and jail.
But the record is notice to the world of the character of the
grant: Price et al. v. Methodist Church, 4 Ohio R., 515.
The term way or highway has in law a fixed definite signifi
cation, always implying certain legal rights. Not so with the
term “ public square.” It has no fixed legal meaning. It im
plies no covenant, and works no estoppel. It is like any other
term descriptive of limits, and is to be taken in its general
acceptation. This by no means implies that it should be what
the complainants claim—an open, uninclosed space. And in
this case the answer shows that at the time of the conveyance
of lot 49, and subsequently, it was understood and declared to
mean that the lot was intended for public use for a court house
and jail, and not for a street or common.
Besides, the lot conveyed neither had nor required these
premises to give access to it. It had its front on Main street,
and has been subdivided since the purchase was made of Com
stock.
4. If the lot did not revert to Comstock, but the fee is still
in the county under the grant, the complainant is in no better
position, and must fail in the suit. By the grant of a lot for a
court house and jail, no right is given to the owners of adjoin
ing lots to require it to be kept unfenced, or without buildings,
or open as a street or highway. Indeed, this would defeat the
very object of the grant.
In the case of the Cambridge Common, it was decided that
inclosing it with a fence, excluding travel by horses, carriages,
teams, planting trees, etc., was not inconsistent with the grant;
but, the land being appropriated to a specific public use, a high
way over it would be inconsistent with the grant: 16 Pick. R.,
87.
Under the grant for a court house and jail there is a full
as?
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right not only to inclose the premises and to erect
[*410] thereon a court house and *jail, but barns, stables and
all necessary outbuildings for the use of the jailer and
others necessarily having charge of the public buildings: Jack
son o. Pike, 9 Cow. R., 69.
And an occupying of the premises in the ordinary mode of
occupying village lots is not inconsistent with the grant: Ib.
5. So far as even the imaginary rights of the complainant
can go, the lots on the south side of the premises in question
are abundantly provided for, in the location gratuitously by
the defendants of a street thirty feet wide adjoining lot No. 49.
6. Here was no dedication of the land to the public for the
purposes claimed in the bill. Such dedication supposes an act
to be done by the owner in fee; this act must be unequivocal,
and evidence an intention to grant the land for the purposes
claimed; where the original owner continues to exercise any
acts of ownership over the premises, or denies the right of the
public to it
,
or claims rights in himself inconsistent with such
dedication, it prevents a dedication. Even a disability to exer
cise acts of ownership over it will prevent it: 5 Taunt., 137,‘
10 Serg. <f; R., 412,- Wood iv. Veal, 5 Barn. & Ald., 454; Har
per v. Charlesworth, 4 Barn. & Ores., 574; Price et al. v.
Methodist Church, 4 Ohio R., 515.
The facts disclosed by the bill and answer forbid the idea of a
dedication of the lot in question, to be kept open without fence
and without buildings. They show, on the contrary, that it
was set apart for a purpose totally different, and every act of
the donor in reference to the lot has been in accordance with
the grant last mentioned. The answer shows that before the
deeding of the lot owned by complainant, at the time of deed
ing it
,
and subsequently to that time, he denied the dedication
of the lot for the purposes demanded in the bill, and claimed
full and perfect right to the same, subject only to the interest
acquired by the public for the uses designated in the plat of
the village of Adrian.
ass
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Baker, Harris cf: Jllillerol, contra:
The estate conveyed to the county is not properly a trust
estate. No trustee and cestui qua trust. The title is absolute,
except that they take on condition of devoting it only to a par
ticular use; and equity would restrain from any other use.
It conveys the fee in presenli, although the county
seat was not then established at Adrian, *and there [*411]
was no assurance that it ever would be. Suppose it
never had been, would the land have reverted, and, if so, when ‘?
And suppose it had been removed from Tecumseh to Palmyra,
would the land have reverted ? How does it appear but that
the county seat may still at some time be established on this
lot? Laws of llfic/zigan, 1838,12. 531.
Comstock has dedicated the land to the public, and given
reason to expect that it would always remain a public square.
1. By leaving it open and allowing it to be so used from the
time of laying out the village.
2. By designating it the public square in solemn instruments.
3. By having maps lithographed and circulated, with this lot
marked as a public square, and another as a court house square,
after the county seat had been removed. Though the answer
states that another person procured the maps, it does not deny
a knowledge or participation on the part of Comstock, nor that
he circulated them.
These are unequivocal acts which amount to a grant to the
public, independent of the consequence on the original plat,
and from which the individuals concerned were fully justified
in concluding that it was always to be a public square.
The location of the court house and jail upon another lot,
instead of this, having been made by Comstock’s own consent
and procurement, he cannot take advantage of it as a forfeiture.
Comstock, having conveyed to Hoag (under whom complain
ant claims), and described this lot as the “public square,” and
bounded the lot conveyed by the “public square,” is estopped
from denying that it is such.
ass
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The act to provide for -the recording of town plats, etc.,
approved April 12, 1827, made it necessary for Comstock to
make and record a plat, bounding and specifying all the streets
and public grounds, and what the lands so described were
intended for, and the acknowledgment and recording vested
the fee of such land in the county; and the statute expressly
recognized the title as in the county, by the provisions that
such plat should not afterwards be altered, unless satisfactory
proof was adduced that all persons owning any lot or
[*412] part *there0_f had agreed to such alteration; by this
means protecting acknowledged rights of persons,
who had purchased with a view to the advantages of the pub
lic ground so set apart; and not subject to any condition, either
subsequent or precedent.
The provisions in section four of the act to amend an act to
provide for establishing seats of justice, on page 534 of Laws
of Michigan (1833), do not apply to this case, as this convey
ance from Comstock was made under another and entirely dif
ferent law, relating to towns generally, and not to county
seats, and under which the donor could have no grounds for
claiming a reversion; and, further, if it did ever apply to cases
like the one now under consideration, it can have no influence
here, as it was in 1835 repealed, long prior to anything done
herein.
THE CHANCELLORZ
There is no doubt that when the proprietors of a village or
town have dedicated lots for streets or for a public square, and
have sold lots with reference to such plan, they cannot resume
and exercise rights of ownership over them, which will deprive
their grantees of any privilege which they might derive from
having such streets or squares left open.
‘But, in every such case, the dedication for the purpose claimed
must be made clearly apparent. The lot in question was
granted to the county of Lenawee for the purpose of a site for
aao
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a court house and jail. The original dedication shows that such
was the special purpose to which it was dedicated; and the
answer of Comstock, the original proprietor, shows that it was
granted for this and no other purpose; and states that it was
always so declared by him.
The proper authorities of the county of Lenawee designated
another and a different lot for this purpose, and have actually
erected the court house and jail on another and different lot in
the village of Adrian.
Comstock, the original proprietor, having transferred this
lot originally dedicated for a court house and jail, the present
complainant claims that it shall be kept open and uninclosed.
Comstock, in granting the adjoining lot to the grantor of the
complainant, describes the adjoining lot as bounded on the pub
lic square.
If this lot 14 had been left open as a common, and not desig
nated upon the original plat as having been dedicated
for that particular purpose, *1 should have no doubt [*413]
that this would have been held as suflicient evidence
that this lot had been dedicated for the general use of the
inhabitants of the village of Adrian.
But when it appears by the public records that it was dedi
cated to a particular purpose, it would seem that this phrase
ology must have been used merely by way of description, and
was not intended to and cannot change the character of the
grant.
In order to sustain this injunction it is necessary to require
that a lot granted for one purpose, and to be used in a particu
lar way, shall in fact be devoted to another purpose, which
requires it to be used in a different manner.
The complainant claims that it shall be kept open as a com
mon, or public square. The record shows that the only inter
est the public had in it was to occupy it as the site for a court
house and jail; and the record must be considered as notice to
the world of the character of the grant. By a grant of a lot
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for a court house and jail, no right accrues to the owners of
adjoining lots, that it shall be kept open and uninclosed. On
the contrary, it is to be supposed that if occupied for these
purposes it will almost necessarily be inclosed, and occupied by
all such necessary outbuildings as may be appendant, such as a
jail yard, the usual stable and necessary outbuildings for the
use of the jailer and his family.
The act of the commissioners establishing these buildings
elsewhere seems to me a sufficient evidence of the refusal of
the county to accept this donation according to the condition
of the grant, and that it must in fact revert to the donor.
Whether this shall be the effect or not, this complainant has
no right to insist that it shall be kept open as a public square
or common, when from the terms of the grant it is apparent
that such was not the intention of the donor; but on the con
trary, from the object of the grant, if accepted and used for
the purpose intended, it must necessarily have been occupied
and inclosed.
Injunction dissolved.
lass
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Receiver, when one will be appointed. Where complainant by his bill shows a legal
title to lands in possession of the defendant, and from the answer 0! defendant
a strong presumption arises of title in complainant, the court will grant a
receiver.
This is especially the case when there are large lncumbrances on the lands, and no
part of the rents and profits is applied to keep down the‘"interest, and defendant
is irresponsible, and ls holding over against his own deed.
Answer: Impeaching deed. An answer which admits a deed set out in the bill does
not sufllciently impeach it by denying lts validity in general terms; it should
state the facts which are supposed to render the deed invalid, so that the court
may pass upon them.
At law a party is estopped from disputing his deed; and if he would impeach it in
equity he must show in what his equity consists.
Vendee’s lien. A vendee who has paid the purchase money, has a lien against the
vendor analogous to that of a vendor against a vendee who has not paid the pur
chase money.
The bill in this case states that December 8, 1838, defendant
became the purchaser of the N. E. qr. of section No. 14, town
7 S. range 17 W., containing 15913635 acres; also the N. W. fr.
qu. of section 13, town 7 S. range '17 W., containing 136T4D§U
acres. That soon after such purchase defendant mortgaged
the same to George W. Walker, to secure the sum of $2,500,
which, according to the belief of complainant, was for the pur
chase money of said premises. That another mortgage was
executed by defendant upon the same premises to John Ham
ilton, to secure the sum of $1,000, which, according to the
belief of complainant, was also for purchase money. That
the defendant purchased said premises subject to a mortgage
made by John Hamilton to Alfred Stanton for $2,000, also sub
ject to a mortgage made by Jacob Beeson to George Kimmel,
upon which there was due at the time of the purchase about
$1,000. That defendant came to Michigan from New York in
the spring of 1839, and commenced erecting a large flouring
mill upon that part of the premises described as the north-east
quarter of section fourteen. That the defendant was possessed
393
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of little or no means for carrying on and completing the mill,
but relied on his credit and the chance of procuring
[*415] *loans of money for that purpose. That August 14,
1839, defendant applied to complainant as cashier of
the F. & M. Bank of Michigan, at St. Joseph, for a loan of
money to be used in erecting said mill, and informed complain
ant that he had funds in the hands of Philip S. Orooke, of New
York city, who would accept the drafts of defendant, and
would certainly pay the same at maturity. That confiding in
these statements complainant made a loan of $2,000 to the
defendant upon his draft drawn upon said Crooke, payable four
months after sight. That August 24, 1839, said Crooke accepted
the draft in writing thereon. That September 14, in the same
year, defendant again applied to complainant for another loa_n
of $3,000 upon the same kind of security, and complainant
having confidence in the integrity of defendant, which was
strengthened by the ready acceptance of the first draft by said
Crooke, which had not yet matured, complainant did loan and
advance to defendant the further sum of $3,000 to aid defen
dant in building said mill, and the defendant as security there
for drew his other bill of exchange dated at St. Joseph, Sep
tember 14, 1836, directed to said Crooke, payable sixty days
after sight, payable to the order of R. O. Payne, Esq., cashier,
for the sum of $8,000. That September 26, the same was
accepted by said Crooke in writing.
The bill further states that prior to the drawing of the first
mentioned bill or draft, defendant had borrowed $200, and had
drawn on said Crooke to pay the same; that said Crooke ac
cepted said draft, and defendant made provisions for the pay
ment of the same out of the money obtained on the $2,000
draft, thereby inducing the complainant to believe he actually
had money in the hands of Crooke in New York.
The bill further states that the complainant commenced suits
in the circuit court for Berrien county in the spring of 1840,
on the two drafts of $2,000 and $3,000, they having been pro
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tested for non-payment; that the defendant, Atterbury, execu
ted a deed of the premises to Crooke, bearing date March 1,
1839, for the consideration of $7,800, subject to the mortgages
aforesaid, which was recorded June 24, 1840. The bill further
states that in the summer of 1840 an attachment suit
was commenced against Crooke by the complainant *for [*4l6]
the purpose of collecting the amount due on the drafts,
and the property in question was seized. That suit was finally
settled by the complainant agreeing to take a deed of the prem
ises, and paying for them $2,191, being the amount of some
lien upon the premises on which Crooke was liable, and sur
rendering the two drafts drawn by Atterbury, then amounting
to $5,299. On the 14th of October, 1840, this negotiation was
consummated, and Crooke deeded complainant the lands de
scribed, with the mills and appurtenances.
The bill states that various ofiers were made to the defend
ant for the purpose of finally and amicably arranging the same,
but he has refused to do anything _towards paying the amount
due, and will not yield up the premises to the complainant; that
a suit of ejectment has been commenced against the defendant
to obtain possession of the property, but in the meantime the
property is depreciating in value from the neglect of the defend
ant, who is insolvent, and unable to respond in damages.
The bill further states that the interest on the several mort
gages has not been paid up, but is suflfered to accumulate by the
defendant;' that the mill is out of repair, and from neglect of
defendant there is great danger of the dam being carrid away,
which will injure the property to the amount of $1,500 to $2,000;
states that the defendant has made threats to destroy the mill,
and _said complainant should never have any benefit from it.
The bill prays that a receiver may be appointed of the rents and
profits of the mill and property during the pendenoy of the suit
in ejectment.
The answer admits the' purchase of the property, and that it
is subject to the several mortgages mentioned; admits the obtain
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ing the money on the drafts on Crooke, and that he paid the
$200 draft out of the money obtained on the $2,000 draft; admits
the drafts were protested for non-payment, and that suits have
been commenced against him. His answer denies the deed to
Crooke was valid, as it wanted a proper acknowledgment as
required by the statutes of this state, but admits it has been
placed on record in Berrien county, where the lands are situated.
The defendant says he always claimed the property, and when
the attachment suit was commenced against Crooke, notified
the complainant to that efl’ect; neither admits nor denies the
settlement between complainant and Crooke, and the
[*417] taking *of the deed from him, as set forth in the bill
of complainant. Admits various propositions, and that
they were not accepted; denies that the complainant has peace
ably and quietly attempted to obtain possession of the mill, or
that the mill is out of repair, or has been sufliered to become in
any way injured for want of repair, or that he is insolvent and
unable to pay the amount due to the complainant; admits the
interest on all the mortgages has not been paid; denies that he
is abusing the mill or premises; avers they are in good condi
tion; admits he may have used hastily expressions about the
complainant’s obtaining the property and deriving any benefit
therefrom; admits complainant has requested him to deliver
possession of the premises, which he refused, and that a suit in
ejectment has been commenced; denies pretenses, combina
tions, etc.
Green <f: Dana, for complainant, moved for the appointment
of a receiver in accordance with the prayer of the bill, upon the
bill, answers and depositions showing the value, condition and
situation of the property.
VT L. Bradford and I G. Atterbury, opposed the motion.
THE Cnsscnnnonz
From the case presented the complainant has made out a
legal title to the property in question. In the case of Slilwell
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'0. 'Willz'ams, 6 Madd., 49, it is said, “ that where from the answer
itself there is a strong presumption against the defendant’s
title which is impeached by the bill, the court will grant a
receiver.” The answer of the defendant in this case shows or
raises a strong presumption of title in the complainant. It
admits the deed to Crooke—the deed from Crooke to the com
plainant, and it states no facts which invalidate it. It denies
generally its validity, but that is swearing to a conclusion which
the defendant’s own deed denies. He should state the facts
which make the deed invalid, that the court may pass upon
them, and not having done this, his deed must be held to bind
him. The evidence in the case raises a strong presumption that
the defendant, in attempting to evade the payment of his debts,
was so far guilty of a fraud as that he could be estopped from
setting up the facts upon which he relies, even as against Crooke
himself. Indeed, from the testimony of Thomas Constantine
and John S. Chipman, it is apparent that this must
be so. And if this shall prove to be the contingency *re- [*418]
ferred to in the answer, it would constitute no defense
either in law or equity. He should have shown in what his
equity consists, for as a question of law he is estopped from
denying his own deed. A receiver will be appointed in behalf
of a vendor as against a vendee who has obtained possession
and refuses to pay the purchase money.
It is held in 15 Vesey, 844, that a vendee who has paid the
purchase money prematurely, has a lien as against the vendor
analogous to that of a vendor in the opposite case. The defend
ant, as the case is presented, is holding over as against his own
deed, and is not responsible for mesne profits or permissive
waste. The amount of incumbrances, including the drafts paid
by the complainant, amounts, with interest and costs, to about
the sum of $16,000; this, from the testimony, must be the full
value of the property or more. It also appears that the pro
perty could and should be made productive, and that it should
yield sufiicient to keep down the accruing interest on the incum
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brances. But instead of that, that nothing whatever is paid
on the outstanding mortgages, some of which are in process of
foreclosure, and which the complainant must extinguish in
order to protect himself; that a property which should produce
some $2,500 per annum is actually not doing more than about
one-tenth of the business of which it is capable.
The evidence in regard to the danger of the property is con
tradictory, but the weight of evidence is that the mill is badly
managed, and the dam in a hazardous condition. The facts
show bad management, a depreciation in the value of the prop
erty, and a total neglect of duty, or inability to perform it, on
the part of the defendant. The case under all its circumstances
is one pressing itself very strongly upon the discretion of the
court. There is a large amount of interest constantly accruing
on the outstanding incumbrances, all of which must fall on the
complainant. This valuable property, which, under ordinary
management, should produce suflicient to keep down the incum
brances, is actually paying nothing upon them, but the interest
is suffered to accumulate, and the defendant is irresponsible.
If this motion is refused the complainant is subjected to almost
irreparable, inevitable injury, for which he has no redress. No
rule is better settled than that the complainant is
[*419] entitled to the rents and profits from *the time his
title accrued. Lord Hardwicke in Dormer 0. For
tescue, 3 Atk., 128, observes: “ Nothing can be clearer both
in law and equity, and from natural justice, than that the
plaintiff is entitled to the rents and profits from the time his
title accrued:” Green '0. Biddle, 8 Wheat., 1. The case is still
stronger where there are large outstanding incumbrances, and
no part of the rents and profits are applied to keeping down
the interest, and the defendant totally irresponsible.
The answer of the defendant is in, testimony has been taken;
from the answer and testimony it results that there is imminent
danger that the complainant must lose the intermediate rents
and profits unless the motion be granted; that the interest is
ass
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permitted to accumulate on this large amount of incumbrances,
and that the property is not made productive, and a portion is
permitted to go entirely to waste, and the weight of evidence
is that it is in danger of destruction.
Under this state of facts the court cannot be satisfied that
its duty is performed without the appointment of a receiver.
Order accordingly. _
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Specific performance: Want of mutuality. As a.general rule a court of equity will
not decree a specific performance where the remedy is not mutual, and one
party only is bound by the agreement. (a)
Jurisdiction obtained for one purpose retained for another. Though specific per
formance is refused on a bill filed for that purpose, the court, in a proper case,
may retain the bill for the purpose of adjusting accounts between the parties. (b)
Bill retained for the purposes of an accounting as to the value of improvements
where the complainant had been in possession, and made improvements which
defendants claimed were to be applied on rents.
The bill in this case was for the specific performance of a
contract, and for the settlement of an account between the par
ties; and the prayer was that the balance found due complain
ant on the accounting might be applied on the contract. The
facts, as appears by the bill, answers and proofs, are that
defendant Sheldon, in May, 1834, proposed to the complainant
to remove from Dearbornville, Wayne county, Michigan, to
Kalamazoo, to keep the public house, and as an inducement,
ofifered to sell one-half of the public house or tavern, and lands
attached to it with the appurtenances, to the complainant, for
$4,000, or the Whole at the same rate. The proposition was in
writing, but no answer except a verbal one seems to have been
given, though the complainant avers that he intended to have
accepted and taken one-half of the premises, and did remove
to Kalamazoo in 1835, and enter into possession of the whole
premises. Considerable improvements had been made to the
tavern-house and outbuildings by the complainant, and no
rent had been demanded or paid, though he had been in pos
session some four years. The defendants were indebted to
complainant in a large sum on account of board, etc., which he
insisted was to apply towards the purchase price of the prop
(a) See McM1t'rtrie v. Bennette, ante, 124.
(b)See Brown 0. Gardner, ante, 291; Carroll v. Rice, Wal. Ch., 373; Whipple u.
Fa1"rar, 3 Mich., 436; Hawkins v. Clermont, 15Mich., 511.
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erty; and they insisted was to be canceled by the rent due
from complainant. It does not appear that defendants Burdick
and Lyon, who were joint owners with Sheldon, ever authorized
him to make the proposition to sell, or even knew of it until
about the time the bill was filed. There is no memorandum in
writing except the proposition to sell from Sheldon, and he
denies positively that it was accepted by the complainant, and
claims that complainant has been in possession as tenant. The
bill was filed in April, 1839, and it appeared the defendant
Sheldon had sold his interest to other persons prior to that time.
A. Pratt and D. B. ‘Webster, for complainant.
C. E Stuart and H. Mower, for defendants.
*Tn:s: CHANCELLORZ [*42l]
The defendants in their answers severally and positively
deny the existence of any agreement to sell the premises in ques
tion, and two of them deny all knowledge of any such pretense
until a short period before the filing of this bill.
There is in proof a proposition made by defendant Sheldon,
in the alternative to sell either the whole or the half of the
premises. There is no sufiicient proof that this proposition
was accepted, and a mutual contract based upon it obligatory
upon all the parties.
It is a general rule that a court of equity will not decree a
specific performance where the remedy is not mutual, or one
party only is bound by the agreement: Par/churst 2:. Van Cort
lcmdt, 1 Johns. Ch., 281. It is not proved that Sheldon had
authority to make the proposition from the other parties in
interest, who deny all knowledge of any such claim until a very
recent period, and many years after the proposition had been
made. To test the right of complainant to the relief heseeks,
it is but necessary to ask the question, if from the showing in
the case it would have been in the power of the defendants, or
any of them, if the property had decreased in value, to have
20 401
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coerced the complainant to make the purchase. But the com
plainant, under this indefinite proposition, has made valuable
improvements upon the property, with the knowledge and
assent of the defendants, under an arrangement, as they say,
that the expense of the improvements should be allowed for
in payment of rent. However this may have been, the com
plainant is entitled to pay for those improvements, whether
they were made relying upon the imperfect arrangement with
Sheldon, or under the understanding as stated by the defend
ants. From the changes in the title to the property, and the
singularly indefinite manner in which this business has been
transacted, the remedy of the complainant at law would per
haps be diflicult and less plain and adequate than in this court.
Under the circumstances of the case I deem it the duty of
the court to retain the case and direct a reference to ascertain
the cost of the improvements, and also to state an account
between the complainant and Burdick and Sheldon, the present
owners of the property, allowing in stating the account a fair
and reasonable rent for the premises during the period
[*-122] they were occupied by the complainant. This *was
done in the case in 1 Johns. Ch., 278, before referred
to, a case very analagous to the present in all its important
features.
Decree accordingly.
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Foreclosure bill : Parties. A trustee, holding a mortgage as such, need not make
his cestuis que trust parties to a bill to foreclose it.
Cestuis que trust, when not necessary parties. Cestuiw que trust are not necessary
parties when the only object of the suit is to reduce the property into posses
Bion. (a)
Bill by assignee: Allegation of assignment. It ls not ground of demurrer to a fore
closure bill by an assignee, that it does not glve the date of assignment.
Bill not signed by counsel. Though a bill should be signed by counsel, yet if this
should accidentally be omitted, the signature will be allowed to be supplied
afterwards without costs.
The bill of complaint was filed by William E. Sill, trustee
for Jonathan Dwight, Henry Dwight, Edmund Dwight, John
Ward, and Benjamin Day, for the foreclosure of a mortgage
made by the defendant to E. P. Hastings, president of the
Bank of Michigan, in trust for said bank, for the sum of
$12,000. The bill states that E. .P. H., president and trustee
as aforesaid, and mortgagee, did, by his deed of assignment
duly executed, acknowledged, and delivered, under the author
ity and by direction of the Bank of Michigan, sell, assign,
transfer and set over said bond and mortgage to the complain
ant. The date or time of the assignment is not given. In all
other respects the bill is in the usual form, and is signed by the
complainant by his solicitors. The bill was not signed by
counsel.
To the bill a demurrer was filed by the defendant, and the
following causes assigned:
1. The cestuis que trust, Jonathan Dwight and others, are
necessary parties.
2. The bill of complaint is not signed by counsel.
3. The bill is bad for uncertainty, as it does not show the
(a) See to the same eflect, Cook v Wheeler, poet, 448; Wheeler u. Clinton Canal
Bank, post, 449; Martin v. McReynold:, 6Mich, 70; Adam: v. Bradley, 12Mich, 346.
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time of the assignment of the bond and mortgage to the com
plainant.
Joy <f
¢
Porter, for complainant.
If Romeyn, for defendant.
Tun CHANCELLOR1
'
The complainant files his bill in this case as trustee for five
cestuis que trust. The object of the bill is to foreclose a mort
gage given as collateral security for a debt.
The principal question is
,
whether it is necessary in a case
of this kind, to make the cestuis que trust parties to this suit.
There is a good deal of confusion in the authorities
[*424] upon this subject. *Without going through the nume
rous and somewhat contradictory cases cited, I will
refer to the remarks of Mr. Calvert in his treatise on parties,
who has, I think, stated the result to be deduced from all the
cases very correctly. He says, page 210, “ It will be observed
that Lord Eldon says in most cases respecting trust property
the cestuis que trust should be made parties. This expression
naturally suggests an inquiry, in what cases they are not to be
made parties. In the cases just quoted the existence or enjoy
ment of the property is alfected by the prayer of the bill. But
there are cases in which the existence of the property is not
afected, and the only object is to transfer it into the hands of
the trustees; these two classes must not be confounded together.
In cases of the former class the interest of the cestuis gue trust
is immediately affected by the proceedings. Not so in cases of
the latter class, for they will not lose their lien upon the prop
erty whether the trustee does or does not reduce it into posses
sion. The duty of the trustee is to reduce it into possession,
that he may have the complete execution of the trust within
his own power, a duty which he must perform, and in which
the cestui que trust, although he may compel his trustee to
undertake it, ought not to bear any part: It seems that where
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the prayer of the bill is confined to this olgiect, the cestui gue
trust ought not to be made aparty.”
What is meant by the language here used? The reason
given for the rule that the cestuis gue trust should be made
parties, is that the court may be enabled to do complete justice
by deciding upon and settling all the rights of all persons
interested, and preventing further litigation.
Where the object of the bill is to settle an account of trust
property, it is undoubtedly necessary that all the cestuis gue
trust, or, in other words, all persons interested in the event
of the suit, should be before the court. This was the case in
Harme v. Stevens, 1 Ver., 110, which has been referred to in
several of the subsequent cases.
What is the object of the present bill? It is merely to get
in the money due upon the mortgage in part execution of the
trust. The rights of the cestuis gue trust are not brought in
question in this proceeding. There are no rights of these per
sons put in issue. The trustee assignee of this mort
gage takes no more than is actually due *upon it. [*425]
Under the case made by the bill he does take all that
is due. This litigation cannot be aided or varied, so far as I
can perceive, by making the cestuis gue trust parties. The deci
sion would be the same upon the validity or the amount due
upon the mortgage in either case. The right of the persons
for Whom this trustee acts cannot be affected by the collection
of this money; their right to the proceeds in the hands of the
trustee remains. From all reasoning in the cases cited, I am
satisfied this comes within the reason of the exception to the
rqle, although no parallel case has been found; and unless the
court is restrained by the authority of adjudged cases, every
consideration of reason and convenience is in favor of this
practice. Indeed, this seems to me but the duty of the trustee
as the first step in the execution of his trust. If any question
as to the right of any or all of the cestuis que trust to the pro
ceeds should arise, then of course they must all be made parties.
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As to the allegation of the assignment it shows a suflicient
title to enable the complainant to sue, and is sufficient upon
demurrer. The other cause of demurrer, that the bill is not
signed by counsel, is technically correct, but as it is a mere slip
the bill may be amended in this particular without costs to
either party.
Demurrer overruled.
mo
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Setting aside pro confesso for answer. The general rule is that when a defendant,
by whom the bill has been taken pro confesso presents an answer which shows
a.defense, and there is an excuse shown for the default, the court will permit
him to flle the answer on terms.
The inclination of the court is always to permit an answer to be filed if it discloses
a.defense, unless there has been intentional delay.
This was an application to set aside a decree pro confesso,
and for leave to file an answer. It was based upon aflidavits
excusing the delay, and the answer proposed to be filed if the
decree was set aside.
A. D. Fraser, in support of the motion.
THE CHANCELLORZ
The general rule is
,
that where the answer shows a defense,
and there is some excuse shown for the delay, the court will
permit the answer to be filed on terms. If the answer discloses
a defense, the inclination of the court has always been to per
mit it to be filed, unless the court shall believe that there has
been a delay intended to retard the proceedings in the cause. I
do not believe that such has been the case here.
Some attention is due to the character of the liability. Per
sons have been drawn into these institutions without any
knowledge of the extent of their liability. This cannot shield
them whenever their liabilities are fixed, but it may properly
be considered upon an application to be permitted to make
whatever defense they may have.
The court cannot now undertake to define or to foresee the
extent, or the limit of the liability of the stockholders in these
institutions, where so many may prove insolvent. It is impos
sible to tell where or to what extent the blow may fall.
In view of this, and of the uniform practice of this court, I
do not feel myself at liberty to refuse this application, or to
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impose upon the counsel the obligation to stipulate as to the
rights of their client, as asked for by the complainants.
The terms should he to pay the costs of the default and all
subsequent costs as a condition, and also to receive a replica
tion, and rule for taking proofs upon filing the answer, if the
complainant shall so elect.
Order accordingly.
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Samuel Street v. Leander S. Dow and another.
Specific performance on behalf of assignee. Courts of equity recognize and protect
the rights of assignees, and enforce the performance of contracts in their favor.
Contracts: Parol merged in writing. It is ageneral rule theta contract cannot rest
partly in writing and partly in parol. Where a contract is reduced to writing, all
previous parol agreements relating to the same matter are merged in the written
contract. (a)
Fraud: Lashes in applying for relief. A party seeking to set aside 9. conveyance
on the ground of fraud, must be prompt in communicating it, and consistent in
his notice as to the use he intends to make of it. (b)
Bill for specific performance of a contract.
The facts, as appears by bill and answer, were, that Leander
S. Dow and William Bort gave their bond to one George Har
lan in the penal sum of $3,000, conditioned for the conveyance
to Harlan or his assigns, within twenty-four hours after demand,
of the S. E. quarter of section 6, town 8 South range 17 West,
in the state of Michigan, at any time within one year from
date, provided Harlan or his assigns should previously pay the
sum of $200 in such money as would be received at the land
office for the land in question, Dow holding the possession of
the premises under the pre-eruption laws. Harlan assigned the
bond to the complainant. The defendant Dow left the state,
so the money could not be paid or tendered him. The com
plainant olfered it to Bort, who refused it
,
and finally paid it
into the land ofiice and obtained a landoifice receipt for the
same in payment for the land, as described in the bond. Notice
was given of the payment of the money by complainant to
Bort, and a deed demanded before the expiration of the time
limited in the bond. At the time the defendants executed the
(a) See Svhwarz v. Wendell. Wal. Ch., 26?’;Adair 1:.Adair, 5 Mich., 204; Saver
cool v. Far-well, 17Mich., 308;Martin 1:.Hamlin, 18Mich., 854;Vanderkarr 1:.Thomp
eon, 19 Mich., 82.
(b) See De Armand v. Phillips, Wal. Ch., 186;Wilbur 1:.Flood, 16 Mich., 40;Mar
tin 1:.Ash., 20Mich., 166; Campau v. Van Duke, 15Mich., 371.
1 —
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bond, Harlan gave four notes of $50 each to defendants, which
were to be indorsed by the complainant, and they were received
conditionally, and Harlan was to procure the indorsement;
though no mention of this was made in the bond. This was
never done except as to one of the notes. The others were
retained by the defendants and put in circulation; no ofier to
return them to Harlan, or Street, ever having been made by the
defendants.
Green (f; Dana, for complainant.
J1 S. Uhipman, for defendants.
[*428] *Tan OHANCELLORZ
The complainant, Samuel Street, must be regarded as stand
ing in the same situation as the original obligee of the bond
would have occupied if the bond had not been assigned. Courts
of chancery recognize and protect the rights of assignees. The
condition of the bond is plain and clear. On the one side the
obligee of the bond, Harlan, was to furnish to the said Dow
$200 in money receivable at the land oflice, and Dow was at
any time when required, upon a notice of twenty-four hours, to
convey the lands mentioned in ‘the bond by a good and sufii
cient deed. Dow being absent from the state under circum
stances which led the complainant to apprehend that he in
tended to evade the fulfillment of the conditions of the bond,
the complainant actually paid and applied the $200 to the pur
pose particularly designated in the bond to which it was to be
applied. This seems to me a substantial compliance with the
condition of the bond.
The money has been applied according to the conditions of
the bond itself; so far, therefore, as this question rests upon
the bond, the condition has been performed on the part of the
obligee, and he is entitled to the land in question.
It is a general rule that a contract cannot rest partly in writ
ing and partly in parol; but where a contract is reduced to
~Z¢-mi ——
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writing, all previous parol contracts relating to the same mat
ter are merged in the written contract.
It is attempted to be shown in this case that defendant Dow
was induced to deliver this bond upon a promise that the four
notes executed by Harlan should be indorsed by Street, which
was not done except as to one. If the defendant had at the
time, and before he had put the notes in circulation, insisted at
once upon returning the notes and receding from the contract
upon this promise, unless they were indorsed, he would have
been authorized to have done so.
But having actually used and put these notes in circulation,
and permitting the bond to stand, he must be considered as
having waived his right. He cannot aflirm and satisfy the con
tract by using the notes received, and at the same time dis
aflirm it. He must adopt one course or the other.
A party seeking to set aside a conveyance on the
ground of fraud *must he prompt in communicating [*429]
it, and consistent in his notice as to the use he intends
to make of it: 3 Pet. R., 215.
There must be a decree for a conveyance according to the
conditions of the bond.
Decree accordingly.
I11
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Thayer v. Jason Swift and others.
Creditor’; bill .- Remedy at law must be exhausted. A creditor-’s bill to reach equit
able assets cannot be filed until the remedy at law has been exhausted.
The remedy at law is not exhausted until an execution has been issued and returned
unsatisfied. And for this purpose it cannot be returned until the return day. (a)
The remedy by creditor’s bill is a harsh remedy, which will not be aflforded unless
the creditor shows a strict and rigid compliance with the rules and forms of law.
Bill in aid of execution. Where a lien has been acquired by levy of execution, or
whera there is an outstanding execution in the hands of an ofllcer, and a.fraudu
lent obstruction is interposed to prevent its being levied, a bill may be sustained
for a.discovery, and to remove such obstruction. (b)
Im'uncti'on exparte. The ground and the only ground on which injunctions are
granted against persons in possession of personal property and ostensibly the
rightful owners, upon an ea:purte application, is the protection of the fund or
property, when it ls shown that without such interposition of the court there is
danger that it may be lost to the complainant it he succeeds in establishing his
title.
Trust : Receiver as against trustee. One to whom a debtor has conveyed his prop
erty to keep it beyond the reach of his creditors will be held to be a trustee for
their benefit, and will be liable for all the property in his hands when suit is
brought against him. But a receiver will not be appointed over one charged
with being such a trustee, when there ls no allegation that he is insolvent, tran
sient or irresponsible, or that the fund is in a hazardous condition.
The complainants obtained a judgment against the defend
ant Swift in the circuit court for the county of Washtenaw, on
the 13th of December, 1839, for $686.44 damages, and $43.72
costs of suit. On the 31st of December, 1839, a ji. fa. was
issued, directed to the sherilf of Washtenaw county, where
Swift resides, against the goods, chattels, lands and tenements
of Swift, and was delivered to J . K. Wallace, deputy sherifi,
on the first day of January, 1840. The execution was return
able on the first Tuesday of May, 1840. On the 20th April,
1840, the sherifl’ by his deputy returned on said writ, “that
(a) To the same eflect is Smith u. Thompson, Wal. Ch., 1; Beach v. ‘White, Wal.
Ch., 495. And see Williams v. Hubbard, 1Mich., 446.
(b) See McK1lbben11.Barton, 1Mich., 213. But a bill in aid of execution can only
be filed to reach those interests which are subject to sale at law. It cannot be flled
to reach mere equitable interests: Trask v. Green, 9 Mich., 358; Maynard v. Hos
lcins, 9Mich. 485. Compare Clelancl 1:.Taylor, 3 Mich., 201.
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there was no goods and chattels, lands and tenements to be
found in his bailiwick to secure or pay the sum due the com
plainant, or any part thereof, to his knowledge, after diligent
search.” The judgment remains in full force, and wholly
unsatisfied.
The bill states that defendant Swift has a considerable
amount of property, real and personal, which he keeps
concealed, and particularly *that he deeded to defend- [*431]
ant Banister a lot in the village of Dexter, without
consideration, for the purpose of keeping the same out of the
way of his creditors. That since making the deed, Swift has
remained in possession, and has erected thereon a brick house,
and paid for the same out of his own means, though the whole
business has been carried on in the name of Banister. The
improvements are supposed to be Worth from $1,500 to $2,000.
The bill alleges certain other property has been purchased by
Swift in the name of Banister, for the purpose of defrauding
his creditors. The complainants charge that all the property
described as in the name of Banister, is held in trust by him
for Swift, and that he has also a large amount of notes, accounts,
etc., belonging to Swift, which he is collecting for Swift’s ben
efit. The prayer is in the usual form of a judgment creditor’s
bill. A preliminary injunction was granted.
Motion for receiver by complainants.
Motion for dissolution of injunction by defendants.
Miles J: Wilsorz, for defendants.
THE CHANCELLORI
The various questions presented under this motion involve
principles of the most important and complicated character.
The consequences flowing from their decision either the one
way or the other are of great importance. It is to be regretted
that this question is presented under circumstances which pre
clude that careful examination of authorities, and that deliber
ate reflection which the subject demands.
- 41s
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Under these circumstances, I shall confine myself to the con
sideration of such portions of this case as may be required by
the present exigency.
The first question is
,
can this bill be sustained as a judgment
creditor’s bill merely ‘P The foundation of the jurisdiction of
this court in this class of cases is
,
that the judgment creditor
shall have fully exhausted his remedy at law. It has been
repeatedly held that the court will not retain a bill as a judg
ment creditor’s bill merely, filed before the return day of the
execution. In the absence of any authority or dicta upon the
subject, I should have as little doubt upon a case where the
execution was actually returned before the return
[*432] *day, although the bill was not filed until after the
return day had elapsed. Courts of chancery have
held the judgment creditor in every adjudged case, before
administering this harsh remedy of depriving the debtor abso
lutely of all control over every part and portion of his prop
erty, to bring himself strictly and rigidly within this rule.
No case can be found where this remedy has been afforded
without a strict compliance with all the forms. What is the
reason of the rule? It is that a judgment debtor shall not be
harrassed with a suit in chancery until the creditor has availed
himself of all his common law rights to collect his judgment.
The only dictum to be found which has ever led to any doubt
upon this subject is to be found in the opinion of Chancellor
Walworth in the case of Oassidy v. Meacham, 3 Paige, 312.
This idea is thrown out under a perhaps, and rather as a specu
lation than as a decision. He says perhaps a return made
before the return day may be good by relation. But if we
once depart from the well settled rule, that the creditor shall
fairly and fully first exhaust his remedy at law, where shall we
stop ‘P
Will it answer that the execution may be issued, delivered
to an ofiicer, and immediately returned, and slumber in the files
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of the court until after the return day has passed, and then
become good by relation, notwithstanding the debtor may have
been in possession of property on which to levy the execution.
There is no other safe course to adopt, in administering this
severe remedy, but to adhere to the well-established principles
which govern this class of cases; and I think the rule is too
well established to be overturned by a speculative expression
of this kind, which formed no part of the decision, and was
unnecessary in the case. The fact that a suit of this kind has
never been sustained as far as we can find,- is not without its
importance. I place some reliance on the manuscript case of
173:1-guson 2:. Néwsteaol, cited from New York.
I have very little doubt it is correctly reported, and entirely
concur in the reasoning. This is the first time I have been
called upon to decide this question. Its decision is now unavoid
able, and as it is now decided must be the rule in future cases
upon this subject. I entertain no doubt as to what should be
the rule.
The next question, whether under the allegations contained
in this bill, the complainant can call upon the other defendants,
the alleged trustees or the judgment debtor, is of a much more
grave and important character.
*If a levy had been made, and an actual lien thus [*433]
been acquired, there could be no doubt.
If there was an outstanding execution in the hands of the
oflicer, and the bill had been filed for a discovery, and to remove
fraudulent obstructions interposed to prevent its being levied,
there could, on general principles, exist but little difiiculty.
Here it is not averred that there has been any attempt to levy
this execution upon this property, and there is no outstanding
execution in aid of which the extraordinary powers of this
court are invoked. I am inclined to think, however, and to
hold for the purpose of this motion, that the complainant,
under the showing contained in his bill, may sustain it for the
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purpose of making this trust property available, if it really
has any existence, for the liquidation of his judgment. (a)
It is, however, urged that the injunction granted in this case
against the assignees, is neither required nor justified by the
allegations contained inthe bill. The ground, and only ground,
upon which injunctions against third persons in possession of
personal property, and ostensibly its rightful owners, upon an
em parte application are granted, is for the protection of the
fund or the property, when it is shown to be in danger with
out this interposition.
Here there is no allegation that these trustees are insolvent,
transient, or irresponsible. It was held in the case of Hadden
v.~Spacler, 20 Johns., 570, that it makes no difference whether
the goods are converted into money or not; the trustees are
equally responsible to the creditor if he establishes his right
to the goods or their proceeds, and if paid away by the trustees
pendente lite, they are held personally responsible. Under these
circumstances, it should certainly be required in order to sus
tain an injunction which may operate with such extreme
severity, that it should be shown that the fund is in a hazardous
condition. Such has been the usual practice of the court.
But as certain real estate, the title to which is not vested in
these trustees, is alleged to belong to this judgment debtor,
and any transfer or incumbrances upon that may lead to the
necessity of making new parties, the injunction in that respect
may stand until the coming in of the answer. It results, then,
that the bill cannot be sustained as a judgment creditor’s bill
merely.
[*434] *It also results that the general injunction against
Swift must be dissolved. That the injunction against
the other defendants be dissolved, except so far as relates to
the real estate alleged to be the property of the defendant
Swift.
(a) This is inconsistent with the case of McKibben v. Barton, 1 Mich., 218,in which
it was held essential that a levy should actually be made.
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The motion for the appointment of a receiver, as against
Swift, must be denied, and as the other defendants, in oppo
sition to the motion for a receiver, deny absolutely having or
holding any property, rights, credits or effects of Swift of any
kind, a receiver of the alleged trust property cannot be granted
until they have an opportunity of answering the bill.
:1 417
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Spencer Stafford v. T. J. Hulbert.
O1‘editor‘8 bill: Premature return [of execution. A creditor’s bill cannot be sus
tained where the return of execution was made more than a month before the
return day, notwithstanding the bill was actually filed after the return day. (0)
This was a motion to dissolve injunction for want of equity
in the bill.
The facts will appear sufliciently in the opinion of the court.
Tim Oaxncnnnon :
This is a creditor’s bill merely. It appears from the bill that
the execution was returned by the sheriif more than a. month
before the return day, but that the bill was not filed until after
the return day had passed.
Several other questions were raised upon this motion, but
since from the views taken in the case of Thayer 'v. Swift and
others, decided in the second circuit, this must be decisive of
the case, it will not be necessary to notice them all. The prac
tice of the court and the reason of it are set forth in that case
at length, and I adhere to the opinions therein expressed.
It may be proper to say, since that case was decided, I have
seen an extract from the record in the case of Flarguson '0. New
stead et al., referred to, from which it appears that the news
paper report is correct, and that the case turned upon the ques
tion here presented, and that the demurrer was allowed.
A question was raised as to the reception of the aifidavit
stating that the return of the oflicer upon the execution was
limited only to goods and chattels, and that it does not appear
(a) The doctrine of this case and of‘the preceding case of Thayer v. Swift, was
examined more at length and fully approved and indorsed by Chancellor Manning
in Smith v. Thompson, Wal. Ch., 1,and has ever since been considered settled in this
state. The equity courts have always administered the harsh remedy by creditor’s
bill with caution, and only where the preliminary requisites have been strictly com
plied with.
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but that the defendant was posessed of lands and tenements
out of which the money could have been made.
From the view taken upon the first point it is not necessary
to decide this question.
Where the aflidavit shows a distinct fact, and that the well
settled practice of the court has been departed from, I am
induced to believe that the aifidavit may be received.
Motion granted.
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Charles W. Whipple v. Cullen Brown and others.
Contempt: Proof of failure to comply with order. The return of a master charged
with the execution of an order of court, showing the failure of a person to appear
and submit to an examination as required by the order. is Sufllcient foundation
Y for a rule to show cause why an attachment for contempt should not issue.
But the aflidavit or return ot service of the master‘s summons, should show the time
and manner of service. Where the aflidavit of service was in general terms that
the summons was served as required by the rule of court, and the respondent
made an aflldavit showing that it was served less than a full day before the time
for appearance, the service was held insumcient.
Where a notice was to appear before one master, and return was made by another
that the defendant did not appear; held, not to show any failure of defendant to
comply.
This was a rule for the defendant Brown to show cause why
an attachment should not issue for contempt in not obeying a
master’s summons to appear at the master’s ofiice, and submit
to an examination under a creditor’s bill. A receiver had pre
viously been appointed after a master’s summons served on
defendants for the purpose, and on April 5, 1842, an ea: parts
order was entered that Brown appear before a master, and
submit to an examination. A summons was issued on the 22d
of the same month, returnable on the 24th, and a return was
made by the master, accompanied by the aflidavit of Mr. Hol
brook, that notice of the reference was served upon Brown the
usual time pursuant to the seventy-second rule. (a)
The notice was to appear before Jeremiah Van Rensselaer, a
master of the court, to whom it stated the execution of the
order was committed, but the return to the order was made by
Mr. Dalton, another master, that Brown did not appear before
him in pursuance of the order and summons. Upon this return,
the rule to show cause was entered.
In opposition to the rule Brown made an afiidavit that the
notice to appear for examination was served upon him at half
past two o’clock P. M. of the 23d, the day before the time of
(a) This rule required the service to be not less than two days in any case.
420
FIRST CIRCUIT. 436
Wanna v. Baowx.
appearance, which was at ten o’clock A. M. of the 24th. He
also aflirmed that no other notice had been served upon him in
the cause except the summons of the master on the reference to
appoint a receiver, to which he responded.
A. Davidson, for complainant.
D. Stewart, for defendants.
Tns: Onmcnnnonz
The return of a master, charged with the execution of an
order of this court, is a suflicient foundation for a rule to show
cause; but that rule having been taken an parte, it is competent
now for the respondent to show cause against granting the
attachment.
The defendant swears positively that the notice to appear
before the master was served only some eighteen hours before
the time he was required to appear, and he specifies the time of
service, and when he was required to appear. The master in his
return refers to the afiidavit of Mr. Holbrook, as to the mode
of service.
On looking at this aflidavit of service, it is perceived that he
does not specify when or how it was served, but that it was the
usual time pursuant to the seventy-second rule. It shows his
conclusion; the facts should be stated in order to enable the
court to judge.
*It strikes me that a copy of the notice should have [*437]
been returned with the proof of service indorsed.
Brown also swears that no other notice has been served upon
him in the cause, except the summons of the master, for the
purpose of appointing a receiver, which was obeyed.
This proceeding I think has been irregular, and the court is
bound on this motion to notice it.
The notice and return under the rule to show cause are also
irregular. The notice to Brown under this rule is to appear
before the master, in four days, etc. The notice as returned,
it-I——n-g
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indorsed upon the order is
,
that Jeremiah Van Rensselaer, jr., a
master of this court, had the execution of the order referred to.
The return upon the order is made by Mr. Dalton, that the
respondent did not appear before him, pursuant to the order.
The notice did not require the respondent to appear before him,
but before Mr. Van Rensselaer, and non constat but that he has
appeared according to notice.
'
While on the one hand there is no escape from the proceed
ing under this class of bills, when the proceedings are regular,
on the other, such is the severity of its operation, it would be
hazardous to the rights of the parties defendant, if the courts
were to relax the strictness of the proceedings, and attach a
party when in fact, as appears here, the notice has been clearly
irregular.
Motion denied.
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Hammond and others v. Place and others.
Amended bill, application for leave to file. It is not a matter of course to allow the
filing of an amended bill after the cause has been put at issue and testimony
taken. A special application should be made to the court, with a full statement
of the facts proposed to be incorporated in the amended bill, so that the court
can judge of the propriety of giving leave. (a)
Amended bill, what may be set forth in. Facts which have transpired since suit
commenced cannot be set forth by way of amendment
Rule by consent: Vacating same. A rule entered by consent will not be vacated
unless fraud or misrepresentation is made to appear.
This cause being at issue, and testimony having been taken,
the parties, by their solicitors, at the last term of court, entered
a rule by consent granting to the complainants leave to file an
amended bill. A motion was now made to set aside this rule,
on the ground that it should have been made by the court, after
a showing of such facts as would indicate its propriety.
J: Kingsley, in support of the motion.
O. Hawkins, contra.
Tnn Onancnnnonz
The filing of an amended bill of complaint at this stage of the
cause is not a matter of course. Application should be made to
the court for that purpose, and a full statement of the facts
intended to be incorporated as amendments should be set forth.
(a) The complainant should make his application for leave to amend at the earli
est opportunity after being made acquainted with the defects in it: Bank of Michi
gan 1:.Niles, Wal. Ch., 398. Leave may be given even after a cause has been set
down for hearing on pleadings and proofs, if material facts have then for the first
time come to complainant’s knowledge: Briggs 0. Briggs, W Mich., 84. Formal
defects may be amended at the hearing without opening the proofs where they do
not affect the issue or prejudice the right of defendant: Gorham v. Wing, 10Mich.,
486; Goodenow v. Curtis, 18Mich., 298; Babcock v. Twist, 19Mich., 516. Amendments
cannot be made in the supreme court on appeal: Bank of Michigan v. Niles, Wal.
Ch., 398; Sears v. Schwarz, 1Doug., Mich., 504. But in a proper case there may be a
remand to the circuit court with leave to amend there: Palmer v. Rich, 12 Mich.,
414; Moran 0. Palmer, 13Mich., 367. See Home v. Dexter, 9 Mich., 246.
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Their materiality must appear, for it would be absurd to think
that a cause would be delayed for the purpose of filing an
amended bill, that would not in the least change the legal efiect
of the original statement. It is a well settled rule also, that facts
which have transpired since the commencement of the suit, can
not be set forth by way of amendment to the original bill. If
the complainants wish to take advantage of any such facts, they
must do it by a supplemental bill. An amended bill relates
back to the time when the original bill was filed, and it is con
sidered but one bill, and cannot be separated.
But in this case, the rule for leave to file an amended bill was
entered in open court by consent. The court will not interfere
to set aside arule or order thus entered. It is a matter of great
convenience for solicitors to agree to rules, and if the court
would vacate them upon application of either party,
[*439] without its appearing they *were entered into under
a mistake, or by fraudulent representations, such rules
would tend to confusion rather than convenience. In 2 Goa:
R., 166, and 1 Moult. Pr., 86, it is laid down that consent rules
will not be vacated.
Motion denied.
cu
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Catharine E. Schwarz and others v. Nathan Sears and others.
Injunction, motion to dissolve. On motion to dissolve an injunction before answer,
the allegations in the bill are to be taken as true.
Deposit in court, when dispensed with. Where a party comes to have a foreclosure
set aside and for leave to redeem, he must bring into court the amount admitted
to be due. The deposit will only be dispensed with where there is uncertainty as
to the amount due.
Setting aside foreclosure at law. Aforeclcsure under the power of sale, if made
for an excessive amount, may be set aside before the proceedings under it are
perfected, on a bill filed by the debtor tor leave to redeem on paying the amount
due.
The bill in this case was filed for the purpose of setting aside
a foreclosure of mortgage under the statute, and to redeem from
the same. There was a dispute between the mortgagor and
mortgagee as to the real amount due upon the mortgage, usury
being charged, and also certain payments which had not been
allowed in the foreclosure. An injunction was granted on the
filing of the bill, to restrain the defendants from perfecting
their proceedings under the statute foreclosure, and from pro
curing a deed from the sheriff. The case now came before the
court on a motion to dissolve the injunction before answer.
A. W. Buel, in support of the motion, contended that the
injunction should be dissolved:
1. Because there is no equity in the bill.
2. If there be equity in the bill, the balance due upon the
mortgage should have been brought into court.
By the complainants’ bill the court is in possession of the
whole case, and having the power to do equity as well to the
defendants as to the complainants, will exercise that power,
and for such purpose will refer the case to a master to ascertain
the amount due, and will order a sale of the premises upon such
terms as are just and equitable.
A party seeking equity must do equity; when a party comes
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into a court of equity for relief he will be compelled to do
equity to others: 2 Cow. R., 139.
[*441] *Where a party seeks equitable relief against usury,
he must first bring into court the money actually
loaned with legal interest: 1 Johns. Ch., 856; 1 71 R., 153; 1
Paige R., 429.
This case comes within the spirit of the statute, and for that
reason we contend the money should have been brought into
court. As to the meaning of the term “proceedings at law,”
see 1 110172 Oh. 1%., 88, 89; also note to page 89, showing that
chancery proceedings come within the spirit of the phrase
“proceedings at law,” and that proceedings in chancery would
not be restrained without bringing the money into court.
A. D. Iluser, contra: -
Under the motion to dissolve the injunction in this case, two
positions are assumed by the defendants: First, that there is
no equity in the bill; and second, that if there is, the complain
ant should have brought the balance due into court.
The complainants insist upon the negative of both these
positions; for:
1. The bill sets out various grounds for the equitable inter
position of the court.
2. This case does not fall within the rule applicable to that
class of cases in which the money is required to be brought
into court. That rule appears to have reference to personal
actions at law in which judgment has been obtained, or an
award, and in certain cases where the defendant’s answer shows
a certain sum to be due. The rule is discretionary in some of
those cases, but the principal is wholly inapplicable to this case:
Eden, 82, 83; 2 Ves. 12 Beames, 74; 1 Paige R., 426," 4 Wash.
C
'.
0'. 178.
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This is a motion to dissolve an injunction:
1
. For want of equity in the bill.
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2. For that the complainants have not brought into court
the amount due.
There is suflicient stated in the bill to warrant the interfer
ence of the court, and as the case now stands, to require that
this court should aflford the complainants the protection they
ask. The defendants not having answered the allegations of
the bill, it must be taken to be true, for the purposes of this
motion.
*But it is further urged that the complainants should [*4-12]
be required to bring the amount actually due into,
court. The court in its discretion may require as a condition
of granting the continuance of an injunction that the com
plainants bring the amount apparently due into court. It is a
general rule that when a party comes into a court of equity for
relief he must do equity.
The cases where the deposit of money is dispensed with when
relief of this kind is sought for in this court, are, where there
is uncertainty as to the amount due, or doubt whether in the
progress of the cause it may turn out that no part of the claim
should be paid; such is not the case here.
It is admitted by the bill that there is a balance due upon
the mortgage which they profess their readiness to pay, and
which can be as well ascertained now, by reference to a master
to compute the amount due after deducting the several pay
ments, as at any other stage of the cause.
If the defendants choose to submit to the case as made by
the bill, I can see no reason why they should be subjected to
the expense of answering.
The complainants, by the course pursued by the defendants,
were compelled to come into this court to obtain relief, and as
the case now stands I see no reason why they are not entitled
to the relief they ask. The complainants proffer their readi
ness to pay the amount actually due, and as preliminary to
granting them the relief they ask, they should be required to
do so.
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Let it be referred to a master to compute the amount remain
ing due after deducting all payments which have been made;
and it is ordered that the complainants, within sixty days after
such report becomes absolute, shall deposit in this court, sub
ject to the order of this court, the amount remaining due, with
interest from the date of the report; and upon compliance with
said order, the injunction to stand until further order.
as
FIRST CIRCUIT. 448
Cook v. Wassnsn
Elijah F. Cook and others v. Russell M. Wheeler.
General banking law: Enforcing claims against stockholders. Where by a general
law for the incorporation of banks, the directors and stockholders are made
individually liable tor all debts, and an assignee of a demand is proceeding to
entoree it against them, it is immaterial whether he paid full value tor it, as they
are liable for the whole whether he did or not.
Fraudulent partners are also liable to the assignee for the whole amount of a part
nership debt, whether he paid full value or not.
Where, therefore, a bill was flied against parties charged as being directors and
stockholders in a bank organized under the general banking law of 1837,or, in
the alternative, as being fraudulent partners, the object of the bill being to en
force payment of notes of the bank, it was held, that defendants were not
entitled to file a cross-bill, to compel complainant to disclose when he became
owner of the notes, or how much he paid for them; as such discovery would be
immaterial to the defense. (a)
Parties: Ceatuis que trust. Where the object of the bill is merely to collect money,
it is not necessary tor the complainant to make a cestui .que trust a.party;
though it would be otherwise it the existence or enjoyment ot the trust property
were to be aflected. (b)
This was a hearing on demurrer to a. cross-bill. The case on
the original bill is reported, post, p. 449.
The bill was for a discovery, and stated that some time in the
month of January, 1841, defendant Wheeler filed his bill in
this court against complainants and others, as being or having
been directors and stockholders in an institution established
under the general banking law, and called the Clinton Canal
Bank, charging them with a fraudulent combination to injure
the creditors of said corporation or association, setting forth
various particulars which he alleged to constitute such fraud,
and seeking satisfaction from them individually, as being a.
creditor of said bank by reason of holding its notes to the
amount of $2,594, and also two certificates or receipts given by
Seth Beach, a receiver of said bank, to R. D. Hill, for notes of
the bank received by said bank of said Hill, amounting to
(a) Bee note, p. 448.
(b) Approved and followed in Martin v. McRe1/nolds, 6 Mich., 70. See Sill v.
Ketchum, ante, p. 428,and note.
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$1,002, which were transferred to said Wheeler by said Hill.
That an injunction was issued according to the prayer of said
bill against the several defendants therein named; that the
complainants in this suit appeared in said cause and filed their
demurrer to the bill of complaint therein; that said demurrer
was overruled, and they were required to answer said bill in
twenty days after service of the order entered for that purpose,
which service was made on or about the 23d day of April, 1841.
That Wheeler in his bill omitted to state how, or at what time,
he became possessed of the notes and certificates therein men
tioned, or the consideration, if any, paid for the same. Charges
that defendant did not obtain possession of them until
[*4-14] long after the bank stopped payment, *and that if he
is the bona fiole owner, he obtained them for much
less than their face, and that if said receipts have been trans
ferred to him it was in trust for said Hill or some other person;
and if any consideration was paid, it was merely colorable.
That said bills were bought up by said Wheeler, or said Hill,
or some other person, on speculation after the bank had stopped
doing business, and that if anything is realized by said Wheeler
under his said bill, it is to be shared between himself and some
other persons according to some stipulations entered into when
the notes and receipts were obtained by him. Prays a discov
ery from Wheeler to enable the complainants to make their
defense to his bill.
The defendant demurred specially.
E 0'. Seaman, in support of the demurrer:
1. The complainants have not made such a case as entitles
them in a court of equity to a discovery. The discovery sought
would be immaterial, and could not avail complainants for the
purpose they intend to use it for.
2. So much of their bill as relates to the consideration paid
by defendant, and any agreement relating to the bills and re
ceipts whereby Hill was to retain any share of the proceeds,
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can be sustained only on the ground of champerty and mainte
nance, which would subject defendant to a forfeiture which
complainants have not waived.
3. The matters sought to be discovered relate exclusively to
defendant’s title, and cannot affect complainants’ liability; and
the interrogatories founded thereon are indefinite, hypothetical
and impertinent, and the bill a mere fishing proceeding, inquir
ing through idle curiosity into what does not concern the com‘
plainants or either of them.
Z Romeyn, contra:
I. In support of the cross-bill the complainants therein con
tend that they have a right to the discovery of the title of the
defendant to the demands in dispute.
If the defendant be not in fact the equitable and beneficial
owner of these demands, his original bill must fail for want of
parties—this court requiring in all cases the parties interested
in the object of the suit to be before it.
*This rule is especially rigid so far as the rights of a [*445]
complainant are concerned; -the court compelling the
true party to be before it even where there has been an assign
ment subsequent to the commencement of the suit: Mills 2:.
Hoag, 7 Paige R., 21; Sedgwick v. Cleaveland, 7 Paige R., 289.
On these general principles we contend that the inquiry as to
the title of the defendant is material and proper.
We further claim that this is the case under the statute, upon
which the original bill is founded.
The statute of 1839 (p. 94) is the only source of jurisdiction
and guide to procedure in this case; the remedy at law being
complete, and the original bill (even if this court had jurisdic
tion independent of the statute) being multifarious and other
wise bad. '
The statute in question gives the remedy to the creditor of
the corporation. See Laws o_f1887', pp. 806, 30?’; Laws o_f1889,
p. 102.
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Hence the propriety of the inquiry as to the title of the com
plainant in the original bill.
‘
This inquiry is material.
1. Under the statute—because it declares that none but a
creditor shall sue.
2. There may be equities between other actual creditors and
the defendants, which will be defeated by allowing a trustee to
sue.
The propriety of making the bonafide creditor the complain
ant is farther evident from the next subject of inquiry in the
cross-bill—which is as to the consideration paid by the com
plainants in the original bill for the claims against the defen
dant.
II. The complainants in the cross-bill further contend that
they have a right to the discovery of the amount paid by the
defendant for the demands on which he seeks to recover in his
original bill of complaint.
The proposition is that the complainant in the original bill
can be treated in this court as a creditor only to the amount
which he actually paid for the demands which he seeks by that
bill to enforce.
I assume that the original bill must be considered as filed for
the benefit of all the creditors of the bank, and that the moneys
received under the decree must be considered as a common
fund for the benefit of all the creditors.
[*446] *By referring to section 17 of the act of 1839 (p. 98),
we find that the receivers are made subject to all the
obligations imposed by law on trustees of insolvent debtors.
In R. S., 10. 606‘, sec. 1, we have a definition of this term, and
in the same volume (p. 608, sec. 8), we find a positive enactment
that a petitioning creditor, who shall have purchased or pro
cured to be assigned to him a claim against the insolvent for
less than its nominal amount, shall be deemed a creditor to the
amount only actually paid by him.
These enactments bind the receiver and this court.
ass
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And such would be the rule on general, principles, indepen
dent of these statutes.
Equity administers legal assets on equitable principles: 8
Paige, 167.
Equality is equity: Ib.,‘ also 1 Paige, 255. -
Receivers are bound to inquire into the equitable character
of the debts presented to them: 4 Paige, 224.
These general principles will be found recognized and applied
by Chancellor Walworth: 7 Paige, 615. See also Edwards
on Receivers, 283.
Under these circumstances it is submitted that the inquiry as
to the amount paid by the defendant for the claims which he
seeks to enforce is pertinent and material. He seeks to recover
of the complainants connected with the bank, in case the bank
was legally in existence.
Is the defendant protected from the disclosure ?
A number of authorities are cited by the defendant to show
that he is not obliged to discover his own title.
These authorities all have reference to real estate, and they
all rest on the principle that a party must recover on the
strength of his own title, and is not entitled to any discovery
of the defects of his adversary’s title when such discovery does
not tend to establish afiirmatively the plaintifi"’s case.
Is this our case ‘P Is not the discovery we seek in afiirmance
of our own defense, just asmuch as a discovery of pay
ment or satisfaction ? *Concede the principle that [*447]
complainant in the original bill is to be deemed acred
itor, so far only as he has paid value for his demands, and you
concede this point. For if this be so, it is a part of our defense;
and in What way can we examine the original complainant
touching the defense but by a cross-bill: Storg/’s Eq. Pl., 811,
312.
But in truth the rules insisted on by the defendant in this
cross suit grew out of the rules relating to this case; and if
they were, they do not afiect the right of the defendant (in the
as as
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original suit) to a discovery. A defendant has a right to a dis
covery of the defects in the plaintifi’s title. See Hare on D1‘;
eovery, 203, 204.
Tun CHANCELLORZ
The original bill in this case was filed for the purpose of
enforcing the liability of the defendants in that case, a part of
whom are the complainants in this cross-bill, as directors and
stockholders of the Clinton Canal Bank, an institution organ
ized under the general banking law of this state. In order to
arrive at the result upon the questions presented upon this
demurrer it will be necessary to give a construction to the
provisions of the statute bearing upon this class of corporations.
By the 25th section of the original act (Laws of 1837,10. 84),
and by the 21st section of the amendatory act (Laws of 1838,12.
82), the directors are made liable for the amount for which an
insolvent institution organized under these acts may be
indebted, and the stockholders are secondarily made liable for
the debts of any such insolvent institution in proportion to the
amount of stock of any such stockholders.
The 42d section of the act of 1839 (page 102 of the laws of
that year) provides that whenever any creditor of a corpora
tion shall seek to charge the directors, trustees or other super
intending oflicers of such corporation, or the stockholders, on
account af any liability created by law, he may file his bill for
that purpose in the court of chancery.
By the act under which this bank was organized the liabilities
of the directors and stockholders were fixed. The act of 1839
prescribed the mode in which a creditor may enforce this lia
bility.
The original bill in this case seeks to charge the
f"448] directors and stocholders *as such under the act, or in
the alternative as partners fraudulently combining
under color of the general banking law.
For the purpose of a defense to the original bill the discov
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ery sought by the cross-bill is immaterial. The statute makes
the directors and stockholders liable for all deficits in conse
quence of the insolvency of the bank.
If the defendants are fraudulent co-partners, they are equally
liable for the entire amount of the indebtedness of the concern.
It is not alleged that the money is not actually due from the
defendants, and the mere fact that, from the course pursued by
the stockholders and oflicers of the bank, their notes had become
depreciated in the market, would not discharge them from their
liability, which is for the entire amount of the indebtedness of
the concern.
It is not alleged that the complainant is not the assignee of
the certificates, but it is alleged that if he is the assignee of the
certificates, and holder of the bills, he holds them as trustee
for Hill, or some other person or persons. Where the object
of the bill is merely to collect money or reduce it to possession,
it is not necessary for an assignee either of a bond, note or
chose in action, to make the cestuis qua trust parties, although
the rule is otherwise Where the existence or enjoyment of trust
property is to be afiected by the prayer of the suit: Calvert
on Parties, 17.
There is no pretense that the amount claimed by the bill is
not due, and I do not perceive how the discovery sought for by
the cross-bill can constitute a defense.
Dernurrer allowed. ((1-)
(u) The act which gave occasion for the case here decided was one of the most
important in its results in the whole history ot legislation in the state. It was a gen
ieral law for the incorporation of voluntary associations formed for the purpose of
engaging in the business of banking, and was passed March 15,1837,when specula
tion was more rite and wild, perhaps, in proportion to the means for carrying it on,
than at any other time in the history of the country. That it was meant to establish
a sate and prudent system of banking there can be no doubt. No bank was to com
mence operations until thirty per cent at least of its capital stock was paid in, in
specie, and at least ten per cent more was to be paid in as often as every six months
thereafter. The association was to furnish real estate security to be held by the
auditor-general for all its indebtedness; directors and stockholders were made per
sonally liable for debts in case of insolvency, periodical reports were required, and
periodical examinations by a bank commissioner provided for. All these securities,
however, proved wholly insufficient. There was no sufllcient capital in the state tor
I‘ L
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the banks formed, and they were consequently brought into existence by means of
evasions. Ingenious devices were resorted to for the purpose of deceiving and mis
leading the examiner; and well authenticated stories are told of a single bag of specie
being made to perform the duty of reserve for several banks while the bank commis
sioner was on his tour of inspection, until by doubling on his course and repeating
his visits he was able to verify the fraud he suspected. The collapse of the system
so soon as a check should come to speculation was inevitable. The number of the
banks was tar beyond any wants of the state except for speculative purposes; the
borrowers were mostly speculators whose paper was good only while speculation
was successful, and the real estate security became utterly unavailable the moment
lands came to be in demand only for actual occupation, and at their real value. It
became so not only because the demand was then very light with abundance of eager
sellers, but because, also, it was found, as indeed ought to have been anticipated, that
the securities generally had been based upon the wildest estimates of value, which
for a generation were not likely to be realized by actual sales. The “ wild cat cur
rency,” as it was not inappropriately called, speedily became nearly or quite worth
less, and the people who had been so unfortunate as not to succeed in getting it ofl
their hands in exchange for anything of value, began to look about for some remedy
beyond what might be had against the deceptive assets of the banks. Suits against
directors and stockholders were then resorted to, but they generally proved of little
avail.
Meantime receivers of the several banks. appointed by the court of chancery, were
proceeding to collect their dues, so far as they might tlnd it practicable to do so. A
suit for this purpose came on for hearing in the supreme court in January term,
1844,when after full argument the court declared its opinion that the act under which
these associations were formed was unconstitutional. The point was that the con
stitution provided that " the legislature shall pass no act of incorporation unless
with the assent of at least two-thirds of each house;" and this was construed to
require the direct agency of the legislature to create each particular corporation by
two-third vote. The result was to sweep out of existence not only all the banks, but
all the indebtedness by and to them.
The question then remained whether those who had created these debts on behalf
of the banking associations might not in some way be made liable for them. In State
v. How, reported in appendix to 1 Mich., 512,it was claimed that if the associates
never became a corporation, they must have been partners, and liable for debts as
such; but Chancellor Manning held that, it not incorporated, their business was ille
gal under the statutes forbidding unauthorized banking, and therefore contracts
growing out of it could not be enforced. The same decision was made by the supreme
court in Brooks v. Hill, 1Mich., 118. Those cases must in efiect be regarded as over
ruling the views of Chancellor Farnsworth in this and the following case, which,
however, were expressed before the supreme court had declared the general bank
ing law unconstitutional, and were doubtless entirely correct on the assumption of
the validity of that law.
438
Fmsr cmcurr.
T
449
Wnuas v. Onnrrou Cunt. Bum.
Russell M. Wheeler v. The Clinton Canal Bank, William S.
Stephens and others.
Fraudulent associates assuming to bea corporation. Where defendants are charged
as fraudulent associates, who under the pretense and color of a general incor
poration act have combined to defraud complainant, the fact that another cred
itor has seen flt to treat them as a corporation, and obtained the appointment of
a receiver, is no bar to complainant's suit.
Fraud: 0reditor’s bill. A bill to enforce a demand thus contracted is not what is
called a creditor’s bill, and it is not essential that there should have been judg
ment and execution at law before it can be flled.
Fraud: Remedy at law. Courts of equity have concurrent jurisdiction with courts
of law where fraud is charged. .
If the remedy at law is difllcult or doubtful, equity will entertain jurisdiction. (a)
Multifariousness. Where parties are charged as fraudulent associates under pre
tense of a corporation, the bill is not rendered multifarious by the fact that the
defendants were connected with the association at difierent periods and in dif
ferent capacities, and may have different liabilities.
Bill against fraudulent associates: Parties. In proceeding thus against parties as
fraudulent associates, it is not necessary to join as defendant the receiver pre
viously appointed in the suit against them as a corporation.
This was a hearing on demurrers.
The bill states that under the act known as the general bank
ing law, books were opened at Pontiac, in the county of Oak
land, on or about the twentieth day of November, 1837, to
receive subscriptions for a banking association to be located at
that place, and called the “ Clinton Canal Bank,” with a capital
stock of fifty thousand dollars, to be divided into one thousand
shares of fifty dollars each. That the whole amount of stock
was taken, and that on the twenty-third day of November,
1837, an election of directors and oflicers of said bank was
duly held. That bonds were executed and filed with the
auditor-general, and the directors and stockholders, claiming
to have complied with the provisions of law, issued their bills,
and commenced banking business under their corporate name
on or about the eleventh day of December, 1837. The bill
(a) To the same eflect are Ankrim v. Woodworth, ante, 855; Edaell v. Briggs, 20
lflch., 429.
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then sets out several assignments and transfers of stock, and
consequent changes of ofiicers, and states that in pursuance of
an act amendatory to the general banking law, differ
[*450] ent bonds and mortgages were executed to *the audi
tor-general as collateral security, at various times
from some time in March, 1838, to some time in May of the
same year. It then sets out further assignments and changes
of ofiicers, and prays a discovery of such other stockholders
and oflicers as may have been interested in said bank. States
that the bank continued to do business until about August 22,
1838, since which time it ceased to carry it on, and has had no
oflicers or oflices during the past year. That the bank went
into operation under, and availed itself of the provisions of
the suspension law of June 22, 1837, and did not make a prac
tice of paying its liabilities in specie until about May 16,
1838. That only $2,220.95 of the capital stock was paid in
specie, and the balance of the first thirty per cent was paid’ in
specie certificates and stock notes, none of which have been
paid, and that no more than the first thirty per cent of the
capital stock has ever been paid in. That on the twenty-fourth
day of February, 1838, the bank had on hand in specie only
$3,164.85; that the average amount on hand from the time of
commencing business up to the 16th of May, 1838, was less
than three thousand dollars, and at no time amounted to more
than three thousand five hundred dollars. That on the twenty
fourth day of February, aforesaid, their circulation amounted
to $30,456, and their indebtedness, exclusive of circulation, to
$7,867. That on the same day the amount due to the bank
from its directors was $6,390.81, from stockholders $3,580, and
from other persons $20,462.80. That previous to the injunc
tion issued in October, 1838, the bank had in circulation over
$39,000, and time drafts amounting to more than $25,000, most
of which are unpaid, and parcels have been presented for pay
ment from time to time, and payment refused. Charges that
during the whole period of its operation, the directors and
as
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stockholders owed the bank more than four times the amount
of specie and good funds paid in; that at the time when it
stopped business, William S. Stephens, a director, was owing
nearly $20,000, Charles Hubbell, another director, more than
$5,000, and other directors and stockholders owed considerable
sums, and that the whole amount of assets reported by the
receiver, including these debts, is less than $50,000, most of
which he considers doubtful. That the bank has never been
solvent since January, 1838, and cannot pay more than
ten per cent of its liabilities, and has no property *which [*45l]
can be reached at law. Charges the subscribers to the
bank with forming the association for fraudulent purposes, and
that all the stockholders knew and participated in their fraud
ulent designs and operations. States that complainant is a
creditor of the bank, holding its notes and receiver’s certifi
cates; that they were presented to the receiver for payment,
and payment refused. Charges that defendants are individu
ally liable. Prays the appointment of a receiver, and satis
faction from the assets and property of defendants.
The defendants demurred to the bill, and assigned the fol
lowing causes:
1. That complainant had an adequate remedy at law.
2. That a receiver has been appointed, and it does not appear
that there will be any deficiency of assets.
3. That the defendants are charged in difierent capacities,
and having distinct liabilities.
4. That the stockholders cannot be charged until the prop
erty of the directors is found insuflicient.
5. That there is no sufficient equity in the bill.
6. That the bill prays for a receiver, while it shows one to
have been already appointed, without asking his removal, or
showing it to be necessary.
W Draper appeared for D. Paddock and others.
S. G. Watsort, for William Phelps.
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Richardson dc Knight, for Alfred Judson and others.
W E Mosely, in person.
Counsel for defendants contended that it appears by the said
bill that the same is exhibited against the individual defend
ants and the Clinton Canal Bank, for several and distinct mat
ters and causes, in many of which it appears the individual
defendants are not in any manner interested or concerned.
“ If a bill blends together a demand by the plaintiff as legatee
against the defendant as executor with a demand of the plaintiff
in his private capacity against the defendant in his individual
character, is good cause of demurrer:” 4 Johns. Oh., 199.
“ If a bill be brought concerning things of distinct
[*452] nature against *several persons, or against one, it is
demurrable:” 2Mad. C'h., 234. See, also, 5 Paige, 79.
In ,that case the court says: “The form and effect of a demur
rer to a bill in chancery for multifariousness is substantially
the same as a demurrer to a declaration at law for a misjoinder
of parties, or of different causes of actions which cannot be
properly litigated in the same suit.” “ And where a joint
claim against two defendants is improperly joined in the same
bill with a separate claim against one defendant only, either or
both may demur.” And the same principle is found in 6 Paige,
28, and the authorities there cited.
By said bill it appears that the said association of persons
never became a legal corporation or banking company in accord
ance with the statute.
By the act to organize and regulate banking associations,
passed March 15, 1837, it is enacted that “no such association
shall commence operations until thirty per centum of the capital
stock shall be paid in, in legal money of the United States.”
The bill alleges that the whole of the stock was taken, and
that “ only $2,220.95 of the capital stock was paid in in specie,
the balance of the thirty per cent being paid in specie certifi
cates or stock notes; that no more was ever paid in, and that
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none of the certificate or stock notes have been paid.” See ninth
section of act of 1837, where it says that “all such persons as
shall become stockholders of any such association shall, in com
pliance with the provisions of this act, constitute abody politic
in fact and in name,” etc.
By said bill it does not appear that any matter is set forth
in said complainant’s bill for which he has not an adequate
remedy in a court of law.
The rule is that in general, courts of equity will not
assume *jurisdiction where the powers of the ordinary [*453]
courts are sufiicient for the purposes of justice. The
present suit is brought to recover the amount of the bills and
receiver’s receipts now in possession of the complainant. The
statute directs that all demands against the bank after the
appointment of a receiver, shall be presented to him; and a
mode of proceeding is prescribed by which all the assets of the
bank are to be applied to their payment. Here is an adequate
statutory remedy, so far at least as the assets extend.
There is also an adequate legal remedy which may be pur
sued upon the liability of the defendants, as a bank, as direc
tors, and as stockholders.
The receiver of the bank, as such, is vested with all the estate
of the bank, and is a trustee for the creditors and stockholders.
By the tenth section of the laws of 1839, page 96, the receiver
is vested with all the estate, real and personal, of the corpora
tion, etc., and is the trustee of the estate, for the benefit of
creditors and stockholders.
By the eighth section, the chancellor is authorized to appoint
receivers, etc., and on such appointment the corporation shall
thereupon be dissolved, and shall cease to exist.
As such trustee the receiver is the only accountable person,
the corporation is defunct, ‘the powers of the defendants, their
rights and duties, abrogated, and passed over by operation of
law to the receiver, the only person known in the law, in the
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place of said corporation. As to power of trustees, see 6Munf
R., 366‘; 2 Paige, 21, 488.
The bill prays for the appointment of a receiver, when it
appears from said bill that a receiver had before been appointed
to take charge of the estate and eifects of said bank, without
showing that said appointment had been obtained by collusion
or fraud, or that said receiver was an improper person to dis
charge the duties of said trust, and seeking his removal.
The remedy of the complainant, for the appointment of a new
receiver, is by filing a supplemental bill: See 5 Paige,
["‘454] 46‘. And although *the forty-second section of the act
allows any creditor to file his bill against directors and
trustees, and to proceed as in other cases, yet it was never
intended to apply in a-case where areceiver had been appointed,
and the property and efieots transferred from the bank and
its ofiicers to the trustee.
It would in efiect be authorizing the creditor to do an act
by which he could derive no benefit whatever.
If the receiver is an improper person, then the remedy was
by removal, on application, founded on petition or aflidavits or
other evidence of improper conduct, and that the trust funds
were in danger of being squandered. See Hopk. Rep., 485.
The complainant has not alleged that he had obtained any
judgment or decree against the defendants or either of them,
or that executions had been issued and returned unsatisfied.
This suit having been instituted in a case not within the
statute of 1839, may have been intended as a creditor’s bill, so
called.
'
But if so, an execution should have issued upon a judgment
at law against the property of the defendants, and been returned
unsatisfied in whole or in part; which is not alleged in this bill.
And the bill should have contained the averments which the
rules require in creditor’s bills. V
E G. Seaman, contra.
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1. The bill shows that the subscribers to the stock of this
banking companny did not comply with the conditions
of the general banking *act; that is
,
they did not pay [*455]
in thirty per cent. of the stock, and comply with those
provisions of the statute which constitute a condition precedent
to their becoming a corporation; but, on the contrary, that all
their proceedings are based on a fraudulent violation of the
statute, which was used merely as a cover or device under
which they carried on their fraudulent schemes and practices;
they therefore did not become a legal corporation, but consti
tuted a joint stock unincorporated banking company, and are
liable individually as co-partners in a swindling operation.
2. A court of chancery has jurisdiction of the case, independ
ent of any statute, and can enforce the collection of the plaintiif’s
claim against the directors and stockholders of the company on
the following grounds:
lst. On account of the convenience of enforcing contribu
tions between the several defendants in proportion to the
amount of stock held by each. See the case of Briggs o. Penni
man, 1 Hopk. Ch. Rep., 300; 8 Cow. Rep., 387; Manda-ville v.
Briggs, 2 Pet. Rep., 482; 8 Pet. R., 256.
All the defendants are liable in their individual capacity
jointly, and therefore the bill is not multifarious: Brinkerhoof
'0. Brown, 6 Johns. Ch., 139 to 159. All combined to defraud,
although the defendants performed distinct parts in the drama
of fraud, all tending to one point: Fellows '0. Fbllows, 4 Cow.
Rep., 682; Campbell v. ]l{cKay, 7 Simons, 564; /S't0ry’s PL,
530 and 589.
Persons liable on a contingency are proper parties defendants
in equity: St0ry’s Pl., sections 7.4, 75, 169, 172, 178, 174,
224, 232.
In a variety of cases, the plaintifi may or may not join cer
tain persons as parties defendants at his election: Story/’s Eq.
PL, sections 169, 221 ; 2 Paige, 279.
2d. In consequence of the frequent transfers of stock in this
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case, as well as the frequent change of directors or some of
them, and the difiiculty or impossibility of showing
[*456] when the notes or bills of the *bank, on which this
suit was commenced, were issued, it would be difiicult
if not impossible for the plaintifi to determine on whom to fix
the liability at law, and his remedy, if any, at law, would there
fore be doubtful and diflicult, and on that account a court of
equity has jurisdiction: American Insurance Co. v. Fisk, 1
Paige, 92; Wey-mouth v. Boyer, 1 Ves., 416.
3d. The transactions of the defendants are fraudulent, and
they used the general banking law merely as a cover for their
fraudulent devices and schemes. A court of equity has concur
rent jurisdiction with courts of law in matters of fraud: Colt
v. Wollister, 2 P. Williams, 156; Green v. Barrett, 1 Simons,
37, 45; Blair v. Agar, 2 Simons, 289.
4. The statute of Michigan of 1839 for the voluntary dissolu
tion of corporations, and for other purposes, applies only to
legal corporations, and not to cases of this kind, where the com
pany did not become a legal corporation. That statute also
gives a cumulative remedy, and does not take away the usual
remedy to which the creditors were entitled in equity previous
to the statute. We claim the common remedy in equity inde
pendent of the statute: Orittenolen v. Wilson, 5 Cow., 165.
THE Cnnncnnnonz
The bill in this cause substantially charges the defendants
with having combined under the color merely of the general
banking law of this state, for the purpose of defrauding the
complainant and other persons who should receive the notes of
said banking association. It not only charges that the original
stockholders and oflicers of the institution, but also that the
persons severally charged with having become subsequent pur
chasers of the stock, purchased for the purpose of aiding in
such fraud and with the intent and design to deceive and de
fraud the complainant and all the creditors of said association.
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It purports to charge them and each of them in their individual
capacities as members of a fraudulent co-partnership, or associa
tion. A variety of questions have been raised upon the differ
ent demurrers. It will not be necessary to notice all the points
raised at the arguments, as the grounds upon which the bill is
sustained, and the demurrers overruled, will appear in
the opinion. *The complainant in this case seeks to [*457]
charge the defendants as a voluntary association, who
under the pretense and color of the general banking law ofthis
state have conspired to defraud the complainant, and such
others as should receive the notes of said association. The fact
that another creditor has seen fit to treat them as a corporation,
and has filed his bill and obtained the appointment of a receiver
of the effects of this corporation, cannot deprive this complain
ant of his remedy, in this form, if he can establish the truth of
the allegations of his bill. The objection that the bill contains
a prayer for the appointment of a receiver is not a good cause
of demurrer; it may or may not have been necessary, but is not
such an objection as can sustain the demurrer. This is not
what is termed a creditor’s -bill; but on the contrary, it seeks
to charge the defendants in an original proceeding as members
of a fraudulent association or co-partnership. The objections,
therefore, that the complainant has not, in the allegations in his
bill, conformed to the rules required in creditors’ bills, have no
application, from the view I take of the scope and objects of
the bill. Another cause of demurrer is that the complainant
has an adequate remedy at law, and therefore a court of chan
cery has not jurisdiction. The frequent transfers of stock and
changes of interest, and the extraordinary manner in which the
business has been conducted, according to the showing in the
bill, would render the complainant’s remedy at law both diffi
cult and doubtful; this of itself is suflicient to give this court
jurisdiction: 1 Paige R., 92. Courts of chancery have also
concurrent jurisdiction in cases of fraud. The objection of
multifariousness, that the several directors and stockholders are
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made parties, notwithstanding they were connected with this
association at difierent periods, and have distinct rights and
liabilities, is the next and principal remaining question. From
the manner in which the business was conducted, it seems to
me that the course the complainant has pursued was the proper
one. The stockholders and directors only, are parties, and it
is alleged that they all performed different parts in the same
drama. A bill may be sustained against different persons rela
tive to matters of the same nature, in which all the defendants
were more or less concerned, though not jointly in each act.
Should it prove in the event that any of these defendants were
not partners in the concern at the time the notes on
[*-L58] which the *complainant prosecutes were issued, they
may not be liable to contribute to their payment. But
if it proves true that this was a fraudulent combination, merely
under the pretense of the statute, in which the defendants all
participated to defraud the complainant, it is but just that
each and all should be held responsible to the creditors who
have been defrauded in this way. From the view I have taken
of this bill it was not necessary that the receiver should have
been made a party. The complainant is entitled to his divi
dend from whatever may be obtained from the property of this
concern in the hands of the receiver, without making him a
party, and without a waiver of his rights against the defendants
in this form. (b)
Demurrer overruled.
(b) See Cook v. Wlieeler, ante, p. 448,and the cases cited in note (c), p. 448.
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ACCEPTANCE.
See Assrexmasr ron ran Banmrrr or Cnnnrrons, 1, 2; Town Pmrs, 3, 4.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT.
See Monroaaa, 3; Pnaanmas, 4.
ADMINISTRATORS.
See Exacw-roas AND Anumrsraarons.
AFFIDAVIT.
See INJUNCTION, 11; Pnacrrcn, 7, 13, 14.
AGENT.
See Parscrru. AND Aearrr.
ALIENATION.
See DEED; WILL.
ALIMONY.
Jurisdiction. A court of chancery has no jurisdiction of a case where the
bill is filed for alimony merely. Peltier v. Peltier....~. .. . I9
AMENDMENT.
See Pnasnmes, 8; PRACTICE, 3 to 11,37.
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ANSWER.
See Pnmnnzos.
ASSIGNMENT.
See Monmaca, 5: Pmunisos, 3, 4; Sracmo Pmnronuanon, 10.
ASSIGNMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.
1. Acceptance. An assignment for the benefit of creditors, absolute in its
terms, and which is accepted by the assignee, dedicates the property abso
lutely to the purposes of the trust, notwithstanding it is made without the
knowledge or concurrence of the creditors. Suy/dam v. Dequindre . . . . . . . .. 847
2. By the execution axnddelivery of the assignment the relation of trustee and
cestui que trust is constituted at once, without any express assent of the
creditors; and it cannot afterwards be revoked except upon the dissent of
creditors. Ib....... ......................... ....................... 347
3. Receiver. The court in decreeing the execution of the trust under an assign
ment, under the special circumstances of the case, appointed a receiver
forthepurpose. Ib...... ........ . . . . . . ............ 347
See Bnzxs AND Bmxma, 2, 3, 4, 6; Pmrxnnsnrr, 1 to 7.
ATTACHMENT FOR CONTEMPT.
l. Proof of failure to comply with order. The return of a master charged
with the execution of an order of court, showing the failure of a. person
to appear and submit to an examination as required by the order, is sum
cient foundation for a rule to show cause why an attachment for contempt
should not issue. VVh'ipple 1:.B1-oum.. ........ .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 436
2. But the aflidavit or return of service of the master-‘s summons should show
the time and manner of service. Where the afildavit of service was in
general terms that the summons was served as required by the rule of
court, and the respondent made an affldavit showing that it was served
less than a full day before the time for appearance, the service was held
insuflieient. Ila. .............. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..486
3. Where a notice was to appear before one master, and return was made by
another that the defendant did not appear; held, not to show any failure
of defendant tocomply. Ib....... 486
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR. -
Privileged communications. A statement of fact made by an attorney to his
client, and which apprises the client of equities in a third party, is not a
privileged communication, and may be proved by the attorney. Wade
worthv.Loranger...... ..... ................. 113
See PLIADINGS, 5; Piucrics, 22to 25.
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BANKS AND BANKING.
1. Insolvency of bank, what facts are evidence of. Where it appeared from the
statements in the bill, that a bank commissioner examined into the affairs
of the Bank of Brest on the second day of August, 1838,and the specie then
on hand was $9,754.92,and that another examination of the affairs of the
bank was made on the eleventh day of the same month, and it then had
but $138.89,and there was no corresponding decrease of liabilities; and
about $44,000of the issues of the bank were in the hands of agents without
sufllcient sureties; and that of the assets there were $5,000in uncurrent
notes; and that $25,000of post notes were issued on the fourth day of the
same month of August, without being indorsed by a bank commissioner;
and the bill charged the bank to be insolvent; and the answer admitted the
facts set forth in the bill, but denied the insolvency; it was held that the
bank was insolvent within the meaning of the law, and that a proper case
was made for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of its effects.
Bank Commissioners v. Bank of Brest ............................. .. . ...... ..
Assignment by bank. A transfer. by way of security, of_ a portion of the
eflfectsof a moneyed corporation, for the purpose of carrying on the con
cern, is within the power of the directors; and a corporation which has no
particular mode pointed out for closing its concerns may make an assign
ment on obtaining the assent of the stockholders. Ib.................... . .
General assignment by bank. The directors of a moneyed corporation, like
that of the Bank of Brest, have no power to make an assignment, without
being authorized so to do by the stockholders. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Directors, for what purpose are trustees. The directors are trustees of the
stockholders for the purpose of carrying on the business of the corporation,
and not for the purpose of winding it up and destroying its existence. Ib. .
5. Statutory provisions for winding up. The statutejprescribes the mode in
which the affairs of banking associations, established under the general
banking law of this state, shall be wound up, in case of insolvency; and this
forms a part of the security to the public, and is one of the conditions upon
which they take their chartered powers. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0. Assignment to evade statute void. An assignment made by the directors oi!
the Bank of Brest, to a trustee, for the benefit of creditors, with a view to
evade the provisions of the statute, was held to be against the policy of the
law, and void, Ib. ........ ....... ...................................... ..
Injunction against bank, what not suflcient cause. By the act incorporating
a bank a previous act was referred to, and in effect made a part thereof,
which provided that if any bank did not pay its notes on demand, the char
ter should not for that cause be dissolved, but it gave the bank sixty days
within which to redeem its notes. It contained further provisions that the
act should not prevent the issuing of an injunction, and that one might be
issued when any bank should refuse to pay its debts: Held, that these pro
visions relative to injunctions did not change the previous law on that sub
ject. Barnum v. Bank of Pontiac . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8. The provision that an injunction might be issued on a failure to pay was not
imperative, but left it to the sound discretion of the court, upon a proper
case being made. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
9. Where a bill alleged merely a demand and refusal by the bank to pay its notes,
and contained no allegations of any impending mischief, danger or hazard
of the rights of complainant, an injunction was refused. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
2.
8.
4.
7.
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10. Efect of injunction against a bank. An injunction against a bank goes to
prevent all actibn whatever, and is rather in the nature of n final injunction
which is sometimes granted at the termination of a cause, than the usual
injunction to prevent some particular mischief.
11. Cause for irljunction against bank : Notice. Except in cases where the
bill is filed by a.bank commissioner, showing fraud, violation of the char
tor, or insolvency, notice should be given of an application for an injunc
tion against a bank, and a case should be made out that would warrant the
court to wind up the concerns of the bank. Ib. . . ......... . . . . . . ..... .. . . . .
12. Insolvent banks, dismissal of suit against. Where an individual creditor had
filed his bill against a moneyed corporation, obtained an injunction and the
appointment of a. receiver, and the receiver had taken upon himself the
trust, and other creditors had filed their claims, it was held that the credi
tor who had flied his bill, obtained the injunction, and the appointment of
a receiver, was not entitled, as a matter of right (upon being paid his
demand), to dissolve the injunction, dismiss his bill, and discharge the
receiver. Fag 11.Erie d‘ Kalamazoo R. R. Bank ..... . . . ...... . . . . . . . . . . .
18. There is no doubt that the court has the power, in such case, to dissolve the
injunction, discharge the receiver, and permit the party to dismiss his bill,
when it is satisfied that the interests of all concerned will be best subserved
by permitting the corporation to manage its own concerns. Ib. . . . . ..... . .
14. Ojflcers of bank, powers of. Where a note is made payable at a bank, it is
within the ordinary scope of the powers of the bank ofiicers to receive
other notes as collateral, on the understanding that they should be placed
in the bank for collection, and that when a.sufficient amount should be col
lected thereon for the purpose it should satisfy the first note. Wales u.
Bank of Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15. Injunction against suspended bank. The rule adopted in this state hes been
not to grant an injunction in the first instance upon the allegation alone
that a bank has stopped payment, but to grant a.rule to show cause and
require notice to be given to the defendants. If not explained or excused
in cases where the banks are not protected from a forfeiture of their char
ters by reason of a. failure, the court would be authorized to grant an in
junction and appoint a receiver. But when banks are authorized to SUI
pend specie payments, such refusal is not even prime facie evidence of
insolvency. Attorney-General v. Bank of Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
16. The true construction of the sixth section of the suspension act of April 12,
1841,is that the statements should be made out and transmitted to the aeo
retary of state on the days specified, or as soon thereafter as the same
could be made out and stated. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................... ..
17. General banking law: Enforcing claims against stockholders. Where by a
general law for incorporation of banks, the directors and stockholders are
made individually liable for all debts, and an assignee of a demand is pro
ceeding to enforce it against them, it is immaterial whether he paid full
value for it, as they are liable for the whole whether he did or not. Cook
v. Wheeler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
18. Fraudulent partners are also liable to the assignee for the whole amount of a
partnership debt, whether he paid full value or not. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19.Where, therefore, a.bill was flied against parties charged as being directors
and stockholders in a bank organized under the general banking law of 1837,
or, in the alternative, as being fraudulent partners, the object of the bill
being to enforce payment of notes of the bank, it was held, that defendants
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were not entitled to file a cross-bill, to compel complainant to disclose when
he became owner of the notes, or how much he paid for them; as such dis
covery would be immaterial to the defense. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W. Fraudulent associates assuming to be a corporation. Where defendants are
charged as fraudulent associates, who under the pretense and color of A
general incorporation act have combined to defraud complainant, the fact
that another creditor has seen fit to treat them as a corporation, and
obtained the appointment of a receiver, is no bar to complainant's suit.
Wheeler v. Clinton Canal Bank. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . . . .
21. Fraud : Creditor‘: bill. A bill to enforce a demand thus contracted is not
what is called a creditor’s bill, and it is not essential that there should have
been judgment and execution at law before it can be filed. lb. .
BETTERMENTS.
See JUBIBDIOTXON,B.
BILL.
See Pursnmcs.
BILLS OF PEACE.
1. Bills of peace are only allowed where the complainant has established his
right at law; or where the persons who controvert the right are so numer
ous as to render an issue under the direction of this court indispensable to
embrace all the parties concerned, and save a multiplicity of suits. Lapeer
C'ount*yv.Hart............. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Where sixty-seven suits were brought upon county orders by different plain
tiflfs before justices of the peace, some of which were tried and judgments
rendered for the plaintiffs, and five of them appealed to the circuit court,
and the county commissioners claimed to have a valid defense to them all,
and filed a bill in equity to enjoin them until the appealed suits could be
tried, it was held that no case of equitable jurisdiction was made out. and
a preliminary injunction was dissolved. Ib ................. . .. . . .. . . . . . . . ..
I. The fact that there were no funds in the county treasury with which to pay
the costs and appeal the remaining suits constitutes no reason for equitable
interference. .....ii
CITY OF DETROIT.
See Dsrrnorr CIT!
COMITY.
See Izuvucrron, 8.
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COMMISSIONERS OF INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT.
See Wns, 3.
CONSIDERATION.
1. Support of parent. An agreement by a daughter and her husband to sup
port her father during his natural life, is a sufllcient consideration for a con
veyance of the father's lands to the daughter. Go] v. Thompson . . . . .. ..
2. After the death of the father, the agreement having been fully performed.
the conveyance will not be set aside to give eflect to a previous will made
by the father, notwithstanding the daughter had attempted, by deed
executed by her alone, to re-convey the lands to the father as security for
hissupport. lb ..... ...................................................... ..
8. Duress. Where the fears of a timid and ignorant man were practiced upon
by threats of a prosecution for slander, and he was thereby induced to
assign a mortgage to another, the assignment was held to be without con
sideration, and a re-assignment was decreed. Tate v. Whitney. ............
See Corrrnscrs, 2.
CONSTRUCTION.
v See Coxrrmcrs, 1; S'i‘A'i‘U'TB,1.
CONTEMPT.
See A'rrAcnuau-r ron Coxrranvr; Piuc'riol:, 17.
CONTRACTS.
i. Contemporaneous. Where several papers are executed between the same
parties contemporaneously, and relate to the same subject matter, they are
regarded as together constituting one and the same transaction. Disbrow
v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
2. Contract to mislead land board immoral and void. If two persons, claiming
joint possession of land, enter into an agreement that a claim by them
shall be presented to the government land board, in the name of one alone,
and that when the claim is confirmed to him he shall convey a part of the
land to the other, is immoral as tending to mislead the land board, and
therefore, it seems,void. Bernard v. Bouga-rd.. ...... .. . ............. ..
I. Parol merged in writing. It is a general rule that a contract cannot rest
partly in writing and partly in parol. Where a contract is reduced to
writing, all previous parol agreements relating to the same matter are
merged in the written contract. Street v. Dow .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
See Consinniunon; Dun; Fawn; Insmuncl.
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CONVEYANCE.
Bee Ooxsrnmaa-nos; Damn; hwsuantoa; Mon-maul.
CORPORATIONS.
1. Corporations, jurisdiction over. The jurisdiction of this court over corporate
bodies, for the purpose of restraining their operations, or of winding up
their concerns, is based upon and controlled by the statutes of the state.
It has no such jurisdiction at common law, or under its general equity pow
ers, and it will not interfere except where the case is fairly brought within
the scope and object of the statute conferring this special jurisdiction.
Attorney-General v. Bank of Michigan................. ....... 815
2. The provisions of the act of June 21, 1887,and the act of April 12, 1841,in
regard to banks and lncorporations, commented upon and explained. 1b.. 815
8. Forfeiture of corporate rights. It a corporation has forfeited its rights by
mlsfeasance or non-feasance, such forfeiture must be shown by the plead
ings; it is not to be presumed; the legal presumption is otherwise. Ib. . 815
»4.The fact that abank not protected by statute authorizing a suspension of
specie payments, has stopped payment, is not of itself conclusive evidence
of its inability to pay its debts, but is prima. facie evidence of inability or
insolvency. Ib . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815
5. Surrender of corporate rights, what is. If a corporation suffers acts to be
done which destroy the end and object for which it was instituted, it is
equivalent to a surrender of its rights. Bank Commissioner: 1.1.Bank of
Brest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
‘6. Dissolution of failing corporations. The primary object of proceeding in
chancery against failing corporations is not for the purpose of dissolving
the corporation, but to protect the assets for the benefit of creditors. The
power to decree a dissolution of the corporation is merely incidental. Fay
v.Erie¢tKa.lamazoo R.R.Bank ....... ............ .............. .. 194
7. Discharging receiver. It is the duty of the court to look into the condition of
the corporation before it will discharge the receiver, and make such order,
either absolute or conditional, as the case may require. Ib. . .... .... .. 194
See Bums arm Bmxmo.
COSTS.
See Moaroaou, ll.
COUNTY ORDERS.
See Brats or PEACE.
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COVENANT.
Several. Where the covenants and conditions of bonds and other deeds are
several, they may be good in part, and void as to the residue. Kirby 1:.
Ingersoll............................................... . ............... 178
OREDITORS‘ BILLS
1. Jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the court of chancery to apply the prop
perty of the defendant, which is beyond the reach of an execution at law,
to the satisfaction of the debt due to the judgment debtor, proceeds upon
the ground that the remedy at law is exhausted. Steward v. Stevens, 169;
Thauer v. Swift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480
2. The remedy at law is not exhausted until an execution has been issued and
returned unsatisfied. And for this purpose it cannot be returned until the
return day. Thayer v. Swift.......................................... .. 430
8. The remedy by creditor's bill is a harsh remedy, which will not be aflorded
unless the creditor shows a strict and rigid compliance with the rules and
forms of law. Ib ........................................................... .. 430
4. Return of execution. For the purpose of a creditor’s bill, the execution can
not be returned until the return day. Steward v. Stevens, 169. Even
though the bill is not filed until after the return day. Stajord v. Hulbert. . 485
5. A return that the sheriff has propertyin his hands for want of bidders, is
insufficient. Eldredv.Camp.............. .......... .................. .. 162
6. Bill, what to state. A creditor's bill must contain the averments required by
the 109th rule (Rule 102of 1858),and those averments must be sworn to.
Clark v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 227
7. Bill with double aspect. A bill may be flied both to reach mere equitable
interests and in aid of execution at law; and such a bill is not multifarious.
Ib............. ....................... . . . . . . . . . . . . .............. ..227
8. Waiver of right to file. The right to file a creditor’s bill having once attached
by the return of an execution unsatisfied, the party does not lose his right
to file the same by the issuing of a new execution. Ib.. ...... .. . ..... . . 22'!
9. Bill in aid of execution. Where alien has been acquired by levy of execu
cution, or where there is an outstanding execution in the hands of an om
cer, and a fraudulent obstruction is interposed to prevent its being levied,
a bill may be sustained for a discovery, and to remove such obstruction.
Thayerv. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 480
See Buss Arm Bnmma.i,
DAMAGES.
See Jurusmcriox, 7. 8
__—_
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DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
See ASSIGNMENTnon THE Blmnrr or Cnnnlrons; Cnsnrrons’ Bums.
DEGREE.
See Pmcncn, 32to 37.
DEDICATION.
See Town Puws; Wns.
DEED.
1. Fraudulent in part is void. The better opinion seems to be, that even at oom
mon law a deed fraudulent in part is altogether void. Kirby v. Ingersoll. . . 172
2. Illegal conveyance void. The construction to be put upon 5 deed conveying
property illegally is, that the clause which so conveys it is void equally,
whether the illegality be by statute or at common law. This is the rule,
except in cases where the statute declares the whole instrument void. Ib. . 172
8. Deeds void in part. One good trust inserted in an illegal instrument of
assignment cannot make that instrument a valid one.
4. A grantee, who voluntarily becomes a party to a.deed which is fraudulent in
part, forfeits his right to claim benefit from another part which would have
been good. Ib.............................................................. .. 178
See CONSIDERATION; Insmuncm; Moarewn; Rnconnme Luvs.
DEFAULT.
See Prucrrcz, 13to M.
DEMURRER.
Bee Puunmos.
DEPOSIT IN COURT.
See PRACTICE, 81.
DEPOSITIONS.
See Prue-non, 27to 8.
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DETROIT CITY.
Corporate powers of. The corporation ol the city of Detroit has no power
except that which is conferred by the act of incorporation or other acts spe
cially relating thereto. Cooper v. Alden . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ ‘B
See Wns.
DIRECTORS OF BANKS.
See Bums mo Bmxmo, 3, 4, 6, 19.
DISCOVERY
In aid of defense at law. Equity may compel a discovery in aid of a defense
at law, and may stay the proceedings at law until an answer to the bill of
discovery has been obtained. Wright v. 12
ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS.
Probate sale : Judge interested. Where a sale of real estate was ordered by
a judge of probate, and it appeared that he himself became interested in
the purchase, the sale was set aside, and a re-sale ordered to be made under
the direction of the court. Walton 1:. Torrey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ H9
See Exncnrrons um Anumxs-rnnons; Pnnrmmsnxr, 11, 13.
ESTOPPEL.
See Pumnxsos, 2).
EVIDENCE.
Bee Monromz, 1; Pnnnmas, 18; Pnacncn, 27to 29; TAX Trrnn.
EXECUTION.
Bee C1mnrroRs' Brua.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
1. Administratov-‘s sale, when should be miioumed. When the day appointed
for an administrator's sale is rainy and inclement, and but few persons
456
INDEX. 469
appear and bid, and the bids do not exceed halt the value of the property, it
is the duty of the administrator to adjourn the sale. Beaubien 11.Poupard, 206
2. Administrator's sale: Administrator cannot bid. A party cannot become
the purchaser, either directly or indirectly, at a sale made by himself as
administrator. Ib................................................ . .. . . . . . . . .. 206
3 Where the administrator procured his brother-in-law to become the pur
chaser, and immediately afterwards took a conveyance of the premises so
purchased to hlmselt, the court ot chancery, on bill filed by the heirs, set
aside the sale, ordered the deed delivered up to be canceled, and directed a
resale. Ib . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 206
See Esrurs or DECEASEDPimsons; INJUKGTION, 9.
FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE.
See Moaroaoa.
FORFEITURE.
See Barns AND BANKING; Conroanrmrs.
FORMER SUIT PENDING.
See PLsAm:\'as, 12.
FRAUD.
1 Meaning of. By the term fraud, the moan intent and eflect of the acts
complained of is meant. Kirby v. Ingersoll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 The law has a standard for measuring the intent of parties, and declares an
illegal act, prejudicial to the rights ot others, a fraud upon such rights,
although the party denies all intention of committing a fraud. Ib. . . . . . . . . .
8. Setting aside contract for. A stock of goods was exchanged by complainant
for lands, which defendants represented to be pine lands, having a certain
large quantity ot pine timber standing thereon. Complainant had never
seen the land, and relied upon these representations. It turned out that
there was pine on but about one-fourth of the land, and on that only about
halt the quantity represented. The court decreed the contract rescinded,
that the unsold portion of the goods be re~delivered to complainant, and
that he be paid for those sold, and have a lien on the land as security until
the payment was made. Jones v. Wing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. False representations: Scientcr. Where the representations on which a
party relies are untrue, it is immaterial whether the party making them
iii
172
179
801
457
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knows them to be so or not; the eifect upon him being the same in either
case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . $1
5. Remedy at law. Where the transactions stated in the bill, by which certain
notes were obtained, presented a case of fraud, although from the case
made, it was doubtful whether the complainant could defend successfully
the full amount of the notes, and a general demurrer was interposed, the
court refused to sustain the demurrer, and required the defendant to
answer. Ankrim v. Woodworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 356
6. In cases of fraud where it is doubtful whether the defense would be good at
law, the court of chancery will entertain jurisdiction. Ib .. .. 356
7. Lachea in applying for relief. A party seeking to set aside a conveyance on
the ground of fraud, must be prompt in communicating it when discovered,
and consistent in his notice to the opposite party of the use he intends to
make of it. Disbrow v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
8. Same: The principle applied. Where the complainant had rested for sev
eral months after he had knowledge of the fraud complained of and until
the condition of the property had changed, before he took any steps to
rescind the contract, this court refused to interfere, and left the complain
ant to his remedy at law. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 192
See BANKS um Bsxxnw, 17,21; CONSIDERATION; LIIlTATlOh or Tina Ann
Power to sell mortgage. The guardian of a minor has the right to collect and
receive money due to his ward on bond and mortgage, or to sell and assign
the bond and mortgage, in the exercise of his discretion as guardian Liv
ingston v.J0nes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
LACBES.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
See sPEClFlC PERFORMANCE; Tavsrl.
GENERAL BANKING LAW.
See Buss mo Bmxmo.
GOVERNOR AND JUDGES.
See CONTRACTS,2; Wars.
GUARDIAN AND WARD.
See
Esnrls or Dacimsln Pmsoits.
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HUSBAND AND WIFE.
1. Deed of married woman. A deed executed by a married woman without her
husband joining with her is void. G011’v. Thompson. ............. . . . . . . . . . .. 60
1 Bill by married woman. A bill bya married woman against her husband
must be filed byprochein ami. Peltier v. .Peltier.................... 19
See Anmolw.
iii
ILLEGAL INSTRUMENTS. .
See Bums mo Bssxmo, 6; Comiucrs, 2; Duns, 1.
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
See Tans-rs.
INFANT.
BeeGnmnns um WARD.
INJUNCTION.
L Against public ofllcerc. Equity has undoubted jurisdiction to interfere by
injunction where public oflicers are proceeding illegally and improperly,
under a. claim of right, to do any act to the injury of individual rights.
Cooperv.Alden................ ..... ..................... ...... .. 72
2. The ground on which equity interferes to restrain public omcers who are
acting illegally, is to prevent great and irreparable mischief. It will not
interfere if the injury is slight or doubtful. Brown v. Gardner. . . . . . . . . . . . 291
8. Where a bill was filed and preliminary injunction obtained to restrain com
missioners of highways from laying out a.highway through the orchard and
garden of complainant in violation of the statute, and it appeared that the
road was actually opened before defendants had notice of the injunction,
the bill was dismissed. .... 291
4. To prevent improper appropriation of ctreet. Where land is dedicated to a
particular purpose, and the municipal authorities undertake to appropriate
it to an entirely diflerent one, they may be restrained by injunction, on the
application of an adjoining lot owner, from so doing. Cooper 1:.Alden. . . . . 72
6. Injunction ea:parte. The ground and the only ground on which injunctions
are granted against persons in possession of personal property and osten
sibly the rightful owners, upon an ea:parte application, is the protection of
the fund or property, when it is shown that without such interposition of
the court there is danger that it may be lost to the complainant if he suc
ceeds in establishing his title. Thayer v. Swift ........ . . . . .. .............. . . 430
459
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6. Order by oflicer out of court: Motion to dissolve. An injunction granted
by a justice of the supreme court, in cases where the statute authorizes it,
stands upon the same footing as if granted by the chancellor; and in either
case it is competent for the defendants, in vacation, and before they put in
their answer, to move to dismiss the injunction for want of equity in the
bill. Cooper v. Alden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
7. Injunction bond. Where the statute requires that, before an injunction shall
be issuedto stay proceedings which are at issue at law, a bond shall be
filed by the complainant, the court cannot dispense with the filing. Oar
roll v. Farmers and Mechanics‘ Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .
8. Oomity. Courts of chancery will not sustain an injunction bill to restrain a
suit or proceeding previously commenced in a court oi a sister state or in
anyof thefederalcourts. Ib............. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9. To stay probate sale: Disputed rights. Where an administrator, under a
license from a judge of probate, was proceeding to sell the interest of the
intestate in sixteen village lots, which interest was stated to be one undi
vided half, upon a bill illed by the other parties interested, stating that the
intestate owned only an undivided interest of one-third, an injunction was
granted to restrain the sale, and the chancellor refused to dissolve the
injunction until the interest of the intestate was ascertained and settled.
Thayer v. Lane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10. Dissolution of, where equity denied. Where the equity of a bill is denied by
answer, the injunction will be dissolved on motion; and so it will be if it is
shown by special plea that there is no equity in the bill. Eldred v. Camp. .
11. Motion to dissolve. On a Inotlon to dissolve an injunction before answer,
an amdavit is admissible which goes to show that the injunction was irreg
ularly issued, or that the otficer allowing the injunction was misled and
induced to grant the injunction contrary to law. Carroll v. Farmers and
Mechanics’ Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
But the allegations of the bill cannot be contradicted by afidavit. Schwarz
v. Sears . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12. Dissolved on default. Where the complainant had due notice of a motion to
dissolve an injunction. and he neglected to appear and oppose the motion,
the defendant was permitted to take his order dissolving the injunction
with costs. Kellogg v. Barnes . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
See Buss um BANKING; Bmns or Pnscn; Onnnrroas‘ Buns.
INSOLVENCY.
Bee Bums mo Bmxmo; CORPORATION!
INSURANCE.
Insurance is a personal contract, and does not pass to a purchaser by a eon
veyance of the property insured. Disbrow v.
IRREGULARITY.
See PRACTICE, 20,28.
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JUDGE OF PROBATE.
See Esraras or Daciussn Paasous.
JUDGMENT.
I Relief against. Where the party is ignorant of the facts which constitute a
defense at law until after judgment is rendered against him, he may have
relief in equity. Wales v. Bank of Michigan .............................. ..
2 This court will not relieve against a judgment at law on the ground of its
being contrary to equity, unless the defendant was ignorant of his defense,
pending the suit, or the facts could not be received as a defense at law, or
unless, without any neglect or default on the part of the defendant, he was
prevented by fraud or accident, or the act of the opposite party, from avail
ing himself of his defense. Mack v. Doty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
8 But where the defendants were prevented from making their defense at law
by the acts of the plaintifl until the only witness, by which the defense
could be proved, was dead, and a resort to this court, in consequence thereof,
became indispensable, it was held that the complainants were entitled to
relief in this court, and that it was not necessary for them to appeal the case
at law, and then to apply to this court for a discovery, in order to entitle
them to equitable relief. Ib......................... . . . .................... . .
4. Where it appeared by the bill that the complainants became security for a
third person to the defendant on two promissory notes, and that the defend
ant extended the time of payment three several times for ninety days each,
without the knowledge or assent of the sureties, and the maker of the notes
at the time of the extension was able to pay, but, at the time to which pay
ment had been extended, he had become insolvent, and the defendant had
commenced two several suits before a justice of the peace to recover the
amount of the notes against the sureties, and they appeared and defended,
and after the testimony was taken, the defendant, who was plaintiff in the
justice’s court, discontinued his suits, and, after the decease of the only
witness on the part of the defense, new suits were commenced, upon which
judgments were recovered, the suits being undefended; upon demurrer, it
was held that the case made by the bill was such as entitled the complain
ants to relief in equity, and that it was competent for this court to afford
that relief in any stage of the proceedings, as well after as before judg
ments at law. Ib.. ..............................
See JURISDICTION,4.
JUDGMENT CREDITORS‘ BILLS.
See Cminrroas' Bram
JURISDICTION.
L Remedy at law. The court of chancery will not take jurisdiction where there
is a plain and adequate remedy at law. Barrows 0. Doty. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
808
366
366
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2. But it will have jurisdiction if the bill prays relief to which complainant is
entitled, but which cannot be had at law. Rowland v. Doty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. If the remedy at law is difflcult or doubtful, equity will entertain jurisdiction.
Wheeler v. Clinton Canal Bank ........................ . .
4. Remedy at law: Lachea. If he has a defense at law of which he is aware,
but neglects to make it, orto apply for a discoveryin aid thereof when
necessary, he cannot. after judgment against him at law, have relief in
equity. Wrightv.Ktng... . . . . ......... .. . . . . . . . . .......... 12
5. Title: to land. Chancery is not the appropriate tribunal for the trial of titles
to land. Devauz v. City of Detroit ....................... . . . . . . . . -..... . . H
6. Jurisdiction for one purpose retained for another. The court, being satis~
fled that defendants had acted in good faith, refused, on denying the prin
cipal relief, to retain the bill for the purpose of giving damages to com
plainant. Brown v. Gardner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... .. 291
7. Though specific performance is refused on a bill filed for that purpose, the
court, in a proper case, may retain the bill for the purpose of adjusting
accounts between the parties. Hawley v. Sheldon.. . ...... . . . ..... . . .. . .. . . 420
8. Bill retained for the purpose of an accounting as to the value of improve
ments where the complainant had been in possession and made improve
ments which defendants claimed were to be applied on rents. Ib. . . . . . . . . 420
9. Fraud : Laches in applying for relief. A party seeking to set aside a con
veyance ou the ground of fraud, must be prompt in communicating it, and
consistent in his notice as to the use he intends to make of it. Street v.
Dnw. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42‘!
10.Fraud: Remedy at law. Courts of equity have concurrent jurisdiction with
courts of law where fraud is charged. l'Vheeler v. Clinton Canal Bank.. . . 449
See ALIIONY; Buns or Pesos; Coavonxrrous; Cnnn1'roas' Bums; FRAUD;
JUDGIINT; Psanrxos; QUIETING Trrms.
LACHES.
See Lurriwrron or Tnm urn 11-scars.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
See Norms.
LAND TITLES.
Bee Juiusnxo-riou, 5; Qmsrrmo '1‘r1-nus.
LIEN.
l. Vendor‘: Lien. The vendor of real estate has an equitable lien upon the
lame for the purchase money, where there is no security for its payment
taken. Oarrollv. VdnRensselaer....... ..... .. %
46?
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I. 7endee’a lien. A. vendee who has paid the purchase money, has a lien against
the vendor analogous to that of a vendor against a vendee who has not
paid the purchase money. Payne v. Attev-buru.. ........... . . 414
LIMITATION OF TIME AND LACHES.
1. Lachea a bar to relief. Where the action was not commenced for upwards of
twenty years after the right of action accrued, and no disability or excuse
for the delay was pretended, or new discovery of facts suggested, and both
the person charged with committing the fraud and his grantee were dead,
the court refused to sustain the suit, by reason of the lapse of time, and
held that the case could not be aided by proof of facts which were not put
in issue by the pleadings. McLean v. Barton... . ....................... .. 279
2. A court of equity will lend its aid to detect and redress a fraud, notwith
standing the lapse of time; but when the fraud is discovered the parties
must act upon that discovery within a reasonable time. The party seeking
redress should not wait until all those who were cognizant of the trans
action have paid the debt of nature, and until no one is left to deny or
explain the allegations, unless satisfactory excuse can be given for the
delay. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 279
3. A party who has a defense at law, of which he is advised, and neglects to
make it, comes too late to this court, to ask to be relieved against the judg
ment. Barrowsv.Doty ......... . . . . . ........... . . . . . . . . 1
4. If a party has a defense at law, of which he is advised before the trial, and
neglects to make it, or to apply to the court of chancery for a discovery,
if necessary to his defense, in aid of the trial at law, he is precluded, and
cannot afterwards have relief in this court. Wright v. King. ..... .. ........ 1!
See Faaun; Juarsnxcrzozr, 4, 9; LIIITATIONS, Sraruws on
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
1. Repeal of limitation acts. Whether by section three of the repealing act
contained in the Revised Statutes of 1838it was intended to continue in force
the provisions of the acts of limitation repealed by that act, where the time
had “begun to run, " or whether the time prescribed in the Revised Statutes
was intendedas the period at the expiration of which the suits should be
barred, quaare. McLean v. Barton........... .......... ............... .. 279
2 Lapse of time, how taken advantage of. The statutes of limitation and lapse
of time may be taken advantage of on demurrer. 279
IIARRIED WOMAN .
Bee Hussasn mo W1‘|'l.
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MASTER IN CHANCERY.
See ATIAOHIENT non Conrnurr; Pizatrrioa, 27.
MORTGAGE.
By deed absolute in form : Parol evidence to show intent. A deed absolute
in form may be proved by parol to have been intended by the parties to
operate only as a mortgage for money loaned at its date; and such proof
will entitle the grantor to redeem. Wadsworth v. Loranger . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Defective, purchase subject to. One who buys land and receives a convey~
ance subject to a mortgage thereon, cannot afterwards contest the validity
of the mortgage on the ground of defect in the formalities of execution.
Disbrow v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . _. _. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. Acknowledgment no part of deed. The acknowledgment of an assignment
of mortgage is no part of the instrument of assignment. Livingston v.
Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Release of mortgage by quit-claim deed. Where the holder of a mortgage
executes a quit-claim deed of the mortgaged premises to one who has
received a deed thereof under an agreement that he shall pay the mortgage,
the effect is to discharge the lien of the mortgage. Jerome v. Seymour. . . .
A subsequent assignment of the mortgage to a third person will not entitle
the latter to enforce it. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Foreclosure for one installment. Equity will not interfere to prevent the
mortgagee selling, under the power of sale, the whole of the mortgaged
premises for a single installment, when it appears that they cannot be sold
in parcels without injury to the whole. Disbrow v. Jones. . . . .. ........... . .
Set-of by mortgagor of claim owing by mortgagee. Where land which was
under lease for a term was sold, and a mortgage taken back for the pur
chase price, and it was agreed between the parties that during the leasehold
term, the mortgagee should pay to the mortgagor-s the interest on the pur
chase price: held, that on a foreclosure of a mortgage the amount of this
interest should be deducted from the amount due on the mortgage, and a
sale be decreed for the balance only. Jones 1:.Disbrow ................... . .
8. Irregular foreclosure, waiver of. Where, in a foreclosure of a mortgage, by
advertisement under the statute, a mistake occurs, which renders the pro
ceedings irregular and voldable, the mortgagee has a right to waive those
proceedings, and commence de nova, either by advertisement under the
statute, or by availing himself of the right he had in the first instance to
seek his remedy in this court. Atwater v. Kinman ....................... . .
9. Setting aside foreclosure at law. A foreclosure under the power of sale, if
made for an excessive amount, may be set aside before the proceedings
under it are perfected, on a bill illed by the debtor for leave to redeem on
paying the amount due. Schwarz v. Sears . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
10. Redemption against subsequent purchaser. Where the grantee in such a
deed sells and conveys to one who has full notice of all the facts, such
second grantee will take no greater interest than his grantor had in the
premies, and he will hold them subject to be redeemed on payment of the
amount due on the mortgage. Wadsworth v. Loranger .............. . . .
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11. Costs on redemption. Where one purchases lands with knowledge that his
grantor holds it in security for a loan, and refuses to receive payment of the
’_
)
loan when tendered, and puts the party entitled to redeem to the expense'
of a suit for the purpose, he will be compelled to pay costs. lb. . . . . . . .. 118
See Puvrms; PLEADINGS, 3
,
4
,
7
;
Rsoonnmo Laws.
MULTIFARIOUSNESS.
Where parties are charged as fraudulent associates under pretense of a cor
poration, the bill is not rendered multifarious by the fact that the defend
ants where connected with the association at diflerent periods and in ditIer
ent capacities, and may have different liabilities. Wheeler v. Clinton Canal
Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 449
MULTIPLICITY OF sUI'iS.
See BILLS or PEACE.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
See Dsrnorr CITY; Towx Pans.
NE EXEAT.
See PRACTICE, 1
NOTICE.
By possession of land. The possession of a tenant is notice to a purchaser
of the tenant’s actual interest in the premises. Disbrow v. Jones . . . . . . . . .. 48
See Arrsoalasr Ion OoN'rnin>'r; Bums AND Bmxma, 11; Rscoanme Laws.
OFFICERS.
Bee Bums nan Bnnnso, 3
,
4
. 14; Izuvsonos, 1 to4.
PARTIES.
1
.
Foreclosure bill: Parties. A trustee, holding a mortgage as such, need not
make his cestuis que trust parties to a bill to foreclose it. Sill 1:.Ketchum, 423
30 465
478 INDEX.
2. Ceatuis que trust, when not necessary parties. Cestuis que trust are not
necessary parties when the _onlyobject of the suit is to reduce the prop~
erty into possession. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8. Where the object of the bill il merely to collect money. it is not necessary for
the complainant to make a ceatul que trust a party; though it would be
otherwise it the existence or enjoyment of the trust property were to be
aflected. Cook 1.1.Wheeler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
4. Bill against fraudulent associates: Parties. In proceeding against parties
as fraudulent associates, it is not necessary to join as defendant a receiver
previously appointed in a suit against them as a corporation. Wheeler v.
Clinton Canal Bank........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
See Tnusrs, 4.
PARTITION.
Jurisdiction. Equity has jurisdiction to make partition between joint owners
of lands, notwithstanding a remedy at law is given by statute. Thayer v.
Lane ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... ..
PARTNERSHIP.
l. Partners, implied power of. One partner may bind his co-partner in all mat
ters within the scope of the co-partnership; the implied authority of one
partner to bind his co-partner is generally limited to such acts as are in
their nature essential to the general objects of the co-partnership. Kirby
v. Ingersoll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
2. Partners, general assignment by one. One partner cannot make a general
assignment of the partnership effects to a trustee for the benefit of the
creditors of the firm, without the knowledge or consent of his co-partner,
when he is on the spot, and might have been consulted. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. There is no implied authority resulting from the nature of the contract ot
co-partnership, that will authorize one partner to makeageneral assign
ment ot the partnership eflects, without the knowledge or consent of his
co-paitner. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
4. Partners, implied power of. The authority impliedly vested by each partner
in the other is for the purpose of carrying on the concern, and not for the
purpose of breaking it up and destroying it. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .
5. One partner does not, by any implication, confer a power upon his co-partner
of divesting him of all interest in, or authority over, the concern. Ib. . . . . ..
6. One partner may transfer a portion of the assets for the purpose of paying
or securing debts, or to raise means to carry on the concern; but the power
of divesting entirely one partner of his interest, appointing a trustee for
both, and breaking up the concern, is not one of the powers either contem
plated or implied by the contract of co-partnership. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7. Partners, general assignment by one. The principle upon which general
assignments by one partner have been declared void is that one partner
has no authority to make a general assignment of the partnership eflfects in
fraud of the rights ot his co-partner to participate in the distribution of the
partnership eflfectsamong the creditors. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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8 Equities of individual and partnership creditors. As between bona fide
creditors of a previous firm and the separate creditors of a partner who
continued the business and was the sole visible owner of the property
employed in trade, and where the separate creditors had given credit,
relying on the property employed in trade for payment, such creditors
should be preferred to the creditors of the previous firm. Toplifl v. Vail..
9 The creditors of a partnership have a right to payment out of the partnership
effects in preference to the creditors of an individual partner. Ib....... ..
I0 In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, it is fair to presume that a
retiring partner does not intend that the partnership property shall be used
for the individual benefit of a partner who continues the business, leaving
the debts of the firm lmpaid; and this was held to be the presumption
where the retiring partner transferred the partnership effects to a partner
continuing the business, who agreed to pay the partnership debts and gave
bondtothateflect. Ib ................. . . . . . . . . . ......... . . . . . . ..
11 Right of rurvia.-or to posseuion of assets: Receiver. A surviving partner
having the legal right to the possession of the partnership property, the
court will not deprive him of that right, unless upon proof of mismanage
ment or danger to the partnership effects. Connor v. Allen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12 Continuance of partnership business after the death of one : Rights of rep
resentatives of deceased partner. Where one of several partners dies and
the business of the copartnership is carried on by the surviving partners
without the assent of the representatives, they have, as a general rule,
their election to demand interest on the amount of the share of the
deceased, or to take a share of the profits; but where the interest of the
deceased partner had become vested in one of the surviving partners, who
consented to the continuance of the co-partnership, it was held the rule
did not apply, and his only right was to share as partner. Millard v.
Ramadell.............. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
See Buns AND Bnrsmo, 18,19.
PATENT.
Settling equities under government grant. After a confirmation of a claim
to land by the board of land commissioners under an act of Congress, and
after patent issued, if competent at all for this court to go behind the pat
ent to settle conflicting claims, it should only be done on the clearest and
most irrefragable proofs. Bernard v. Bougard.............................
PAYMENT.
See Mos-rams, 4. 5; Srscunc Psnronuaxcl; Tax Tirus.
PEACE, BILLS OF.
See Brats or PEACI.
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PLEADING S.
1. Tun B114.
Injunction bill : Averments. Where the bill seeks a.discovery in aid of pro
ceedings at law, the rule is that the complainant must charge in his bill
that the facts are known to the defendant and ought to be disclosed by him,
and that the complainant is unable to prove them by other testimony; and
it must be afilrmatively stated in the bill that the facts sought to be discov
ered are material for such purpose. Carroll v. Farmers and Mechanics’
Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
When an injunction is asked to stay proceedings at law, it is incumbent upon
the complainant to show in his bill the state of the pleadings, and the court
in which the suit is pending, in order to enable the oificer to whom the
application is made for the allowance of the injunction to judge of the
propriety of its allowance, and to prescribe the terms on which the same
shall be allowed. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Bill by assignee: Allegation of assignment. It is not ground of demurrer
to a foreclosure bill by an assignee, that it does not give the date of
assignment. Sill v. Ketchum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
The averment in a foreclosure bill that the owner of a bond and mortgage.
in consideration of one dollar, assigned the same to the complainants, and
that on the same day the assignment was duly acknowledged before a com
missioner of deeds according to the laws of the state of New York, where
the same was executed, is sufllcient on demurrer. Livingston v. Jones. . ..
Bill not signed by counsel. Though a bill should be signed by counsel, yet
if this should accidentally be omitted, the signature will be allowed to be
supplied afterwards without costs. Sill v. Ketchum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Oath to bill. Where no preliminary order is required it is not necessary that
bills should be sworn to, although the answer under oath is not waived.
Atwater v. Kinman. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Foreclosure bill : Parties. Minors whose guardian has assigned a mortgage
which he held for them, are not necessary parties to a bill by the assignee
to foreclose the same. Livingston v. Jones . . . . . _. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Amended bill, what may be set forth in. Facts which have transpired since
suit commenced cannot be set forth by way of amendment. Hammond v.
Place............. . . . . . . ......
H. Daxunlum.
General demurrer. A general demurrer for want of equity cannot be sus
tained, unless the court is satisfied that no discovery or proof properly
called for by or founded on the allegation of the bill can make the subject
matter of the suit a proper case for equitable cognizance. Clark v. Davis,
Demurrer ore tenus. Where a new cause of demurrer is assigned ore tenus,
the cause must be co-extensive with the demurrer. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Demurrer, when too broad. Where a demurrer is to the whole discovery and
relief prayed for by the bill, if the complainant is entitled to any part of
the relief, the demurrer must be overruled. Thayer v. Lane. .. . . . .
III. Pun.
Plea of former suit pending. A plea of a former suit pending in another
court for the same cause of action must set forth the general character and
l9T
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objects of the former suit, and the relief prayed for. Bank of Michigan u.
Williams....... ...................................... .... ........... .. 219
Plea and answer. A defendant may plead to one part of the bill, and answer
to another part; but these defenses must clearly refer to separate and dis
tinct parts of the bill. Clark v. Saginaw City Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 240
When the answer and plea are to the same parts of the bill, the answer over
rules the plea. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
Plea, requisites of: Answer in support of. A plea of a stated account must
aver the accounts settled all the dealings between the parties; that the
accounts were just and fair, and due; and these averments must he sup
ported by an answer to the same efiect. Schwarz v. Wendell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895
A plea of a release, unsupported by an answer, is insufllcient. lb . . . . . . . . . . . . 895
IV. Answsa.
Denials by answer, how made. Where an allegation is made in the bill with
divers circumstances, the defendant should not by his answer deny the
allegation literally as laid in the bill, but should answer the point of sub
stance positively and certainly. Jones v. Wing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Answer, when responsive to bill. Complainant, by his bill, averred his right
to certain shares in a partnership, purchased by him of the heirs of a for
mer partner. The answer of defendant set up an agreement by which
these shares were to be purchased by complainant for himself and defend
ant jointly: Held, that as to this agreement the answer was not to be
regarded as directly responsive to the bill, and, therefore, the agreement
was not proved by it. Millerd 1:.Ramsdell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
301
878
19. Answer: Impeaching deed. An answer which admits a deed set out in the
bill does not sufflciently impeach it by denying its validity in general
terms: it should state the facts which are supposedto render the deed
invalid, so that the court may pass upon them. Payne v. Atterbury . . . . . . .
29. At law a party is estopped from disputing his deed; and if he would impeach
it in equity he must show in what his equity consists. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
V. Svvrnsunmu. BILL.
£1. What may embrace. It material facts have occurred subsequent to the
commencement of the suit the court will give the complainant leave to file
a supplemental bill, and where such leave is given the court will permit
other matters to be introduced into the supplemental bill, which might
have been incorporated in the original by way of amendment; and this is
especially proper where the matter which occurred prior is necessary to
the proper elucidation of that which occurred subsequent to the filing of
the original bill. Graves 11.Niles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... ....................
POSSESSION OF LANDS.
See Noncs; QUIETING 'l‘rruns.
PRACTICE.
I. Fmma Bum AND Paocnss.
1. A subpmna is the first process; it is irregular to have injunction and ne exeat
issued and served before the issue of subpcena. Peltier 1:.Peltier . . . . . . . . .
414
414
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2. Subpoena, service of. The service of a subpoena on a defendant out of the
8.
4.
5.
7.
8.
10.
11.
state is irregular. Pratt v. Bank of Windsor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 254
H. Anssnusirr or Pmmnmes.
Amended bill: Application for leave to file. It is not a matter of course to
allow the filing of an amended bill after the cause has been put at issue
and testimony taken. A special application should be made to the court,
with a full statement of the facts proposed to be incorporated in the
amended bill, so that the court can judge of the propriety of giving leave.
Hammond v. Place . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 438
Amendment of plea. In an application to amend the defendant's pleading,
the proposed amendments should be set out. Freeman v. Michigan State
Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31)
A plea may be allowed to be amended for the purpose of placing before the
court an additional fact unknown to the defendant when the plea was flied,
and consistent with the defense then made. But it will not be permitted
for the purpose of setting up a fact or state of facts inconsistent with the
original defense. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Amendments to answer, how made. Where leave is given to amend an
answer, a new answer, with the amendments added, must be made, flied,
and copy served, or the original answer withdrawn by leave of the court,
and the amendments added; or the amendments must refer to the portions
of the answer on file, intended to be amended, and specifying their nature
and application. Mason o. Detroit City Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Amendments in the form of affidavits, without referring to the answer, are
irregular, and a motion to dissolve an injunction will not be heard upon
them. Ib................................................................... ..
Supplemental answer, leave to file when allowed. An application to flle a
supplemental or amended answer is seldom granted, and never without the
utmost caution, and when a just and necessary case is clearly made out,
and it is then generally confined to a clear case of mistake, as to matter of
fact, and as to that only; and the court is still more cautious in granting
such an application after a considerable lapse of time from the filing of the
blll or original answer in the case. Graves v. Niles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
Where a motion was made to file a supplemental or amended answer in which
it was proposed to take entirely new ground, and change entirely the char
acter of the defense, and this not upon the ground of any actual mistake in
a matter of fact, or upon any discovery of new facts, but upon the ground
that the defendant did not mean to be understood to state as he had stated
in his answer, the court denied the motion. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
But where there was doubt in regard to the proper application of certain
moneys admitted to have been received by the defendant, and the answer
was obscure, and there was a possibility that great injustice might he done
to the defendant, the court granted an order with reluctance, permitting a
separate supplemental answer to be filed, as to this particular, and explain
ing this ambiguity. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _. 332
Where a defendant had leave to file a supplemental answer to explain cer
tain ambiguities in his original answer, and he incorporated other matters
of defense in his supplemental answer, on motion of the complainant the
supplemental answer was ordered to be taken ofl the files. Ib. . . . . . . . . . ..
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Ill. Dsznuvr, AND Orsnmo THE Sum.
Setting aside default. A regular order to take the hill as confessed will not
be set aside upon a simple affidavit of merits, although an excuse is given
for the default. Stockton v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
In such case, the defendant must either produce the sworn answer which
he proposes to put in, or must in his petition or afidavit state the nature
of his defense, and his belief in the truth of the matters constituting such
defense. Ib . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Setting aside pro confesso for answer. The general rule is that when s
defendant, by whom the bill has been taken pro confesso, presents an
answer which shows a defense, and there is an excuse shown for the default,
the court will permit him to file the answer on terms. Smith v. Saginaw
City Bank. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................... . . . .................. . .
The inclination of the court is always to permit an answerto be filedif it
discloses a.defense, unless there has been intentional delay. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . .
A defendant in contempt cannot move to set aside proceedings; but where
there is merely a failure on his part to comply with the provisions of an
interlocutory order he may move to discharge the order for irregularity.
Peltierv.Peltier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
18.Motion to open default: Aflldavit of merits. On motion to open a default,
19.
20.
the aflldavit of merits should bemade by the defendant himself, or, if made
by counsel, a suflicient reason should be shown for its not being made by
the party. Bank of Michigan v. Williams .......... .................. ..
A decree by default may be set aside, on motion, without petition, where
the facts upon which the motion is based appear by theprecord. Graham
1:.Elmore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Waiver of default. A defendant who had defaulted the complainant for
failure to serve a copy of the bill, afterwards flied his answer and moved to
dissolve an injunction: Held, a.waiver of the default. Higgins v. Carpenter,
IV. Soucrroas.
82. Signature by one who is not. Where a solicitor has appeared in a cause, and
23.
24.
25.
27.
a demurrer is filed, signed by solicitors who have not appeared, the demur
rer may be treated as without signature and as a nullity. Graham v. Elmore
But where the demurrer in such case was treated as a. nullity by the com
plainants, and a default was entered for want of an answer, and it appeared
that the signature of the wrong solicitors was put to the demurrer by mis
take, and that injustice would be done if the defendant should not be
permitted to answer, the default was set aside on terms. Ib. . . . . . . . ..... ..
Motion by one who is not. It is no objection to an order that it purports to be
made on the application of one who is not the solicitor in the cause. It is
not necessary that an order should show on whose motion it was made. Ib.
Rule by consent: Vacating same. A rule entered by consent will not be
vacated unless fraud or misrepresentation is made to appear. Hammond
v. Place...........
V. Tums Dsrosrrxoss.
Agent ofparty acting in absenceof commissioner. Where the agent or attor
ney of the complainant examined witnesses and wrote their depositions, and
the commissioner before whom they were taken was absent from the room
iii-~
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several times during the examination, and the defendant did not appear
and cross-examine the witnesses, the proceedings were held to be irregular,
and the depositions were suppressed. Burtch. v. Hogge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
28. Irregular-ities or unfairness in taking depositions will, it seems, be taken
notice of by courts of equity in any stage of the proceedings in the cause
before hearing. 31
S9. Exhibits at the hearing. Where the assignee of a mortgage files a bill to
81
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foreclose, setting forth the mortgage and assignment, he may, upon the
notice required by the 62drule to the opposite party, have an order to prove
the assignment as an exhibit at the hearing under the provisions of rule 56
Jerome v. Seymour ......... ...... ......... .. 255
VI. Dnrosrr m Counr.
When dispensed with. Where a party comes to have a foreclosure set aside
and for leave to redeem, he must bring into court the amount admitted to
be due. The deposit will only be dispensed with where there is uncer
tainty as to the amount due. Schwarz v. Sears . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 440
VII. DEGREE.
. Motion for decree. Applications for final decree must be made at a general
term, even though they be based on a default. Higgins v. Carpenter . . . . . . 256
Decree : Cause cannot be severed. Where there are joint defendants the
complainant cannot, upon a pro confesso obtained against one, before the
cause is at issue or in readiness for hearing against the other, enter a final
decree and issue execution thereon against the party against whom the bill
has been taken as confessed, and leave the cause to proceed against the
other defendant. Graham 1:.Elmore . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 265
. A final decree, or an interlocutory decree, which, in a great measure, decides
the merits of the cause, cannot be pronounced until all the parties to the
bill, and all the parties in interest, are before the court. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 265
. This court will not adjudge upon a part of the case; it will not make a final
decree until the case is properly presented in such form as will enable the
com-t to make a final disposition of the case, and do justice to all the par
ties. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
. Where a cause is in readiness for hearing against one defendant, and there is
another defendant as to whom the cause is not in readiness, the defendant
who has appeared and answered cannot notice the cause for hearing, but
must move to dismiss the bill for want of prosecution if the complainant
fails to expedite it. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 265
Amending decree. The court of chancery has the power to direct the alter
ation or correction of a decree after it has been entered, either upon motion
or petition, where there is evidently a mistake or clerical error. Bates 0.
@¢l1‘Ti80'7t.......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .“E1
See Arrscnusm non Conrnurr; Cnanrron.s' Brats; Dlscovnnr; Hosanna
mo WIFE, 2; INJUNCTION; MULTIFARIOUSNESS; Paarncs; RECEIVER.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
Agency riisavowed. Where parties assumed to be agents for a bank in
settling a demand, and procured from the debtor an assignment of prop
472
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erty in compromise, and the bank denied their authority to make the com
promise, whereupon the debtor made a second assignment of the property
to complainants, held, that complainants might maintain a hill in equity to
restrain the assumed agents from collecting and disposing of the property.
Pratt v. Campbell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $6
PROBATE SALES.
See Es'rA'ri=;sor Dmcmssn Pmzsona.
PUBLIC POLICY.
See Coummcrs, 2.
- ommrmo TITLES.
Under the eode of 1833the court of chancery had jurisdiction to quiet the
title of the legal owner of _land in possession of the same, as against any
other person setting up a claim thereto. Rowland v. Doty.. 8
RECEIVER.
1. When one will be appointed. Where complainant by his bill shows a.legal
title to lands in possession ot the defendant, and from the answer of defend
ant a strong presumption arises of title in complainant, the court will grant
a receiver. Payne v. Atterbun; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414
2. This is especially the case when there are large incumbrances on the lands,
and no part of the rents and profits is applied to keep down the interest,
and defendant is irresponsible, and is holding over against his own deed.
Ib..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..414
3. Affidavits are not admissible to contradict the answer on motion for the
appointment of receiver. Connor 11.Allen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 371
See Assionunm roe. was Bnuzrrr or Cimnrroas. 8; PARTNERSHIP, 11; Tausrs.
RECORDING LAWS.
1. Priority as between grantees. Where a. party claims priority under or by
virtue of the statute regulating the registry of deeds and mortgages, he
473
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must show a.compliance with its provisions in order to entitle him to such
priority. Thompsonv. Mack . . . . . . . . . . .... 150
2 Mortgage by deed absolute in form, record of. Under the code of 1833,where
a deed absolute in form was shown by contemporaneous writing to be only
a mortgage, it should have been recorded as a mortgage; and it recorded
as a deed, the record would not give it priority over a prior unrecorded
mortgage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . .
8 Once a mortgage always a mortgage. Where a deed absolute in form was
given to secure a debt, and the grantee at the time gave back an agreement
to reconvey when the debt should be paid, but this agreement was not
recorded, and the deed was recorded as a deed and not—-as the statute
required—a.s a mortgage; and the grantor, to obtain further credit, after
wards gave up the agreement to reconvey, and the grantee sold the land;
Held, that the deed having originally been a mortgage did not cease to be
such on the surrender ct the agreement; and that the deed not having been
properly recorded, the subsequent grantees could not claim priority over
a mortgage duly recorded, which the first grantor had given alter convey
ing as above stated. Ib.............. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................. . .
4. Recording acts of 1837. The act of April 12,1827,entitled "an act concerning
mortgages," prescribes the manner in which mortgages may be registered
and, being an act expressly in relation to mortgages, and general in its
terms, ls not controlled in relation to the record of mortgages by the act of
the same date, entitled “an act concerning deeds and conveyances; " and a
compliance with the first mentioned act in the record of a mortgage is sut
flcient. Weed v. I/11010... . . . .....'............................................
REDEMPTION.
See MORTGAGE,10, 11.
REMEDY AT LAW.
See Fawn; Jumsnlcrron.
BETRAINT UPON ALIENATION.
See WILL.
SERVICE.
See Arracnussr roe Cosrnnvr.
SET—OFF.
See Monmaox, 7.
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SOLICITOR.
Bee Arronnnv nan Counsanon; PRACTICE, 22to 25.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
1. Of parol contract: What will take case out of statute of frauds. Specific
performance will be decreed of a parol contract for the conveyance of
lands where the vendor has received a considerable portion of the purchase
money, caused the laud to be surveyed, put the vendee in possession, and
allowed him to retain such possession and make valuable improvements.
in reliance on the contract, for a series of years; these acts of part per
formance being suflicient to take the case out of statute of frauds. Bomier
1:. Caldwell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Where under a parol agreement to convey land the purchase money had been
paid, possession taken and valuable improvements made, these acts of part
performance were held to be suflicient to take the case out of the statute
of frauds, and to entitle the purchaser to a decree for specific perform
asce. Burtch v.Hogge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Part performance, to take a parol contract for the purchase of lands out of
the statute of frauds, should be of unequivocal acts that confirm the exist
ence of the contract. Millerd v. Ramsdell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... ..
If a party sets up part performance to take a case out of the statute of frauds,
he must show acts unequivocally referring to and resulting from that agree
ment, such as the party would not have done unless on account of that very
agreement, and with a direct view to its performance; and the agreement
set up must appear to be the same with the one partly performed—there
must be no uncertainty or equivocation in the case. Mcllurtrie v. Benuette,
On what grounds performance of parol contracts decreed. The ground of
the interference of courts of equity to enforce specific performance, is not
simply that there is proof of the existence of a parol agreement, but that
there is fraud in resisting the completion of an agreement partly per
formed. Ib . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... .... ..
Part payment of purchase price not enough. Part payment of the purchase
price is not, of itself, sufliicient to warrant a decree for the specific perform
ance of a parol contract for the purchase of lands; but it seems that full
payment would be. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Specific performance discretionary. Courts of equity do not, as a matter of
course, decree specific performance of contracts for the conveyance of
lands, but they exercise a discretionary power in view of all the facts of the
case; and their discretion must not be arbitrary and capricious, but regu
lated on grounds that will render it judicial. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Contracts must be mutual. The contract sought to be enforced must be
mutual, and the tie reciprocal, or a court of equity will not enforce a per
formance. Ib. Hawley v. Sheldon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... ........ . . . . ..
Contract must be certain. A parol contract will not be enforced unless it is_
certain in all its essential particulars. Mclilurtrie u. Bennelte, 124. Mil
Ierd v. Ramsdell.......................
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10 Rights of assignee. Courts of equity recognize and protect the rights of
assignees, and enforce the performance of contracts in their favor. Street
v. Dow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 427
ll Effect of inadequate price. Inadequacy of price, where it is so gross and
palpable as of itself to appear evidence of actual fraud, may be sufflcient to
induce the court to stay the exercise of its discretionary power to enforce
a specific performance, and leave a party to his remedy at law; but inade
quacy of price merely, without being such as to prove fraud conclusively,
ls not a good objection to specific performance. Burtch v. Hogge..
See JURISDICTION, 1
‘,
8
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STATUTES.
Construction of. Where one part of an act is equivocal, other portions of
the act maybe resorted to as a guide in construction. The occasion and
the reason of the enactment, which is the same thing as the old law and
the mischief; the letter of the act, whether words be used in their proper
or in a technical sense; the context, the spirit of the act, whether statutes
be in their nature remedial or penal; the subject matter and the provisions
of the act, and the intent of the legslature in passing it, are to be con
sidered; which intent is not to be collected from any particular expression,
but from a general view of the whole of the act. Attorney-General v. Bank
of Michigam.......................... .......... . . . . . . .. ....................
STAY OF PROCEEDINGS.
See Discovsavg Iumncrxon, 8
.
SUBPCENA.
See Pmicrlcn, 1
,
2
.
TAX TITLES.
I Tax paid. A sale of lands for taxes is wholly unwarranted if the tax has
been paid, and the deed given thereon will convey no title to the purchaser.
Rowland v. Doty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
'
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 Evidence of payment. The collector's return that the tax has not been paid
is such evidence only of non-payment as will justify the treasurer in sell
ing; and under the code of 1822'the treasurer‘s deed was evidence only that
the sale made by him was regular according to the provisions of the stat
ute. The land owner might go behind both, and show that in fact the tax
had been paid before the return was made.
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TIM E.
Statutory condition, when to beperformed. Where no time is prescribed in
which an act is to he done, it must be done in a reasonable time. Attorney
General 1:.Bank of Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....................
T'TLE TO LANDS.
See Quuarmo Tums.
TOVVN PLATS.
Dedication. Where the proprietors of a village plat have made a plan by
which they have dedicated land for streets, or for a public square, and have
sold lots in reference to such plan, they cannot afterwards resume and
exercise acts of ownership over the land thus dedicated, which will deprlve
their grantees of any privileges or advantages which they might derive
from having the streets or square kept open. Sinclair v. Comstock. . . . . . . .
But in every such case the intention to appropriate the land for the purpose
claimed must be clearly apparent. Ib.. . . . . . . .1............................ . .
Dedication: Refusal to accept. Where a lot was marked on a town plan
as “ Court House Square," the purpose being to donate it to the county for
the erection of a court house and jail thereon, and the county erected these
buildings on another lot, it was held, that this constituted suflicient evidence
of the refusal of the county to accept the donation, and the proprietors
were at liberty to appropriate it to other purposes. 1b. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
After such refusal, the purchasers of other lots on the plat have no right to
insist that such lot shall be kept open as public grounds. Ib. . . . . . . ....... . .
TRUSTS.
Implied. To raise a trust by implication there must be an actual payment of
money. Wright v. King . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... ..
Under statute of frauds, To make an express trust valid under the statute
of frauds, the terms and conditions of the trust must be in writing, under
the hand of the party to be charged. ID. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Resulting. Where two persons claim equities in land, and one of them pre
sents a claim which is allowed by the government land board, there is no
resulting trust in favor of the other which can be enforced in equity. Ber
nard v.Bougard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... ..... . . . . . . ..
Bill to enforce a trust : Parties. To a bill to enforce a trust, it is not neces
sary to join as defendants parties having a prior interest subject to which
the conveyance to the trustee was made. Suydam u. Dcquindre . . . . . . . . . . ..
5. The trust being under a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, some
of the creditors filed a bill to have the assignment set aside as fraudulent,
or, in case it was sustained, then to have the trust enforced. The bill
316
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averred that certain other creditors had been paid their demands in full.
Held, not necessary to make such persons parties to the bill. Ib.......... ..
6. One of the creditors who had not been paid was made a defendant instead of
complainant. Held, that as complete justice could be done between the
parties on this bill, the fact of his not being made complainant was not
good cause of demurrer. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7. The tact that a time is limited in the assignment for the closing of the trust,
will not preclude the filing of the bill before that time has expired, where
the bill alleges that the assignee has done nothing in the execution of the
trust. lb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................... . .
8. Trust: Receiver as against trustee. One to whom a debtor has conveyed his
property to keep it beyond the reach oi his creditors will be held to be a
trustee for their benefit, and will be liahle for all the property in his hands
when suit is brought against him. But a receiver will not be appointed
over one charged with being such a trustee, when there is no allegation that
he is insolvent. transient or irresponsible, or that the fund is in hazardous
condition. Thll]/GT v. Swift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _. ..
See Assramnnrr Ion. ran Bnmrn-r or Ciusnrroas; Bums Am: Bmxmo, 1 to 6;
PARTIES.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER
See Lms.
WAIVER.
See MORTGAGE,B; Pawnee, '20.
WAYS.
1. Lot owners in Detroit, rights of, in streets. Purchasers of lots in the city of
Detroit acquire no other or greater rights from the fact that said city was
laid out by the governor and judges of the late territory oi Michigan, under
an act of Congress authorizing them so to do, than they would acquire if
the same had been laid out by an individual who had legally dedicated cer
tain portions for streets and alleys. Cooper v. Alden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Rights of lot owners in streets : Power of city to lease street. Purchasers of
lots bounded on a street or square acquire a right to have such street or
square preserved and appropriated to the uses for which it was dedicated,
and the city, in the absence of any express authority, has no power to lease
any portion oi’ such street or square, to be used for a purpose destructive of
the ends for which it was originally dedicated. Ib. . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . . . . . . . . . .
8. Commissioners of internal improvement, power of, to appropriate streets. The
commissioners oi! internal improvement have no right, under the general
powers conferred on them, to appropriate a.portion of a street in the city
of Detroit for the purpose of erecting ofllces and other buildings thereon.
Ib.. .... ...........
847
847
847
(80
72
72
72
478
INDEX. 491
I. Plat of Detroit: Power of common council to open streets. Complainant
went into possession of a lot in Detroit in 1809,and in 1821received a.con
veyance of the same from the governor and judges ot Michigan Territory.
Nearly thirty years atter she took possession, the common council of De
troit, on a claim that a street was laid out through the lot originally, pro
ceeded to open the same. On bill flied tor the purpose, held, that the coun
cil should be enjoined from opening the street until they had established
their title at law. Devaua: v. Detroit. ..................................... 96
WILL.
I. Restraint upon alienation. The provision in a will that the estate shall
remain undivided until the youngest of the devisees becomes ot the age of
twenty-one years, will not preclude any one of them from conveying sooner.
Waltonv. Tor-refl...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ...... .. 259
‘Z
.
Provisionsinrestraint 0! alienation are not favored. Ib...... 239
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